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Chapter 12
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The Knowledge business and the
neo-managerialisation of Research
and Academia in France
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What we need is to thatcherise France – Franck Tapiro (nicolas sarkozy’s spin
doctor, 31 January 2007).
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is research only a matter of resources and posts? so how do you explain that,
with a higher research budget than Great britain and nearly 15% more titular
researchers than our english friends, France lags behind them in terms of
scientiic production? You’ll have to explain it to me! more titular researchers,
less publications and … sorry, i don’t want to be unpleasant … but with a
comparable budget, a French researcher publishes 30 to 50% less than his british
counterpart – nicolas sarkozy (speech about the national strategy on research
and innovation, 22 January 2009).
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The greatest favour that can be done to sociology is probably to prevent from
asking it anything – Pierre bourdieu (inaugural lesson, Collège de France, 23
April 1982).
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Introduction
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French people like to see their country as the last bulwark against the tyranny
of neoliberalism. They think their country does well to resist the tide of
commodiication induced by globalisation and the domination of Anglo-saxon
market-friendly visions of the world. The higher education and research system
is seen as an essential feature of this ‘French exception’. Higher education is free
in France and anybody in possession of a ‘baccalauréat’ can have access to it.
Research is conducted inside large public research institutions populated with
researchers enjoying a civil servant status. Research is supposed to be one of the
key missions of the ‘Colbertist state’ (mustar and larédo 2002), a form of state
intervention considered to be in the public interest.
This conception and organisation of the higher education and research system
is now under serious threat. since the election of nicolas sarkozy as president in
2007, the right-wing government has made the reform of the system in accordance
with neoliberal and neo-managerial precepts one of its priorities. The explicit
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objectives of the reform are the adaptation of the university and research system
to the needs of the so-called ‘Knowledge society’, the reduction of the autonomy
of the academic community and the bureaucratic steering of higher education
and research activities. This trend is not new. We will see that a decisive turn has
been taken in the late 1990s when the left-wing government discretely decided to
introduce new principles, such as a closer link between public research and higher
education on the one hand, and business on the other hand. French actors have also
played a key role in the ‘bologna process’ that is guiding the transformation of the
european system of research and higher education in line with the precepts set and
diffused by institutions such as the World bank, the imF and UnesCo. What is
new with sarkozy is that for the irst time in France a government publicly assumes
a neoliberal and neo-managerial orientation of the reforms, and those reforms
attack the heart of the system – universities and the government funded research
organisation, the Centre national de la Recherche scientiique (CnRs) – while
creating new institutions to overcome the obstacles imposed by the existing ones.
in writing this analysis, a decision has been made not to separate the evolution
and reforms of the higher education and research systems, since both are
inextricably linked and targeted by the same reforms. The irst part of the chapter
consists of a presentation of the French system of research and higher education.
This preliminary section is essential since the historical forms of organisation of the
academic system shaped its evolution and the reforms that targeted it. We will see
that one of the peculiarities of the French situation is the precocity and recurrence
of state interventions to adapt the system to its proper needs. but for a long time,
those interventions consisted in adding layers to the existing system rather than
attacking its core principles and organisations. in the second part, we will see
that it is precisely this peculiarity that has been questioned from the mid-1990s
onwards. Until this period, policy-makers and politicians never really questioned
the autonomy of academia and its corporatist forms of self-governance. What is
new with the ideology of the ‘knowledge economy’ is that it paradoxically drove
the government to attack those almost millenary principles. in the last part, we will
try to identify how those reforms may change the academic ethos and practices.
For this, experience will be drawn from one year spent in british academia, where
experimentation in neoliberal and neo-managerial reforms have predated those in
France.
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a Brief history of the french research system
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even if supranational institutions tend to have an increasing inluence on the
way national academia and research systems are evolving, it would be a mistake
to downplay the national speciicities of research systems. As shinn puts it,
‘denationalisation does not eclipse the national component of the organisation
and funding devices of research and universities’ (2002: 29). in this ield as in
others, it is important to take into account inertia and path dependence. As far as
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relationships between research and universities, on the one hand, and state, civil
societies and economic interests on the other hand are concerned, the notion of
‘national innovation systems’ forged by Richard nelson (nelson 1993), is still
very helpful.
The French national innovation system has been historically characterised by
two main features: irst, the congenital weakness of the institutions that elsewhere
embody research and scholarship: the universities; second, the strong and recurrent
intervention of the central state to reorganise the research and higher education
system. This intervention was justiied by the weakness of the universities but also
tended to worsen it. This importance of the role played by the state drove mustar
and laredo (2002) to deine the French innovation system as ‘Colbertist’.
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Strong State, Weak Universities
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The will to reorganise and to orientate scientiic research is not only a recent
habit of the French central state. it actually occurred much earlier in France
due to two French peculiarities: the weakness of universities and the early rise
of an interventionist state. The weakness of the universities became a French
peculiarity under the ‘Ancient Regime’ (musselin 2001). French universities fell
quite early under the control of the Catholic Church and became places which
reproduced an oficial knowledge rather than being cradles of the scientiic spirit
(Charle and Verger 2007). French Universities were specialised in the education of
specialists –mainly lawyers, theologians and physicians- and their activities were
submitted to the censorship of the Church and the state. but the centralising and
reinforcing French state soon started to see in the conservative and bigoted stance
of the universities an obstacle to its power and inluence and started to create
or to promote the development of scholar institutions released from the corset
of scholastic and ecclesiastic orthodoxy. in 1530, Francis i created the ‘Collège
Royal’ – then ‘Collège de France’, home of michel Foucault and Pierre bourdieuwhere Greek and Hebrew were taught while they were prohibited in sorbonne.
The seventeenth century, the enlightenment century, saw the generalisation of
this model. Thus while the Universities were resistant to the development of the
scientiic approaches, the central state sponsored them. Royal academies were
created often by the recognition and funding of the activities of scholar societies.
These academies enjoyed privileges and franchises that enabled them to overcome
censorship. With the parlours and scholars societies, they became the cradles of
the modern secular scientiic culture.
