Symbolic and Utilitarian Political Value of a Tradition: Martyrdom in the Iranian Political Culture

Symbolic and Utilitarian Political Value of a Tradition: Martyrdom in the Iranian Political Culture Manochehr Dorraj Martyrdom has been a recurring theme in the Iranian political culture. This article presents an analysis of its sociological and historical significance and delineates the causes of its politicization and popularization since the 1960s. In order to understand this tradition in its broader cultural context, the relationship between the preeminence of tragedy in Iranian pre and post-Islamic popular culture and martyrdom is explored. By examining the writings of the major literary and political figures, the metamorphosis and political utilization of this tradition in recent political history of Iran are propounded. The article demonstrates how martyrdom as a symbol has functioned to forge a sense of solidarity, enhance mass mobilization, and preserve the sacred values of the community. In this context, the leading intellectuals and lay thinkers alike perceive of martyrdom as a symbol of communal cleansing and regeneration. The symbolic and utilitarian use of this tradition are also analyzed in the pre- and postrevolutionary period. "He who is in love never fears death. He fears neither punishment nor imprisonment. His heart is like a hungry wolf. The wolf does not fear the shepherd's cries." —Baba Taher "In the martyrdom of a candle flame is a luminous secret known best to that last tallest glimmer." —Forough Farokhzad Introduction Throughout the Iranian Revolution of 1979 many Shi'ite Muslims donned white gowns and marched in the streets, indicating a readiness to become martyrs for the Islamic cause. During the Iran-Iraq war much of the world watched in amazement as thousands of Iranian youth voluntarily walked through Iraqi mine fields to clear a path for Iranian tanks and artillery divisions. Despite Iraq's superior fire power, Iran mobilized repeated human wave assaults on Iraq's fortified positions. These two events dramatize a significant symbolic component of Iranian political culture which has,so far, received little attention. Throughout the history of Iran, martyrdom has been a recurring phenomenon to celebrate and safeguard the sacred boundaries, 490 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS sublime values and exalted rituals by which the culture is sanctioned. The question of the persistence of martyrdom in the Shi'ite culture of Iran is a socio-historical one. Therefore, the first part of this article delineates the sociological foundations and historical genealogy of martyrdom. Then the politicization and popularization of this ritual by religious and secular intellectual leaders throughout the 1960s and 1970s will be examined. The tradition of martyrdom is by no means confined to the Islamic faith. Both Judaism and Christianity exalt martyrdom in the path of God as a noble act. Judaism, for example, is said to be a religion of martyrdom. It preaches that Jews, the chosen people of God, must be prepared to suffer and, if necessary, to die in order to safeguard and preserve their faith.1 Christians are also taught to "confess and if need be to suffer for the name." The pious must carry the cross and the spirit it represents.2 Indeed, Christians are told that the crucifixion of Christ was a corollary to the slaughter of other prophets: "The prophets, by their sufferings at the hands of the Jewish nation, had been witness of God's mercy and judgment and Jesus' sufferings would be continued in the lives of his followers."3 Only through examples of martyrdom can the believers prove themselves worthy servants of God. Since all major religions, including Judaism, Christianity and Islam, emerged as persecuted sects, they developed elaborate rituals not only to cope with the repression and death associated with martyrdom but also to celebrate life. Martyrdom is defined as a conscious attempt to embrace death for a personal or political cause. While it may appear as self-negation, as it would be demonstrated in the following pages, martyrdom is often an act of self-aggrandizement to affirm the time-honored tradition of the community. Loyalty to communal tradition strengthens the personal and the communal sense of honor and consolidates cultural vitality and historical continuity. Thus through martyrdom the community regenerates itself. 1. See W. H. C. Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church (New York: New York University Press, 1967), p. 22. 2. Ibid., p. 58. 3. Ibid., p . 61. MARTYRDOM AND POLITICS 491 Martyrdom in Iranian Political Culture: A Brief Overview Two significant themes in pre-Islamic Iranian political culture directly influenced the development of a cult of martyrdom in Shi'ite Islam. Unlike the ancient Greeks, who believed that refinement of the human spirit is dependent on development of the body and thus encouraged sports and fine arts, the ancient Persians, for the most part, held that spiritual elevation is attainable only through an ascetic life. The individual who epitomized this outlook was Mani, one of the two major pre-Islamic prophets of Iran. Manichaeism synthesized elements of the philosophy of Eastern gnosis with Hindu stoicism and Christian unworldliness. Fasting, living ascetic lives and self-castration were among the rituals that followers of Mani maintained.4 Refinement of the soul was, for Manichaeans, possible only through self-denial and avoiding the pleasures of the flesh. The second significant element contributing to pervasive celebration of martyrdom is the prevalence of tragedy in Iranian political culture. Before we proceed with a discussion of pervasiveness of tragedy in Iranian political culture, it is important to state the relation between tragedy and martyrdom. A culture whose art, literature, and popular myth are deeply imbued with tragedy, perceives martyrdom as dramatic expression of tragedy. In such social context, martyrdom is not an aberration but the manifestation of a culture of tragedy personified. It is a tragic fate. Seen in this dynamic relation, martyrdom is best understood in the historical context of recurring themes of tragedy in Iranian popular mythology and literature. Firdowsi's (c.935-1020) Shahnameh (The Book of Kings), the great Iranian national epic, is replete with resonant tragic themes and stories: the tragedy of a just and fair-minded Jamshid, brutally slain at the hand of the cruel and oppressive Zahhak; and the tragedy of the murder of Iraj, the designated crown prince and the favored son of King Feraidun, by his older brothers Salm 4. See Naseh Nateq Bahsi Dar Bareh-e Zendegani Mani Va Paym-e Ou (A discussion of Mani's life and message) (Teheran: Kavian Publisher, 1978), pp. 4985. Although Manichaenism never became all-pervasive throughout Iran its intellectual impact was distinct and powerful. 492 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS and Tur. The most enduring tragedy is Sohrab's death at the hands of his father Rostam, the son of Zal, the mythical protector of Iranian monarchy, the great warrior and man of exceptional valor and virtue. This episode epitomizes the tragedy of filicide. Rostam, who faced the dilemma of killing his son or being killed by him, died a tragic death as well.5 Tragedy surrounds the aura of another Rostam, the son of Farrokhzad who as the commander of Iranian forces under the last sasanid (224-651) ruler, Yazdgerd III, suffered humiliating defeat in the hands of invading Arab Muslim armies. Once a mighty empire with its proud people and civilization, Iran was subjugated, becoming servants to their new Arab masters. Tragedy is also the dominant theme in the life story of Siyavush, the son of King Kay Kavus. Siyavush was told by his father to attack Turan, the main rival of the ancient Persian empire ruled by Afrasyab. Siyavush refused to do so, and to escape his father's wrath he took refuge in Turan. Thus a great friendship and love emerged between the two men. Soon, however, Afrasyab suspected Siyavush of conspiring to overtake his empire and had him killed. Siyavush's death promulgated a cycle of revenge and bloodshed that devastated both Turan and Iran.6 Afrasyab's murder of Siyavush accentuates the tragedy of the murder of a beloved friend that triggers the death of thousands of innocent people. When the news of Siyavush's death reached his father, he lamented and said it was not Afrasyab but rather he himself who killed his son. Thus, the tragedy of filicide is replicated. The tragedy continues with the death of Zarer, a devoted defender of the Zoroastrian faith. As Vishtasp, the holy 5. Ehsan Yar Shater, ed., The Epic of the Kings: Shah-nameh the National Epic of Persia, by Firdowsi, trans. Reuben Levy (Chicago: University of Chicago, Press, 1967). Rostam was killed in 637 after his armies were defeated by Umar's forces in the battle of Qadasyyia. 