Locating Turkey as a ‘Rising Power’ in the
Changing International Order:
An Introduction
Emel PARLAR DAL and Gonca OĞUZ GÖK*
In recent years there has been a
signiicant increase in the number of
academic studies on changes in the
current international order and the
way the so-called rising powers have
been contributing to these changes
through their behaviours and strategies
of global governance.1 Hot debates are
still ongoing in academic and political
circles about whether, despite their
normative challenges to the current
order, these rising states have been
successfully integrated into the rulebased and open liberal international
order through international cooperation
or have been destabilizing the liberal
global governance with the aim of
changing the order and functioning of
global governance institutions according
to their own interests. If a power
transition is currently under way in the
international system, how the rising,
middle and major powers are facing the
systemic, regional and domestic efects of
* Emel Parlar Dal is associate professor of
International Relations in International
Relations Department at Marmara University.
Gonca Oğuz Gök is assistant professor
in International Relations Department at
Marmara University.
PERCEPTIONS, Winter 2014, Volume XIX, Number 4, pp. 1-18.
this transition remains as a fundamental
question requiring an answer. On the
other hand, there exists confusion in the
International Relations (IR) literature
with regard to the conceptualization and
categorization of the ‘rising powers’ and
their similarities and diferences. here
is a general tendency in the literature
to restrict the ield of research to the
key rising powers such as China, Brazil,
Russia and India or the middle powers
and their subcategories. ‘Regional
powers’ also appear as another category
of states which have become of greater
concern to many scholars and observers
in recent years. his overlapping
conceptual luidity adds new confusion
to the literature and makes it harder for
countries like Turkey to be appropriately
conceptualized and categorized.
his special issue aims to address this
theme by opening a new ground of
research for Turkish foreign policy and
its changing power status in the global
system by proiling Turkey as both a
“middle” and “rising” power. Turkey
has become the world’s 17th biggest
economy and a member of he Group
of Twenty (G-20) in the last decade, with
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Emel Parlar Dal and Gonca Oğuz Gök
an increasingly expanding material and
soft power. Turkey is certainly leaping
forward, though at a lesser degree when
compared to the core big rising powers
like China, India and Brazil. Yet its rise
is somehow diferent from the latter, not
only structurally, but also ideologically.
Despite its increasingly critical stance
in regard to the global governance
institutions and their decision-making
mechanisms in recent years, the
normative challenges to Turkey and its
behavioural posture within the current
international order need to be nuanced
from those of the other rising powers in
the Global South. Turkey’s complaints
about the current international order
are not informed by an anti-Western
attitude or hird Worldist ideology,
but clearly fall into the framework of a
within-system challenge.
his special issue also touches upon the
“normative” dimension of Turkish foreign
policy through an in-depth analysis of
Turkey’s understanding of international
law, justice and ethics and of its shifting
approach to the UN over the years. It is
known that the increasing normativity
and cosmopolitanism in Turkish foreign
policy under the AK Party government
have been harshly criticized by some
political and academic circles both inside
and outside the country in recent years. It
is thus important to draw on the regional
and international challenges to Turkey’s
regional and global rise, as is done in this
special issue.
2
his issue also looks at Turkey’s rise
and quest for a new international order
from the window of the Muslim world
and through the use of alternative
approaches, discourses and policies such
as “the civilizational discourse”. It also
takes up the theme of, “civilizational
justice” and the Muslim perception
of injustice as key components of the
Muslim grievances about the global
order. A number of analyses in this issue
take on board the recent developments in
the Middle East after 2011, commonly
known as the “Arab Spring”.
he dual themes of “Turkey in the
global governance” and “Turkey-asa-middle power” have conspicuously
been lacking in Turkish foreign policy
literature and thus are in need of
further elaboration, both conceptually
and empirically. To partially ill this
gap, this special issue also contains an
article that seeks to locate Turkey in
the current liberal global governance
as a “rising middle power” occupying a
middle ground between the traditional
middle powers and the non-traditional
or emerging middle powers. he said
study then assesses Turkey’s preferences,
capabilities and strategies in the
changing network of global governance.
A second article serves a similar purpose
by providing an evaluation of Turkey’s
global governance strategy in the context
of its 2015 G20 Presidency.
Against this backdrop, a set of
questions crop up to lesh out Turkey’s
Locating Turkey as a ‘Rising Power’ in the Changing International Order:
interaction with the international order,
such as the following: How can one
best locate and conceptualize Turkey in
the current international order? What
are the delineating features of Turkey’s
conception and behavioural posture
vis-à-vis the current international
order in the context of law, justice and
ethics? How can one make sense of
Turkish conceptions of “world order”
through alternative lenses? How can
one interpret its relatively diferent
approach to the UN today compared to
the past? How can one proile Turkey’s
recent activism in global governance
and compare its “rising” power status
with that of other traditional middle
powers and the BRICs countries?
Informed by such questions, this
special issue brings together ive
articles under the main theme of this
special issue and aims to understand
the ways in which Turkey and other
rising powers position themselves in
the current international order vis-àvis the major powers. hey also seek
to shed light on Turkey’s behavioural
posture and conceptual outlook
that accompany its quest for a new
international order. Aside from these
ive articles under the main theme of
“Turkey and the international order”,
this special issue also contains two other
articles providing insights into Jordan
and the Arab Spring and Afghanistan’s
transition challenges after 2014.
