1.
A structural and monetary
perspective of the euro crisis
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and
Mariana Mortagua
1.1
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents an analysis of the financial crisis by combining a
Marxian and financial Keynesian perspective. Both are framed in a longrun, structural perspective of capitalist dynamics. We are experiencing the
crisis not of a generic neoliberalism or a empty financialization, but of
money manager capitalism, which was built upon centralization without
concentration of capital, new forms of corporate governance, aggressive
competition, capital market inflation, indebted consumption. A world able
to gain from the same old exploitation in new forms, to provide internal
demand and present itself as a stable Great Moderation. It can be characterized as financially privatized Keynesianism, based on a new monetary
policy and a new autonomous demand driving the process, a configuration that is necessarily unsustainable. The crisis is evolving from a Great
Recession to a Lesser Depression.
The chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 1.2 first gives a general
scenario of the global and European crises since 2007–2008. Sections 1.3
and 1.4 summarize the main approaches – mainstream and heterodox – on
trade imbalances, and Section 1.5 offers a truly credit money view of external imbalances. Section 1.6 complements this analysis by looking into the
new geography of the industrial and trade relations within the European
Union (EU) and Section 1.7 applies the previous discussions to the concrete reality of the euro crisis. Finally, in Section 1.8 some preliminary
conclusions are provided.
Mainstream theory woke up relatively late to the euro crisis, and it is fair
to say that it is still in denial regarding many aspects of the current global
trend towards very unstable stagnation. The euro crisis was first posed
as a fiscal problem, caused by the profligate behaviour of some peripheral countries, and then moved into a current accounts crisis, caused by
15
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access
16
The financialization response to economic disequilibria
nominal rigidities, market distortions and lack of discipline in those same
nations. The heterodox approaches underline the role of the Economic
and Monetary Union’s (EMU) design faults more and more, which have
allowed Germany and its satellites to pursue a neo-mercantilist strategy,
accumulating huge current account surpluses, recycled as capital flows to
the periphery to debt-finance their deficits. Using this outlook the euro
crisis is mainly a balance-of-payments (BoP) problem, caused by cumulative differences in relative prices that have led to distinct growth strategies:
export-led in the core, and debt-led in the periphery, focused on consumption and real estate investment.
As with most heterodox approaches, we accept as a baseline scenario that (1) public debts are the consequence and not the cause of the
European problems and (2) the process of asymmetric integration interacted with growing financialization to create different national economic
structures and subsequent modes of existing in the EMU. We also agree
that the strategy of real deflation through austerity and labour market
reforms is a disastrous option that, in the end, might become the ultimate
cause of the problem this strategy is trying to avoid in the first place – the
collapse of the EMU. However, this is not to say that everything has been
said about the euro crisis, not only on the mainstream side but also on the
heterodox side.
We argue that the euro crisis is not due mainly to the current account
imbalances, nor to fiscal deficits, not even to the euro itself. In order to
understand the euro crisis, one needs to focus on the changes in finance
and industry in the last 15–20 years. First, how are the so-called trade
imbalances dealt with in the Eurozone, and what is its true meaning,
origin and connection with the financial imbalances? Second, how has
the restructuring of German manufacturing created a transnational value
chain in production and a new geography of industrial and trade relations
between, roughly, the Centre-North and the South-West of the European
continent?
1.2
A QUICK REMINDER OF THE GLOBAL AND
EUROPEAN CRISES
Neoliberal capitalism during the so-called Great Moderation decades was
a paradoxical kind of ‘financial and privatized Keynesianism’ (Bellofiore,
2013). To understand why and how it led to the Great Recession we have
to look deeper into the features of what Minsky labelled ‘money manager
capitalism’ (Bellofiore, 2014). During the 1990s and early 2000s, in the
USA the tendency was for the household sector to become a net borrower.
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access
A structural and monetary perspective of the euro crisis
17
The non-financial corporate sector ended as a net lender in the years
before the crisis and banks lost their best customers. Financial innovations won the day: they reduced risk individually, but increased it globally.
In terms of social class relations, these dynamics had devastating consequences. Workers were ‘traumatized’ in labour markets and within the
capitalist labour process, so that the Phillips curve was flattened. Pension
and institutional funds fostered a ‘capital asset inflation’ that, at least for
a while, was hedging corporations’ balance sheets ex post. Instability was
hidden under the carpet as savers entered into a ‘manic’ phase, deceived by
assets appreciation, while the propensity to save from income fell dramatically. ‘Indebted’ consumers internally boosted effective demand, thereby
providing outlets to Asian and European neo-mercantilism.
Wage deflation, capital asset inflation and the increasingly leveraged
position of households and financial companies were complementary
elements of a perverse mechanism where real growth was doped by toxic
finance. Growing debt had its ultimate raison d’être in the insufficiency
of income to support consumption of non-manufacturing goods and
services. This caused an escalation in expenditures generating rents for
the financial sector. Based on a burgeoning private debt, the process was
unsustainable and collapsed the first time with the dot.com crisis. A return
to military Keynesianism (after September 11) and then to a revised form
of the asset bubble-driven, privatized Keynesianism led to a second bubble
phase. The proliferation of subprime mortgages was an attempt to keep
the real estate bubble inflating by any means. Commodities price inflation
worried the Fed and other central banks; and from 2004, the Fed began
to increase interest rates such that by 2005 US house prices softened. The
hope that the increase in borrowing costs could be offset by a further rise
in asset values, thereby expanding the value of the collateral used in loan
applications, faded away. This time the ‘depressive’ phase was inevitable,
and the economy fell into the biggest crisis since the Great Crash.