6. Shahrukh Miskub, Sug-i Siyavush.Dar Marg va Rastakhiz (Mourning for Siyavush: on death and resurrection) (Teheran: Kharazmi Publishing House, 1975). The death of Siyavush inspired a cult of mourning that lasted until the tenth century. A significant myth associated with this cult depicts Siyavush as a divine martyred saint whose death generates new life. According to legend from Siyavush's blood grew a herb called "the blood of Siyavush." Thus, the death of Siyavush is followed by a rebirth and the martyred hero becomes immortal. See Ehsan Yarshater, note 7. MARTYRDOM AND POLITICS 493 king of the Zoroastrian church, is threatened by Arjasb, the King of the Chionites, for his conversion to the religion of Zoroaster, Zarer bravely volunteers to fight the mighty enemy Arjasb against extreme odds. Despite his valor, he is ruthlessly slain by Bidarafsh, Arjasb's brother. Zarer's death aroused much grief and lamentation in the Zoroastrian community. Over the years members of the community came together to partake in rituals to commemorate the death of their slain hero.7 Thus, in Firdowsi's Shahnameh there are recurring episodes of tragedy. Michael Hillman notes the uniqueness of Firdowsi's Shahnameh in the context of literary epics: Although the literary epic tradition generally implies or represents nostalgia for a bygone heroic age, epics themselves generally recount the story of victory in the heroic age of the people or nation whose history the story represents. The Greeks defeat the Trojans in the Iliad. Odysseus returns home to Penelope in the Odyssey. The Aeneid celebrates the founding of Rome. Hope for humankind is the final message in Paradise Lost. The future holds promise for the Joads of America at the end of the Grapes of Wrath. But Ferdowsi composed his Shahnameh as a national history culminating in disaster.8 Thus in "Immortalizing Defeat,"9 Shahnameh has had a powerful impact on the Iranian psyche through the ages: identification with defeat and tragedy. Similar tragedies are repeated in the drama surrounding the deaths of the two Shi'ite legends Imam Ali (the first Shi'ite Imam) and his martyred son, Imam Husayn. Ali was murdered by Ibn Muljam, a dissenting member of his own camp, a Khariji'ite, while praying in the Mosque of Kufa. Husayn and his family were brutally slain by perfidious Shimr in an unequal war. The conditions of their deaths and their stoic attitudes toward it adds to the drama of their ordeal and its historical impact. Shi'ites like to contrast the death of Umar (one of the four Sunni rightly guided Caliphs) with that of Ali. When "Umar was 7. Ehsan Yarshater, "Ta'ziyeh and Pre-Islamic Mourning Rites in Iran," in T'aziyeh ritual and drama in Iran, ed. Peter Chelkowski (New York: New York University Press and Soroud Press, 1979), pp. 89-90 . 8. Michael C. Hillman Iranian Culture: A Persianist View (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990) pp. 14,15. 9. Ibid., p. 15 494 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS struck by his assassin [Firuz, the Persian], he cried, 'Grab that Magian who has killed me!' Ali, when struck by his assassin, cried 'Oh God, most fortunate am I!'" The contrast is between one who saw death as an end and one who saw it as the beginning of a return to God.10 Ali is quoted as saying: "Martyrdom has been my long-held dream. He who dies in the path of God does not die, but rather is immortalized. More than that he reaches perfection [Kamal] and becomes united with God."11 When the renowned poet, Al-Farazdaq, encouraged Imam Husayn not to go to Karbala and risk his life fighting against overwhelming odds, Imam Husayn answered: If the world be counted a thing precious, still the abode of God's reward (that is, paradise) is higher and more noble. And if bodies be made for death, then the death of a man by the sword in the way of God is the better choice. And if men's provisions be allotted by divine decree, then it is more worthy of a man not to run after worldly gain. And if wealth be gathered in order to be finally left behind, why should a man be tight-fisted with that which he would have to abandon.12 Martyrdom in the struggle against social injustice and oppression is said to be the noblest of all causes. A Muslim's sincerity and devotion to the faith are measured by his/her readiness to sacrifice his/her life for it.13 Here again Imam Husayn provides 10. Michael Fischer Iran, from Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 16. 11. Muhammad Ray Shahri, Shahadat Dar Nahj Albalaqeh (Martyrdom in the Nahj Albalaqeh) (Qum: Yaser Publishers, n.d.), pp. 9,41,50. 12. Mahmoud Ayoub Redemption Suffering in Islam: A Study of Devotional Aspects ofAshura in Twelver Shi'ism (New York: Mouton Publishers, 1978) p. 242. 13. The legacy of this asceticism and the virtue of noble suffering goes back to Prophet Muhammad. The prophet was told, "The Lord wishes to try thee with three things to test thy patience. The first was hunger and privation, as he was to give all that he possessed to the poor. The second trial was the persecution and calumnies which Muhammad had to suffer at the hands of the hypocrites and the wounds inflicted upon him. The third trial was the persecution and wrong his family was destined to suffer after him." The Imams, the descendants of the prophet, "were from the beginning destined by God to drain the cup of suffering and martyrdom and to play a decisive role in human salvation and judgement. To a large extent, the intercessory prerogative of the Imams is dependent upon their patient endurance of privation, rejection and persecution. Indeed, Shi'i piety has insisted, in many cases with little or no evidence, that all the Imams were martyred." In Shi'ite devotional piety "the house of sorrow" represents "the community of MARTYRDOM AND POLITICS 495 the paradigmatic example for the Shi'ites. When he was advised by some companions to seek a compromise with the unjust and the impious Yazid, he responded: I shall go, for there is no shame in the death of a youth if he intends truthfulness and engages in the struggle as a Muslim . . . for then if I live I shall have no remorse and if I die I shall incur no blame. It is sufficient humiliation for you to live and be coerced.14 The enduring impact of Imam Husayn's martyrdom on the Shi'ite psyche and his exaltation as the lord of martyrs deserves closer scrutiny. The Primordial Impact of the "Lord of Martyrs," Imam Husayn The tragic martyrdom of Imam Husayn and the drama associated with it have a special place in the consciousness of Shi'ite Muslims. The martyrdom of Imam Husayn is perceived as a cosmic event to restore truth against falsehood and justice against oppression and to heal and redeem the community. According to Hamid Enayat, the significance of Imam Husayn's martyrdom must be understood on two levels: "First, in terms of a soteriology not dissimilar from the one invoked in the case of Christ's crucifixion: just as Christ sacrificed himself on the altar of the cross to redeem humanity, so did Husayn allow himself to be killed on the plain of Karbala to purify the Muslim community of sin; and second as an active factor vindicating the Shi'ite cause, contributing to its ultimate triumph."15 Therefore, as a paradigmatic example, Imam Husayn represented both solace and comfort for all suffering souls, and became a role model for political action and militancy. The commemoration of the anniversary of his death in the Plains of Karbala in the month of Muharram in 680 became an established suffering,which is basically the twelve Imams, the prophet and his daughter. Into this community, the pious devotees of the Imams can enter through their participation in the suffering of the Holy Family." See Ayoub, Redemption Suffering in Islam, pp. 16,198-99. 14. Ibid., p. 108. 15. Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982), p. 183. 496 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS ritual when the Shi'ite dynasty of the Buyids popularized the ceremonies in the tenth century. The occasion marks the outburst of intense pent-up grief, weeping, lamentation and self-flagellation. The introduction of Ta'ziyyah (a passion play) by the Shi'ite Safavid dynasty in the sixteenth century combined with Rawzah Khani (recitation of the sufferings of holy martyrs) throughout much of the past history, symbolized a "submissive endurance of pain and suffering as the hallmark of all worthy souls."16 As Max Weber has observed, human beings are motivated by both ideal and material interests. "The most elementary forms of behavior motivated by religious or magical factors," wrote Weber, "are oriented toward this world. Religious behavior remains end-oriented, except that both the means and the ends become purely symbolic."17 Seen in this context, salvation for a Shi'ite may be attained through grief and identification with the suffering and tragic faith of Imam Husayn. Hence, identification with Husayn's ennobling and dignified act of self-sacrifice safeguards one against the pitfall of wretchedness and cowardice that awaits the individual in every trial in life. As Imam Husayn redeemed the sins of his community through his suffering and martyrdom, those who weep for him and share his suffering would be rewarded (sawab) on the judgment day and those who do not must await the "awful punishment of strict justice with no mercy."18 Thus, Imam Husayn is simultaneously the compassionate redeemer and the resolute judge, the healer and the avenger. Until very recently, however, Shi'ite scholars and theologians emphasized the healing and redeeming aspects of Imam Husayn's martyrdom. As Enayat accurately asserts, the "passive and pietistic" aspect if Imam Husayn's behavior reflected in the orthodox Shi'ite writings on Karbala drama belies much of the contemporary politicized rendition of the drama as a defiant act of rebellion. The popular reference to Imam Husayn as a Mazlum has two connotations. First, it characterizes an individual who has been oppressed or sinned against. Second, it signifies an unwillingness, derived from a sense of noble generosity and forbearance, 16. Ibid. 17. Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), pp. 6-7. 