CRITIQUE OF SUÁREZ ON INDIVIDUATION
Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2023.
Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) examines the problem of individuation in the fifth
disputation (Individual Unity and Its Principle) of his Disputationes metaphysicae (1597).1 What
is Suárez’s position on individuation? Suárez maintains “that every being is individuated by
itself, and by its own proper entity.”2 “According to Suárez a being is constituted an individual,
not by any definite quantity of matter, nor by any formality distinct from its reality, but by the
possession of its own reality.”3 “Suárez considers, in opposition to Scotus, that the principle of
individuation can only be logically distinguished from the individual being. Every being…is
individual of itself, by reason of its entity. He is particularly determined in his opposition to the
Thomist thesis which would see in a part of the nature only, viz., matter affected by quantity, the
principle of individuation.4”5 Henry J. Koren states that Suárez “held that an essence is
individual by its very entity,” but that such a position is “unsatisfactory, because it does not
explain how this entity is this entity and no other.”6 “Scotus, Ockham and Suárez denied that
matter could be the principle of individuation. Scotus made the haecceitas the individuating
principle; by haecceitas, he meant the ultimate reality in the scale of formalities which gives the
specific nature of the thing its ‘being this,’ that is, its individuality. Ockham maintained that
whatever exists, by the mere fact of existing, is individual, thus denying the reality of the specific
nature. Suárez, following the nominalist tradition, affirmed that ‘any entity is by itself the
principle of individuation.’(Disp. metaph., disp. V, sect. 6, no. 1). Among modern philosophers,
Leibniz devoted special attention to this question (cf. his dissertation, De principio individui).
His solution followed the line of thinking of his mentor Thomasius, and fully coincided with the
positions of Ockham and Suárez.”7 “In the fifth disputation Suárez considers the problem of
individuation. All actually existing things – all things which can exist ‘immediately’ – are
singular and individual.8 The word ‘immediately’ is inserted in order to exclude the common
attributes of being, which cannot exist immediately, that is to say, which can exist only in
singular, individual beings. Suárez agrees with Scotus that individuality adds something real to
the common nature; but he rejects Scotus’ doctrine of the haecceitas ‘formally’ distinct from the
specific nature.9 What, then, does individuality add to the common nature? ‘Individuality adds to
the common nature something which is mentally distinct from that nature, which belongs to the
same category, and which (together with the nature) constitutes the individual metaphysically, as
1
An English translation of Disputation V by Jorge Gracia was published in 1982: Suárez on Individuation:
Metaphysical Disputation V: Individual Unity and Its Principle, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1982.
2
H. GRENIER, Thomistic Metaphysics, vol. 2 (Philosophy of Nature), St. Dunstan’s University, Charlottetown,
Canada, 1950, p. 122.
3
J. F. McCORMICK, Scholastic Metaphysics, vol. 1 (Being, Its Division and Causes), Loyola University Press,
Chicago, 1928, p. 72.
4
Cf. F. SUÁREZ, Disp. metaph., V, Sect. 3.
5
R. P. PHILLIPS, Modern Thomistic Philosophy, vol. 1 (The Philosophy of Nature), Burns, Oates & Washbourne,
London, 1941, p. 154.
6
H. J. KOREN, An Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1955, p. 157.
7
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, p. 103.
8
Cf. F. SUÁREZ, Disputationes metaphysicae, 5, 1, 4,
9
Cf. F. SUÁREZ, op. cit., 5, 2, 8-9.
1
an individual differentia contracting the species and constituting the individual.’10 Suárez
remarks that to say that what is added is mentally distinct from the specific nature is not the same
thing as saying that it is an ens rationis; he has already agreed with Scotus that it is aliquid reale.
In answer, then, to the question whether a substance is individuated by itself Suárez replies that if
the words ‘by itself’ refer to the specific nature as such, the answer is in the negative, but that, if
the words ‘by itself’ mean ‘by its own entity or being,’ the answer is in the affirmative. But it
must be added that the thing’s entity or being includes not only the ratio specifica but also the
differentia individualis, the two being distinguished from one another by a mental distinction.
Suárez emphasizes the fact that he is speaking of created things, not of the divine substance; but
among created things he applies the same doctrine to both immaterial and material substances.