Turkey’s Behavioural and
Normative Posture within
the Current International
Order
It is known that the world is currently
witnessing colossal global changes,
which are in fact the birth pangs of an
emerging post-Westphalian international
order: the decline of the hitherto
consecrated principles of sovereignty,
territoriality, and non-intervention; the
rise of democracy and human rights; the
entry of new actors and processes into
the realm of international politics; the
expansion of supranational organizations
and legal systems. Today, international
society is facing three main challenges,
as observed by Hurrell: “the need to
capture shared and common interests, to
manage unequal power, and to mediate
cultural diversity and value conlict.”2
hese aspirations will continue to be
adjourned so long as global politics
continues to be marred by a legitimacy
deicit.3 Hence the choice about the
nature of international order is between
one emphasizing technical management
of global afairs and global governance,
against one that underscores manifold
problems, “political” in nature, that have
to be solved.
In the aftermath of the Cold War,
contrary to expectations, the armed
and non-armed interventions and
imperialistic intrusions launched by
3
Emel Parlar Dal and Gonca Oğuz Gök
states with hegemonic impulses and
allegedly humanitarian motives in the
Muslim world and more generally in
the developing world have aborted the
likelihood of a transition to a peaceful
and egalitarian international order. he
West’s promiscuous exploitation of the
low level of human rights and democracy
in certain non-Western countries that
stand up against Western hegemony,
by virtue of military interventions,
geopolitical exclusion, and international
sanctions, speaks volumes about the
chequered history of the place of human
rights and democracy in the international
order after the end of the Cold War in the
early 1990s. he collective enforcement
mechanism of the UN as formulated in
Chapter VII often falls prey to the power
political game played out in particular
by the permanent members of the UN
Security Council. he Council, more
often than not, has stiled the hope of
the world community for genuine peace
and justice since the early 1990s. he
troubling question, therefore, revolves
around the level of deterrence which
could possibly be exercised by the UN
Security Council against aggressive
states. If the contemporary international
order is to be sustainable, it ought to give
greater voice to the will and aspirations of
the South within international political,
economic and inancial institutions,
while formulating policies that will
assist in the elevation of the standards
of peace, justice and material conditions
4
in the impoverished South. In the words
of Shapcott, “he ethical framework
associated with Westphalian sovereigntywhich gives only minor moral signiicance
to the sufering of outsiders- seems less
than adequate.”4 In an age in which
“democracy” and “human rights” have
become the “mantra” of world politics,
the sustainability of the international
order can only be achieved if and when
global structures and processes become
transparent, democratic and inclusive. If
we assume that international order shapes
the rules and mechanisms through which
international society is constructed, this
could easily presuppose the existence of
a “family” of nations and communities
that are bound together and cooperate in
solidarity. his solidarity is a prerequisite
for peace, prosperity and justice in the
world.
In spite of the globalization of
international law, which holds the
promise of ofering efective solutions
to global problems while elevating the
status of human rights and democracy as
cardinal principles of international law,
the power politics emanating from the
imperial appetite of hegemonic actors
continue to stile the longing of Asian
and African societies for peace, justice
and better living standards. Indeed, we
ought to be aware of the existing
“…crisis of global governance beyond
the capacities of a world of sovereign
states. In such a setting, the global war on
terrorism has been understood as a new
hegemonic project to assert dominance
Locating Turkey as a ‘Rising Power’ in the Changing International Order:
over the South while keeping the world
economy tilted to favour the North.
One reason for eforts at dominance
may be to control resources, but other
motives, including partisan national
interests, also play a role.”5
One disturbing feature of the current
changes and trends in international law
is the apparent disregard of the needs,
aspirations and interests of the Muslim
world by international institutions and
powerful states. Although the Muslim
world constitutes roughly one ifth of the
world population, it gets a very low share
of world revenues or a say, inter alia, about
the future of international law and society.
As noted by Abu Ni’meh, “the Islamic
countries are being pressured and even
harassed into being ready for ‘appropriate’
changes in International Law, however
much that disturbs or upsets them.”6
hat the Muslim world does not get its
fair share of decision-making prerogatives
in the UN (and most other international
organizations such as the World Bank
and World Trade Organization) once
again became manifest when, during
debates about reforming the UN Security
Council, which was a fashionable topic
a decade ago, there was almost no
discussion about possible ways in which
to ensure better representation for the
Muslim world within this body, while
the same actors had no qualms about
conceiving the possibility of conferring
permanent membership within the UN
Security Council for states as diverse as
Japan, Germany, India and Brazil.
As is noted by observers, Turkey
has been pursuing a multilateral and
multidimensional foreign policy since
2002. Turkish foreign policy is no longer
attuned to the vagaries of the American
geopolitical interests or the whimsical
dictates of the European Union, but is
rooted irmly in the “Ankara criteria”. he
point of departure for this behavioural
role is the Turkish priorities, vision of
international society, and long-term
projections. Turkey’s present government
is committed to “reforming” the
international system which, in Turkish eyes,
is beset by global injustices, economic and
social inequality, excessive militarisation,
undemocratic
representation
and
decision-making in major international
institutions, and the geopolitical, geoeconomic and geo-cultural marginalisation
of the Muslim world. Not surprisingly,
therefore, global and/regional actors with
hegemonic ambitions have become rather
weary of Turkey’s moral stand7 on issues
ranging from the endurance of poverty
in the South to Israel’s enduring military
occupation of and massive human rights
violations in the Palestinian territories,
from its unlinching denunciation of the
coup d’êtat in Egypt that removed the
elected President Mohammed Morsi from
power in July 2013 to its repeated calls
for the elimination of nuclear weapons
from the face of the Earth. his normative
search and behavioural posture reinforce
the “moral” ingredient of Turkish foreign
policy.