18. Ayoub, Redemption Suffering in Islam, p. 232. MARTYRDOM AND POLITICS 497 to act against others. To demonstrate the depoliticized connotation and the quiescent character of Imam Husayn's martyrdom in Shi'ite traditional sources, Enayat reminds us that the ritual of Ta'ziyah was used by both the Safavid and Qajar dynasties to ensure their hold over the masses.19 Yet, the image of Mazlum in Shi'ite tradition, [as a person who has been violated, while evoking strong emotional response] also signifies passive acceptance of one's faith. Enayat's account is reaffirmed by Mahmoud Ayoub, who asserts: After the death of Imam Husayn, both the Imams and their followers lived in fear and had to propagate their teachings in secret. It was no longer easy to express their opposition to Umayyad and later Abbasid rule through armed struggle. The only vehicle was the secret, yet active, participation in the sufferings of Ahl Al-bayt through weeping and other means of remembrance.20 According to Sheikholeslami, the commemoration of Imam Husayn's death has a functional value for the faithful: it allows the participants in the ritual to deal with the "real anxieties men have about death. By bringing Husayn back to life every year, they feel a sense of victory over death. Indeed, in the aftermath of these rituals, the participants express a sense of well-being."21 The concept of ma'ad (resurrection) also functions as a divine assurance that "the community will survive individually and collectively."22 Hence, by believing in the return of the twelfth Shi'ite Imam, who is said to be in occultation, the oppressed maintained their chialiastic hope that justice would prevail some day and that the Mahdi would be the great avenger to punish the oppressor. If, in the orthodox account, the Shi'ite martyr represented the house of the prophet, the contemporary interpretation extends the privilege to any Shi'ite Muslim willing to die for the Islamic cause. 19. Enayat,Modern Islamic Political Thought, pp.183-184. 20. Ayoub, Redemption Suffering in Islam, p. 143. 21. Ali Reza Sheikholeslami, "From Religious Accommodation to Religious Revolution: The Transformation of Shi'ism in Iran," in The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, ed. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Winer (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986), p. 229. 22. Ibid. 498 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS Only after World War II, has the drama of Imam Husayn's martyrdom come to signify "combative vengefulness and a deliberate act of rebellion."23 Throughout Islamic history, re-enacting of the drama of Imam Husayn's martyrdom through elaborate rituals has exalted suffering and asceticism as necessary steps in spiritual refinement. This enduring impact is patently clear in Iran's modern political culture as well. This glorification of noble suffering and the defiant embracing of death, the deliberate and conscious approbation of martyrdom, has profoundly influenced the Shi'ite collective consciousness throughout history. Dialectics of Self-Effacement and Self-Aggrandizement Some Western scholars have interpreted Firdowsi's Shahnameh as a celebration of defeat.24 Others perceive the annual commemoration of Husayn's death in Murharram and Ashura ceremonies as another celebration of defeat.25 The prominent role of tragedy in the Iranian collective unconscious and the celebration of defeats through the elaborate ritual of self-flagellation and intense lamentation has prompted Enayat to conclude that with the pre-Islamic myth of the Blood of Siyavush, as recorded in Firdowsi's Shahnameh, the religious hymns of the Alawite Ahl-i haqq describe how the supreme spirit of the perfect man transmigrated from Abel, through Jamshid, Iraj and Siyavush, to Husayn.26 These rituals demonstrate a clear line of continuity between the pre-Islamic Iranian tradition and Islamic culture. Whereas the legend of Siyavush ensures justice for the oppressed, the 23. This new interpretation became popular not only among Shi'ites in Iran, but also Muslim and secular intellectuals in Egypt and other parts of the Sunni world depicted Imam Husayn as a heroic rebel who fought consciously against oppression to set an example for the posterity. See Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought, pp. 184-88. 24. See for example, G. E. Von Grunebaum, "Ferdausi's Concept of History," in Islam, Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1961), pp. 168-84. See also Hillman, Iranian Culture, pp. 14,15. 25. Edward Mortimer, Faith and power (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), pp. 31-120. 26. Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought, p. 181. MARTYRDOM AND POLITICS 499 legend of Husayn inspires faith in political justice.27 To provide further evidence for this continuity, some refer to the Iranian affinity with Husayn. After Imam Husayn's martyrdom in the plains of Karbala in 680, many Iranians led by Mokhtar Thaqafi rebelled against the Omayyads in an attempt to avenge Husayn's murder.28 The primordial significance of tragedy in the Iranian collective psyche was further accentuated by the repeated historical defeats at the hands of the Greeks, Arabs, Mongols, Turks, Afghans, and Russians, to name a few. A nation that lives through tragedies gives expression to life through tragedy. Thus, the occurrence of historical calamities combined with long history of tyrannical rule have ensured the continuity of a tradition and its transmission through generations. In the pre-Islamic stoic tradition and Islamic asceticism, one can, for example, clearly discern elements of Mani's ascetic philosophy and its impact on the later development of sufism in Iran. The exaltation of the suffering of Imam Husayn and the inexorable self-effacement of Sufi traditions in Islam are also linked. Al-Ghazali (d. 1111), who had a pronounced impact on medieval Islamic and Jewish religious thought, held that only in a stage of total negation of this world (fana) and total surrender of the self can one dedicate all his heart, soul and love to God and become capable of seeking reunion with him. In Al-Ghazali's philosophy, for example, poverty is regarded as a crucial virtue (zohd) for rescuing the soul, and a pious sufi dervish (priest) must pursue a life of self-denial and spiritual refinement. This can occur in three stages: The dervish conserves his meager resources and does not attempt to increase or expand them, he learns to downgrade wealth, since he has learned not to suffer from deprivation, he becomes indifferent to both wealth and poverty.29 Seen in this light, sufi dervishes, like Buddhist monks and Franciscan Christians, believe that spiritual fulfillment is possible only through the negation of worldly pleasures and material pursuits. Since God is pure and innocent (pak va Ma'sum) 27. Ibid. 28. Abdol Rafie's Haqiqat, Tarikh-i Nehzat hay-i Fekr-i Iranian (The history of Iranian intellectual thought) (Teheran: Mo'alefan Publishers, 1976), pp. 116-17. 29.1. P. Petroshevsky, Islam dar Iran (Islam in Iran) (Tehran: Payam Publication House, 1971), pp. 352-55. 500 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS and man must reappear before him on judgment day, one must try to maintain one's purity and innocence so that one is worthy of appearance before God. Hence, hardship and deprivation are regarded as a gift of God to strengthen the spiritual and moral convictions of mankind because worldly pursuits are worthless compared to the glory that awaits the pious in reunion with God.30 This influence is also patently clear in the gnostic philosophy of such thirteenth-century mystics as Mowlawi, known in the West as Rumi (1207-1273), who perceived death as a stage in life that opens the gates to a higher state of existence and spiritual enrichment. Death begins a process in which the soul elevates itself to a morally superior state. In death, the human spirit, which is a part of divine spirit, will reunite with its beloved. Therefore, death must not be equated with annihilation or nothingness; rather, it is another stage in life's progression toward, the ultimate purpose, which is unity with the divine (Vahdat alvujud).31 The path to perfection (Kamal) is possible only if one negates worldly pleasures. In other words, self-purification and redemption can be attained only through living an ascetic life. Seen in this context, death is a natural outcome of living a life of self-denial. It is not an abrupt end, but a new beginning of the journey (M'araj) toward unity with God. As Rumi has put it: From the inanimate I died and I became vegetation, From vegetation I died and I became an animal, From an animal I died and I became human. I am not afraid of death; death has never made me lesser. Once more I shall die as a human being, And I shall fly as an angel; Then once again I shall fly from the angelic, And I will become something unimaginable. 30. Ibid., pp. 370-371, 398. 