The subprime crisis broke out in July 2007. European finance was the
first to crumble, and with a lag, the large exporting countries were severely
hit by the plummeting demand of indebted US consumers. The consequent sharp reduction in China’s growth impacted hugely on Europe’s
main manufacturing nations. After a brief Keynesian interlude between
late 2008 and early 2009, the turning of private debt into public debt
created pressures to cut public expenditures. The spread of austerity and
the domino effects after the Greek crisis beginning in 2010 brought out
into the open the fallacies in the institutional design of the euro. Not only
the arbitrary ceilings to public deficits and the debt to gross domestic
product (GDP) ratio, but also the rules denying the European central bank
the possibility to buy government bonds.
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access
18
The financialization response to economic disequilibria
In this chapter we want to extend and go deeper into this perspective,
taking into account some characters of current global capitalism and the
changing European reality that are somehow underestimated in the present
debate, which is focused too much on trade imbalances. We therefore have
to take into consideration the deep modifications in the structural productive configurations of different European areas, and the transformation in
finance and balance sheets. As we detail below, these considerations put
the challenging question of the destiny of the single currency under an
entirely new perspective.
1.3
TRADE IMBALANCES: THE MAINSTREAM
CONSENSUS
Until the development of the ‘sovereign debt crisis’, the build-up of external trade and financial imbalances within the Eurozone went unnoticed.
Such blindness is the result of the prevailing neoliberal consensus supported, first, by the theory of Optimum Currency Areas, according to
which complete financial integration and capital mobility would absorb
any future external shocks within the EMU, and more recently by the
neoclassical growth theories, in particular the inter-temporal approach
to current accounts. According to the latter, current account imbalances
in low-income countries are the necessary outcome of the convergence
process. One way or the other, an attitude of ‘benign disregard’ towards the
external accounts of Eurozone countries seemed justified. According to
the above neoclassical models, based on optimizing and forward-looking
households and firms, current account balances are always consistent with
efficient resource allocation, as long as excessive public deficits or other
(nominal) distortions do not prevail (see Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002).
When, towards the end of 2009, it became increasingly difficult to ignore
Europe’s own and internally generated difficulties, national and fiscal
policies were seen as the main cause of the external imbalances within the
EMU. A new consensus emerged around the idea that it is necessary to
‘reassess the sustainability of government finances . . . but that the exclusive focus on fiscal sustainability is unwarranted and insufficient to understand the issues facing the euro area’ (Holinski et al., 2012, p. 2). Trade
imbalances have received renewed attention as they have started to be
seen not as a reflection of a successful convergence process, but the result
of nominal rigidities and market distortions that led to the accumulation
of large stocks of foreign debt (Giavazzi and Spaventa, 2010).1
This new consensus represents a revisionist approach to the role of
current accounts in a monetary area (Collignon, 2012).
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access
A structural and monetary perspective of the euro crisis
19
The peripheral countries in the Eurozone (Ireland, Greece, Portugal,
Spain and Italy) are charged with having allowed excessive nominal wage
growth relative to the core countries. Higher nominal unit labour costs
caused higher inflation in those economies, deteriorating its competitive
power and introducing disruptions in the way the monetary policy operates at the European level (Mongelli and Wyplosz, 2008, p. 15). These distortions led to a real exchange rate appreciation instead of a depreciation,
reduced exports and redirected demand from domestic to foreign goods.
At the same time, the behaviour of the real exchange rate also favoured
non-tradable sectors. The current consensus is that ‘the imbalances that
matter for the stability of monetary union are the result of either fiscal
profligacy – as in Greece and to some extent Portugal – or of an unchecked
expansion fuelled by capital flows feeding unsustainable growth of the non
traded sector – as in Ireland or Spain’ (Giavazzi and Spaventa, 2010, p. 14).
When markets became aware of such unsustainable patterns, these countries started facing problems with their BoP (Giavazzi and Spaventa, 2010;
Carney, 2012; Sinn, 2012).
This is the argument made by Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) who
portray the euro crisis as a classic sudden stop, known in the context of
emerging markets. Due to reasons other than productivity differentials,
foreigners refuse to provide capital or residents are unable to generate
enough liquidity by selling domestic assets. They argue that the ‘Troika’
loans in Ireland, Portugal and Greece, and TARGET loans in all the
peripheral countries have covered up the internal BoP crisis in Europe.
According to Sinn, TARGET has been the mechanism through which the
Euro system and the Bundesbank in particular have been ‘lending money
to the crisis-stricken Eurozone members’ (Sinn and Wollmershäuser, 2011;
Sinn, 2012).
