Thurston County, Washington Superior Court - West Coast Servicing, Inc. v. Heather Singleton - The declaration of Heather Singleton in support of Motions

The Bank asserts: B. Judgment against Ron Margolis. Stafne (through his neighbor, Margolis) attacks the underlying decree of foreclosure as non- compliant with federal law. The thrust of Stafne’s argument is that the federal district court judge was not authorized to hear the case because “senior status” judges are not qualified constitutiona l judges. These arguments were rejected at the federal level, including by the 9th circuit2. The federal courts ruled in favor of jurisdiction and authority to enter final judgment. The state superior court cannot void and disregard the final, federal court judgment, on the basis it did not comply with federal law. Stafne also appears to identify an interest in the property held by Margolis connected to a boundary line adjustment between the neighbors in 2010. It is not clear whether Stafne pleads priority-of-interest. Any interest Margolis acquired in 2010 is junior-in-priority to Plaintiff’s 2005 deed of trust. It is junior because it is subsequent-in-time to the deed of trust. A decree of foreclosure against the claimed junior interest of Margolis is appropriate.

Under the facts alleged, the Financial Industry lost or destroyed notes in 2006 because this business practice profited its members. The Financial Industry was warned by the federal government that this was a bad practice because it could cause notes to become unenforceable under state laws. The Financial Industry ignored these warnings and continued to profit from subprime loans which its members knew or should have known were unenforceable under many state laws, including most versions of the Uniform Commercial Code. Ultimately, the federal government bailed out the Financial Industry by paying hundreds of billions of dollars in public funds to purchase interests in those real property assets owned by property owners like John, which because of the Financial Industry’s bad practices had little value because they likely could not be enforced. See supra., Note 3. While the Church and Property Owner do not agree with the federal government's stupid decision to bail out the Financial Industry, they understand that an argument can be made that bailing out too-big-to-fail banks (as opposed to property owners as was first proposed) was in the public interest. But they disagree with the notion that the federal government and financial industry can require them to bear the costs of that entire transaction, which has now been paid back to the US Treasury, mostly through foreclosing on property owners. See e.g. GAO Troubled Asset Relief Program: Lifetime Cost GAO-24-107033 (Dec. 7, 2023). The factual situation here is much like the uncompensated taking that occurred in Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937). There, a commission issued an order which had the effect of taking some natural gas producer’s property from them for the benefit of others without the payment of any compensation. The same type of illegal taking is occurring here because the government reimbursed itself these bail out costs by foreclosing on homeowners like John, who under the Washington state law then in effect at the time they entered into the agreements could not be foreclosed upon except by way of compliance with RCW 62A.3-309. And Washington State though its AG, allied with this statutory trustee, has continued to pursue this anti-property owner approach notwithstanding the AG knew (and/or should have known) that (1) property owners did less wrong than the Financial Industry with regard to making such subprime loans worthless; and (2) that this Nation’s organic law does not allow governments to change the terms of private contracts after the fact. See Plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary judgment

2012

Purported interested party begins it surreply as follows: I. SURREPLY The Petersons' Counterclaims warrant dismissal because they are a thinly-veiled attempt to rid themselves of obligations under a promissory note that they made regular payments on for approximately four years, while asserting breach of contract actions based on a contract they claim they did not sign. In support of their untimely-filed Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss ("Opposition"), the Petersons submit a number of unsupported and irrelevant documents, along with non-binding out-of-state case law. Notably absent in the Peterson's Opposition is any evidence to support their claims that the Note is not the one the Petersons signed. Of interest is Exhibit pages 033–37 submitted on behalf of the Peterson's Opposition: a hand-signed declaration of Dan Peterson evidencing apparently the same signature as that alleged "forged" on the subject Promissory Note. For more than seven years now, the Petersons have attempted to evade their mortgage obligations while retaining a property they themselves admit they lease out as an "investment property". The Petersons have not put forth any facts that support their alleged counterclaims, which are affirmative defenses and should be treated as such. The Peterson's Counterclaims should be dismissed.