31. Ali Asghar Halabi, Shinakht-i Irfan-va Arifan-i Irani (The study of Persian gnosis and gnostic philosophers) (Teheran: Zavar Publication, 1981). For a discussion of Rumi's philosophy and poetry see Ghozideh-i ghazaliat-i shams (A selection of poetry of Mowlana jalal-al din mohammad of Balkh [Rumi]) (Tehran: Sherkati-i Sahami-ye Ketabhay-i Jibi, 1984). See also The Ruins of the Heart: Selected Lyrics of Poetry of Jelaludin Rumi, 3rd ed., trans. Edmund Helminski (Putney: Threshold Books, 1981). Other philosophers, such as Ummar Khayyam, are considered by some to be the intellectual precursor of modern existentialism, whose social philosophy consists of rebellion against the absurdity of death and fatalism. MARTYRDOM AND POLITICS 501 I will become nothing, nothing, because the harp tells me: "Unto him we shall return."32 This philosophical outlook on death casts a different light on martyrdom as a deliberate embracement of death. Gnostic selfeffacement seems to be the dominant motif here. When present life has very little to offer, the hereafter becomes much more appealing. Through martyrdom one puts an honorable end to deprivations, frustrations and sufferings and creates the possibility for a better tomorrow in heaven. Hence, the prevalence of stoicism in Iranian culture is not due to masochistic tendencies such as "love of death," as some have suggested, rather, it is a symptom of powerlessness and hopelessness. As Clifford Geertz has persuasively noted, The problem of suffering is, paradoxically, not how to avoid suffering but how to suffer, how to make of physical pain, personal loss, worldly defeat, or the helpless contemplation of others' agony something bearable, supportable-something, as we say, sufferable.33 By developing rituals of noble suffering, one builds a defense mechanism to confront repression and withstand it psychologically. Since all cultures develop elaborate rituals to deal with the existing social reality, the cult of martyrdom in the Iranian culture reflects the pervading atmosphere of political and cultural repression throughout its history. This long tradition of political repression has not only created self-effacing rituals to cope with repression but also has engendered many rebellious acts of self-aggrandizement to defy it. We witness the continuation of this tradition in Zayd's martyrdom (d. 740) in an unsuccessful attempt to avenge Imam Husayn's death, in the martyrdom of Mansur al-Hallaj (858-922), the renowned sufi rebel who never denied his claim of divine incarnation in the face of torture and death and in murder of the great philosopher Suhrawardi (d. 1191) for his Isma'ili sympathies.34 3Z Mathnauri (vol. 111.11.3901-07) as cited by Mehdi Abedi and Gary Legenhausen, Jihad and Shahadat: Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam (Houston, TX: Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 1986), pp. 67-68. 33. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 104. 34. Martyrdom has also been used by numerous Shi'ite sects proselytize throughout history to proselyte and to seize political power. For a comprehensive 502 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS The Ismai'ilis, the extremist Shi'ites known as the Assassins, lent a new vitality to the tradition of martyrdom from the eleventh through the thirteenth centuries. They were motivated by religious zeal to purify Islam and liberate it from usurpation of power by what they conceived to be illegitimate and corrupt rulers who deviated from the path of true Islam. They sought to set examples of self-sacrifice and strengthen the sense of commitment of their supporters and proselytize new members. Since martyrs were believed to have a special place in paradise, one could gain eternal salvation through martyrdom. They distinguished themselves by a massive campaign of assassinations of the Sunni leaders. Their campaign was particularly effective against the Turkish Seljugh Empire. The Ismai'ilis' belief in terror as a means for moral purification and the regeneration of collective faith had deep roots in gnostic philosophy and mysticism. Their egalitarianism was buttressed by an ascetic life style, and their campaign of terror was accompanied by millenarian and chiliastic expectations of the return of the Mahdi. It was commonly believed among their ranks that their martyrdom would enhance the return of the Mahdi, thus making redemption possible. In their social philosophy martyrdom was perceived as a noble act of honor that would culminate in the ultimate goal of life, unity with God.35 As the Shi'ite sects became a persecuted and embittered minority, the ceremonies of Ashura and commemoration of Husayn's martyrdom assumed new significance. The celebration of Ashura rituals of lamentation and self-flagellation increasingly became an outlet for the expression of the pervading oppression in their own lives. Identification with Imam Husayn and his tragic fate enabled the Shi'ites to withstand their own suffering. For example, Fadl Allah Astarabadi (d. 1424), the leader of the Hurufyya movement (one of the extremist Shi'ite sects of the fifteenth century), on receiving the news of his execution in study of use of individual terrorism in Islam see David C. Rapaport, "Fear and trembling: terrorism in three religious traditions," American Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (1984): 658-77, esp. 664-68. 35. Bernard Lewis, Origins of Ismai'ilis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940) and The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (London: Nicholson and Weidenfeld, 1967). MARTYRDOM AND POLITICS 503 Shirvan asserted: "The Husayn of the age am I, and each worthless foe a shimr and yazid. My life is a day of mourning, and Shirwan my Karbala."36 Seen in this light, the theodicy of suffering projects martyrdom as a path to salvation: He who remembereth me, loveth me, and he who loveth me passionately desireth me; and him who passionately desireth me I passionately desire; and whom I passionately desire I slay; and of him whom I slay, I am the Blood-will.37 The Ashura rituals were also used throughout history as instruments of cultural assimilation and mass mobilization. As alluded to earlier, the rituals of Ashura were present in Iran as early as the tenth century under the Shi'ite Buiyd dynasty. Shah Isma'il (1501-1524), the Safavid king, effectively used the legend of Imam Husayn to incite his soldiers against the Ottoman Turks in the sixteenth century: "We are Husayn's men, and this is our epoch. In devotion we are the slaves of the Imam; our name is 'zealot' and our title 'martyr.'"38 The ritual of Ashura also has a functional value: to instill a deeper Shi'ite identity in Iranians and to strengthen the communal bonds of solidarity and cultural loyalty. As Bronislaw Malinowski has aptly noted, The ceremonial of death, which ties the survivors to the body and rivets them to the place of death, the beliefs in the existence of the spirit, in its beneficent influences or malevolent intentions, in the duties of a series of commemorative or sacrificial ceremonies—in all this religion counteracts the centrifugal forces of fear, dismay, demoralization and provides the most powerful means of integration of the group's shaken solidarity and of the re-establishment of its miracle.39 36. E. G. Brown, "Future Notes on the Literature of the Hurufis and Their Connection with the Bektashi Order of Dervishes Jras (1907)," as cited by S. A. Arjomand in The Shadow of Cod and the Hidden Imam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 73. 37. Ibid., p. 65. 38. Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), p. 173. The annual observance of Husayn's martyrdom engendered a drama and a theatrical passion play known as Ta'Ziyeh. While having deep roots in pre-Islamic Iranian tradition, it was systematically developed only in the sixteenth century during the Safavid rule. 39. As cited by Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, p. 163, Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion (Boston: 1948), pp. 33-35. 504 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS Hence, the fact that since 1694 only four Iranian monarchs survived either murder or forced abdication further indicates why no symbols and rituals of secular solidarity and secular nationalism binding the nation and the state developed. The lack of such symbols and rituals further explains the popularity of mass Shi'ite rituals and their resilience, appeal and political vitality over the years.40 Historically martyrs have been sacred symbols, comforting the sorrows and pains of the community. With the increasing politicization of Iranian polity after World War II, martyrdom assumed a new political cast calling on the faithful to sacrifice themselves for the cause. A delineation of the salient features of the metamorphosis of Iranian political culture in this period reveals the broader social context in which this new and highly politicized interpretation unfolded. The Preeminence of Populist Asceticism in the Political Culture of Post-World War II The Iranian political culture of the 1960s and 1970s, both religious and secular, experienced a profound populist metamorphosis, and Shi'ite asceticism assumed a new vitality and political dynamism. The autocratic absolutism of the Shah's regime reproduced itself in all societal institutions, thus driving political life underground and lending it a clandestine character. An ascetic populist culture among the committed members of the lay and secular intelligentsia developed in response to the dominant values of a society that espoused hedonism, consumerism, and materialism. Self-denial and an austere life style, forbearance and self-sacrifice were among the constituent elements of this political culture. This asceticism was present in the political thought of some of the leading Muslim traditionalist and modernist activists of this period. Navab Safavi, the founder of Fadayeen-i Islam, a Muslim traditionalist organization that assassinated a number of intellectuals and politicians; preached asceticism and martyrdom to his followers. The lay intellectual Mehdi Bazargan, for example, sought the solution to Iran's economic dependence and 40. Sheikholeslami, "From Religious Accommodation to Religious Revolution/' p. 230. MARTYRDOM AND POLITICS 505 backwardness in forbearance and stoicism. He asserted, "In order to free ourselves from Western domination, we must become self-sufficient. To become economically self-sufficient, we must accept deprivation and an austere life."41 Hence, according to Shariati, "the world belongs to the one who has no house in this world and the wealth belongs to the one who has no wealth in this world."42 Shariati also perceived "revolutionary self-making as a process that involves a revolutionary metamorphosis, a spiritual elevation. This is possible only through active engagement in improving the lives of the impoverished masses."43 To arouse his audience, he drew upon the example of Imam Ali: "Ali was so full of love and compassion for his fellow men and women that when he would hear of the news of oppression or injustice done to those whose rights he could not defend, he would become outraged and would not sit still until he punished the oppressor."44 The readiness of Ali and Husayn, the two paradigmatic figures of authority in Shi'ite Islam, to accept and even glorify death has a direct impact on the Shi'ite attitude toward death in general and martyrdom in particular. Ali, for example, is cited as having said, "I swear to God the son of Abi Taleb [Ali] is more attuned to death than a child is to his mother's breast."45 The allusions to Ali as the avenger of the oppressed were intended to have reverberations for the intelligentsia. As Shariati observed, the intellectuals are susceptible to becoming lost in their subjectivity. Only by linking themselves to the masses, laboring with them, living like them and experiencing their misery and deprivations can they fulfill their revolutionary responsibility.46 The secular intelligentsia also shared this populist assessment of the role of intellectuals and artists in society. Iran's leading post-World War II committed literary figures from Nima 41. Mehdi Bazargan, Sirr-i aghab oftadegy-i Mellal-i Muslman (The secrets behind the backwardness of Muslim nations) (Houston, TX: Center for book distribution, 1977), p. 51. 