5
Emel Parlar Dal and Gonca Oğuz Gök
Turkey’s challenging posture within
the international order is also linked
to its ascendancy to the club of “rising
powers”. he narrative about “the rise of
the rest” has become a major explanatory
framework for the shifting constellation
of power in the world today. he new
power challengers are variably referred
to as “emerging or rising powers”, “great/
major powers”, “middle or middle range
powers (traditional or non-traditional
(or emerging))” and “regional powers”.
As is commonly agreed, the successive
economic crises and the high inlation
rates, as well as big societal and economic
inequalities made it hard for Turkey to
gain the status of an “emerging/rising
power” up until the irst years of the
2000s. However, the monetary policy
and the structural reforms carried out
just after Turkey’s currency and banking
crisis of 2001 helped Turkey’s economic
recovery and the improvement of its
inancial sector in the second half of
the irst decade of 2000s. With high
economic growth over the last decade,
Turkey gained the opportunity to utilize
its material resources for inluence at the
regional and global levels. In other words,
over the last decade, many aspects of
Turkey’s power were fungible in important
policy frameworks. Turkey’s ability to
turn resources into outcomes and its clear
upward trajectory in economic power
made it possible for it to raise its power
status to that of a “rising middle power”
in the global hierarchy of power.
6
However, when compared to the core
rising powers like China, India and
Brazil, Turkey’s material power, and thus
its bargaining power, still remains lower
vis-à-vis the established powers. As in
the case of other rising powers, Turkey
has still limited ability to exert inluence
in the more traditional realms of foreign
policy. Turkey’s rising power status can
only yield policy outcomes if it can use its
regional, economic, military and political
weight against the major powers on a host
of geopolitical matters as a bargaining
tool. On the other hand, Turkey’s active
participation in regional and international
organizations would certainly give it
substantial multilateral weight and
bargaining capacity. On some regional
issues, Turkey appears to have the ability
to frustrate or block (although it has done
so very rarely) Western posturing as seen
clearly in the 2010 Turkish-BrazilianIran swap deal (which was aborted by
the US).8 However, in the Syrian crisis,
Turkey failed to turn its rising power
status into a useful asset for its foreign
policy strategies and convince its Western
allies, particularly the U.S., to put its full
weight behind the opposition against the
Assad regime. In this respect, the Syrian
civil war clearly illustrates the limitations
of Turkey as a rising and regional power.
his also conirms the assumption that
rising powers may occasionally punch
above their weight, especially in a threat
environment with transnational security
challenges.9
Locating Turkey as a ‘Rising Power’ in the Changing International Order:
Obviously, like other rising powers,
Turkey is clearly seeking to establish itself
as the pre-eminent power in its region. Yet,
the ongoing disorder and turmoil in the
Middle East seem not to have provided it
with a convenient atmosphere to wield its
power. However, Turkey seeks to balance
its relatively low proile regional actorness
in the Middle East with a growing middle
power activism at global governance
institutions and forums like the UN, the
G20, and in other extra-regions like Africa
and Latin America. In the inancial realm,
it appears clear that Turkey would wish to
see the construction of a more efective
global inancial governance system,
and is ready to use some bargaining
mechanisms vis-à-vis the major powers
together with the other rising powers. In
matters of security, especially as it relates
to the Middle East, despite the existence
of divergences of its point of view with
some of its allies, particularly the U.S.,
with regard to the region’s key problems,
Turkey stands out as an accommodating
and challenging actor,10 and not as a hard
bargaining and blocking one; indeed
Turkey prefers cooperation as a response
to regional and transnational threats. As
a natural concomitant of its membership
within the Western security system,
Turkey’s challenging attitude is not meant
to obstruct major-power initiatives. his
posture separates out Turkey from other
rising powers on major questions of world
order and in the management of global
problems.
A multitude of writers working from
quite diferent perspectives agree that
directing attention to the rising powers
beyond the West is vitally signiicant for
an understanding of how the global order
is being reshaped in the 21st century.
Accordingly, a scholarly literature is
burgeoning that problematizes the
“foreign policy choices” of rising powers
with regard to the “international order”,
while drawing on the rising powers’
increasing economic and political
might that could pose a challenge
to “established institutions”. In this
vein, a prominent scholar on rising
powers, Andrew Hurrell, suggests that
international institutions are not just
concerned with liberal purposes of
solving common problems or promoting
shared values, but they are also “sites of
power” that relect and entrench power
hierarchies.11 Accordingly, rising powers
are well aware of the reality that “world
order is increasingly maintained by
international institutions”.12 Against
this background, it is no surprise that
aspiring major powers or rising states are
expected to devote so much attention to
international institutions like the United
Nations. We are thus able to witness
Russia’s preoccupation with the Security
Council; Chinese resistance to any
reform of the UN Security Council that
would add new permanent members;
Brazil’s campaign for a permanent seat
in the Council;13 and India’s eforts to
become an “agenda mover” on various
7
Emel Parlar Dal and Gonca Oğuz Gök
issues relecting its newfound role as a
bridge between North and South in the
UN.14 Turkey’s UN Security Council
temporary membership in 2009- 2010
and its application for the period
2015-2016 clearly illustrate increasing
willingness on the side of Ankara to have
an active role in the UN. Similarly, South
Africa wanted a repeat of its holding a
non-permanent seat at the UN Security
Council in 2007-2008 by applying for
membership in the same body for the
period between 2010-2012, which
eventually materialized.
