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1995, problematiquejournal.com
My purpose in this discussion is to show how I understand the "politics" of deconstruction, particularly with regard to Thomas McCarthy's objection that Derrida's "metapolitical, philosophical reflection" cannot "itself produce relevant political insights," and therefore does not "obviate the need for entering into empirical, normative, and critical debates at the level of politics." (1991, 114-15). I begin with the claim that an adequate notion of ethical-political "responsibility" entails the following presuppositions: that moral claims and decisions always necessitate a moment or an ethical ground that philosophy itself is essentially unable to address, that this moment is fundamentally bound up with subjectivity and that, consequently, an element of uncertainty is essential and foundational to the ethical sphere itself. I argue that such an understanding of "responsibility" is not at all congruent with the theories of Richard Rorty or Jurgen Habermas. In other words, I suggest, it would be misguided to reduce my own view of radical contingency to the ways in which contingency is taken up by either Habermas or Rorty. In the last section of the paper, I propose that the view I outline at the start does connect directly - if somewhat abstractly - with Derrida's project. Specifically, I propose that it is on precisely the level of "responsibility" that the deconstructive work of Derrida is an important contribution to radical social theories such as feminism. I conclude with the suggestion that deconstruction is a "critical theory" - but that, unlike that of the Frankfurt school, it is one which works at the metapolitical level of the ethics of ethics.
The idea of a critical theory has colonized the consciousness of academia, and become an integral part of the pursuit of higher knowledge. Competing ideas have thereby become standard bearers in that critical theory acts as a measure of true understanding and/or social rank in institutional settings. The only problem, however, is that many of the distinct – and competing – theories similarly answering to the description raise two related questions – namely, ‘what is a critical theory?’ and what is ‘critical’ about the ‘theory’ (or theories) in question? The idea of a critical theory is not only itself subject to criticism, it also remains open to questioning and contestation. The following research provides an answer by questioning what has traditionally been taken as given. It addresses a perceived lack in the literature regarding the idea’s standard and/or truth- bearing and interrogates the relation between thought and language in (a) critical theory. The thesis explores the problematic connection between criteria and critique, or the distinct ways in which the relation between thought and language directs contested ideas of a critical theory. It does this by taking each’s measure through competing ontological standards of measurement and evaluation. The relation between the problem of the criterion and the question of being therefore becomes integral. The problem of the criterion invariably calls into question the rationality of any given ontological scheme and boundary line. Specifically, if a critical reason is to determine the ontological status of ‘beings’, it is forced to acknowledge the way a criterion may itself determine the quality or state (being) of the very objects (boundaries, qualities, relations) in question. The thesis primarily considers the critical theories of Derrida, Lyotard and Habermas via the circle of understanding. Heidegger and Gadamer pave the way towards the idea of a critical theory via hermeneutics’ conception of the circular relation between thought and language. The thesis moves towards Derrida, Lyotard and Habermas to follow the distinct ways in which the circle calls itself into being and/or question. The thesis's contribution to scholarship is twofold 1) to recall the problematic of hermeneutics as a critical methodology and 2) to act as a stimulus for future research into the question of the direction of fit between thought and language: to what extent do they direct (inform, perform) each other within the circle of understanding? The aim is to rethink the hermeneutical circle via a consideration of the critical theories in question. The approach is performative in that the competing critical theories are interpreted as parts that form a complex whole, and are understood (questioned) with respect to each other. The critical theorists prove to be ‘critical’ in the following way: in prioritizing linguistic parts over a complex whole – Derrida (the syntactic), Lyotard (the semantic) and Habermas (the pragmatic) – the corresponding critical theories return us to the circle in conflicting ways. The conflict of interpretations directs our questioning accordingly: in what ways do the related moving parts bring forth and/or hold back the complex whole being questioned? We argue that the critical issue between them is a normative conception of our practical and/or linguistic identities (moral being). The methodological approach to the circle therefore serves a critical function in that it is performed (enabled and directed) through the very idea(s) in question.