The crisis thus changed the official narrative and, after public debt, trade
imbalances gained central stage in the process. Current account imbalances
led to the accumulation of large stocks of foreign debt and, when sovereign
markets collapsed, risk aversion among private investors left large funding
gaps unfilled. The sovereign and external debt led to a BoP crisis, which
would have been catastrophic if it was not for TARGET flows and Troika
loans, which have replaced private capital flows in the peripheral countries
of the EMU.
More recently, a second trend has developed, although not applied to
the EMU, based on the idea that the focus on current accounts misses
‘the spectacular evolution and integration of international financial
markets over the past quarter century. Global imbalances are financed by
complex multilateral patterns of gross financial flows, flows that are typically much larger than the current account gaps themselves’ and ‘entail
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access
20
The financialization response to economic disequilibria
potential stability risks that may be only distantly related, if related at all,
to the global configuration of saving-investment discrepancies’ (Obstfeld,
2012, pp. 3, 5). The main thesis behind this growing literature is that
current accounts exclude changes in the Net International Investment
Position (NIIP) resulting from an increase in the volatility of non-flow
factors, such as the effect of price shocks on large stocks of foreign assets.
The focus is on the economic significance of NIIP, which is still mostly
determined by current accounts, but suffers an increasing influence of
factors connected with the growth in gross flows (and corresponding
stocks).
1.4
TRADE IMBALANCES: THE HETERODOX
APPROACH
Heterodox alternatives have always argued that monetary integration
and capital market liberalization are unlikely to bring convergence. Such
approaches to the euro crisis can be divided into two main groups. The
first focuses mostly on the design faults of the EMU and its theoretical
foundations. These design faults led to an asymmetric process of integration, fostered by financial flows, which undermined peripheral countries’
capacity to compete in the international markets creating current account
imbalances. Probably the most important line of criticism concerns the
role of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the defective structure of
the Eurozone: ‘the Eurozone has a central bank without a government,
governments without central banks, and banks without an effective lender
of last resort’ (Toporowski, 2013, p. 572). Arestis and Sawyer (2001, 2011)
pay special attention to the differences in terms of national unemployment
levels, and to the deflationary bias imposed by the Stability and Growth
Pact.
The second group of heterodox critics includes all those analyses that,
albeit in different ways, discuss the European crisis in the context of a
finance-dominated capitalist regime. These views see the European crisis
mostly as a BoP problem originating in the precarious integration of
peripheral countries into the Eurozone and exacerbated by the financial
and banking crises. The sovereign debt problems are not the cause but the
consequence of such dynamics.
Perhaps one of the most stringent criticisms of the mainstream approach
included in these analyses arises from the post-Keynesian view of financial
balances.2 Two main implications can be derived from this analysis. First,
the explosion in public deficits did not happen because of governments’
chronic profligate behaviour but as a consequence of the shift in the
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access
A structural and monetary perspective of the euro crisis
21
balance of the private sectors towards a surplus, as a consequence of the
deleveraging process forced by the financial crisis. Second, for the accounting identity to hold, external surpluses in one country must be matched by
external deficits in other countries. This is the main reason why it is almost
impossible for all the countries in the Eurozone to run current account
surpluses in the same way that Germany does.
It is also consensual among the heterodox community that one of the
main causes of the European crisis is the German neo-mercantilist strategy
that considers net external surpluses as a crucial source of profits. It is a
Luxemburg-Kalecki model, or a Kaleckian foreign trade model (Lucarelli,
2011), in which Germany relies on the deficits of peripheral countries to
generate demand for its own exports. It is also undisputed that in the face
of a process of wage compression and decreasing labour share of income
fostered by the process of European asymmetric integration different
regimes of ‘capitalism under financialization’ (Hein, 2012) emerged in the
Eurozone. The export-led neo-mercantilist type,3 matched by domesticled4 and debt-led5 regimes. In general, both regimes are associated with
current account, private sector and public deficits, but only in the first
case are these deficits related to high levels of debt-financed consumption. Moreover, these ‘growth strategies’ were based on the expansion of
consumption and/or household debt, in the case of countries like Portugal
and Greece, or of corporate investment, mostly in the real estate sector, in
the case of Spain and Ireland.
1.5
TOWARDS A TRULY CREDIT THEORY OF
MONEY PERSPECTIVE ON EXTERNAL
IMBALANCES
We argue that both orthodox and heterodox views that put trade imbalances in the centre miss fully integrating the role of money and finance in
their analysis. The specificities of a monetary union, in which reserves are
endogenously generated by the creation of credit, question the validity of
the argument that the euro crisis is just one more BoP crisis. Moreover, the
stress on current accounts fails to capture the relevance of financial flows
in the EMU, and its relation with saving and investment decisions, which
we have argued is a crucial dimension.
From the mainstream point of view, those theories based on the
NIIP represent a major evolution when compared with the traditional
approaches, but do not break with its main assumptions. NIIP works
as a national constraint, meaning simply that the net present value of
the future excess of imports over exports has to be equal to net holdings
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access
22
The financialization response to economic disequilibria
of foreign assets. Furthermore, current accounts are seen as limited by
the predetermined size of international assets and liabilities that can be
‘recycled’, hence the importance of gross flows. In the end what we have
is an upgrade of the well-known ‘loanable funds theory’: gross capital
flows might trigger or amplify specific phases of the cycle, but they have
a ‘real basis’, determined by ‘real’ economic decisions of saving and
investment. This analysis seems to fail to understand that the focus on
saving/investment relations is not suited to a credit economy where credit
takes place and has ‘free will’ well beyond real consumption decisions.