hese foreign policy moves on
the part of aspiring rising states are
consistent with their insistence on an
“inter-governmental” and “UN-based
vision” for the future world order. he
rising powers often articulate a desire
to strengthen aspects of international
institutions, but with a speciic emphasis
on “egalitarian” and “just” redistribution
of political decision-making authority,
while at the same time championing
their own case for representation. In this
regard, rising powers tend to advocate a
more “equitable”, “just” and “legitimate”
multilateralism
through
United
Nations.15 his goes well with Hurrell’s
suggestion that power transitions among
major states have never been simply
about clashes of material power and
material interest; rather, conlicts over
“rival justice claims” have often been
a determinant factor in the history of
world order. Contestation over these
8
“normative claims” has long been at
the heart of international politics, and
the return over the past decade of more
Hobbesian or Westphalian tendencies
has brought them once more to centre
stage. hus, for Hurrell, emerging powers
have laid great emphasis on arguments
for normative issues like, “justice”
and “fairness” and they will naturally
seek to revise the dominant norms
of the system in order to relect their
own interests as well as values through
international institutions.16 What is
notable is the way in which “rising
states” have become more proactivefor example, using the language of
democracy and representativeness to
constantly push for the “reform” of
international institutions, particularly
the UN Security Council. States like
Brazil, India, South Africa and Turkey
have mobilized claims for “normative”
issues like greater representational
fairness (as with membership of the
Security Council) and distributional
justice (as with Brazil’s promotion of a
global hunger fund and Turkey’s attempt
to lead global humanitarian eforts
relected in its hosting of the irst UN
Humanitarian Summit in 2016) in the
UN platform. In this vein, Fontaine
and Kliman assert that states like Brazil,
India, Indonesia, and Turkey ofer great
potential as partners to “extend” the
global order.17 However, it is much less
clear how far any of these rising states,
including Turkey, have moved in terms
Locating Turkey as a ‘Rising Power’ in the Changing International Order:
of becoming producers of the “ideas”
that will shape conceptions of global
order in the future.18
Assessment of Individual
Articles
In “Muslim Perceptions of Injustice
as an International Relations Question”,
Hasan Kösebalaban argues that the
Muslim world is deeply suspicious of
the international order on account of the
deeply felt sense of injustice committed
against Muslims. In the author’s view,
the root of the problem lies in the lack
of suicient opportunities within the
existing international institutions and
decision-making bodies for Muslim
participation. his is compounded by
the lack of stable political institutions
and political fragmentation within
the Muslim world which undermines
Muslim actors’ ability to take a joint and
assertive posture within the international
order. Kösebalaban asserts that Muslim
grievances about the existing international
arrangements derive in particular from
the failure to address the Palestinian
problem, lack of overall interest in
the plight and aspirations of Muslim
minorities, and the lack of democracy
in most of the Muslim countries. In
all these cases, it is irst and foremost
the West which impedes the cause of
justice, (positive) peace and democracy
in the Muslim world. he author also
notes that the West has also sought to
sabotage the emancipatory potential of
the “Arab Spring” that began at the end
of 2010 by aligning itself mostly with the
counterrevolutionary political forces, as
in the case of its support for the military
junta that deposed the elected President
Mohamed Morsi in 2013 and its failure
to support the opposition against the
murderous Assad regime in Syria.
Kösebalaban is also critical of the
fact that international relations theories
decline to address the issue of “justice” in
favour of political and economic interests
of states because they are grounded in
a materialistic paradigm. By contrast,
Islamic international relations theory
considers “justice” as a key component
of its conceptual and analytical concerns
and views “peace” not only as the
“absence of war”, but combines it with
justice and a just social order.
In the article entitled “Turkey’s Quest
for a “New International Order”: he
Discourse of Civilization and the Politics
of Restoration”, Murat Yeşiltaş argues that
the most important efect of the Justice
and Development Party (JDP) in Turkish
foreign policy has been that it re-opened
Turkey’s understanding of “international
order” up for discussion on the basis of
a “new representation of civilizational
belonging”. According to him, the
increased emphasis on civilization in
Turkish foreign policy fundamentally
afected Turkey’s cultural critique of
the international order and caused it
to change its foreign policy paradigm
9
Emel Parlar Dal and Gonca Oğuz Gök
that coded the “Western system as the
inal target of an advancing political
understanding”. Foreign policy makers
and political elites deined this period
as “restoration politics” and thus both
historicized it and then recreated it along
the axis of the “New Turkey” discourse.
Building on Ahmet Davutoğlu’s three
scholarly works, namely Alternative
Paradigms: he Impact of Islamic and
Western Weltanshchauungs on Political
heory, Civilizational Transformation and
the Muslim World, and Strategic Depth,
the paper asserts that Davutoğlu leans
toward the concept of “civilization” as a
“unit of analysis” and the key discourse
for “New Turkey” which seeks to
reproduce the “civilizational identity”
as part of Turkey’s international order
narrative by blending it with an antihegemonic “dissident” discourse.