After being seen as obstacles to the development of sciences and techniques
by the monarchy, the Universities were seen as remains of the Ancient Regime by
the Revolutionaries. They were consequently dismantled. The Consulate and the
First empire (1799–1815) recreated them but placed them under the strict control
of the central state. napoleon i also launched a process that then proved very
harmful for the universities. eager to develop engineering and applied research
in order to backup the national military forces and economic development, he
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created engineering schools, the most famous and prestigious one being the
ecole Polytechnique, that provided the basis of the development of the system
of the ‘Grandes écoles’. This system is formed of very selective higher education
institutions operating in ields that were neglected by universities (engineering
sciences, agronomics, business and commerce, public administration), that escape
their control and that still provide most of the French professional and political
elites. Again under the second empire, in 1868, faced with the underdevelopment
of empirical and experimental research in France compared to what was happening
in the UsA, UK and Germany, the regime decided to create the ecole Pratique
des Hautes etudes which was designed to fund research and train a new type of
professor it for the modern scientiic approach. The ePHe became one of the
cradles for the development of modern social sciences in France.
The Third Republic (1875–1940) tried to give power back to universities by
authorising the recreation of faculties outside of Paris and releasing the central
control on their functioning. However, the harm was already done. many resources
were drained towards the Grandes Ecoles and other state sponsored institutions.
most scientiic research was conducted there and oriented in order to correspond
with the needs of the state. The activities of the new faculties were still limited
to the ields on which the Universities had a monopoly, i.e. law and medicine,
where activities were oriented towards the transmission of techniques rather than
towards research.
it is the very incapacity of universities, due to a lack of inancial and human
resources, to develop research activities that eventually led the French state to
create the CnRs in 1939. The objective was to reunify in a single body all the
state-controlled fundamental and applied research centres in order to coordinate the
national research effort. The CnRs has three main missions: irstly, to fund the current
functioning of the laboratories; secondly to fund research projects through calls and
bids; and thirdly, to manage its own research staff (26,000 researchers, engineers
and technicians in 2004). Unexpectedly in the French context, the major part in
the governance of the new institution is entrusted to the researchers themselves.
indeed, they have the responsibility to orientate the research effort according to
what is considered as strategic by the scientiic community itself. somehow, the
CnRs created a realm of academic liberties that never really existed in the French
universities. CnRs researchers beneit from a civil servant status and a life-time job
contract, are entrusted with a mission to develop fundamental research within an
institution that preserves their autonomy, and play a key role in its governance.
nevertheless, the creation of the CnRs did not mean that the state had
abandoned any will to control and orientate research activities and had given priority
to fundamental research. After WWii, as well as the CnRs, the state created a series
of applied research agencies in strategic sectors. The Centre National d’Etudes des
Télécommunications (CneT) was founded in 1944, the Commissariat à l’Energie
Atomique (CeA) in 1945, the Institut National de Recherche Agronomique (inRA)
in 1946, the Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (Cnes) in 1961, the Institut
National de la Santé et la Recherche Médicale (inseRm) in 1964, etc. The most
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prestigious of those établissements publics scientiiques et techniques (ePsT) are
usually well connected to the French state apparatus. The staffs of ministries and
research institutions were usually recruited in the same pond of the Grandes Ecoles,
which created a strong proximity. This proximity is attested by the budget they can
count on. For instance, while in 2004 the global budget of the CnRs was made €0.5
billion, the CeA could rely on more than €3 billion.
The landscape of the French system of research evolved again in the late
1960s due to a irst stage of democratisation in the higher education system. The
economic development and the rise of the French Welfare state created a call for
a more educated workforce. That challenge was taken up by the universities in
which new departments of social sciences, sciences and economy were created
or reinforced. That democratisation also provoked a signiicant growth of the
academic staff. Universities were emerging as the main staff pool of researchers.
That new situation led to the narrowing of universities and CnRs. in 1966, the
CnRs decided to create some unités associées [associated units] to sponsor the
research departments created in various universities. Those departments hosted
researchers that were both CnRs and university staff. They were linked to the
CnRs by a contract that guaranteed them, besides more scientiic credibility,
funds for administration, equipment and research operations. This narrowing of
CnRs and universities was particularly important for the social sciences that were
able to strengthen their fragile position.
nevertheless, the coming together of those two institutions did not favour them
in the long term. in the eyes of the preachers of academic reforms, they were
seen to embody the weak pole of the French system of innovation. The CnRs
represents the autonomy of the scientiic community and the orientation towards
fundamental research. The Universities have been accused of making no effort to
adapt their teaching to the needs of the job markets and to solve the problem of
youth unemployment. Thus, so as to orientate research towards ‘social needs’, a
bureaucratic crusade began in the 1960s.
The Early Development of Contract Research and its Unexpected Effects
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Very early on, the way the CnRs had been conceived – as an institution dedicated
to fundamental research, with its own permanent research staff, and governed by
the research community itself – appeared as an anomaly to the bureaucratic and
political elite. As far as this elite was concerned, the research effort had to be
orientated according to the social and economic needs of the nation. in the 1970s,
political pressures compelled the CnRs to reorganise. industrial demand for
innovation support led the agency to create an ‘engineering sciences’ department.
The CnRs was asked to deine a scientiic strategy and it launched a new policy
of calls and bids on targeted themes. The central idea was to orientate researchers
to topics considered as socially useful.
social scientists were also encouraged to pay more attention to the needs of
policy-makers through the development of contractual research on the initiative of
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institutions, such as planning agencies and ministries, whose central activities were
not to undertake research. As Amiot (1986) states, contractual research in social
science developed with the rise of the Etat planiicateur, the planning state, through
the 1950s and 1960s. What we call the Etat planiicateur is both a whole set of
institutions of agencies and a new way to govern the country. The conviction of
its proponents was that modern governance should be based on a solid scientiic
knowledge, that the state should be endowed with an eficient apparatus able to
produce statistics, to conduct economic studies, and to elaborate long term plans
(bourdieu and boltanski 1976; Fourquet 1980). The Fourth Republic (1946–1958)
saw the creation of a national planning agency (the Commissariat Général au Plan),
a national agency for statistics (insee), and bureaus of statistics and economic
studies inside key ministries like the ministry of Finance. Faced with universities
that were unable to provide the kind of economic expertise they needed, a set of
schools and research centres was also created outside of the universities and CnRs.
The French research system in economics was thus progressively organised by the
planning networks of the central state and orientated according to its speciic needs.