From this it follows that he rejects the Thomist view of materia signata as the only principle of
individuation.11 In the case of a composite substance, composed, that is to say, of matter and
form, ‘the adequate principle is this matter and this form in union, the form being the chief
principle and sufficient by itself for the composite, as an individual thing of a certain species, to
be considered numerically one. This conclusion…agrees with the opinion of Durandus and
Toletus; and Scotus, Henry of Ghent and the Nominalists do not hold anything substantially
different’ (in re non dissentiunt).12 It is perfectly true that because our knowledge is founded on
experience of sensible things, we often distinguish individuals according to their several
‘matters’ or according to the accidents, like quantity, which follow on the possession of matter;
but if we are considering a material substance in itself, and not in relation simply to our mode of
cognition, its individuality must be primarily ascribed to its principal constitutive element,
namely the form.13”14
Renard’s Critique of Suárez on Individuation. Henri Renard, S.J. critiques Suárez on
individuation in his Philosophy of Being as follows: “Suárez, also, since he does not admit the
limitation of act by potency had, of necessity, to evolve his own theory of individuation. His
views are closer to those of Occam who denies that there is such a problem, than to those of
Scotus, who, with his usual subtlety, creates new little entities, the ‘thisnesses.’ With Suárez the
very being, the very entity of the individual is the reason for his individuality.15 We can only
agree with the Doctor Eximius, adding, however, that we should like to go a bit further in our
analysis of the individual, and to find the reason for the fact that the entity of the individual is
this entity. For it seems to us that to say that an individual is this individual because of his entity,
is merely to restate the problem of individuation.”16
Jolivet’s Critique of Suárez on Individuation. Régis Jolivet critiques Suárez on
individuation in the second volume (Cosmologia) of his Trattato di filosofia as follows:
“Soluzioni inadeguate. – L’individuazione mediante l’essere. I nominalisti, Durand De SaintPourçain, Pietro Aureblo e, dopo di loro, Suárez, Leibniz, pensano che ogni cosa è
individualizzata dalla sua entità propria, dal suo stesso essere. Se soltanto gli individui sono
reali, ne consegue che la individualità è data nello stesso tempo della realtà, in altre parole
10
F. SUÁREZ, op. cit., 5, 2, 16,
Cf. F. SUÁREZ, op. cit., 5, 3.
12
F. SUÁREZ, op. cit., 5, 6, 15.
13
Cf. F. SUÁREZ, op. cit., 5, 6, 17,
14
F. COPLESTON, A History of Philosophy, Book 1, vol. 3, Image Doubleday, New York, 1985, pp. 360-361.
15
“Unaquaeque entitas est per seipsam suae individuationis principium”(Disp. Metaphys., disp. V, sect. 6, n. 1).
16
H. RENARD, The Philosophy of Being, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1950, p. 226.
11
2
l’essere è individuale per il fatto stesso che è; il principio di individuazione è nella materia e
nella forma riunite, cioè nella esistenza stessa della materia e della forma come composto
sostanziale.
“Questa soluzione sembra semplice e in realtà lo è anche troppo, perché non risolve
affatto la questione. È certo che l’essere è uno e indivisibile per il fatto che è. Pietro è un
individuo per il fatto di possedere questa natura, questo corpo, quest’anima e queste note
individuanti (principio formale dell’individuazione). Ma come avviene che egli sia proprio
questo e non un altro, che egli possieda questa natura, questo corpo, questa anima, queste note
individuanti? Ciò risulta dall’individuazione ma non la costituisce e quello che bisogna scoprire
è il principio radicale dell’individualità: la teoria nominalista constata il fatto, ma non lo
spiega.”17
Ferraro’s Critique of Suárez on Individuation. Christian Ferraro critiques Suárez on
individuation in his 2013 Appunti di metafisica as follows: “Suárez, seguendo i nominalisti
(Occam, Durando), affermava che ogni entità è individuale per se stessa,18 perché tutto cho che
è, è di per sé individuale e singolare, anche la materia prima, anche la forma. Non ha senso
l’andare a cercare oltre, un principio d’individuazione della sostanza, perché soltanto esistono le
cose singole, e la sostanza è ciò che esiste per sé, di modo che è l’entità stessa della cosa a
individuarla.19
“La tesi però altro non fa che convertire il problema in soluzione. A tesi vicine a questa,
sostenute dai suoi contemporanei, Scoto, dal canto suo, obiettava, che si poneva il problema
ulteriore di come l’esistenza divenisse individuale, vale a dire «questa» esistenza che fa essere la
sostanza, che in virtù dell’esistenza diventa «questa»: si aprirebbe un regresso all’infinito.”20
Hart’s Critique of Suárez on Individuation. Charles A. Hart critiques Suárez on
individuation in his 1959 Thomistic Metaphysics as follows: “Position of Suárez. Suárez rejected
the position of both his illustrious predecessors. He argued effectively against the Scotistic
formal distinction between the various forms, or more precisely ‘formalities,’ in the being which
represent the various grades of perfection in its nature. He saw these universal concepts were
only formally in the mind although having a foundation in reality, as held by St. Thomas. But
Suárez himself moves in the opposite direction from Scotus. Starting with the fundamental truth,
accepted generally by all prominent Christian metaphysicians of the Middle Ages, that only the
individual is real, he went on to say that the abstract universal representing the common aspect of
the class to which the individual belongs is contracted by an individual difference to constitute
the individual.