Underlying this analysis rests the idea of money neutrality, so embedded
in the neoclassical theory.
This view resembles what the mainstream considers the ‘normal’ case
of bank deposits creation, in which credit is based on existing resources.
In fact, this is a ‘soft’ version of a commodity theory of money, what
has been named a monetary theory of credit (Toporowski, 2013). It is an
instance of a real analysis, the essence of the neoclassical growth models,
crucial to the process of monetary integration in Europe. As argued by
Schumpeter (1954), such an analytical framework applies to a world in
which investment can only be carried out by transferring real resources
from saving units to investment units. We are rather in favour of what
Schumpeter called monetary analysis, where money is not secondary,
but introduced on the very ground floor of the analytic structure. It is
better to start from debt/credit relationship – that is, from capital finance
as a clearing system that cancels debts and credits and carries forward
the difference – with money payments as a residual consequence (credit
theory of money).
In reality, capital flows cannot be addressed as a stock of pre-existing
endowments, necessary to carry on production and investment, in high
productivity countries. The loanable funds theory does not hold in a world
where, as demonstrated by the modern heterodox monetary theories, the
circuit of production is a monetary phenomenon: the starting point is the
endogenous creation of credit-money, ex nihilo, which will be validated by
future production/expenditure. It seems obvious, therefore, that we must
look at current account determination and imbalances from a monetary
perspective.
There is no intention here to go deeply into the heterodox thinking of
money. One should take into consideration two very distinctive functions:
money as (bank) credit, the result of decisions relative to production and
investment; and money as wealth, the result of savers’ choices among different assets according to their liquidity preference. These two are not the
same, as assumed by mainstream theory, and the source of the confusion
is due to the difference between saving and financing.
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access
A structural and monetary perspective of the euro crisis
23
The distinction between saving (income not consumed) and financing
(access to purchasing power) is crucial to assess the centrality of current
accounts in the explanation of today’s imbalances. According to Borio and
Disyatat (2011), the common association between (global) current account
imbalances and the financing of credit booms implicit in the majority of
the analysis is misleading. In a closed economy, saving simply captures
all the income not consumed, therefore, the only way to increase saving is
to produce something that is not consumed (that is, to invest). And to do
so, one needs financing. This means that ‘in ex post terms, being simply
the outcome of various forms of expenditure, saving does not represent
the constraint on how much agents are able to spend ex ante’ (Borio and
Disyatat, 2011, p. 7). This constraint is determined by financing conditions, which are not necessarily related to the levels of saving or the direction and dimension of current accounts.
In an open economy, current accounts register the net capital outflow/
inflow that is, from the accounting point of view, equivalent to the difference between saving and investment. But this accounting equivalence
does not mean that: (1) there is a link between global financial intermediation and current accounts or (2) ‘real’ saving and consumption decisions
determine the type or direction of financial flows. In the same way, current
accounts do not tell us: (1) the extent of investment that is financed from
abroad or (2) the contribution of offsetting gross flows to the existing
stocks of debt and sectoral imbalances.
Within this outlook it is important to consider that countries in the
Eurozone share the same payment system: ‘a cross border payment
between banks in two countries in the euro zone automatically generates
balancing credit claims between the national central banks and the ECB.
This is the mechanism that irrevocably unifies the former national currencies, converting a set of currencies whose exchange rates are merely fixed
at par into a single currency’ (Garber, 2010, p. 2). Even though a technical
feature such as a payment system does not suffice in order to create a new
currency, its existence has important implications in terms of the macro
monetary structure of the EMU. In the case of a monetary union, as long
as the liabilities created by individual national central banks remain equivalent and valued at par, there is no limit to the amount of reserves the Euro
system can create.
The first point is, therefore, that in a monetary union such as the EMU,
with a common payments and monetary system, where reserves are endogenously generated by the creation of credit that needs not to be backed by
any commodity, a BoP problem loses some of its meaning. This is not to
say that individual countries might not face payment difficulties, however,
and until the central bank has exhausted all the means at its disposal to
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access
24
The financialization response to economic disequilibria
prevent a collapse in payments, these difficulties will mainly be a matter of
liquidity rather than solvency – though, admittedly, in a big crisis and in
a debt deflation/balance sheet recession, it becomes harder and harder to
delineate a liquidity crisis from a solvency crisis.
Two other factors seem crucial in assessing individual macroeconomic situations within a monetary union. The first refers to liquidity
conditions in the markets, which are related, on the one hand, to the
institutional design of every monetary area and, on the other, to the
circulation of gross flows. The accumulation of foreign reserves through
trade surpluses is no precondition for the stability of the system, as
long as there is a central bank willing to act as a lender of last resort,
replacing the market in case of a liquidity crisis; moreover, imports from
other euro countries do not require any holding of foreign currency by
local citizens, since they can be financed by credit generated internally.