Accordingly, Yeşiltaş argues that this
“civilizational identity” caused the
birth of a new geopolitical vision that
was blended with the Islamic solidarity
discourse and which was shaped
around the institutional and normative
representations of the Islamic world
on a historical level. It is the start of a
new way of viewing Islamic civilization’s
normative-based order narrative as a
value in establishing the multi-cultural
structure of world order. his goes well
with Davutoğlu’s conceptualization of
new “cultural order” in the sense that
in a period where globalization ofers a
re-blending of the continuity elements
10
of old cultural basins, a Euro-centred
civilizational fancy will not keep its
hegemonic position for long. In the inal
analysis, Yeşiltaş demonstrates that since
the early 2000s Turkey has placed its
critique of the international order within
a political and economic discourse as
well as a “civilizational” one. Yet, as
the paper suggests, how and through
which mechanisms the representation of
Islamic civilization will be transferred to
the international system by virtue, inter
alia, of Turkey’s rise still remain as openended questions.
In her contribution to this special issue,
“Tracing the Shift in Turkey’s Normative
Approach towards International Order
through Debates in the UN”, Gonca
Oğuz Gök draws on Turkey’s changing
“normative approach towards international
order” in a historical perspective through
the debates in the UN over the last decade.
To this end, she irst analyzes the normative
challenges posed by rising states towards
the international order by giving reference
to the rich literature on “rising powers
and international order”. In doing so, she
also focuses on the role of international
institutions in providing the rising
powers with space for coalition building,
bargaining and counterbalancing the
major powers. Secondly, Oğuz Gök aims
at understanding the historical evolution
of Turkey’s normative approach towards
international order from a comparative
perspective by mainly focusing on two
consecutive periods, the 1990s and 2000s.
Locating Turkey as a ‘Rising Power’ in the Changing International Order:
Here the author investigates to ind
out if there has been a shift in Turkey’s
normativity towards the international
order and in its order criticism since the
1990s. For the author, Turkey’s “ordercriticism” is not a new phenomenon and
goes back to the Republican era. However,
as stated by the author, despite its criticisms
with regard to the UN’s decision-making
system, Turkey was generally cautious in
adopting an anti-system stance towards
the UN and its mechanisms and, as a
result of this, it followed the decisions
and resolutions of the United Nations
throughout the Cold-War years. In the
post Cold War era, Turkish rulers started
to raise the tone of their criticism about
the UN’s failure in responding to crises
and did not hesitate to openly declare their
expectations from the UN. he author
also points out that the second half of the
1990s was marked by Turkey’s multiple
quests for a new role and position in the
changing world order. he “world state”,
“bridge”, “Turkish model” concepts can
be seen, in this respect, as part of Turkey’s
willingness to relocate and reconceptualise
itself in the changing international
conditions of the 1990s.
From the article by Oğuz Gök, one
can also deduce that since the 2000s
there has been a gradual shift in Turkey’s
order-criticism compared to the 1990s.
his new approach to international order
has been shaped by both more “concrete”
normative suggestions and a brand
new order-building role at the regional
and global levels. he author also
underlines the “Davutoğlu” efect in the
construction of this new international
order understanding both discursively
and empirically over the last decade. In
the last part of her article, Oğuz Gök
also explains the reasons behind Turkey’s
vociferous criticism of the UN and other
major global governance institutions.
She concludes that Turkey’s normative
resistance to the international order
is concretized by its increasing reform
demands and its willingness to extend
the existing international order by
proposing an “international justice-based
alternative approach” to the current
order, which needs to be reconstructed
within, not outside, the UN platform.
In the article entitled “On Turkey’s Trail
in the Network of Global Governance
as a ‘Rising Middle Power’: Preferences,
Capabilities, and Strategies”, Emel Parlar
Dal discusses Turkey’s contributions to
global governance as a “rising middle
power”. She seeks to take up the case
of Turkey which, she notes, is largely
neglected within the academic literature
on the “rising powers”. Parlar Dal takes
up this challenge by evaluating Turkey’s
shifting status in the power hierarchy
within international society. She argues
that the root causes of Turkey’s elevation
to the status of a “rising middle power”
within the last decade could also be sought
in the current Turkish government’s
more “nuanced” pluricentric perception
of international society, its difering
11
Emel Parlar Dal and Gonca Oğuz Gök
civilizational understanding and its
new cosmopolitan worldview. he
author also draws on a number of other
factors: “possession of necessary material,
ideational and institutional power
resources, the increasing dependence on
global economy, and the strength of civil
society.” She designates Turkey’s place
between traditional middle powers such
as Canada, Australia and South Korea and
non-traditional middle powers like Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa.
In this context, she draws on Turkey’s
“unique position and its bridge-building
role between ‘the West and the rest’”.
he author delineates the main
contours of Turkey’s “reformist”, and
certainly not anti-systemic, rather
“within system” posture on the issue of
global governance, which include a call
for greater justice, more representative
and participatory mechanisms for
international decision-making, more
efective conlict-resolution mechanisms,
and the recognition of the pluricentric
coniguration of the world order today.
his overall context explains a great
deal about Turkey’s reformist agenda
as the new holder of the presidency of
the G20 in 2015: overseeing sustainable
growth at the global level; reducing
economic disparities between the North
and South; establishing coalitions with
which it has similar developmental
needs; and engaging the G20 with global
problems that are beyond its immediate
and speciic concerns.