Updated Record of Settlements, 2020

As a homeowner, I am tired of the "Deadbeat" narrative. At this point in our history it is laughable. To prove my point……I am posting this list of settlements, white papers, investigative reports and studies, all pointing to collusion by industry insiders. Courts have stated that homeowners were not harmed. Yet when the lenders and servicers are allowed to arbitrarily add charges, stop payments and issue trial modifications with no intention of following through, the homeowner is harmed. When the MERS website contains more than one lender/servicer listed as the owner/holder of the note, the homeowner is harmed. When the lender/servicer refuses to give us an accounting and yet they are able to raise our payment or add charges that they are not required to verify, the homeowner is harmed, and the "lender" can use this power as extortion to remove the homeowner from their home, or increase their debt without cause and without oversight. See Row 22-The National Mortgage Settlement agreement contains the following wording: Standards for Documents Used in Foreclosure and Bankruptcy Proceedings. 1. Servicer shall ensure that factual assertions made in pleadings (complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, answer or similar pleadings), bankruptcy proofs of claim (including any facts provided by Servicer or based on information provided by the Servicer that are included in any attachment and submitted to establish the truth of such facts) ("POC"), Declarations, affidavits, and sworn statements filed by or on behalf of Servicer in judicial foreclosures or bankruptcy proceedings and notices of default, notices of sale and similar notices submitted by or on behalf of Servicer in non-judicial foreclosures are accurate and complete and are supported by competent and reliable evidence. Before a loan is referred to non-judicial foreclosure, Servicer shall ensure that it has reviewed competent and reliable evidence to substantiate the borrower's default and the right to foreclose, including the borrower's loan status and loan information.

STATEMENT OF FACTS: Robertson has requested Scott Erik Stafne, the Church Advocate for Church of the Gardens (Church), to represent Robertson’s interests with regard to 21st’s Motion to confirm the sale of his property. Stafne is an attorney licensed to practice law in Washington State, who sometimes represents parties like Robertson in matters consistent with the Church’s mission. Stafne, the Church, and Robertson agree that Robertson’s representation by Stafne in this case is consistent with mission 4 of the Church’s spiritual mission, which states: The mission of Church of the Gardens is: * * * 4) to minister to and protect those in need such as the hungry, the sick, the poor, the homeless, the indebted, the enslaved, the vulnerable, and all others who are unfairly prevented from exercising their inalienable God-given natural rights; The pertinent promissory note in this case established its own contractual standing requirement. In this regard, the pertinent promissory note states: I understand that the Lender may transfer this Note. The Lender or anyone who takes this Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under this Note is called the “Note Holder.” Robertson asserts that the term “transfer” as it is used in the above referenced promissory note is a term of art referencing the “transfer” of promissory note instruments pursuant to Washington’s then current version of the Uniform Commercial Code. Additionally, at all relevant times RCW 62A.3-309 set forth the following statutory standing requirement for enforcement of Robertson’s note by way of foreclosure: (a) A person not in possession of an instrument is entitled to enforce the instrument if (i) the person was in possession of the instrument and entitled to enforce it when loss of possession occurred, (ii) the loss of possession was not the result of a transfer by the person or a lawful seizure, and (iii) the person cannot reasonably obtain possession of the instrument because the instrument was destroyed, its whereabouts cannot be determined, or it is in the wrongful possession of an unknown person or a person that cannot be found or is not amenable to service of process. Standing is necessary to establish a justiciable case between parties over which courts have jurisdiction to exercise judicial power. See e.g., Bellingham Bay Improvement Co. v. New Whatcom, 20 Wash. 53, 58, 54 P. 774, 775 (1898)(“[W]e think that it is equally clear that it [judicial power] does not necessarily include the power to hear and determine a matter that is not in the nature of a suit or action between parties.”); Trump v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 530, 535 (2020). See also Stephen Landsman, The Adversary System: A Description and Defense (1984). Cf. Trump v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 530, 535 (2020); United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154-155 (1990). On appeal of the jury verdict below 21st argued, among other things, that “21st is entitled to a new trial due to trial court’s errors on remand.” See Stafne Declaration, Exhibit 1 (21st Answering Appeal Brief at 26-44). As it turns out Robertson agrees with this argument by 21st because the Court of Appeals decision purports to wrongly hold that Washington courts can award property owned by one entity to another entity which fails to prove its standing for the exercise of judicial power to achieve such a “taking” in violation of the clear terms of the contract.