17
R. JOLIVET, Trattato di filosofia, vol. 2 (Cosmologia), Morcelliana, Brescia, 1957, no. 94.
«…unaquaeque entitas est per seipsam principium individuationis» (F. SUÁREZ, Disputationes metaphysicae,
Disp. V, sect. 4, nr. 1).
19
Locke difende una tesi alquanto vicina. Secondo lui, come per alcuni nominalisti, sarebbe l’esistenza stessa a
individuare la sostanza: «...it is easy to discover what is so much inquired after, the principium individuationis; and
that, it is plain, is existence itself, which determines a being of any sort to a particular time and place,
incommunicable to two beings of the same kind» (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, B. II, ch. XXVII,
sect. 3, Hayes & Zell, Philadelphia 1854, 207).
20
C. FERRARO, Appunti di metafisica, Lateran University Press, Vatican City, 2013, p. 141.
18
3
“Actually of course, as realized in the individual, this abstract common nature is identical
with the entire entity of the individual substance. The same is true of the conceived difference.
Accordingly the intrinsic principle of individuation, or the entity existing in the individual and
making the realized specific nature incommunicable (that is, separate and distinct) is only
logically distinct from this realized, abstractly conceived nature. In reality, it is identical with the
realized common nature or with the entire substantial being of the existing individual. Suárez
says: ‘Thus the individual difference does not have in the individual substance any special
principle or fundament which would be really distinct from its entity; and in this sense it declares
that every existing entity is of itself its own principle of individuation. In a word by its whole
existence every being is necessarily individual.’21
“Criticism of Suárez’ Position. The position of Suárez is an even better example than that
of Scotus of how a particular theory of knowledge can dominate one’s ultimate conviction as to
the structure of reality itself. A misunderstanding as to the manner of our thinking will mean
misrepresentation as to the actual character of reality. Suárez’ position is the logical consequence
of his theory of knowledge. His extreme emphasis on the fact that the existing individual is the
only genuine reality is a truth. However, it should not be isolated from the problem of knowing
the individual. Since only the individual exists, Suárez insists that this is paralleled in the
knowing process by the active intellect’s power to do more than merely dematerialize the image
as the instrument for getting an idea (as is the case in the more moderate view of St. Thomas).
Rather, the active intellect can completely spiritualize the image so that its entire content in all its
particularity is rendered intelligible. Thus this spiritualized species or form represents the
individual in the intellect in the same way it is represented in the senses by the particular
image.22 The intellect knows the individual immediately and directly, rather than indirectly and
reflexively, by a ‘turning back to the image,’ as St. Thomas holds in his much more moderate
and, we believe, truer estimate of the limited power of the human intellect.
“The representation of a material substance, in all its individuality, by a spiritual form
does not constitute a contradiction, according to Suárez, because if it did such knowledge in God
and angels would have to be denied. Evidently Suárez is again overestimating the power of the
human intellect, forgetting that it is the lowest in the gradation of intellects. ‘That which is
known first by the intellect is the individual being’ says Suárez.23 Thus the individual has the
same primary position in Suárez’ theory of knowledge that it has in his metaphysics. Thereafter
universal concepts are produced, as in Scotus, by a process of precision or cutting off (abcissus)
of differences by the passive intellect. Obviously, this is different from the Thomistic universal
which results from abstraction, with the dematerialized image being used as an instrument of the
active intellect to move the passive intellect to the production of the universal.
“St. Thomas is more properly aware of the limitations of an intellect in a human body
which is thus dependent upon sense data for its activity. Suárez is far too optimistic about the
power of the human intellect, making it in certain respects equal in power to the intellect of
purely immaterial substances. Thus his position on the principle of individuation, which is the
result of his extreme claims for the power of the human intellect, inherits all the weakness of his
21
F. SUÁREZ, Disputationes metaphysicae, Disputation V, Barton edition, Vives, Paris, 1861, vol. 6, n. 1.
Ibid., n. 3.
23
De Anima, IV, c. 3, n. 15.
22
4
very doubtful principles of knowing. At the opposite extreme, Scotus’ position was unacceptable
because he considered universal concepts as having not merely a foundation in reality but as
being in a certain way real in the nature of the thing (ex natura rei). In contrast, St. Thomas’
doctrine on individuation is built on what are evidently sounder principles of knowing and being,
displaying a much more conservative appreciation of the precise power of the human intellect
within its clearly recognized limits. Therefore, his solution to one of the most profound problems
in the mystery of being – the constitution of the individual – is preferable.”24
Fabro’s Critique of Suárez on Individuation. For an explanation of the teaching of St.
Thomas Aquinas on the principle of individuation, and for a detailed critique of Suárez’s
position on individuation, see pages 127-140 of Cornelio Fabro’s Curso de Metafísica, Ediciones
de la Facultad de Teología de la Pontificia Universidad Catolica Argentina y Libreria del
I.C.R.S., Buenos Aires, 1951.