The second has to do with patterns of investment and balance sheet
management, that is, the internal capacity to generate cash flows to meet
debt obligations, investment and (gross) financing flows are crucial in
determining the adjustment dynamics inside the Eurozone. They are
connected in multiple ways, most of them bearing no relation to trade
and current accounts.
Similarly, the association of current account imbalances with the
financing of credit booms in deficit countries ignores the fact that current
accounts are not an indicator of how much of the domestic investment
is financed from abroad. Indeed, as pointed out by Johnson (2009), any
country can show a balanced current account and still have its investment
financed from abroad. Net balances reflect offsetting pluses and minuses,
which represent assets and liabilities with different characteristics. As a
consequence, the excessive focus on current accounts does not prevent
future crisis or the emergence of financial fragility.
The mainstream sees the problem as a lack of saving in the periphery,
the heterodoxy as excess saving in the core. Behind the view underlying
both heterodox and mainstream approaches that trade deficits are the
origin of their financial imbalances looms a causal relationship between
the trade and capital accounts that seems unlikely in a world where trade
transactions capture only a small fraction of transactions across jurisdictions, all of which require financing.
A monetary analysis implies looking beyond the transfers of real
resources and net capital flows, as registered in current accounts. In order
to understand the structure and dynamics of capitalist economies it is necessary to understand the impact of financial flows on the various sectors,
and how these condition economic decisions and increase the fragility of
the economy.
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access
A structural and monetary perspective of the euro crisis
1.6
25
THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF THE
EUROPEAN AND GERMAN INDUSTRY
A key determinant of the process of change in Europe, before the current
crisis, was the capital–labour relation. The rollback strategy led to the
weakening of the working class: an outcome also achieved through new
productive networks, and to the progressive enfeebling of the national
trade unions in the EU countries. This was very instrumental in setting
up a highly fragmented labour market. The progressive freedom of the
circulation of capital and not of workers in the Eastern countries was
also a way to realize what Sinn (2006) nicknamed the German Bazaar
economy.
The current industrial vision in the EU is that the only competitive possibility for the EU economy is in moving upstream in the value chain. In
this view higher investment accelerates the incorporation of new technologies into the production process, thus leading to more efficient and more
environmentally sustainable production. Critics have pointed out that in a
perspective like this, unemployment is primarily a problem of labour costs
and that the way to a more labour-intensive European economy is to pass
through a higher proportion of low-paid service jobs in the private sector.
The building of a European industrial structure was based on a process
of ‘centralization’, but there was no ‘concentration’ process in the classical
way, leading to a highly integrated company. This ‘centralization without
concentration’ consists of a double move. On the one hand, the strategic
functions of a corporation become more and more centralized; on the
other hand, however, production operations results in a strong disarticulation via the imposition of global supply chains. Centralization conceals a
very high level of concentration of capitalistic power; as a matter of fact,
the firms at the top of each network have the classical prerogatives of the
managers: they decide for the other companies how to plan the quantities
of outputs in a given period of time, the pace and the speed to deliver the
batches of outputs, how to arrange in sequences a mix of different items
and so on.
The network/chain-like structure of the European industry and its
geographical dispersion implies that the flows of products and services
within each network/chain are made up of sequential acts of import and
export, arranged in series. It is therefore extremely useful to understand
both who exports and what is exported to a chain where the final product
is consumed or exported to another country, and who imports intermediate goods essential to complete its chain of production for both domestic
final consumption or for export. This is essential to understand where the
added value is created. Looking at intra-European trade in this way, the
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access
26
The financialization response to economic disequilibria
current account balance fails to focus on the actual process of power and
value redistribution occurring in the EU and in the euro area.
In Europe, a process of heightened ‘destructive’ competition, as well as
offshoring through the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and outsourcing,
culminated in record levels of mergers and acquisitions in the two years
immediately before the start of the current crisis, 2006–2007. Greater centralization was dictated by the oligopolistic strategy of controlling larger
market shares. Yet the merger movement jeopardized the existing oligopolistic structure in many industrial branches, so that some of the big players
were themselves increasingly at risk. The opening up of Eastern Europe to
Western European capital after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 accelerated the industrial restructuring that had begun in the late 1970s, while an
additional powerful stimulus came from China’s entrance into the global
manufactures market.
This is what brought about the new social division of labour in Europe:
an integrated industrial system with an uneven territorial distribution of
core competencies and corporate headquarters. These new extended or
virtual companies are the new key industrial players in Europe and they
consider the EU territory as a strategic resource. They can, indeed, organize their networks by utilizing all kinds of legal, fiscal and social obligations, as well as skills and competencies availability, as a way to fine-tune
their internal division of labour.
This struggle among capitals has generated new productive facilities,
though the existing ones already carried significant unused capacity. This is
why we can argue that the current crisis is also characterized by oversupply
in key sectors. This situation has been compounded by huge investment in
‘green prairies’ to create industrial bridgeheads.
It is in this context that we locate the German export boom. According
to some authors (for example, Danninger and Joutz, 2007), the important
factors were new ties to fast growing trading partners as a result of a desirable product mix or long-standing trade relationships and the regionalized
production patterns through offshoring production to lower cost countries, partly as a result of European economic integration. The offshoring of production to lower cost countries, also within the EU-27 area,
to implement a very aggressive export strategy has compounded wage
moderation and shrinking social protection. The rationale of this strategy
is that high-tech investment can give Germany an edge over the new competitors such as India and China, making the medium-high sector of these
mass markets available for its exports, ahead of a never-ending catch up
attempt by India and China.