42. Ali Shariati Abuzar (Abudhar), collective work, vol 3, (N.p.,n.d.), p. 105. 43. Ali Shariati Khod sazi'i inghilabi (Revolutionary self-making) (Tehran: Hossienieh Ershad, 1977), 2:133. 44. Ibid., p. 89. 45. See for example Negahi Be Ali (A look at Ali) by Mohammad Taqi ja'fari (Tehran: Jahan Ara Publishers, n.d.), p. 115. 46. Ibid., pp. 163-77. 506 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS Yushi'ij to Shamlu and Sa'edi sensitively wrote about the pain and suffering of the impoverished masses. Ahmad Shamlu eloquently captures this spirit: I write for the prostitutes and the bare, for the tubercular, the destitute, for those who, on the cold earth are hopeful and for those who believe no more in heaven. Let my blood spill and fill the gaps among the people. Let our blood spill and graft the suns 47 to the sleepy people. But even when "sleepy people" do not wake up and hear or comprehend his message, when the engaged artist realizes his loneliness, that he has "shouted in a vacuum," he concedes: I am twice condemned to torture: to live so and to live so among you with you whom I have loved for so long.48 In the Islamic gnostic philosophy of love, the individual, drawing upon his/her powers of reason and love, transcends a personal quest for spiritual self-fulfillment and reaches a state of love for all.49 Seen in this light, not only is love of the people deeply rooted in gnostic philosophy, but martyrdom as a noble act of self-sacrifice in the path of ideals of the collectivity also finds its roots in the Islamic concept of gnostic love. For Khorrow Golsorkhi, the secular populist writer of the 1960s and 1970s, and a martyr himself (d. 1973), the artist must bear pain, suffering and torture because his goal is an exalted one. "The artist," writes Golsorkhi, "is a fighter who does not 47. Leonardo Alishan, "Ahmad Shmlu: A Rebel Poet in Search of an Audience," Iranian studies 18, nos 2-4 (1985): 380. 48. Ibid., p. 385. 49. Aligholi Biani, Manteq-i ishq-i irfani (The logic of gnostic love) (Tehran: Inteshar Publishing Company, 1985), p. 162. MARTYRDOM AND POLITICS 507 have modern technological tools at his disposal. He struggles with primitive means. But this struggle is in the realm of human values and ideals. Therefore, it is a sublime resurrection for an exalted cause."50 Armed by their ideas, the populist intelligentsia drew strength and power from their political faith, faith in the people.51 Like the gnostics, the populist intelligentsia sought to liberate the self from the hollow material attachment of a corrupt world. While for the religious intelligentsia salvation could be attained by cleansing the self of the sinful dross of a profane world, the challenge for the secular populists was to overcome their petit bourgeois values. Only through such a transformation, could one become a conscious and dedicated revolutionary capable of leading the liberation of the masses. Filled with the love of the people, the populists went to the people to experience their pain and suffering, hoping to become one with them. The religious populists held that since to serve God was to serve his vice regent on earth, the people, then, the path to God was made possible by love of the people. For the secular populists, dissolution of the self in the masses was a necessary step to learn from them, to gain their trust and to liberate them; only then could one fulfill his/her historical mission. Therefore, in sharing the suffering of the masses, both populists demonstrated their sincerity and the seriousness of their political commitment.52 The populists extolled as epic-making heroes, those who had the physical and psychological capacity to withstand barbaric tortures, and those victims who failed in this task were considered as the "treacherous betrayers of the people's cause." Many political prisoners, for example, used to refuse food and clothing that their parents brought them. The more a political prisoner refused to be comforted and suffered under torture without recanting or revealing organizational secrets, the more he/she was revered. While their modern education rendered many of them suspicious of absolutes, in the face of the fragmentation and alienation 50. Firdowsi, 5 December 1978, no 11, p. 26. 51. For a study of Iranian populism see Manochehr Dorraj From Zarathustra to Khomeini: Populism and Dissent in Iran (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990). 52. Ibid., pp. 109-50. 508 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS of modern life, the intelligentsia still yearned for a unifying vision, for a monolithic ideology that would resolve the dilemma of moral choice and explain the problems of modern society. Heir to a glorious past that no longer existed and inspired by a future that could be realized only through the negation of perceived cultural malaise and moral degeneration of the present, the intelligentsia lived in a vacuum. To gather the fragmented pieces of its suspended existence in a repressive and increasingly bureaucratic society the intelligentsia were in dire need of a cohesive holistic idea that would explain the cosmos and provide an orientation toward the here and beyond. If one could not realize this unifying vision in life, then through martyrdom such unity would become eternal. The pervading sense of spiritual hunger and the thirst for faith in a profane society was so intense among the alienated intelligentsia that self-sacrifice in the name of an ideal or ideology seemed like a small price for such exalted stature. In this context the holistic interpretations of Marxism and Islam and their depiction of the descending Utopia as a Unitarian classless society in which oppression has ended and justice and virtue reign supreme, became intensely appealing to the committed intelligentsia. Inspired by belief in progress and the creation of a new moral order, the populist intelligentsia began a crusade inspired by the suffering of the downtrodden, whose noble virtues were extolled as the force of social regeneration. Caught amidst a corrupt society, the populists elevated a romanticized image of the toiling people as the source of purity and virtue. In the suffering and misery of the poor, the populists found a sense of spiritual superiority and moral dignity that was lacking among the nobility. Objectively, the life of poverty, deprivation and ignorance had dehumanized the poor, subjectively, their suffering had humanized them. In order to make them fully human, the populists aspired for a social revolution that would destroy the old order. Perceiving history as a process of development guided by universal laws, the intelligentsia gave this Newtonian scientific theory a divine twist. If history is a continuous march of progress and development in which human beings can play a role, then to understand the logic of historical necessity is of paramount significance to the individual and his/her place in the chain of historical events. Since freedom is the realization of historical MARTYRDOM AND POLITICS 509 necessity, then to become aware of the unconscious process of historical development and to act accordingly is the most significant challenge to conscious and free men and women. Only then could the individual find his/her unique place in life and perform his/her unique mission. This nineteenth-century sense of mission, an idea attributed to the heroic age of European romanticism, became exceedingly appealing to the Iranian intelligentsia in the post-World War II era. The conviction became popular that the ineffable felicity of the future is possible only through the massive self-sacrifice of the present. This political eschatology portrayed martyrdom as a small necessary step on the path to the realization of the grand ideal of liberating humanity. Since the autocracy was deemed the embodiment of inequality and oppression, it was intrinsically evil and had to be destroyed. Intensely suspicious of any reforms initiated from above, the intelligentsia scorned gradualist and reformist tactics as either manifestations of a naive liberalism or a deliberate treacherous betrayal and deception of the masses. Only a full-fledged social revolution could provide a viable remedy to the misery and wretchedness of the masses. In realizing this goal, the populist intelligentsia lived a self-effacing life marked by a strict discipline, unswerving faith in the revolutionary ideal and an enormous capacity for self-sacrifice. Their faith in scientific progress and revolutionary change became the basis of their new political religion. In fulfilling their responsibilities toward the impoverished masses, in paying back their debt, these individuals totally sacrificed their personal lives and careers to their political cause. Driven by a sense of moral revulsion against autocracy and their passion for social justice, the populist intelligentsia sought to regenerate the society morally and to create a new social order. Considering themselves the awakened conscience of their society and an instrument of liberation for the impoverished masses, they sought to avenge their suffering. They perceived of their own organizations embodying their sacred goals as the historical vehicles of social transformation and salvation. Inspired by their own sense of dignity and moral obligation, the committed populist intelligentsia believed that all human beings deserve to live a dignified life free of oppression, tyranny and exploitation. Only such a sense of personal integrity could drive individuals to romantic embracement of their own deaths. 