Answer to Suárez on Individuation: Actus Essendi Metaphysics on the Principle of
Individuation of the Essence of Corporeal Substances. The true solution regarding the
individuation of the essence25 of corporeal substances is that quantified matter, or matter marked
or signed with quantity (materia quantitate signata), is the principle of individuation.26 This
section concerns the principle of individuation as regards corporeal substances according to actus
essendi metaphysics. It will also deal briefly with the questions as to how accidents are
individuated and how subsistent forms are individual. Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo on the
Principle of Individuation. “The Essence of Beings Exists Only in an Individuated Way. We
realize that ‘universal’ species do not subsist; we only find particular individuals around us.
There are various individuals of the same kind, but they are distinct from one another. They
possess the same specific essence, the same degree of being which gives them a certain mutual
similarity, but the essence has its own characteristics in each of them.
“Essences do not exist, then, as something general and abstract; rather, they are
‘individualized’ in each member of the same species. The human race, or human species, does
not subsist; only individual men do.
“Metaphysics tries to explain how the essence can remain specifically identical and yet
be really diversified in a multitude of individual beings. As we have already seen, act is
multiplied by potency. It can be said then, for a start, that in the realm of the essence of corporeal
beings, matter is the principle which multiplies the forms. The form accounts for the specific
similarity of things, because it determines a common degree of being, which makes all men to be
24
C. A. HART, Thomistic Metaphysics, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1959, pp. 132-133.
“Il principio d’individuazione dell’essenza dell’ente corporeo è la materia in quanto sottostà alle dimensioni.”(C.
FERRARO, op. cit., p. 145). “We must note that ‘what is individuated’ is not, strictly speaking, the being (since this
is an individual in itself) but the common form, a property which can be shared by many.”(T. ALVIRA, L.
CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, p. 102). “Hay que notar que «lo que se
individúa» no es propiamente el ente (éste resulta individual sin más), sino la forma común, la propriedad
participable por muchos.”(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metafísica, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1989, p.
103). “Bisogna sottolineare come «ciò che viene individuato» non è propriamente l’ente (esso è individuale
senz’altro), ma la forma comune, la proprietà partecipabile da molti.”(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO,
Metafisica, Le Monnier, Florence, 1987, p. 88).
26
Cf. R. J. KREYCHE, First Philosophy, Henry Holt, New York, 1959, p. 117.
25
5
men, and all dogs to be dogs. Matter, on the other hand, as the receptive subject of the form,
renders plurality possible within one and the same degree of being. Because of matter, there can
be many men, many dogs, many roses, many pieces of quartz.
“Aside from multiplying the form, matter also individuates or singularizes it. Not only are
the individuals of a species many, but they are also diverse from one another, as experience
continually shows.
“We might say that the diversification brought about by matter has a ‘horizontal’ effect,
in contrast to that produced by the form, which gives rise to a ‘vertical’ hierarchy of creatures
having greater or lesser degrees of perfection in being. Hence, the diversity caused by matter
remains confined within the limits set by the form of the species.
“As we consider the process of individuation, we can distinguish two aspects, which are
inseparably united in reality, in view of the two roles that potency plays with regard to act:
multiplication and singularization.”27
“La esencia de los entes existe sólo individualizada. A nuestro alrededor no encontramos
especies universales, sino sólo individuos singulares y concretos. Se trata de cosas que
pertenecen a una misma especie, pero que son distintas unas de otras: poseen la misma esencia
específica, un mismo grado de ser que les da una cierta semejanza recíproca, pero que presenta
en cada una de ellas características propias.
“Vemos, pues, que las esencias no existen como algo abstracto y general, sino
individualizadas en cada uno de los que integran la misma especie: no subsiste la especie
humana, sino los hombres individuales.
“La metafísica trata de explicar cómo la esencia, permaneciendo específicamente
idéntica, se diversifica en realidad en una multitud de entes singulares. La multiplicación del acto
se debe -como ya vimos- a la potencia, y por eso cabe adelantar que, dentro de la esencia de las
realidades corpóreas, la materia es el principio multiplicador de las formas. La forma explica la
semejanza específica entre las cosas, porque determina un grado de ser común, haciendo que
todos los hombres sean hombres; los perros, perros, etc.; la materia, en cambio, como sujeto
receptivo de la forma, es lo que hace posible la pluralidad dentro de un mismo grado de ser: que
haya muchos hombres, muchas rosas, muchas piedras de cuarzo, etc.
“La materia, además de multiplicar a la forma, la individúa o singulariza. Los
componentes de una especie no sólo son muchos, sino también diversos entre sí, como nos
muestra de continuo la experiencia.
“Se podría decir que la diversificación que introduce la materia es de carácter
«horizontal», por contraposición a la producida por la forma, que jerarquiza a las criaturas según
la mayor o menor perfección de ser, en una dimensión «vertical». La multiplicación causada por
la materia se mantiene, por tanto, dentro de los límites que la forma señala a la especie.