The installation of the 5th Republic in 1958 was an opportunity for the planners
and bureaucrats to enlarge their grip on the state apparatus. The restoration of
a strong executive power dedicated to the development of the country and the
weakening of Parliament was a boon for the planners who had acquired key
positions in the government and ministries. Under the new regime, a new device
was created in order to orientate the research effort of the country. An interministerial committee for scientiic research was created whose mission was to
coordinate the way each department was managing its research funds. besides
its coordination mission, it is entrusted with its own funds, the national Fund for
Research, which was to give a real boost to contract research (Amiot 1986). This
committee was backed by the Direction Générale de la Recherche Scientiique et
Technique (DGRsT), a bureau located inside the ministry of Finances.
The new role of governmental agencies in the coordination of research
continued, with a renewed interest in the social sciences (bezes 2005; 2009). in
the mid-1960s, after having reorganised research in economics, the main concern
of the members of the planning apparatus was about the social acceptability of
economic change and the identiication of non-material needs in society. They
then turned themselves towards the social sciences, in the hope that they would
help to build the conditions for the social acceptability of the planned change. The
planners and bureaucrats ‘were asking sociologists to trace for them the limit of
the bearable’ (Amiot 1986: 79). Their aim was also to reorganise research in the
social sciences on the model that they had applied to economics: large research
centres oriented to answer to bureaucratic requests (Pollak 1976). They failed.
most sociologists were reluctant to become planners’ auxiliaries. However,
despite this initial failure, the DGRsT and the different ministries launched new
calls for research speciically targeted towards social scientists. The idea was
explicitly to avoid the transfer of research monies through CnRs and to establish
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direct relations with research centres in order to drive them towards more applied
research. As was now common in France, ‘academic institutions have not been
dispossessed of their powers; but other powers and other funding sources had been
set up, that were not entrusted to them and which objective was to transform the
functioning of academic institutions’ from outside (Amiot 1986: 87).
The development of contract research opened a period of material opulence
for social sciences. Public monies were pouring into departments as never before.
Although the CnRs and universities recurrent funds only covered the operating
costs of research, funds from government and the ministries were large enough
to support ambitious large-scale empirical research programs. Classics in French
sociology like bourdieu and Darbel’s L’amour de l’art (1969), Crozier’s La
société bloquée (1971), or Touraine’s works on post-industrial social movements
were drafted from empirical research undertaken under contract to DGRsT and
research support units in the ministries. French urban sociology was one of the
sub-disciplines in the social sciences that secured the greatest beneits from the
channelling of governmental funds towards research. indeed, it took great advantage
of the creation, in 1966, of the Ministère de l’Equipement; a huge department with
functions in the spheres of public works, infrastructures, housing and planning. A
bureau for urban research was created inside the ministry that started to allocate
large amounts of money to research teams working on the effects of urban planning
on populations. With the may 1968 outburst, the funds channelled towards urban
research grew even further, reaching 15 million francs per year at the beginning
of the 1970s. A large number of sociologists that started their careers in the 1960s
and 1970s were thus oriented to work on urban issues.
Unexpectedly, this abundance of contract funds supported research studies that
gave birth to the most radical theories French urban sociology has ever produced.
Castells and Godard’s Monopolville (1974), a book based on research conducted
between 1971 and 1973 in Dunkirk (a city drastically re-organised by state planners
in order to host a large steel industry compound by-the-sea), is probably the best
example of the kind of radical theories that contract research funds helped to generate.
in this book, inspired by the Althusser’s theory of the Capitalisme Monopolistique
d’Etat, the authors tried to demonstrate how a new kind of city controlled by large
industrial companies was emerging with the help of state planning. Dunkirk had
been chosen by one of the largest French companies, and by the Commissariat
Général au Plan within the framework of the 6th Plan (1971–1975) to host a
new steel production site. However, at the same time, state offcials were eager
to demonstrate their desire to solve the socio-spatial contradictions generated by
economic growth. Thus the newly created Ministère de l’Equipement was entrusted
with the formulation and implementation of spatial policies (planning, housing,
transport) that would accompany the construction of the industrial site. Yet the
authors argued this new state concern with housing conditions was little more than
an exercise in ideological mystiication. Production remained the priority, so the
oficial concern for collective consumption (e.g. housing) originated from a desire to
provide a support infrastructure for the production process.
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in a nutshell, Monopolville set out to analyse the extension of exploitation from
the sphere of production to the sphere of the collective consumption of commodities
and housing – with the state playing an orchestrating role in both processes for
the purposes of maximising opportunities for capitalist proit making. most other
research studies conducted in this period displayed a similar critical stance towards
the meaning, ideology and methods of state planning (Chamborédon and lemaire
1970; lojkine 1974; Topalov 1974; mehl 1975; Huet et al. 1977). This being the
case, it is dificult to understand why the state and, in particular, the Ministère de
l’Equipement, continued to inance research of this nature but one thing is clear:
the trauma among political and administrative elites generated by may 1968, and
the fact that many of the staff that were hired by the bureau for urban research had
a social sciences background, made them sympathetic to this kind of research.
After 1981, the victory of the left at the Presidential election enabled them to stay
inside the ministries and to continue funding critical research.
nevertheless, this kind of urban research never fully satisied the bureaucratic
elites who commissioned them. Although bureaucratic elites expected social
scientists to share their intellectual interests and concerns, they encountered a social
scientiic community that was constantly trying to challenge their world views and
to reformulate the research issues in different ways. For bureaucrats and planners
who had been mainly trained in Grandes Ecoles to apply solutions rather than to
undertake research, and whose vision of science was structured by what they knew
about ‘exact’ research, it was a source of frustration. This frustration might partly
explain the subsequent evolution of the state/social sciences relationships.
in this irst part i tried to demonstrate that the state’s interest in research is not
new in France. indeed, attempts to reorganise the research and academic system
according to its own ‘knowledge needs’ are one of the historic peculiarities of the
French state. but what should be noticed is that those attempts almost always
resulted in the creation of new institutions, or new funding devices, rather than the
internal reorganisation of the existing system. As Amiot put it clearly (1986, 72):
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The conservatism of the medieval universities led to the creation of the Collège
de France designed to host the new disciplines rejected by universities. later,
the Académies […] were juxtaposed next to existing institutions to host the
disciplines that did not ind any place either inside universities or in Collège
de France. That sequence ended with the French Revolution that put down
the Ancient Regime ediice and designed a brand new one. The history of the
academic institutions during the 19th and 20th century offer analogue sequences:
on the margins of universities, unable to innovate, the Ecole pratique des hautes
études was designed under the second empire to develop scientiic research. The
creation of the CnRs testiied of the insuficiency of the previous arrangements
and the necessity to add another layer.