12
In his contribution to this special issue,
entitled “Transformation Trajectory
of the G20 and Turkey’s Presidency:
Middle Powers in Global Governance”,
Sadık Ünay irst presents a historical
and institutional evolution of the G20
since its foundation in the aftermath
of the Asian inancial crisis in 1997. In
this study, Ünay also touches upon the
evolution of the G20 after the 2008
global inancial crisis under the Bush and
Obama administrations respectively, and
explains how the G20 was symbolically
and supericially designed at the leader’s
level as an umbrella organization through
an expansion of the club of the G7; with
the former now including prominent
rising powers like China, India and
Brazil. As noted by the author, after the
elevation of the Forum to the leader’s
level in 2008, the G20 engaged in
transforming global inancial governance
into a shared operational area between
the Global North and the South. Despite
all these eforts, as indicated by the
author, there still exists some limitations
of the G20 in terms of institutional
efectiveness, legitimacy and agency.
In Ünay’s view, in order to overcome
the current structural problems and the
“legitimacy/ownership deicit” of the
G20, a more inclusive policy agenda
regarding development issues appears
as a must. he difering strategies
of the BRICS and middle powers
regarding the G20 are also scrutinized
by Ünay. He holds that while the
Locating Turkey as a ‘Rising Power’ in the Changing International Order:
middle powers as insiders in the G20
are more committed to the activities of
the forum, the BRICS prefer adopting
hedging strategies and thus remain
reluctant towards actively becoming
involved in the day-to-day running
of the forum. In the inal analysis, the
author explains how the transformation
trajectory of the G20 over the years and
the middle powers’ increasing activism
in this platform have matched Turkey’s
ambitious global governance agenda in
general and its 2015 G20 Presidency
programme in particular. According
to the author, the increasing weight of
development issues in the G20 agenda
over the last ive years has also itted well
Turkey’s multidirectional foreign policy,
geographically covering the developing
countries from diferent continents.
Ünay also states that Turkey’s objective
of establishing an institutional basis for
the G20 that would also welcome the
least developed countries (LDCs) may
also be seen as a relection of Turkey’s
middle power activism and its bridge
building role between the developed
and developing countries. he author
suggests that Turkey’s rotating 2015
G20 presidency could create leverage
for Turkey’s middle power actorness in
global governance and its call for reform
in major global governance institutions.
Two articles on a theme diferent
from the main theme of the issue
are also included in this special issue
and contribute to this special issue’s
multi-perspective approach to regional
and international afairs. In “Jordan
and the Arab Spring: Challenges and
Opportunities”, Nuri Yeşilyurt aims to
analyze the impacts of the Arab Spring
on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
Acknowledging the fact that among
Arab monarchies, the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan is one of the most
vulnerable because of its small size,
poor economy, fragmented society
and uneasy neighborhood, the article
speciically deals with the survival of
the Hashemite regime in the course of
the Arab Spring by analyzing the main
sources of stability/instability for the
regime. Yeşilyurt asserts that Arab Spring
brought more beneits to the Hashemite
regime than problems in the sense
that the regime has been successful in
overcoming radical Islamist challenges,
deepening economic problems and the
growing unrest among East Bankers.
Yet, the article stresses that the long term
sustainability of Jordan’s stability is still
questionable since it is highly dependent
on external factors, namely the regional
conjuncture and foreign assistance.
In “Post-2014 Drawdown and
Afghanistan’s Transition Challenges”,
Saman Zulfqar draws on the challenges
of transition that Afghanistan has been
facing since the 2014 drawdown of
foreign troops from the country. he
author aims to depict the country’s
various transition challenges related
with security, economics and domestic
13
Emel Parlar Dal and Gonca Oğuz Gök
politics and tries to assess how regional
states could play a constructive role
in facilitating the transition process in
Afghanistan. For the author, among all
the transition processes it is the process
of political transition that has been
the most challenging and decisive in
shaping the contours of the new order
in the making in Afghanistan. Saman
Zulfqar also emphasizes that political
transition will be incomplete unless the
reconciliation process with insurgent
groups, namely the Taliban, is successfuly
resumed. In the inal analysis, the author
concludes that the onus for making the
transition process successful rests on the
Afghan people themselves, who have
been sufering for decades from tribal
and ethnic conlicts and civil war.
his special issue wraps up with
a tribute dedicated to Ali Mazrui,
written by one of his students, M. Akif
Kayapınar. As a complementary piece to
Hasan Kösebalan’s article, the tribute,
entitled “A Life of ‘Long Debate’: A
Tribute to Ali A. Mazrui (1933-2014)”,
presents a short biography of Professor
Mazrui, who was a spirited Africanist,
a conscientious public intellectual, a
proliic writer and a life-long activist
against abuses of power and violation
of human rights. In his works, Mazrui
speciically focuses on the role and
signiicance of “culture” in world politics,
as opposed to power based explanations.
Kayapınar asserts that the solution
ofered by Mazrui for the prevailing
14
inequalities in the world today was a
“world-federation of cultures”, which
he believed to be more relevant than an
order based solely on the distribution of
power and security concerns. his tribute
completes this special issue’s “order”
debate by emphasizing once again the
“ethical” and “cultural” dimension of
international politics as well as sensitivity
towards basic freedoms, fundamental
human rights and inequality in a
changing international order.