510 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS In the absence of free political parties and other channels of political participation, many individuals took the gigantic task of social transformation upon themselves. Convinced and elevated by their political faith, they perceived themselves as new apostles of change whose self-negation would give life to the mass movement. It was in this context that politicization and exaltation of martyrdom permeated the political atmosphere of the past five decades. During their trial by the Shah's regime, two political prisoners, one a Muslim and the other a Marxist, reveal the essence of this mind set: "The only thing we do not expect from you is justice. Between us stand only weapons. Therefore, we will bring you to justice with our most effective weapon, our blood."53 The other prisoner also expressed his willingness to sacrifice himself for the cause in these words: "If it takes blood to awaken the people, let rivers flow from our veins."54 Both prisoners were executed after their trials. As individualists who sought self-aggrandizement, the power of faith enabled them to elevate themselves above the prohibitive material social obstacles that stood in the path of realizing their ideal. As Emile Durkheim has perceptively observed: The believer who has communicated with his God is not merely a man who sees new truths of which the unbeliever is ignorant; he is a man who is stronger. He feels within him more force, either to endure the trials of existence, or to conquer them. It is as though he were raised above the miseries of the world, because he is raised above his condition as a mere man.55 Driven by their passionate embracement of their political faith, many dedicated revolutionaries conquered the fear of death and thus became imbued with a sense of invincibility. Their own death was no longer considered annihilation, rather a trans historical migration to an elevated state of spiritual existence 53. Zendegy Nameh va Modafe'at-i Mojahed-i Shahid Saeed Mohsen (The life story and the trial defenses of the martyred Mojaheed Saeed Mohsen) published by Iran's Freedom Movement abroad, 1976, p. 16. 54. See Salrooz-i shahdat-i Roofagha Pooyan, Sadeqi nejad, Pirvandiri (The commemoration of the martyrdom of our comrades [Pooyan, Sadeqi Nejad and Pirvandiri]). Published y Cherik Hay-i Fdayee- Khalq, (n.d.), p. 7. 55. Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life: A Study in Religious Sociology (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1947), p. 416. MARTYRDOM AND POLITICS 511 (Me'araj). A further analysis of the vicissitudes of this culture of martyrdom in the contemporary political culture of Iran reveals a remarkable continuity in the resiliency, sanctity and vitality of this time-honored sublime tradition. Martyrdom in Contemporary Iranian Political Culture Through the further study of the political writings of Muslim and secular intellectual leaders, it becomes patently clear that the concept of martyrdom has undergone a complete metamorphosis since World War II. For example, using Qura'nic traditions Ayatollah Taleqani (1911-1979), coleader of the 1979 Islamic revolution and one of the most revered clerics after World War II, deduced the word shahid, the martyr, from shuhud, the person who has witnessed the truth. Therefore, the martyr sacrifices his life with full consciousness. He "annihilates himself, like a drop in the ocean of truth."56 By doing so he elevates himself above this lowly world and strengthens the faith. Ayatollah Mutahhari (1920-1979), one of the chief theoreticians of the Islamic Republic, defined shahid as the individual who sacrifices himself/herself consciously for a cause. The blood of the martyr is not wasted: it "infuses fresh blood into the veins of the society." He revitalizes his sense of zeal and commitment and immortalizes himself through exemplary self-sacrifice.57 Repeated references are made to the two grand shi'ite martyrs, Ali and Husayn, to legitimize this new interpretation. By linking the concepts of jihad (holy war) and martyrdom, Mutahhari opened up the possibility of systematic martyrdom pervading Iran during the war with Iraq.58 56. Abedi and Legenhausen, Jihad and Shahadat, pp. 67-68. 57. Ibid., p. 136. This concept of martyrdom is pervasive among Sunni theoreticians as well. Sayyid Qutb, one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, echoed the same theme when he asserted that the Mujahid (one who strives to realize God's will; soldier) willing to lay down his life for the cause of God does not die. "All the people die; he is a martyr. He departs this world to the Garden while his opponent goes to the fire." Sayyid Qutb, Maalimfi Al Tariq (Cairo: Maktabat wahbah, 1964; English translation: Milestones, Cedar Rapids, Iowa: University Publishing Company, n.d.), p. 226 as cited by Yvonne Haddad, "Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival," in Voices of Resurgent Islam, ed. John L. Esposito (London: Oxford University Press, 1983). 58. During the Iran-Iraqi War the leaders and the publicists of the Islamic Republic made a special effort to further popularize the idea of martyrdom and 512 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS He asserted, "The sacred cause that leads to shahadat or the giving of one's life has become a law in Islam. It is called jihad."59 In the same vein, Ayatollah Khomeini (b. 1902-1989) asserts that the martyr is "the heart of history and the blood of each martyr is like a bell which awakens the thousands."60 Through martyrdom, a society strengthens its ties and revives itself spiritually. In this sense, martyrs are the conscience and the heroes of the community. Perhaps the most politicized and systematic exposition of martyrdom was made by Ali Shari'ati (1933-1977), the intellectual precursor of the 1979 revolution and the hero of Muslim youth. For Shariati, one of the greatest and most revolutionary contributions of Islam to human society has been to instill a sense of devotion and sacrifice in the pursuit of justice.61 Through martyrdom a society refines itself. By sacrificing the most precious possession (one's life), the individual also affirms his/her faith in the ideals of the collectivity and adds to the credibility and sanctity of this ideal. Shariati utilized the deep tradition of martyrdom in the Iranian culture to elevate the level of commitment and generate the spirit of militancy and self-sacrifice necessary in any successful political struggle. As he put it, enhance mass mobilization. Basing his comments on Imam Ali's advice to Mohammad Hanifeh, Hojat Al Islam Ali Akbar Nategh Noori, the former minister of the interior, proclaimed to graduating Gendarmeri students: "Fear is the main reason for defeat. If human beings were not afraid of death and surrendered totally to God's will, they would never surrender to degradation and humiliation. So far as our nation was tied to the past system and had its eyes focused on worldly gains, it was afraid of death and would commit any disgraceful act to escape. But since the day that our nation has come under a leadership modeled after the prophet, the leadership of Imam Khomeini, and stepped in the Imam's path, it has grown immensely and has overcome the fear of death. Death in God's path is no longer regarded as death but martyrdom" (Jumhury-i Islami, 4 January 1982, p. 2). In the same spirit Mr. Chamran, the former commander of the armed forces, addressed the troops at the Iraqi front, drawing upon the example of Ali Shariati: "Ali Shariati, like Ibrahim, sacrificed all of himself for the love of God thus he became all light. As the candle illuminates only when it burns and melts, Shariati consciously burned to illuminate others. All his life, he anxiously awaited martyrdom" (Kayhan Havai, 20 June 1990, p. 19). 59. Abedi and Legenhausen, Jihad and Shahadat, p. 129. 60. Iran Times, 16 November 1982, p. 12. 