And so on, until the very last period.
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The period spanning the mid 1970s to the mid 1990s did not bring about much
change in the relations between social sciences and the state. The economic
crisis generated cuts in ministries’ research budgets but the state planners that
were in charge of these funds remained active and cultivated their networks. in
compensation, the left-wing government elected in 1981 integrated many of the
researchers that were employed on contracts within the CnRs with a civil servant
status. This was a period of consolidation for the French system of research and
higher education. in 1984, a decree improved the status of the ‘enseignantschercheurs’ (i.e. professors and lecturers working within the universities) by
setting up standardised salary grids and teaching duties. However, from the
mid-1990s onwards, things began to change. The French polity became more
sympathetic to the neoliberal narrative on higher education and research promoted
by supranational institutions such as oeCD and eU. This narrative was being
relayed by domestic actors like Claude Allègre, a renowned geochemist and
minister of education of the socialist Prime minister lionel Jospin between 1997
and 2000. During this period, a series of silent reforms were implemented that led
the French system of innovation to comply with the neoliberal Knowledge Society
and New Public Management agendas. However, the election of nicolas sarkozy
as President in 2007 has seen an intensiication of these efforts to compel French
academia to conform to neoliberal and nPm prescriptions.
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Knowledge Society and the Redeinition of the Framework of
Higher Education and Research Policies
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Changes to the research environment in France cannot be understood without
taking account of the global neoliberal offensive that has now targeted higher
education and research institutions for more than 20 years. This offensive was
launched by international institutions such as the oeCD and the World bank who
have found allies within the european Commission, national governments and the
business world more generally. This ideological offensive found scientiic backing
from new ‘theories’ about knowledge production which claimed that researchers’
relationship with the state and business should change to comply with the reality of
the knowledge economy, i.e. the links between wealth production and knowledge
production. The offensive irst struck in north America but has recently expanded
to higher education institutions in europe; France included (laval 2009).
The neoliberal offensive against higher education institutions and research
began in the United states in the 1970s. scientiic disciplines with the greatest
potential for industrial application, such as biological engineering or computing,
were compelled by the state to service business interests. moreover, as businesses,
university managers and academics themselves came to realise the economic
potential and beneits of collaboration, a new movement in the privatisation of
academic knowledge started. The procurement of patents for scientiic achievements
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became a new priority for researchers, universities and businesses (Krimsky
2004; Duval and Heilbronn 2009) and thus opened the way for a widespread
commodiication of knowledge and universities (Harvey 1998; Warde 2001;
malissard, Gingras and Hemme 2003). in the 1980s, the iscal stress imposed on
universities by states and the federal governments created a new incentive for the
commercialisation of research results and partnerships with private interests. in
1980, the Bayh-Dole Act (or Patent and Trademarks Law Amendments Act) gave
universities and small businesses (that could be created by academics themselves)
the right to claim property rights on inventions and scientiic achievements that
were generated using public research funds. For slaughter and leslie (1997),
the Bayh-Dole Act was the symbol of the oficial legitimisation of an ‘academic
capitalism’.
What followed was the intellectual legitimation of this system of collaboration,
which was provided by the increasing circulation of collaborating actors between
academia, business, and policy networks. The best – and probably most inluentialexample of this kind of intellectual legitimation is provided by the academic,
michael Gibbons; co-author of the New Production of Knowledge (1994)1 which
proposes the ‘two modes of production of knowledge’ theory.
According to Gibbons, mode 1 forms of knowledge production prevailed until
the 1950s and were characterised by the distance that existed between the scientiic
world and society. Universities and academics were strictly autonomous, organised
in impervious and independent disciplines, and the orientation of research was
decided by academics themselves. interactions between academia and industry
were almost non existent. on the contrary, Gibbons argues that mode 2 embodies
the way science works or should work in contemporary society. The idea of mode
2 is based on the claim that the epistemological and institutional independence of
scientists is an obstacle to technological innovation and economic growth. The
implication of this is that the orientation of research should be decided through a
process of dialogue between academics and their political and economic partners.
Priority should be given to the accumulation of knowledge that is directly applicable
to the needs of government and industry because they are the engines of economic
growth. moreover the governance of universities and research institutions should
be revised in order to integrate these new ‘stakeholders’.
For the last 20 years, international institutions have sought to articulate and
mobilise these ideas through a new set of concepts – the ‘Knowledge society’ or
‘Knowledge economy’ – in order to legitimise the restructuring of higher education
and research. Although initially elaborated by international institutions such as the
oeCD, World bank and UnesCo (milot 2003), the idea of the knowledge economy
is now being relayed by the eU through the ‘lisbon strategy’. This ‘knowledge
economy’ narrative posits the core sectors of the contemporary economy as
characterised by constant innovation and a continuous consumption of knowledge
1 burton R. Clark (1998) can be cited as another very inluential ‘expert’ on those
matters.
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and technologies in the pursuit of the economic growth that will apparently beneit
all. Higher education, research and innovation systems are thus a crucial asset
because they are axiomatic to national economic competitiveness, which is why it
is said that they should be reorganised in order to comply with the new challenges
of the ‘knowledge economy’ (Delanty 2003; lorenz 2007; Garcia 2008; Winkin
2008). What is interesting here is the way in which the American higher education
and research system that has evolved over the last twenty years is presented as
the example to follow. The use of this hegemonic example is accompanied by a
negative campaign that denigrates universities and researchers that are still stuck
to the ‘mode 1’ as malfunctioning. The mode 2 zealots constantly disseminate
stigmatising representations of the inner world of the academy (De montlibert
2008) which they represent as closed to any collaboration with the outside world
and composed of researchers that lock themselves away in their ‘ivory towers’
whilst being protected by life-time contracts.