Journal of Pragmatics
Pragmatics, poststructuralism, and hermeneutics: An examination of discursive-consensus formation and its ethical implications2008 •
In this paper, I examine how Jürgen Habermas, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Hans-Georg Gadamer deal with the subject of discursive-consensus formation in their work. I argue that while Habermas's theory of communicative action provides a comparative benchmark on the subject of consensus, and Gadamer's work on hermeneutics supports him to an extent, Derrida's focus on deconstruction and the critique of metaphysics and Foucault's project of disrupting sedimented discourses present markedly divergent opinions on the subject. As such, I also look at the ethical and political implications of each of their respective positions specific to the issues of consensus, understanding, and dialogue.
2008 •
""The Domestication of Derrida" offers a detailed account of Richard Rorty’s attempt to reconcile deconstruction with the American pragmatist and liberal traditions. Fabbri argues that Rorty’s powerful reading protocol is motivated by the necessity to contain the risks of Derrida’s critique of Western philosophy and politics. Rorty claims that Derrida reduces philosophy to a production of private fantasies that do not have any political or theoretical relevance. Fabbri challenges such an aberrant appropriation by investigating the two key features of Rorty’s privatization of deconstruction: the reduction of deconstructive writing to an example of merely autobiographical literature; and the thesis that Derrida not only dismisses, but also mocks the endeavor to engage philosophy with political struggle. What is ultimately questioned in "The Domestication of Derrida" is the legitimacy of labelling deconstruction as a postmodern withdrawal from politics and theory. By discussing Derrida’s resistance against the very possibility of theoretical and political ascetism, Fabbri shows that there is much more politics and philosophy in deconstruction than Rorty is willing to admit. "
Philosophy & social criticism
Judging justice: The strange responsibility of deconstruction2004 •
This paper demonstrates that when the concept of ethical-political responsibility is taken in its modern sense as a decision or outcome based on the protocols of reason, responsibility is neither simply possible nor simply impossible. Paradoxically, it appeals to a demand that it cannot fulfil; responsibility is thus (im)possible. Moreover, insofar as a deconstructive demonstration of this aporia is itself a response to reason’s own demand, deconstruction cannot be characterized as simply responsible or irresponsible. Rather, deconstruction inscribes itself as the interior limit of the order of ethics, of responsibility, as such. Deconstruction is thus characterized best as an (ir)responsible interrogation of the very principle of reason to which political philosophers such as Habermas appeal when they invoke responsibility. To this extent deconstruction enacts the strange responsibility of interrogating critically precisely what is deemed ‘just.’
Studia UBB, Philosophia
Phenomenology, Deconstruction, and Critique: A Derridean Perspective2021 •
Critical phenomenology is gaining currency as a progressive philosophy of emancipation, but there is no consensus on what its “criticality” entails. From a Derridean perspective, critique can be said to involve radical self-interrogation; a philosophy that questions its own conditions of possibility or grounds is one that opens itself to its auto-deconstruction. Deconstruction produces undecidability, however, which means that the philosophy in question can no longer account for its political claims or its normative force. This is the predicament in which critical phenomenology, like any other critical theory, will find itself when it takes its critical injunction to heart.
Contemporary Political Theory
Emancipation, Progress, Critique: Debating Amy Allen's The End of Progress2018 •
Amy Allen is cautious of progress. And she is fighting for it. The ammunition, elaborated in her audacious The End of Progress, is a form of critique that emanates from a synergy she builds between the discontents of postcolonial theory and the insights of critical theory. The debates that followed the book’s publication often presented Allen’s enlightened skepticism as skepticism of the Enlightenment, and her rejection of the hubris of a Eurocentric historical logic of progress as a wholesale rejection of the universalism implied in the commitment to emancipation. The commentaries collected in this exchange (which began at a meeting in Prague in May 2017) rebalance the pendulum of criticism – while most of Allen’s critics have found her unpalatably critical of progress, these five interventions urge her to be more boldly so. Guilel Treiber counsels her to pay due attention to the insignificant and the infamous, Andrew Feenberg – to acknowledge the way technical artefacts and system...
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