61. Ali Shariati, Eqbal, Ma'mar Tajdid Bana-ye Tafakkor-e Islamic (Eqbal, the architect of the renewal of Islamic thought) (Teheran: Forough Publications, 1973), p. 29. MARTYRDOM AND POLITICS 513 In different ages, when the followers of a faith or idea seize power, they struggle to safeguard their rule. When events render them feeble and deprive them of all means of struggle, through martyrdom, they preserve life, movement, faith and power in their history. Martyrdom, in one word, is not an incident, it is an involvement. It is an imposed death on a hero, it is a tragedy, and in our culture it is life, it is a medal of honor. It is not a means, it is an end. It is genuine and elevating. It is a bridge to new heights. It is a great responsibility, it is a short-cut to elevate oneself above mankind. And it is a culture.62 Seen in this light, martyrdom is not a means but a sacred end; it is the most dramatic statement about the power of faith. It is a defiant gesture renouncing the present order. It is self-actualization through negation. More than that, it is an act of self-aggrandizement that enables individuals to transcend time and be placed on the highest summit of history. The self-imposed death of a hero is a dominant motif in some of the secular politicized literature of this period as well. In Samad Behrangi's (1939-1968) Little Black Fish, for example, a determined little fish defies the advice of a large school of older fish and other sea creatures and against extreme odds chooses to confront the mighty enemy, the fish eater, single-handedly. The little black fish is well aware of all the dangers on the path. It is also fully conscious of the possibility of death. But it willingly accepts the risks as a historical necessity for the emancipation of the collectivity.63 The immense popularity of this story reflects the tragic aura and the romantic image surrounding the faith of the hero. The community accepts the loss of one of its most beloved members, the one who is the most devoted to the ideals of the collectivity, not only to safeguard its raison d'etre but also to elevate itself morally and spiritually. The story reenacts the ritual of the sacrificial lamb and this symbolic value is represented in Shi'ite Islam in human terms. If the blood cleanses the community of its sins and the meat provides food and nourishment, the martyr satisfies the collective spiritual hunger and enriches communal power and strength. Seen in this light, the community devours a part of itself to maintain its sanctity and pride, a concept clearly reminiscent of Durkheimian altruistic suicide. 62. Ali Shariati,S/iflfa«ifl( (Martyrdom) (Tehran: Husaynieh Irshad, 1971), p. 68. 63. Samad Behrangi,Mahi Siayah-i Kouchoulou (The little black fish) (Teheran: Kanon-i Parvaresh-i Fekryi Koodakan, 1972). 514 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS The burning desire for unity with the beloved, God, necessitates gnostic forbearance and noble suffering (Sukhtan va Sakhtan). Like candles that illuminate only by burning, martyrs bestow meaning on life through their self-sacrifice. The sanctity of tradition in Iranian culture has ensured historical continuity. Molawi's desire for unity with God, for example, is echoed in the works of Iran's finest poet of the 1960s, Forough Farrokhzad (1935-1967), who longed to "sink in earth," to "plant" and immortalize herself.64 Imam-i-Ali's concept of the martyr as an immortal omnipotent saint is replicated by martyred journalist/poet of the 1970s, Khorrow Golsorkhi's, depiction of the fallen hero of the community: Your body is like the mountain of Damavand Standing proud in infinite skies The dagger of the enemy can never stab you in the back Your body is all eyes Your body is an ever growing65forest standing tall Hell fire can do you no harm. According to the literary critic, Reza Baraheni, the idea of martyrdom is one of the central motifs in the writings of Jalal Ale Ahmad (1923-1969), Iran's renowned writer of the 1960s. Jalal "always spoke of martyrdom. He expected to become a martyr, but he didn't. I feel he wanted to be a living witness to martyrdom. And those who are put in the position of martyrdom possess charisma."66 Likewise, another social critic, Leonardo Alishan, contends that after 1963 Ahmad Shamlu (b.1925), one of the leading Iranian poets, "spoke of poets" as "prophets" and of both as martyrs.67 Both critics hold that since intellectuals are the victims of political tyranny and the philistine people in much of the third world, they identify with martyrs. After the emergence 64. Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak, An Anthology of Modern Persian Poetry (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 137-59. 65. Khosrow Golsorkhi "Tau" (You). Reprinted inPayam, a publication of the Iranian Student Association 12 (1974): 58. 66. Jalal Az Didgaheh Doctour Reza Brahani, "Jalal in Dr. Reza Brahani's perspective," in Mi'adba Jalal (Rendezvous with Jalal), ed. Mirzad Jahani (Teheran: Ravaq Publishers, 1983), p. 102. 67. For analysis of politics in the poetics of Ahmad Shamlu see Alishan, "Ahmad Shmlu," pp. 375-422. MARTYRDOM AND POLITICS 515 of guerrilla organizations that fought against autocracy in the 1970s, Shamlu, for example, wrote several poems glorifying those who "stand before the thunder" and "light the house" before "they die."68 Thus, in the secular culture, the religious metaphors reappear in a different cloak. The secular vision of the world does not preclude spiritual needs; to the contrary, it exacerbates them. To the extent that the individual loses his/her religious conviction as a cognitive moral map of the world, to borrow a phrase from Geertz, the feelings of emptiness instigate an even more intense soul searching. Hence, the preoccupation of the secular intelligentsia with making a career or pursuing art and literature is precisely geared to fill such a spiritual void. To compensate for the feelings of guilt that stem from one's encounter with an amoral world, the intelligentsia never overcame the psychological need for transcendence and deliverance. As Weber has aptly noted, the abnegation of the world is facilitated for the faithful by taking refuge in the redemptive value of religion. "The rational aim of redemption religion," wrote Weber, "has been to secure for the saved a holy state, and thereby a habitude that assures salvation."69 Through martyrdom, one purifies the self from past sins and becomes an immortal saint. Thus, death sanctioned through the sublime collective traditions of the community becomes a means to celebrate life and to strengthen and consolidate communal bonds. Some Muslim opposition groups under the Shah, such as Mojahedin-iKhalq, considered Imam Husayn's martyrdom a focal point in human liberation and freedom. The example of Imam Husayn, in other words, is a transhistorical paradigm that shows the way to future generations.70 The Mojahedin argued that human beings distinguish themselves from animals and become united with God only through self-sacrifice. Having accepted the necessity for suffering and endurance, many mem68. Ibid., p. 409. 69. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 327. 70. See for example "Ashora Falsaphe-i Azadi" (Ashura, the philosophy of freedom) (Mojahadin Khalq, 1979). See also Ahmad Reza-i,Rah-i Husayn (Husayn's path) (Teheran: Sahab Ketab, 1979). 516 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS bers of these organizations died under torture without revealing organizational secrets.71 In the spirit of the myth of the blood of Siyavush, upon receiving the news of their execution, some of the guerrillas sang the song "from our blood carnations will grow," and they awaited their death with a hysteric sense of joy and jubilation. Others saw their death as a necessary drop in a flood that would ultimately cleanse the dross and "moral filth" by washing away the regime that promulgates it. The words of Reza Reza'i, one of the three brothers from the Mojaheedin-iKhalq organization who were executed by the Shah's regime, reveal the essence of this mindset. In a letter to his mother he wrote: "The blood of my brothers showed us the way. Like them I would also be most willing to sacrifice my life in the path of the oppressed people."72 To provide an Islamic justification for their populist program, Mojahedin often utilized the euphemism coined by Shariati: to serve God one must serve His creatures, that is, the people. Driven by a sacred rage against the present order, the revolutionary guerrillas called for a moral revival of society. Thus, they saw their own death as a necessary sacrifice toward the sacred end, the descending Utopia. Socialized through Shi'ism, they were heirs to the rich gnostic philosophical tradition of the past. As they became politicized, the dominant influences of selfeffacement present in early childhood evolved into conscious emotive feelings of self-aggrandizement. It is methodologically wrong, however, to erect a wall mechanically separating the two concepts. They are interchangeably linked, and each evolves from the other and carries the germs of its antithesis. The secular political groups also used martyrdom as an effective theme to instill a sense of self-sacrifice and devotion in their followers and the general public. While religious groups repeatedly referred to Imam Ali and Husayn as the source of inspiration, for the secular opposition, people and their suffering justified revolutionary struggle and self-sacrifice. The words of Shokralah Paknezhad (d. 1981), the leader of an organization 71. See Hamasay-e Yak Payedary-i Bozorg (The epic of a great resistance) (Mojahadin Khalq, n.d.), pp. 38-43. 