Compared to its American or british counterparts, the French system of higher
education has taken more time to comply with the new requisites of the hegemonic
‘knowledge economy’ project. but since it has started to do so, its adaptation
has been quick. Claude Allègre, minister of education under the cohabitation
government of the socialist lionel Jospin between 1997 and 2000, was a key
igure in the mobilisation and imposition of ‘Knowledge society’ doctrine on the
French academy. He was responsible for the innovation and Research Act (Loi
sur l’innovation et la recherche) in 1999 which sought to import the ‘enterprise
culture’ into the French research system. This act authorised researchers to create
their own enterprises in order to capitalise on the value of their discoveries. it
allowed them to take up to 15 per cent of the shares in their enterprises. it also made
it easier for the CnRs and the universities to establish commercial partnerships
with businesses (malissard et al. 2003; Gingras 2003; laval 2009). Allègre also
enhanced the capacity of universities to improve upon their ability to commercialise
the knowledge and inventions by endowing them with commercial ofices that
dealt with property rights and patenting. Finally Allègre also tried to transform
the CnRs into a resources agency limiting its activities to the elaboration of calls
and bids, distribution of funds and evaluation, and to transfer CnRs researchers
to universities, but his attempt was rebuffed by the scientiic community (Charle
1999).
on the higher education front, Allègre was one of the initiators of the ‘bologna
Process’, a commitment signed in 1999 by the ministries of education of the
eU, to build an integrated and competitive european space of higher education
until 2010. The launching of the process occurred one year earlier, on the 25
may 1998, when Allègre invited the ministries of education of Germany, italy
and United Kingdom in the sorbonne University in Paris to celebrate the 800th
anniversary of Paris University. The ‘sorbonne declaration’ sealed the common
will of the ministries to build a ‘europe of knowledge’ that would counterbalance
the ‘europe of bankers’. in actual fact, the sorbonne declaration and the ‘bologna
Process’ allowed the expansion of market principles from economy to research
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and higher education. indeed, the ‘bologna process’ was soon integrated in the
lisbonna strategy formulated by the european Council in 2000 and aiming at
making of europe the most competitive and dynamic ‘knowledge economy’ in
the world. Concretely, the process aims at harmonising the european landscape
of university diplomas by generalising a 3-5-8 system (bachelor-master-PhD) and
by creating a system of credits supposed to facilitate the mobility of students. but
beyond these practical arrangements, many of the bologna process critics consider
that the overarching objective is to impose an instrumental vision of research and
education in which universities would be academic service providers competing in
a deregulated market to attract students, the best professors and researchers and to
raise private funds (neyrat 2007; lorenz 2007; schultheis et al. 2008; Garcia 2009).
in this free integrated market, consumers would have the ‘choice’ to select their
providers. in order to let them exert their freedom of choice in full transparency,
the ‘bologna Process’ also proposes to set up ‘quality assurance’ devices allowing
assessing and rating the providers of academic services according to standardised
values. beyond this obsession for quality assurance, many critics foresee the end
of values such as academic freedom, the disinterested quest for knowledge, and
free access to that knowledge.
The ‘bologna Process’ was actually initiated by French actors identiied with
the leftwing Party. indeed, the origin of the process can be traced back to a report
written in 1998 by the top civil servant and ex-councillor of mitterrand, Jacques
Attali, on the demand of Allègre.2 most of the orientations of bologna were
already in the report: harmonisation of the european university grade systems; the
facilitation of mobility, etc. more decisive was the statement that the emergence
of a globalised higher education market was urging the rationalisation of the
european university systems and especially the French one characterised by a
high degree of fragmentation. The report thus recommended the regrouping of
forces and the identiication of a limited number of ‘excellence poles’. As neyrat
(2007: 148) put it, ‘from now on, it is the position of France in the world market of
higher education that seems to be the ultimate justiication of reforms’. That new
orientation constitutes a break with the previous philosophy of higher education
policy that was aiming mainly at facilitating access to higher education and was
– oficially – based on a principle of equal treatment of the different institutions.
‘Performance, not the maintenance of [territorial or social] balances, has become
the principle of equity: what is equitable is to reward the best and not necessarily
to share out resources on identical bases’ (musselin 2009: 79).
The second half of the 1990s was a crucial period in which many of the
principles that would inspire the reforms of the subsequent period were laid down.
The hegemonic project of ‘knowledge society/economy’ and the narrative about
the necessary commodiication of higher education and research started to structure
discourses and practices of French policy-makers. The inluence of international
2 Pour un modèle européen d’enseignement supérieur, Report of the Commission
chaired by Jacques Attali, published on 5 may 1998.
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organisations (oeCD, World bank, UnesCo, and the european Round Table
lobby) and the mythical example of the American academic and research system
played a key role in the process but one should not underestimate the role of French
bureaucrats and politicians to import and spread those new principles.
The New Governance of Universities and Research
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After 2000 a new period opened for a more systematic implementation of most
of the Knowledge Economy and New Public Management recipes. Those recipes
are, roughly speaking: the reduction of the autonomy of the academic community;
the limitation of internal corporatist regulations; the reinforcement of bureaucratic
control and political steering of universities; research institutions founded on
the belief that scientiic ‘discoveries’ can be programmed; the introduction of
stakeholders (businesses, consumers) in the governance of academic institutions;
constant evaluation and the elaboration of performance measurement instruments;
and the development of an entrepreneurial culture among the academic communities
through bids, contracts and project management. What lorenz calls a ‘managerial
colonization’ (2007: 49) of the public service of higher education and research was
enforced in France by a series of laws, some of which had academia as a speciic
target, whereas others were part of broader reforms of the French state that had an
impact on the management of universities and research institutions.
Within the latter type of reforms, it is worth mentioning the much commented
on 2001 ‘lolF’ (Loi organique relative aux lois de inances) passed under the
Jospin government (bezes 2009). At irst sight, this Act aims at reorganising the
ways that state funds are allocated, managed and controlled and does not seem
to be related to the governance of research and universities. but in actual fact, its
implementation has revolutionised the traditional conception of public services and
the way they are produced. The lolF embodies the conversion of French state
top civil servants and politicians to the new Public management. it implies a shift
from a logic of resource distribution in which funds are allocated to a department
without being clearly associated to speciic tasks, to a logic in which funds are
allocated to speciic programmes for which performance indicators are elaborated
in order to ensure the eficient and effective use of funds. The bureaucratic control
of funds is no longer concerned with simply the legal authority to spend but also
on the economy and eficiency of spending. The lolF is crucial because the
principles it laid down have been implemented within the research and higher
education policies. This focus on performance and results has allowed subsequent
right-wing governments to point to poor performance in terms of student graduation
and publications of French universities. in doing so, they were overlooking the
fact that French universities cannot select their students and have thus been in the
front line to absorb successive waves of higher education massiication while the
resources they have been allocated have constantly remained low compared to the
level of support given to the Grandes écoles system. Recently, this denigration
campaign had a concrete outcome with the reform of the funding system of the
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universities. Until recently, funds were allocated by taking account of the number
of students registered at the university and contracts were negotiated between
the state and each university in order to take into account the socio-economic
characteristics of the university public. With the new system, only the number of
students succeeding at the exams and the number of publishing teachers is taken
into account. behind this new system, many critics see a political will to realise
the vision of the Attali report: the rationalisation of the French university system
to around eight or ten big campuses able to deliver masters and PhDs and the
downgrading of the other to the status of ‘colleges’ delivering only bachelors and
deprived of any research structures.