27
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 99-100.
6
“Al explicar la individuación pueden distinguirse dos aspectos indisolublemente unidos
en la realidad, atendiendo a las dos funciones que corresponden a la potencia en relación al acto:
multiplicación y singularización.”28
“L’essenza degli enti esiste soltanto individualizzata. Intorno a noi non troviamo specie
universali, ma soltanto individui singolari e concreti. Si tratta di cose che appartengono a una
stessa specie, ma che sono distinte l’una dall’altra: hanno la stessa essenza specifica, uno stesso
grado di essere che conferisce loro una certa reciproca somiglianza, ma che anche presenta in
ciascuna di esse delle caratteristiche proprie. Vediamo allora che le essenze non esistono come
qualcosa di astratto e generale, bensì individualizzate in ogni componente della stessa specie:
non sussiste la specie umana, ma gli uomini individuali.
“La metafisica cerca di spiegare come l’essenza, pur rimanendo specificamente identica,
si diversifichi in realtà in una moltitudine di enti singolari. La moltiplicazione dell’atto è dovuta,
come già abbiamo visto, alla potenza, e per questo si può anticipare che, nell’essenza delle realtà
corporee, la materia è il principio moltiplicatore delle forme. La forma spiega la somiglianza
specifica fra le cose, poiché determina un grado di essere comune, facendo sì che tutti gli uomini
siano uomini; i cani, cani, ecc.; la materia, invece, come soggetto recettivo della forma, è ciò che
rende possibile la pluralità all’interno di uno stesso grado di essere: che vi siano molti uomini,
molte rose, molte pietre di quarzo, ecc.
“La materia, oltre a moltiplicare la forma, la individua e la singolarizza. Gli individui
che fanno parte di una specie non solo sono molti, ma sono anche diversi fra loro, come per altro
ci mostra continuamente l’esperienza.
“Si potrebbe dire che la diversificazione introdotta dalla materia è di carattere
«orizzontale», in contrapposizione a quella prodotta dalla forma, che gerarchizza gli enti secondo
la maggiore o minore perfezione ontologica, in una dimensione «verticale». La moltiplicazione
dovuta alla materia rimane, pertanto, entro i limiti che la forma stabilisce per la specie.
“Per spiegare l’individuazione si possono distinguere due aspetti indissolubilmente uniti
nella realtà, considerando le due funzioni della potenza rispetto all’atto: moltiplicazione e
singolarizzazione.”29
Henry J. Koren explains that “at first sight it is clear that the fundamental principle of
individuation must be an intrinsic constituent principle of the individual essence, because the
fundamental principle is an intrinsic principle. Now, an individual essence is composed of two
constitutent principles, matter and form. The form, however, cannot be the ultimate root of
individuation because of itself any form is common, and thus can be found in several (Quodlibet,
7, a. 3). If, for instance, Peter would be this man because he has the form of man, every man
would be Peter, because every man has the form of man. Moreover, individuation within a
species implies multiplication, and therefore also limitation. Form, however, of itself does not
imply any limitation; hence, again, we arrive at the conclusion that the form of an individual
cannot be the ultimate root of individuation.
28
29
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 101-102.
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 86-87.
7
“For the same reasons we must exclude the possibility that the fundamental principle of
individuation would be an additional form, or a combination of additional forms added to the
compound of matter and form. For, of itself any formal principle is communicable to many, and
thus cannot be the ultimate basis of incommunicability. ‘No matter how many forms are joined
together, no definite assignation of this singular thing will result, save accidentally inasmuch as
the collection of these forms happens to be found only in one thing.’30 Moreover, if such an
additional formal principle belonged to the essence, it would cause an essential difference, a new
species, and not a purely individual difference within the same species. On the other hand, if it
did not belong to the essence, it could not cause the individuation of this essence from within,
but, at most, would be something by which this essence could be recognized. Hence, by
exclusion, it follows that the root of individuation must be found in matter.”31
There are a number of erroneous and insufficient solutions to the problem of
individuation as regards corporeal substances, as Henri Renard observes: “Note carefully that we
are seeking the ultimate reasons for individuation. It would not do, therefore, to say that Peter is
Peter and different from Paul because of the color of his hair, because of his height or weight,
because he dresses better than Paul, or because he lives in a different town. These are only
external signs manifesting his individuality. We are not seeking the external manifestations of
individuality, but the ultimate and most profound principle of it.
“It will not suffice to say: Of course the reason why they are different is because God
made them different. That is true; but to say that is to state only the extrinsic cause for their
actuation in the existential order. God is the agent. But that is not what we are looking for. Our
question is: what is it in the individual that makes it this individual? What is it in Peter that
makes him different from anybody else?