The current account imbalances among the Eurozone countries are
the symptoms of an underlying cause: the nature of the economic model
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access
A structural and monetary perspective of the euro crisis
27
briefly outlined above, intertwined with the underlying power relations
among nations both in terms of market and political power. We find the
considerations put forward by Simonazzi et al. (2013) extremely useful as
they once again argue against the (orthodox, but also heterodox) view that
we witnessed a standard BoP crisis in Europe. When the crisis erupted,
the key factors triggering the ‘external’ crisis for deficit economies in the
Eurozone were not the ‘fundamentals’ but instead mounting (speculative)
self-fulfilling prophecies.
These authors’ perspective fit well with our picture about industrial
changes in Europe and Germany. They focus on the crucial factors to
explain the accumulation of German current account surpluses after the
introduction of the euro. ‘Since 1999 the growth of the German economy
has been driven not only by exports but also by imports, in particular of
parts and components linked to the relocation abroad of supply chains’.
Moreover, ‘the primary reason for the rise of current account surpluses
after 2001 was a sharp fall of domestic private investment as a share of
GDP, accompanied by a growth of foreign direct investment driven by
offshoring activities’ (Simonazzi et al., 2013, p. 659).
Wage deflation and rising inequality (courtesy of the Hartz reforms) has
been made tolerable by cheaper prices and inferior quality of goods consumed by an increasing number of the population: a dynamic that appears
bad for the export of superior quality consumption goods from advanced
Southern countries displaced by emerging areas.
The competitive advantage of Germany within the Eurozone is only
partially related to the differences in price competition, and rests mainly
on the quality of the products and the coherence of the productive matrix
with the external trade demand, namely, from China and other countries,
with a new emerging middle class.
1.7
WRAPPING UP ABOUT FINANCIAL AND
INDUSTRIAL INTEGRATION IN THE
EUROZONE
The task now is to understand in which way the critique outlined above
can be extended to the existing analysis of the crisis of the Eurozone. Both
the approaches summarized in Sections 1.3 and 1.4 focus on the impacts
of monetary integration on trade tendencies and, therefore, on current
account imbalances. Mainstream economists point to nominal rigidities
and fiscal profligacy, which have disrupted the otherwise automatic convergence mechanism between the euro countries.
Heterodox studies maintain that convergence is not the automatic
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access
28
The financialization response to economic disequilibria
outcome of free capital movements. The euro mechanism reinforced existing fragilities, by allowing for a neo-mercantilist strategy from the centre
towards the periphery. The result was the erosion of exporting capacity
and the widening of trade imbalances, financed with the savings from
surplus countries.
The main difference between these views is that while the first is based
on unrealistic assumptions and theoretical anachronisms, such as money
neutrality, the second points to (what we think are the) real tendencies: it is
undeniable that financialization and monetary integration worked together
to increase the fragility of the already weaker economies in the EMU, and
that this has had an impact on trade, which has little to do with downward
wage rigidities or excessive public deficits. Similarly, there is no doubt that,
as argued by the heterodox authors, the strategy of real deflation through
austerity and labour market reforms is a disastrous option that, in the end,
might become the ultimate cause of the problem this strategy was trying
to avoid in the first place – the collapse of the EMU. However, current
account imbalances assume centre stage in both approaches. They diverge
largely when it comes to explaining the causes of trade imbalances, and
even more so in the strategy to reduce them, but in both approaches the
euro crisis is seen, mainly, as a BoP crisis.
In fact, these are very distinctive monetary configurations. First and
foremost because, as we described above, countries in the Eurozone share
the same payment system. From a theoretical viewpoint, we question the
possibility of having a normal BoP crisis in a monetary union. It does
not make much sense in fact to think so. These economies are subject to
liquidity and financial disturbances that are not necessarily related with
current account deficits, and will not experience a BoP crisis as long as
the monetary union works as a monetary union. One may then dare to
question if trade imbalances are not a necessary part of the functioning of
credit economies.6
As Toporowski (2013) remarks, in current international monetary
systems, exchange rates are driven by capital flows and expectations,
rather than trade balance: money is nowadays bank credit, whose value
derives from convertibility into other forms of bank credit or into financial assets, with convertibility into other fiat currencies playing a minor
role. Consequently, international reserves are less and less made by gold,
or central bank fiat money, but claims on or deposits in international
commercial banks. On the contrary, the euro is built upon a Ricardian
theory of money perspective, where fiat money issued by a central bank
claims not to be (as it is) a liability, growing out of debt/credit relations,
and must be held scarce by the issuer, setting price and quantity. In this
fictional world, employment arises out of competitiveness, and exchange
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access
A structural and monetary perspective of the euro crisis
29
rate flexibility (aiming at competitive devaluation) is a substitute for wage
flexibility (aiming at competitive deflation). The single currency leaves
only the second option as viable. The desired devaluation, however, internally reduces real incomes because of rising import prices; and it achieves
decreasing export competitive advantage the higher the import content.