72. Payam, p. 30. MARTYRDOM AND POLITICS 517 known as the Palestine Group, captures the spirit of martyrdom among secular opposition: There are human beings who consciously rise for the people's cause in decisive historical moments. Standing at the crossroads of life and death, they willingly walk toward death, a death that is a testimony to the eternal living legends of the toiling masses and is a source of inspiration for other struggles yettocome.73 In the same vein, Karamat Allah Daneshiyan (a colleague of Khorrow Golsorkhi, who was executed with him in 1973), perceived martyrdom as a necessary sacrifice for the moral regeneration of society: The oppressed people of Iran have lost many of their heroic children in the path of struggle. This is a necessity dictated by the very nature of the struggle and the movement itself. Sacrifices, martyrdom and resistance will break the back of the enemy. It is absurd and naive to think that the children of the masses will constantly die and vanish in the process of revolutionary resurgence. Such an illusion can be entertained only by the enemies of the people. The movement will grow and become popular. The workers, the peasants and the oppressed will begin a new and a happy life. Martyrdom is the least precious gift we can offer for the victory of the masses. Each martyr's death is a window closed to evil. Each martyr's death is a window closed to lies, prostitution, poverty and hunger. And then a new window will open up, a window through which the light of life will shine. We must surrender to the glimmer of this light.74 This depiction of the martyr as the vanguard of the masses, who through his/her self-sacrifice will awaken them to the necessity of political struggle, was already evident in the writings of some of the leaders of the Marxist Fedayeian-i Khalq organization.75 With the publication of Parviz Poyan and Mas'ud Ahmad Zadeh's theoretical treatise in defense of armed struggle, many guerrillas now saw themselves as a spark rekindling a wild fire that would burn the old system to ashes. They considered their own martyr73. The defense of the great revolutionary Shokrallah Paknejad, reproduced by the Association of Iranian Students in the United States, 1976, p. 2. 74. Reprinted in Elm va Jam'a (Science and society) no. 15, p. 40. 75. For a description of these organizations see Ervand Abrahamian "The guerrilla movement in Iran: 1963-1977," Merip Reports, no. 86 (1980). 518 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS dom a necessary step in the political awakening and historical march of the masses toward their ultimate and inevitable victory. Seized by a messianic sense of mission, they saw themselves as cadres of history, as the vanguard of humanity whose selfsacrifice would determine the course of the future. Having witnessed the political apathy of the masses, political activists substituted their own will power, determination and devotion for the societal antipathy toward politics. Seen in this light, the concept of rebirth present in the myth of the martyrdom of Siyavush appears in a new form. By negating self one gives life to the movement. The movement immortalizes the individual by preserving his/her ideals. The words of Bijan Jazani (d. 1975), one of the foremost leaders of Fedayeian and a martyr, reveals the essence of this mindset: The vanguard cannot mobilize the masses for revolution unless it takes the initiative in resistance and self-sacrifice. What inflames the cold steel of the masses is the burning glimmer of the vanguard. It is the self-sacrifice of the vanguard that ultimately engulfs the masses. This self-sacrifice and heroism are a direct outgrowth of the pain and suffering of the masses. It is the anger and hatred of the masses that burns through the vanguard. The revolutionary spirit of the vanguard is inspired by the material interest of the masses. Thus, it ultimately explodes their energy and potential.76 Politically speaking, in a society such as Iran in which severe mistrust pervades all aspects of social relationships, martyrdom has a utilitarian value as well. It is not so much the political program of an organization or a group that attracts the public; rather, it is the sincerity of its advocates. Their willingness to sacrifice themselves for the cause becomes the focal point of attention. Given the high rate of illiteracy and the popularity of traditional values among the laity, the determining political factor in the number of supporters is not so much dependent on novel or profound political ideas as it is on the number of martyrs. Since political sincerity is measured by the degree of self-sacrifice, martyrs become political capital, an asset for legitimacy and 76. Bijan Jazani, Tarh'i jamea'h Shenasi va Mabani-i Strategy Jonbesh-i Enqelab-i Iran (The sociological scheme and the strategic basis of Iranian revolutionary movement), vol. II, part one (Fedayeian Khalgh, 1978), p. 69. MARTYRDOM AND POLITICS 519 credibility. No organization can grow substantially without any primitive accumulation of martyrs. Therefore, it is not accidental that all political groups that enjoyed any measure of popular support throughout the 1960s and 1970s were organizations that not only had a history of political struggle but also shared the honor of martyrdom, proudly displaying the long list of their fallen comrades. Throughout the revolution of 1979, the clergy, as custodians of the Shi'ite faith, used the tradition of martyrdom to mobilize millions against the Shah's regime. As some of the demonstrators were shot by the security forces, the clergy effectively employed the tradition of commemorating the deceased on the seventh and the fortieth days after their death to mobilize even larger numbers of people. Thus, as the number of martyrs grew, so did the number of anti-Shah demonstrators.77 Since its ascendence, the Islamic Republic has used the postrevolutionary systematic martyrdom that occurred during its eight year war with Iraq to maintain a permanent state of mass mobilization and to ward off criticism by presenting itself as "the guardian of the honor and blood of martyrs." If prior to the revolution martyrs were to be rewarded in the hereafter, after the revolution there were worldly inducements for martyrdom as well. A Foundation of Martyrs was established. The families of the martyrs were given preferential treatment in receiving coupons for food subsidies, entrance to universities and job placement in governmental bureaucracies. Large numbers of urban poor, peasantry and lower middle classes volunteered for the war with Iraq, thinking that if they died, heaven awaited them andfinancialsecurity and honor awaited the family members they had left behind. This worldly inducement was so prevalent during the war years that the statement below represents a typical attempt on the part of governmental officials to maintain the religious sanctity historically associated with the aura of martyrs and martyrdom: 77. There is a clear parallel here with Lebanese Shi'ite increasing bid for political power in that country. As the Israeli invasion of Lebanon led to their concomitant confrontation with the hitherto subdued and submissive Shi'ite community in the South and as the number of Shi'ite casualties grew, so did their involvement in politics and their political power. 520 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS He drank the sweet syrup of martyrdom, but left a heavy burden on our shoulders to safeguard his pure blood and forbid those who may use his innocent blood as a bridge to reach a position or get ahead.78 While rituals, rites, and symbols have social functions; once practiced, they develop a dynamism and a life of their own which binds the continued existence of the community to the vitality of traditions. Commenting on the political significance of the rituals of Ashura in Iran, Sheikholeslami asserts. The commemoration of the deceased emphasizes the historical continuity of the community, and the social sentiment which the ritual arouses is more than sufficient to compensate for the death, i.e. the breach of solidarity. All these mourning rituals are associated with commensality which brings the community together, and the partaking of the food in particular brings life, contrasted with death, into a clearer focus.79 Only in this dialectical juxtaposition of life and death can we fully grasp the meaning of martyrdom not as annihilation but as a conscious act celebrating life. In the final analysis only something as profound and complex as life itself can explain the voluntary and romantic embracement of death. In the deliberate act of self-sacrifice one makes the most powerful statement about life and its meaning. With the sense of Socratic calm as they face their death, the martyrs echoed a popular poem of the time: "the bird shall die, but flying is eternal." The martyr may die, but martyrdom is eternal. Conclusion "Of all sources of religion," wrote Malinowski, "the supreme and final crisis of life—death—is of the greatest importance."80 Death threatens the very foundations of human existence. The dual response of fear and awe evoked by death, creates emotionally ambivalent feelings of a will to survive—a further attachment to 78. Jumhury-i Islami, 10, Day, 1359, p. 5. 79. Sheikholeslami, "From Religious Accommodation to Religious Revolution," p. 229. 80. Malinowski, magic, science and religion, p. 29 as cited by Geertz, Interpretation ofCultures, p. 162. MARTYRDOM AND POLITICS 521 life—and an affection toward the deceased that engenders a compulsion to be united with him. This powerful motif in the human spirit, touching the very heart and soul of the community, has been effectively used for political purposes throughout Iranian history. Martyrdom has been used not only to sanction certain political ends but also to maintain communal solidarity and loyalty. Historically, the integrative power of such symbols has been significant in inculcating a sense of identity and culturally assimilating and politically mobilizing the populace. The remarkable resonance of this tradition in secular political culture is indicative of the vitality of religious symbols in post-traditional societies and also partially explains the defensive nature of secular ideologies in the Middle East in the postcolonial era. 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