The 2006 Research and innovation Act (Loi d’orientation et de programmation
sur la recherche et l’innovation, loPRi), passed under the right-wing government
of Dominique de Villepin, made explicit the application of nPm and neoliberal
principles to research and education. The ideological framework of the legislators
was clearly presented in the presentation report of the law: ‘in a merciless world
competition, it is urgent to build up in France uncontested research champions’;
‘it is about time to reinforce partnerships between public and private research’,
and for researchers to get involved in ‘economic growth founded on knowledge’.
Assuming that private research is more eficient, the law facilitates the possibility for
private organisations to get public research funds and to get involved in the funding
and governance of public research institutions. As decisively, the law created the
Agence Nationale de la Recherche (AnR) in 2005; the new centre of the research
funding device. The AnR is clearly an instrument meant to erode the model of
research organisation stabilised after the WWii and embodied by the CnRs. The
purpose is to replace recurrent funds granted to the CnRs and its laboratories
by a device of funds distribution based on calls and projects privileging publicprivate partnerships and allowing a tighter political and bureaucratic control. The
‘quest for excellence’ is also present in the loPRi through the creation of Pôles de
Recherche et d’Enseignement Supérieur (PRes). These poles are supposed to be
an energetic response to the irst publication of the famous shanghai ranking that
initially revealed the fragmentation of the French research system. Quite simply,
they are groupings of universities and schools on a territorial basis that will enable
the creation of publications pools to allow them to be ‘better’ ranked. They can
thus be interpreted as a precursor of the reorganisation of the French university
systems around a dozen poles. Finally, the law also planned the creation of an
evaluation agency for higher education and research (Agence d’évaluation de la
recherche et de l’enseignement supérieur, AeRes), that will be in charge of the
application of the principles of ‘quality assurance’.
The elaboration of the loPRi and the very tense climate between the
government and the scientiic world led to an unprecedented social movement
amongst researchers, and to the creation of Sauvons la recherche. This association
brings together a wide scope of researchers working within the universities, the
CnRs and other public research institutions in different disciplines. since the row
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about the loPRi, it has been at the forefront of the contestation of neoliberal
reforms led by the successive right-wing governments.
nevertheless, the election of nicolas sarkozy as President of the Republic in
2007 gave a new impetus to these reforms. The novelty with sarkozy is that he
is the irst French politician endowed with an executive mandate who explicitly
assumes a neo-liberal orientation together with a comprehensive programme
of massive cuts in the civil service workforce and a neo-managerial reform of
administration (bezes 2009). Assuming a ‘market populist’ stance, he has chosen
to overtly provoke the socio-professional groups that are supposed to oppose
resistance to his program, including the academic community. His speech
on research of the 22 January 2009 is a clear illustration of this strategy. This
mendacious speech was clearly meant to discredit and isolate an incompetent and
conservative academic community in order to get public support for his reforms.
French researchers were described as lazy and publishing much less than their
foreign counterparts. Yet in reality the rank of France in various publication tables
remained more than honourable despite constant underfunding and a structural
advantage for english speaking countries. sarkozy asserted that academics are
one of the rare professions escaping regular evaluation. He also claimed that his
Government had made unprecedented inancial efforts to support research, even
though France is the only country of the oeCD that had reduced its inancial
support to research and higher education in the years since 1995.
This speech was preceded by two governmental initiatives that had already
aroused the hostility of the academic community. The irst was the Act on
universities’ liberties and responsibilities (Loi relative aux libertés et responsabilités
des universités, lRU) passed in August 2007. The aim of this new law is twofold:
irst, to transform universities into ‘executive agencies’ and second, to weaken
corporatist and disciplinary regulations. in the new legal framework, universities
are supposed to elaborate their own project and to identify their priorities in
terms of research and curricula in close relation with their local and economic
environment. For this, more power was given to the Presidents of the universities
who became the real bosses of their staff; more emphasis was placed on having
socio-economic partners on university councils; and universities got more power
over their staff. in actual fact, the autonomy awarded is conditional. it has been
granted in exchange for compliance with project management and their involvement
in academic competition. Awarding autonomy to the universities is a way for the
central administration to disengage from the daily management of programmes and
staff, and to gain a ‘hands-off’ style steering capacity (neave Van nught 1991).
‘Rather than specifying precisely what is to be done, government establish broad
objectives, deine several principles framing the action of universities, allocate a
part of the resources allowing the achievement of objectives and intervene only ex
post, if evaluations reveals dificulties’ (musselin 2009: 76). in other words, distant
control, the ‘governance of conduct’ and the control of outputs are supposed to
be more eficient than direct intervention and focus on inputs. such disciplinary
power is a good means to reduce the real autonomy of the academic community.
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The last brick of the new research and academic governance device imagined by
right-wing government has been put down in 2008 and created a mass opposition
movement among academics and students. This brick was a decree project
elaborated by the sarkozy’s minister of higher education and research, Valérie
Pécresse, allowing the presidents of universities to modulate the teaching duty of
the academics according to criteria such as research performances, involvement
in administrative and political functions, etc. seen as a new step in the promotion
of nPm principles and in the rise of a presidential arbitrary power, the decree
project was confronted with huge dissent that compelled the minister to redraft
it. based on a desire to save public funds, the decree project was rooted in the
assumption that academic workforce is not eficient and should be ‘remobilised’
– a typical assumption of the neo-managerial thought. For academics, the law of
the decree is its tendency to consider the teaching task as a punishment. but more
than anything the decree and sarkozy’s speech were seen as public disavowal
from their employer that added to the ‘market populism’ that tends to describe
professions whose activity cannot be assessed on simple market criteria as useless
and privileged. During the irst semester of 2009, the biggest academic social
movement since 1968 paralysed most French universities.