And of course devaluation cuts the real consumption of the working class.
The single currency area must be seen as a credit matter, not just a purely
monetary matter. In a truly credit theory of money perspective, wage and
price reductions give way to a balance sheet deflation and a rise of the real
value of debt. Moreover, exchange rate movement, even when managed
by sovereign central banks, affects not only the trade balance but also the
cost of managing foreign debt (Toporowski, 2013). From this alternative
perspective, a strong, overvalued currency, which negatively affects the
trade in goods and services, ‘reduces the domestic money value into which
foreign obligations may be converted. Specifically, it makes it cheaper to
convert a government’s foreign debt obligations into domestic debt obligations that are then easier to service from tax revenue’ (Toporowski, 2013,
p. 578).
Another reason to be wary about the conclusions drawn from a simplistic analysis of the Eurozone crisis as a BoP problem due to trade imbalances is the aggregation of very distinctive countries into one ‘periphery’.
If we consider the sectoral balances of these ‘peripheral’ countries of the
Eurozone, the only characteristic shared by all of them is indeed their
current account deficits. All these countries have faced a liquidity problem,
and a subsequent difficulty in obtaining cash flows to finance their liabilities in the short and medium term, but the analysis stops there and does
not consider the specificities of the hidden structural dynamics in each
country.
1.8
CONCLUSIONS
Both mainstream and heterodox analyses assume that the euro was crucial
for the growing trade imbalances. Whether you blame it on well-paid laziness in the periphery, as in the mainstream approach, or neo-mercantilist
strategies from the centre, as in the heterodoxy approach, the euro has
messed up the price system and led to decreasing exporting capacity in
the periphery, compensated by imports from the centre. Actually, there is
a prevailing view among the heterodoxy, inspired in the postwar centreperiphery theories, which sees the euro as the product of a deliberate
exploitation strategy of the periphery by the centre. Our point is that the
common ‘periphery-core’ dichotomy, based on current account positions,
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access
30
The financialization response to economic disequilibria
hides important aspects of national economies. We rather think that the
euro is part of a broader strategy to reorganize individual capitals and
compress the rights of the working class through financial liberalization
and exposure of national economies to international competition. The
monetary union was one more step towards this strategy, but its fundamental pillars are to be found in the previous process of financial and
trade liberalization. It has nothing to do with laissez-faire, or a retreat of
the State. It is rather a neoliberal policy variant within the world economy
as contested terrain.
The widespread view of European imbalances as the result of a German
strategy of ‘beggar thy neighbour’ is partial and inaccurate. The magnitude
of changes in trade patterns happened before and beyond the euro. A key
argument in our chapter is the role financial flows play in the growing
imbalances: instead of amplifiers of trade problems, financial flows are a
crucial factor in building the current account imbalances, either because
they can have an impact on the way investment and production are structured or because of the growing importance of other sources of change
in current accounts. Current account imbalances could rather be a consequence of the way capital has circulated in Europe. Inflation differentials
and relative exchange rates are more likely to be symptoms of financial
dynamics (motivated of course by growth and returns expectations in specific sectors) than the drivers of such flows.
The mainstream recipe based on more liberalization, combined with
labour market reforms and wage cuts to increase competitiveness and
force a shift towards the production of tradables, might even balance trade
accounts (as it is now) but will not solve the underlying causes of such
imbalances or prevent future financial disturbances. On the other hand,
asking for more inflation in the core countries might be a very reasonable
demand from the viewpoint of the working rights of German workers, but
definitely is not the answer to the euro problems.
From an empirical point of view, we question the true responsibilities of
the common currency in the current crisis. There is no doubt that the artificial limitations imposed by the euro institutional framework have made
things much worse, but it is equally important to analyze what happened
before and beyond the euro. The exposure to liberalized financial markets
started before the introduction of the common currency and had major
impacts on the way these economies are structured. Financial integration
was pursued from at least the early 1990s leading to a common capital
market and a common market in financial services. On the other hand,
the analysis of industrial and trade relations in Europe cannot ignore the
growing importance of Central and Eastern European countries (some of
them out of the monetary union).
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access
A structural and monetary perspective of the euro crisis
31
This leads us to question about exiting the euro. Exit strategies are problematic since their gains are uncertain, and it is even more unlikely that
they will be followed by an anti-austerity stance. They are also uncertain,
due to the scale of financial and industrial integration, and because of the
innovative and productive hierarchical/geographical stratification of the
European area.
If we look at the trade imbalances through the lenses of industrial
restructuring and geography of European trade flows, like Simonazzi
et al. do, we reach the same conclusion: exiting the euro, and the same
reflationary policies, do not seem to go to the heart of the matter. The
former option may likely turn out sour not only because the exchange rate
that would help the needs of trade may lead to worsening balance sheets,
but because the most important factors in nurturing disequilibria in the
deficit countries are structural. They have to do with the way Germany has
constructed a transnational value chain of firms network and articulated
beyond national borders its matrix of production, how the geography
of trade has been changed, the output composition and import content
of different countries, the impoverishment of the ties among peripheral
nations and so on.