In Guise of Conclusion
his special issue thus ofers a multidisciplinary panorama for assessing
Turkey’s changing power status in
the existing international order via a
framework of multiple perspectives, and
locates Turkey as a “rising” power with
a number of peculiarities. Turkey’s rise
in the current power hierarchy seems
to inluence not only its normative
stance vis-à-vis recent international
developments and regional crises, but also
its preferences and strategies with regard
to the changing global governance and
the liberal international order. As most
of the papers of this special issue have
argued, despite the existing limitations
and constraints to its regional and, to a
lesser extent, global rise, Turkey has shown
its willingness to participate in eforts to
build a more efective set of arrangements
for a more equitable and just international
order. Turkey’s new pluralistic and multi-
Locating Turkey as a ‘Rising Power’ in the Changing International Order:
centric approach to international order
is not only based on a communitarian
understanding of international solidarity,
but also on a cosmopolitan worldview
which is universalistic in terms of global
citizenship, justice and ethics.19 In this
respect, in the new normative agenda
of Turkish foreign policy, the quest for
global justice and order criticism are
interlinked. On the other hand, Turkey’s
quest for a new international order, its
civilizational approach and encompassing
understanding based on the idea of the
coexistence of multiple civilizations and
multiple modernities also constitutes a
critical dimension of its new outlook.
Turkey’s multicentric approach to the
international order also explains its recent
activism in global governance institutions.
he new global governance, as understood
by Turkey, seeks to establish interactions
between civilisations, while contributing
“to the emergence of a genuine global
culture in which convergence and
pluralism coexist.”20
Aside from Turkey’s nuanced normative
stance vis-à-vis international crises and
its quest for a justice and ethics-based
international order, that which is new in
Turkey’s current approach to the global
order is its increasing willingness to act
as a middle power between the West
and the rest. However, given current
structural and regional constraints, this
new role conception has been held in
check by some limitations. Compared
to the other rising powers like China,
India, Brazil and South Africa, Turkey’s
ability to exert diplomatic inluence in
its own sub-region, namely the Middle
East, is actually limited due to the
ongoing regional instability, chaos and
the emerging security threats, such as the
one emanating from the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In contrast, other
rising powers enjoy an incomparable
manoeuvring capacity and growing
diplomatic inluence in their sub-regions,
which may enable them to frustrate
Western diplomacy and wield signiicant
power. Since the occupation of Iraq by
the US in 2003, no new regional order
has emerged in the Middle East, and,
with the outbreak of the Arab revolts in
late 2010, the region has come to witness
new power antagonisms among major
powers, regional states and the emerging
non-state actors (armed and unarmed).
In this highly chaotic atmosphere,
no state is powerful enough to play
a regional power broker role. Here it
must be reminded that between roughly
2005-2013, Turkey positioned itself as a
regional power in the Middle East thanks
to its proactive foreign policy, increasing
trade relations, and socialization with
the regional countries. Although Turkey
successfully responded to the region’s
challenges and performed credibly in the
areas of mediation, conlict resolution
and development cooperation in the irst
decade of the 2000s, the aggravation of
the Syrian civil war after 2012 and the
military coup d’état in Egypt in 2013
15
Emel Parlar Dal and Gonca Oğuz Gök
partly sabotaged its regional calculations;
as a result, its rising regional power status
in the Middle East could not generate
efective policy outcomes. Turkey’s
relatively diminishing political inluence
in the Middle East over the last three
years has slackened its global rise by
weakening its regional competitiveness
vis-à-vis the other rising powers who are,
at the same time, eminent regional actors
in their own sub-regions.
In spite of occasional “road accidents”,
Turkey continues to be unequivocal
about its active advocacy for a reform of
the Western-dominated global order in
order to introduce more representative,
efective and just institutional structures.
In this context, in its criticism towards
the West for having adopted a doublestandard vis-à-vis the international crises
of the last decade, Ankara has come
to take on “a brand new role” aiming
to “bring a higher moral standard to
global governance” during this period.21
Yet, despite intense criticisms towards
the workings of the UN system, in
practice, the UN has continued to be an
important arena in Ankara’s search for
a just international order as well as in its
eforts to “restructure” the world order.
Furthermore, as a rising power that
takes part in the Western institutions,
Turkey’s emphatic calls for a revision
of the international system are clearly
distinguished from those of other rising
16
states, granting it membership within
a plethora of Western international
institutions. In this context, Turkey’s
“normative resistance” of the last decade
is designed to propose an “international
justice-based alternative approach” to the
existing international order which needs
to be reconstructed within, not outside,
the UN platform.
Finally, as guest editors we would
like to thank irst Prof. Berdal Aral for
his valuable contribution to this special
issue since the very beginning. He
made signiicant eforts at every stage
for maximizing the academic value and
content quality of this issue. Without
his rigorous help, criticism and sense
of organisation we doubt it would have
been possible for us to inish this issue
of Perceptions. We also thank all the
authors for their valuable contributions
to this issue as well as Birgül Demirtaş,
deputy editor of Perceptions, for her
feedback and editing and Murat Yeşiltaş
for his encouragement and kind help. As
the guest editors, we hope this issue on
Turkey and the International Order will
bring novelty to both the IR and Turkish
foreign policy literature and will provide
a thought-provoking volume about the
current debates on how to locate Turkey
in the changing international order and
how to understand its new position in
global governance institutions compared
to other prominent rising powers.