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excavating the future of french academia in the anglo world
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This last section is dedicated to the exploration of the potential effects of the neomanagerial reforms on research and academic practices. it has been developed
from two sources: irst, texts that provide an analysis of the evolution of academic
practices in the Anglo-American world where the effects of those reforms are
already visible; second, a work experience in a british research centre on urban
issues located in the manchester region. i will call it the sKi centre. The sKi centre
is a particularly good example of the mutation of british urban research since its
activities were in response to ‘calls for research proposals’ by government and
industry. This was necessary because sKi relied on contractual funds to survive,
and because most of its members had abandoned teaching activities to dedicate
themselves to contract research.
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Commodiication of Research and Mercantile Manners
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A deining characteristic of the Anglo-American research system is contract
research. The irst problem with this is that increases in contract research funding
justify the reduction of public funding to universities; the second problem is that
the augmentation of the share of contractual research is at the expense of recurrent
funding of research organisations. This reduction of recurrent funding compels
researchers to orientate their research towards responses to an external demand
rather than what is considered important by the scientiic community. This might
sound good to economic interests, politicians and bureaucrats but it is well-known
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from the history of science that research, ‘discoveries’ and applications, cannot
be planned with a linear perspective. As Foellmi (2007) put it: ‘no theory of
relativity, no GPs’. einstein’s discoveries were essential to the eventual birth of
the GPs, but it could not have been invented if einstein had oriented his research
towards this aim. The way science works is totally incompatible with planning
or any obligation to respond in priority to corporate or societal needs. market
or bureaucratic steering of research activities usually diverts researchers from
essential scientiic discussion. The sKi centre was created with a faith in the
capacity of researchers both to respond to external demands and to remain active
in scientiic debate. it proved impossible to do both.
even more worrying is the phenomenon of ‘academic affairism’ that developed
mostly in the physical and natural sciences, with the development of universitybusiness research partnerships. Krimsky (2004) describes how the development
of such business partnerships has led to the transformation of the academic ethos
and, in particular, the development of worrying habits. The most worrying one
is the trend to adjust research results to the interests of the funding entity. For
instance, stelfox et al. (cited in Duval and Heilbron 2006) have showed that the
nature of the judgement of pharmaceutical researchers can be associated with the
existence or absence of inancial links with the irms producing drugs. in the social
sciences, academics with similar links that have reached a large public audience
do not hesitate to cash in on their interventions in seminars or conventions, or as
consultants for government and thinks tanks. in France, the fact that academic
salaries have not been increased for some time has created incentives for them
to create consulting agencies thus enabling them to cash in on extra activities,
sometimes at the expense of their scientiic activities.
Criticism of ‘academic affairism’ and the greedy behaviour that it encourages
should not be seen merely as a moral issue but one that drives to the heart of what
academia is about: the interest in ‘disinterestedness’. The speciicity of scientiic
activities is that they are driven by ‘speciic libido and beliefs, irreducible to the
sole greed for material gain’ (Duval and Heilbron 2006: 9). The accumulation
of scientiic knowledge is guaranteed by the speciicity of the scientiic ield. in
this ield, values like truth and commitment to objectivity have more power than
anywhere else. social hierarchy is determined by the judgment of peers and this
judgement is based on the evaluation of the researcher’s achievements in the quest
for truth rather than public success or inancial success. As bourdieu (1994) has
put it, researchers have an ‘interest in disinterestedness’ and that is what makes
them contribute to scientiic accumulation. Thus, as Krimsky reminds us (2004),
scientiic accumulation is closely dependent on the maintenance of a strong morale
of public interest which is itself guaranteed by institutional arrangements such as
substantial and recurrent public funding of research and civil servant status for
researchers. on the contrary, the development of private funding, public-private
partnerships and the priority put on contractual research and project management
has brought about the alteration of academic values. As stengers (2004) explained,
those phenomena tend to transform the way researchers deine their own interest.
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such researchers shift from a situation in which their interest is to seek recognition
from their peers to a situation in which they seek recognition and rewards from
industry, in which the priority is to say something that the industry will consider
as ‘bankable’.
Academic Individualism
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The other effects that neoliberal and neo-managerial rationalisation of higher
education and research have brought about are: irst, the degradation of the feeling
of professional collective belonging among researchers; second, the development
of a strong academic individualism.
one of the irst signs of academic individualism appeared in the AngloAmerican world as an aftermath of the rush to patents and licenses opened by the
laws facilitating the claiming of property rights on scientiic innovations. That trend
created numerous conlicts in the academic world, conlicts that are increasingly
solved in courts. At the end of the day, far from being a fuel for innovation, the
generalisation of patenting practices creates obstacles to the circulation of scientiic
information. more generally, what was one of the foundations of the academic
community, i.e. the free circulation of knowledge and its status of collective
property, is now at risk (lawrence 2008; Chamayou 2009). even if patenting is a
very marginal practice in social sciences, the climate of competition that has been
imposed in departments and research centres due to publication tables, constant
evaluation and individualised job contracts, will probably have the same effects on
collaboration between academics. While working in the sKi centre, i was struck by
the fact that competition rather than collaboration and fraternal relationships was
the rule between academics, especially the youngest ones that had been socialised
under the rubric of the blairite university.
Paradoxically, while the enforcement of neo-managerial principles aims
at making the agents more faithful to their employer and their behaviour more
predictable and conforming to what is expected from them, it often has the opposite
effect. The best examples might be the effect that publication tables, constant
evaluation, individualised job contracts and new forms of work organisation have
had on the ethos of british academics and their relations to academic institutions.
As Faucher-King and le Galès (2007: 82) writing on the blairite ‘bureaucratic
revolution’ put it,
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… the multiplication of audits erodes the trust in professional ethics and the
sense of public service. such a social control contradicts the idea that everybody
is acting in a moral way and laminates the trust in social competence. Within
organisations, one of the consequences of the audit procedures is the degradation
of the employees’ morale and the decline of morality.
Where neo-managerialism has been implemented, it has engendered a propensity
amongst academics to use its devices to pursue their individual interests rather
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than the interests of their institution or science. nPm has a kind of ‘performative
power’; it creates what it describes. The cynical and calculating rational choice
actor, who lies at the heart of nPm conceptions is actually produced by nPm
rather than pre-existing it. but s/he often acts at the expense of the institution
s/he should be accountable to. Thus british academics that have been subjected
to audits and compelled to ill time sheets and to act as entrepreneurs tend now
to focus on their career and on the increase in their market value rather than on
scientiic achievements and the welfare of their organisation. This drives them to
avoid non-productive activities such as teaching, to recycle data, to write several
articles on the basis of minimal empirical work, and to offer their services to the
better endowed universities at the expense of making a durable investment in a
department or some other collective research endeavour. While in sKi centre, i was
struck to meet professors with absolutely no teaching experience. i was astonished
by the incredible turn-over of staff and by the fact that the research centre was
a collection of individuals whose pursuit of their own enhanced marketability
overrode any desire to join a collective of people that shared a passion for the
same object or the same theoretical inclinations.