“Again one might say, this is an extremely simple question. Peter is Peter and
consequently not Paul nor John, because he has this particular soul, this particular body, namely,
Peter’s body and soul. In other words Peter is Peter because his whole being is his own being; it
is what it is. This is a beautifully simple answer, and true, too, no doubt; but alas, it says nothing
new, it explains nothing. Of course Peter is Peter because his soul is Peter’s and his body is his
own and not someone else’s. Who ever doubted it? But really that does not help one bit, because
what we want to know is precisely why it is that Peter has that particular body and soul, and
nothing else will satisfy our curiosity except that.”32
The true solution, Renard states, is that quantified matter, or matter marked or signed
with quantity (materia quantitate signata), is the principle of individuation: “In the De Ente et
Essentia (chap. 2), St. Thomas explains that matter is the principle of individuation, not,
however, prime matter as such, but ‘signate matter’ with its parts outside of parts (extension),
with its order of parts (situs), and considered under its ‘determinate’ dimensions.”33
30
In VII Metaphysic., lect. 15, no. 1626.
H. J. KOREN, op. cit., pp. 149-150.
32
H. RENARD, op. cit., pp. 217-218.
33
H. RENARD, op. cit., p. 218.
31
8
Regarding the multiplication of the essence in individuals in light of the doctrine act and
potency applied to form and matter, Alvira, Clavell and Melendo state: “The plurality of
individuals of the same kind reveals that their essences are composed of two elements related to
one another as potency and act. As we have already seen, pure act at any given level is
necessarily unique. Therefore, an essence which would consist of the form alone (act in the
realm of essence) would not be multiplied in distinct individuals, but would be individuated in
itself as such.
“Hence, it is matter, which the form of the species is received, that makes the existence of
many individuals of the same species possible. For this reason, it can be said that matter is the
first principle of the numerical multiplication of the species, insofar as it is the subject in which
the specific form is supported and multiplied.”34
“La multiplicación de la esencia en los individuos. La pluralidad de individuos de una
misma especie nos manifiesta que su esencia se compone de dos elementos que se relacionan
entre sí como potencia y acto, ya que -como vimos- el acto puro a un determinado nivel es
necesariamente único. Por eso, una esencia que sólo estuviera integrada por la forma (acto en el
ámbito esencial), no podría multiplicarse en distintos individuos, sino que ella misma se
individuaría como tal.
“Por tanto, lo que hace posible que existan muchos individuos de la misma especie es la
materia, en la que la forma de esa especie es recibida. De ahí que se pueda afirmar que la
materia es el primer principio de la multiplicación numérica de la especie, en cuanto constituye
el sujeto en que la forma específica se apoya y plurifica.”35
“La moltiplicazione dell’essenza negli individui. La pluralità degli individui di una stessa
specie ci mostra che la sua essenza è costituita da due elementi che stanno fra loro come potenza
all’atto, poiché, come abbiamo visto, l’atto puro a un determinato livello è necessariamente
unico. Per questo, un’essenza che fosse costituita soltanto dalla forma (atto nell’ambito
essenziale) non potrebbe moltiplicarsi in più individui, ma essa stessa sarebbe individuata come
tale.
“Pertanto, ciò che consente l’esistenza di molti individui della stessa specie è la materia,
nella quale è ricevuta la forma di questa specie. Si può così affermare che la materia è il primo
principio della moltiplicazione numerica della specie, in quanto costituisce il soggetto sul quale
la forma specifica si appoggia e si moltiplica.”36
As regards the singularization of the essence of corporeal substances, in light again of the
doctrine of act and potency as applied to form and matter, Alvira, Clavell and Melendo explain:
“The root of multiplication and therefore of the individuation of the essence is matter. However,
matter individuates essence insofar as matter itself is singular, that is, only to the extent that it is
34
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 100.
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 102.
36
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 87.
35
9
specified by the accident quantity. Consequently, it is said that the principle individuation is
quantified matter (materia quantitate signata).37
“It must be taken into account that quantity, ‘in itself includes position,’ which is ‘the
order of parts in the whole’: quantity is ‘that which has position.’ Consequently, ‘many lines can
be apprehended, even if they are considered in themselves (and not in a subject that multiplies
them and makes them singular), since the diverse relative position of their parts, which by nature
pertains to a line, is sufficient for the plurality of lines.’38
“Quantity enables matter to be in arranged different parts, giving it an extended
dimension and allow one part of matter to be distinguished from another. The different ‘pieces’
of quantified matter thus individuate the substantial form, restricting it to being the form of this
matter and not of that other matter.
“Even though its first principle is matter, individuation also requires the intervention of
the substantial form and quantity. Matter singularizes because it is affected by quantity, but this
is an accident received only by a complete being, i.e., it arises from matter insofar as the latter is
made actual by the form.