Locating Turkey as a ‘Rising Power’ in the Changing International Order:
Endnotes
1
Richard Fontaine and Daniel M. Kliman, “he Global Swing States”, he Washington
Quarterly, Vol. 36, No.1 (Winter 2013), pp. 93-109; Andrew F. Hart and Bruce D. Jones,
“How Do Rising Powers Rise?”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 52, No.6 (2010),
pp. 63-88; Matthew D. Stephen, “Rising Regional Powers and International Institutions:
he Foreign Policy Orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa”, Global Society, Vol. 26,
No.3 (2012), pp. 289-309; Breslin Shaun, “China’s Emerging Global Role: Dissatisied
Responsible Great Power”, Politics, Vol. 30 (S1) (2010), pp. 52- 62, Michael Zürn and
Matthew Stephen, “he View of Old and New Powers on the Legitimacy of International
Institutions”, Politics, Vol. 30 (S1), (2010), pp. 91–101; Florini Ann, “Rising Asian Powers
and Changing Global Governance”, International Studies Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2011),
pp. 24- 33; Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and
Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy”, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Spring 2010),
pp. 63- 95; Miles Kahler, “Rising Powers and Global Governance: Negotiating Change in
a Resilient Status Quo”, International Afairs, Vol. 89, No. 3 (2013), pp. 711- 729; Sean
W. Burges, “Brazil as A Bridge between Old and New Powers?”, International Afairs, Vol.
89, No. 3 (2013), pp. 577- 594; Maximilian Terhalle, “Reciprocal Socialization: Rising
Powers and the West”, International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2011), pp. 341–361;
Amrita Narlikar, “India Rising: Responsible to Whom?”, International Afairs, Vol. 89, No. 3
(2013), pp. 595–614; Amrita Narlikar, “Introduction Negotiating the Rise of New Powers”,
International Afairs, Vol. 89, No. 3 (2013), pp.561–576; Stefan A Schirm, “Leaders in Need
of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance”, European Journal of International
Relations, Vol. 16, No.2 (2010), pp. 197-221; Suresh P Sing and Memory Dube, “BRICs and
the World Order: A Beginner’s Guide”, (2013), pp.1-46; Kevin Gray and Craig N. Murphy”,
“Introduction: Rising Powers and the Future of Global Governance”, hird World Quarterly,
Vol. 34, No. 2 (2013), pp.183-193; Gregory Chin and Fahimul Quadir, “Introduction:
Rising States, Rising Donors and the Global Aid Regime”, Cambridge Review of International
Afairs, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2012), pp. 493-506.
2 Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society,
New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 2.
3 Ibid.
4 Richard Shapcott, “International Ethics”, in John Baylis, Steve Smith & Patricia Owens
(eds.), he Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Fifth edition, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 200.
5 Richard Falk, Balakrishnan Rajagopal and Jacqueline Stevens (eds.), “Introduction”,
International Law and the hird World: Reshaping Justice, New York, Routledge-Cavendish,
2008, 1-7, p. 6.
6 Hassan Abu Ni’meh, “Consequences for Islamic Nations if International Law is Reshaped
–How can Islamic Nations Best Utilize International Law”, Restarting the Dialogue in International Law, Documentation of the International Workshop held in Amman, 21-22 July
2003, p. 68.
7 İbrahim Karagül, “Gazze Ortak Utanç, İsrail bir Sapmadır” (Gaza, our common shame,
Israel as deviation), Yeni Şafak, 21 July 2014.
17
Emel Parlar Dal and Gonca Oğuz Gök
8 Hart and Jones, “How Do Rising Powers Rise?”, p. 84.
9 Ibid., p. 69.
10 Tarık Oğuzlu and Emel Parlar Dal, “Decoding Turkey’s Rise: An Introduction”, Turkish Studies, Vol.14, No.4 (December 2013), p. 618.
11 Andrew, Hurrell, “Brazil: What kind of a rising state in what kind of an Institutional Order”,
in Allan S. Alexandrof and Andrew F. Cooper, (eds.), Rising States Rising Institutions: Challenges for Global Governance, Brookings Inst. Press, 2010, pp. 3- 4.
12 Matthew D. Stephen “Rising Regional Powers and International Institutions: he Foreign
Policy Orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa”, Global Society, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2012),
p. 297.
13 Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be Great
Powers?”, International Afairs, Vol. 82, No. 1 (2006), p. 10.
14 A. Cooper, and T. Fues, “Do the Asian Drivers Pull their Diplomatic Weight? China, India,
and the United Nations”, World Development, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2008), pp. 293- 307.
15 Hurrell, “Hegemony, liberalism and Global Order”, p. 11.
16 Andrew Hurrell and Sandeep Sengupta, “Emerging powers, North–South Relations and
Global Climate Politics”, International Afairs, Vol. 88, No. 3 (2012), p. 464.
17 Fontaine and Kliman, “International Order and Global Swing States”, p. 94.
18 Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order”, p. 11
19 Emel Parlar Dal, “Assessing Turkey’s ‘Normative’ Power in the Middle East and North Africa
Region: New Dynamics and their Limitations”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2013), p.
716.
20 Emel Parlar Dal, “A Normative heory Approach to Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy
through the Cosmopolitanism-Communitarianism divide”, International Journal, Vol. 70,
No. 3 (September 2015, forthcoming).
21 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Global Governance”, SAM Vision Papers, No. 2 (March 2012).
18