The fact that the increase of controls engenders attempts to overcome controls
is also visible in research centres in britain. This can be seen in the spatial
organisation of ofice space in some british universities with the emergence of
panopticons (open plan ofices etc.) that enable a permanent surveillance of the
academic workforce. but far from being eficient, such open-ofices engender a
plethora of escaping strategies such as multiplying tea-breaks whilst endeavouring
to inform colleagues about how busy one is. This is at the expense of contributing
to a collective work of knowledge accumulation.
Another effect of the rise of academic individualism is the erosion of academia
as a community. As some historians have reminded us (Charle and Verger 2007)
universities were historically created as self-organised corporations of masters and
students strongly bonded together to defend a common ideal: the production of
knowledge as an end in itself (Caillé and Chanial 2009). The unity of those strange
corporations was also linked to the strong peculiarity of their activities, that is, what
bourdieu called skholè (1997), which can be translated by ‘leisure’. if academic
activities can be compared to leisure it is because in the european university
tradition they are ontologically disconnected from any form of social, religious,
political or economic utility or necessity. This disconnection allows academics to
maintain a distance from the world and to have access to pure knowledge. That is
why accountability to ‘external agents’ is a notion that is barely compatible with
university and research and why academia is such a strange world for the rest of
society, especially to politicians and bureaucrats for whom accountability is a key
concern. The other peculiarity of academic work is that it is composed of a set
of activities (reading, observing, contemplating, discussing, writing, etc.) whose
common points are that they are dificult to quantify and organise and that are
dificult to separate from the private lives of those that undertake them.
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The Knowledge Business
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indeed, the scholastic lifestyle implies a certain embeddedness of professional
activities into the private and social life of the academic. Academics live with
their tools and products and therefore socialise with the people of the academic
corporation. more than for any other profession, their jobs are a matter of personal
identity construction as much as a means to making a living. The peculiarity of this
academic life (autarchic, contemplative and liberated from utilitarian imperatives)
is one of things that cements academics into communities whilst also being the
guarantee of their ability to produce valuable knowledge. Yet, nowadays, neomanagerial reforms are tearing this life apart. Whilst in the sKi centre, i was
appalled by the inexistence of academic sociability, by the strict separation that
researchers were building between their professional and personal lives, and by the
fact that the researchers’ work had no real prolongation in their personal life. This
disembeddedness of scholarship from researchers’ personal lives, which has been
generated by the nPm ethos, has weakened the academic community’s capacity to
defend itself and has thereby reinforced the trend towards academic individualism,
free riding behaviours, and the lack of loyalty to the academic community and its
institutions.
in spite of its numerous laws, the research and higher education systems
existing under mode 1 that were based on civil servant job contracts, standardised
salary grids, academic autonomy, and internal regulation were not that ineficient
at all. indeed they were miraculously eficient compared to their actual cost! Their
eficiency was linked to the fact that they could rely on a workforce that was
faithfully committed to its public service. This workforce was more motivated by
its collective sense of purpose, shared inside strong academic communities, rather
than by individual rewards. The reforms described in this chapter are destroying
this collective sense of common purpose and the dedication of academics to
systems of service provision that are not based on proitability but on an ideal of
disinterestedness and universal access to knowledge. in an article in which he tries
to give sense to the 2009 academics movement resorting to the lafontaine fable
The wolf and the dog, D’iribarne (2009) compares academics to wolves that made
the choice of a miserable but free life. For him, the fact that French academics
are actually doing their job while they are poorly paid constitutes a miraculous
propensity to dedication that the sarkozy reforms are contributing to dissolve.
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The material situation of university professors is pitiful. even compared to the
standards of high public service (i don’t even mention the private sector), their
pay slip, bonus included, is ridiculous. no way for them to have a decent ofice,
a business car or even a secretary. They ly in economy class. but they are free.
They conceive their courses as they wish; do the research they ind interesting.
And if some of them (mostly researchers) do not do much, the very fact that
they are not sanctioned is the living proof that those who, in large majority, are
working hard are doing so on their own free will, without anything constraining
them.
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Neo-Managerialisation of Research and Academia in France
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That miraculous unconstrained dedication might be the next victim of neomanagerial reforms. And free wolves might turn into cheating dogs.
Conclusion
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What is at stake nowadays is the survival of university and scientiic research.
indeed the paradox of the so-called ‘Knowledge society’ is that its advent could also
signal the death of university and scientiic research. That is exactly what michael
Gibbons had in mind while citing this Douglas Hague’s sentence in a report on
‘Higher education in the 21st century’ for the World bank: ‘if universities do
not adapt, we will do without them’. This is exactly what sarkozy’s government
had in mind when refusing to seriously negotiate with the academic and student
movements in the irst half of 2009.
The most worrying thing is the absolute ignorance of the same élites who
proclaim their belief in the ‘knowledge society’. most of them have been trained
in Grandes Ecoles and have absolutely no experience of research. Their dominant
vision of science is a vision where scientiic progress is linear, where applications
can be clearly foreseen, and thus where research can be planned according to
application objectives. The idea of an academic world funded by the state but
enjoying a large autonomy is thus unbearable.
The challenge for academics now is to defend principles and organisational
arrangements that have become almost unbearable in public opinion and among
policy-makers’ networks which have been converted to ‘market populism’. Those
principles embodied in organisations are the same that Veblen (1919) tried to
defend at the beginning of the twentieth century while observing the intrusion
of businessmen and bureaucrats in the management of universities. He argued
that the missions of university and scientiic research were incompatible with any
commercial imperatives and with any form of hierarchical management. scientiic
progress cannot bear any form of commercial or bureaucratic control and
hierarchies. That is what makes academics so insufferably ungovernable but that is
the price that must be paid. The function of criticism through the delivery of ‘non
consensual expertise’ (Krimsky 2004: 121) is the ultimate vocation of universities
which should not bear any form of constraint. it is even more important to defend
this principle because, with the increasing dominance of the global media within
everyday life, universities are now one of the last places where non consensual
expertise can be expressed.
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