“Consequently, the process of individuation can be broken down into three stages, which
are not subsequent to one another in time but simultaneous. There is mutual influence of the
elements: matter, quantity, and substantial form:
“1. As it actualizes matter, the substantial form of a corporeal being causes the accident
quantity to arise in matter, since quantity constitutes the body as such; 2 As quantity gives
dimensions to matter, it makes some parts in it distinct from other parts, thus making it
individual.39 By virtue of its concrete dimensions, quantity limits matter to being this matter,
distinct from all the rest; 3. Matter, thus singularized by quantity, individuates the specific form.
“In the final analysis, matter is the principle of multiplication of the species, inasmuch as
it is an apt subject of the substantial form, which is its proper act; it singularizes the form to the
extent that it is itself singularized due to the effect of quantity. But since this requires the prior
actualization of matter by the form (which is, by nature, prior to matter), St. Thomas summarizes
37
The commentators of St. Thomas Aquinas had various interpretations regarding the nature of the materia
quantitate signata. Cajetan, and later on John of St. Thomas, identified the principle of individuation with matter
inasmuch as it is the root of quantity; this means that what causes individuation is matter in potency, that is, still
devoid of the actuality of quantity. (cf. Comm. in summam theo., I, q. 29, a. 1). Sylvester de Ferraris rejected that
interpretation – due to the obvious divergence from St. Thomas’ doctrine – and affirmed together with John
Capreolus that the materia quantitate signata is not prime matter alone but matter that is already with the accident
quantity. (cf. Comm. in summam contra gentiles, Lib. I, c. 21).
38
Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, ch. 65.
39
Actualized quantity can be considered as either determinate or indeterminate. In every moment of its existence an
individual has some perfectly determined dimensions [a certain height, volume or weight, for example]; however,
this type of quantity cannot be the contributing factor for individuation, since it varies continuously. For this reason,
St. Thomas Aquinas taught that the principle of individuation is matter, but under indeterminate dimensions, that is,
in its ‘unfinished’ state. This same matter makes possible the designation of a thing in time (nunc) and in place (hic);
it also explains why an individual remains the same notwithstanding the continuous changes that it undergoes in its
dimensions.
10
this question by saying that «given the corporeity by virtue of the form, individuation arises on
account of the matter».40”41
“La singularización de la esencia…la raíz de la multiplicación y, por tanto, de la
individuación de la esencia, es la materia. Pero la materia individúa a la esencia en cuanto ella
misma es singular, es decir, en la medida en que está afectada por el accidente cantidad. Se
dice, por esto, que el principio de individuación es la materia cuantificada (materia quantitate
signata).42
“Conviene tener presente que la cantidad «incluye en sí la posición, que es el orden de
las partes en el todo: la cantidad es lo que tiene posición»; por eso «pueden distinguirse muchas
líneas, incluso consideradas en sí mismas (y no en un sujeto que las multiplique y singularice):
ya que la diversa posición relativa de sus partes -que corresponde a la línea por su misma
naturaleza- basta para que exista una pluralidad de líneas».43
“La materia, bajo la cantidad, se configura en una serie de partes diversas, que le dan una
dimensión extensa y permiten distinguir unas porciones de materia de otras. Esos «trozos»
distintos de materia cuantificada son los que individúan a la forma sustancial, contrayéndola a
ser forma de esta materia y no de otra.
“Aunque su principio primero es la materia, la individualización requiere que
intervengan también la forma sustancial y la cantidad. La materia singulariza porque está
afectada por la cantidad, y ésta es un accidente que sólo sobreviene al ente completo, es decir, se
origina en la materia en cuanto se encuentra actualizada por la forma.
“Por eso, en la individuación se pueden distinguir tres momentos, que no son sucesivos
en el tiempo, sino contemporáneos, en los que se da una recíproca influencia de los elementos
que intervienen: la materia, la cantidad y la forma sustancial:
“1. La forma de un ente corpóreo, al actualizar a la materia, hace que surja en ella el
accidente cantidad, pues constituye al cuerpo como tal.
“2. La cantidad, al dar dimensiones a la materia, distingue en ella unas partes de otras,
haciéndola individual44: la cantidad, por sus dimensiones concretas, determina a la materia a ser
«esta» materia, distinta de las demás.
40
De Natura Materiae, ch. 3.
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 102-103.
42
Entre los comentadores de Tomás de Aquino, no hay una concordancia unánime en la interpretación de la materia
quantitate signata. Cayetano, al que más tarde seguiría Juan de Santo Tomás, piensa que el principio de
individuación es la materia en cuanto raíz de la cantidad, pero esto significa, en fin de cuentas, que lo que individúa
es la materia en cuanto potencia y no en cuanto posee ya la actualidad de la cantidad (Cfr. Comm. in summam theo.,
I, q. 29, a. l). El Ferrariense impugna la solución cayetanista, que ciertamente se apartaba del sentir de Santo Tomás,
y afirma -en la misma línea de lo que enunciaba Capreolo- que la materia signada es la materia corpórea y no la sola
materia prima; y entiende por materia signada la que está bajo la cantidad actual, o sea, actualmente cuantificada
(cfr. Comm. in summam contra gentiles, lib. I, c.21).