Here and now, the issue is not to resurrect a generic Keynesianism of
anti-austerity policies and boosting effective demand – as necessary as
these moves are. The problems are also structural, they pertain to industrial, trade and financial policies on the scale of the continent (within and
outside the Eurozone). For sure, the rejection of too simplistic explanations produces all the difficulties of building a holistic, but still coherent,
narrative of the world we live in. But it might be worth trying.
NOTES
1. In 2010, Giavazzi and Spaventa published a paper claiming that the external payments
situation of member states was disregarded in the monetary union. They criticize the
view put forward by traditional convergence models, such as Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2002).
2. The sum of the difference between income and expenditures of each of the sectors of
the economy must be zero: as long as a country can preserve a trade surplus and a balanced (or deficit) fiscal account, its private sector will be accumulating financial assets (or
claims on the external and public sectors). See Godley (1999).
3. Finland, Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium.
4. Ireland, Greece, Spain.
5. Italy, Portugal.
6. Minsky (1986) clarified that the international credit system requires imbalances to let the
international debt–credit interconnection on which today’s international money is built
run smoothly. Toporowski (2013) denotes the failure to provide a trade deficit to accommodate foreign debt payments as a kind of credit neo-mercantilism.
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access
32
The financialization response to economic disequilibria
REFERENCES
Arestis, P. and M. Sawyer (2001), ‘Will the euro bring economic crisis to Europe?’,
Working Paper No. 322, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.
Arestis, P. and M. Sawyer (2011), ‘The ongoing eurocrisis’, Challenge, 54(6), 6–13.
Bellofiore, R. (2013), ‘Two or three things I know about her. Europe in the Global
Crisis, and heterodox economics’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Special issue
Prospects for the Eurozone, 3, 497–512.
Bellofiore, R. (2014), ‘The socialization of investment, from Keynes to Minsky and
beyond’, Working Paper No. 822, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.
Blanchard, O. and F. Giavazzi (2002), ‘Current account deficits in the euro area.
The end of Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle?’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
2, 147–86.
Borio, C. and P. Disyatat (2011), ‘Global imbalances and the financial crisis: link or
no link?’, BIS Working Papers.
Carney, M. (2012, January), ‘Systemic Financial Resilience’, World Economic
Forum Annual Meeting, Davos-Klosters, Switzerland.
Collignon, S. (2012), Competitiveness and Excessive Imbalances: A Balance Sheet
Approach, Brussels: European Parliament: Directorate General for Internal Policies.
Danninger, S. and F.L. Joutz (2007), ‘What explains Germany’s rebounding export
market share?’, IMF Working Papers.
Garber, P. (2010), The Mechanics of Intra Euro Capital Flight, Deutsche Bank
Special Report, London.
Giavazzi, F. and L. Spaventa (2010), ‘Why the current account may matter in a
monetary union: lessons from the financial in the euro area’, CEPR Discussion
Paper 8008, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Godley, W. (1999), Seven Unsustainable Processes, Special Report, AnnandaleonHudson, NY: Levy Economics Institute.
Hein, E. (2012), ‘The crisis of finance-dominated capitalism in the euro area, deficiencies in the economic policy architecture, and deflationary stagnation policies’, Working Paper No. 734, Levy Economics Institute.
Holinski, N., C. Kool and J. Muysken (2012), ‘Persistent macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area: causes and consequences’, Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis Review, 94(1), 1–20.
Johnson, K. (2009), ‘Gross or net international financial flows understanding the
financial crisis’, Working Paper, The Council on Foreign Relations.
Lucarelli, B. (2011), ‘German neomercantilism and the European sovereign debt
crisis’, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 34(2), 205–24.
Merler, S. and J. Pisani-Ferry (2012), Sudden Stops in the Euro Area, Bruegel Policy
Contribution, 2012/06.
Minsky, H.P. (1986), Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Mongelli, F.P. and C. Wyplosz (2008), ‘The euro at ten: unfulfilled threats and
unexpected challenges’, Paper presented at the Fifth ECB Central Banking
Conference, Frankfurt, Germany.
Obstfeld, M. (2012), ‘Does the current account still matter?’, Working Paper No.
18977, NBER.
Schumpeter, J.A. (1954), History of Economic Analysis, New York: Oxford
University Press.
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access
A structural and monetary perspective of the euro crisis
33
Simonazzi A., A. Ginzburg and G. Nocella (2013), ‘Economic relations between
Germany and southern Europe’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 37, 653–75.
Sinn, H.W. (2006), ‘The pathological export boom and the bazaar effect: how to
solve the German puzzle’, The World Economy, 9, September, 1157–75.
Sinn, H.W. (2012), ‘The European balance-of-payments crisis: an introduction’,
in H.-W. Sinn (ed.), The European Balance-of-payments Crisis, CESifo, 3–10;
Munich, Germany.
Sinn, H.-W. and T. Wollmershäuser (2011), ‘Target loans, current account balances
and capital flows: the ECB’s rescue facility’, CESifo Working Paper No. 3500.
Toporowski, J. (2013), ‘International credit, financial integration and the euro’,
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 37(3), 571–84.
Riccardo Bellofiore, Francesco Garibaldo and Mariana Mortagua - 9781785364761
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 06/18/2020 11:37:49PM
via free access