43
Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, 65.
44
La cantidad ya actualizada se puede considerar determinada o indeterminada. En cada momento de su existencia
un individuo tiene unas dimensiones perfectamente determinadas (una precisa altura, volumen, etc.), pero esta
41
11
“3. La materia, así singularizada por la cantidad, puede individualizar a la forma
específica.
“En definitiva, la materia es principio de multiplicación específica en cuanto sujeto
adecuado de la forma sustancial, que es su acto propio; y la singulariza en la medida en que,
afectada por la cantidad, ella misma se hace singular. Pero como para esto se requiere la previa
actualización de la materia por la forma (según un orden de naturaleza), Santo Tomás resume
esta cuestión afirmando que «supuesta la corporeidad en razón de la forma, sobreviene la
individuación en razón de la materia».45”46
“La singolarizzazione dell’essenza…Il principio di moltiplicazione e, pertanto, di
individuazione dell’essenza, è la materia. Ma la materia rende individua l’essenza in quanto essa
stessa è singolare, cioè in quanto è determinata dall’accidente quantità. Per questo si dice che il
principio di individuazione è la materia quantificata (materia quantitate signata).47
“Conviene notare che la quantità «comprende in sé la posizione, cioè l’ordine delle parti
nel tutto: la quantità è ciò che ha posizione»; per questo, «si possono distinguere molte linee,
anche considerate in se stesse (e non nel soggetto che le moltiplica e singolarizza): infatti la
diversa posizione relativa delle parti di esse – corrispondente alla linea secondo la sua stessa
natura – è sufficiente perché esistono molteplici linee».48
“La materia quantificata si configura in una serie di parti diverse, le quali le danno una
dimensione estesa e consentono così di distinguere certe porzioni di materia da altre. Questi
«pezzi» fra loro distinti di materia individuano la forma sostanziale, contraendola a forma di
questa materia e non di un’altra. L’individuazione, anche se il suo principio primo è la materia,
richiede l’intervento della forma sostanziale e della quantità. La materia singolarizza in quanto è
determinata dalla quantità, e questa è un accidente che sopravviene soltanto all’ente completo,
cioè dipende dalla materia in quanto questa viene attualizzata dalla forma.
“Perciò nel processo di individuazione si possono distinguere tre momenti, che non sono
successivi nel tempo, ma contemporanei, nei quali si dà una reciproca influenza degli elementi
che intervengono: la materia, la quantità e la forma sostanziale:
cantidad no puede ser la que contribuye a la individuación, pues varía continuamente. Por esto, Santo Tomás señala
que la materia bajo las dimensiones indeterminadas, es decir, sin ninguna ultimación ni acabamiento, es el principio
de individuación. Esta cantidad indeterminada permite suficientemente la sigilación (señalación) al hic (lugar) y al
nunc (tiempo), y explica que el individuo sea el mismo a pesar del continuo cambio dimensional al que se ve
sometido.
45
De natura materiae, c. 3.
46
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 103-105.
47
Fra i commentatori di Tommaso d’Aquino, non vi è accordo quanto all’interpretazione della materia quantitate
signata. Caietano, seguito più tardi da Giovanni di san Tommaso, ritiene che il principio di individuazione sia la
materia, in quanto fondamento della quantità; ma questo significa in definitiva, che ciò che individua è la materia in
quanto potenza e non in quanto già possiede l’attualità della quantità (cfr. Comm. in summam theol., I, q. 29, a. 1). Il
Ferrariense critica l’interpretazione del Caietano, la quale certamente si allontanava dal pensiero di san Tommaso, e
afferma – in sintonia con il Capreolo – che la materia signata è la materia corporea e non la semplice materia prima;
per materia signata intende quella che è determinata dalla quantità attuale, cioè quella attualmente quantificata (cfr.
Comm. in summam contra gentiles, lib. I, c. 21).
48
Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, 65.
12
“1. La forma di un ente corporeo, attualizzando la materia, fa sì che sorga in essa
l’accidente quantità, poiché costituisce il corpo come tale.
“2. La quantità, in quanto stabilisce le dimensioni della materia, distingue in essa alcune
parti da altre, rendendola individuale49: la quantità, grazie alle proprie dimensioni concrete,
determina la materia ad essere «questa» materia, distinta dalle altre.
“3. La materia, così singolarizzata dalla quantità, può individualizzare la forma specifica.
“In conclusione, la materia è il principio di moltiplicazione specifica in quanto soggetto
adeguato della forma sostanziale, che è il suo atto proprio; essa singolarizza la forma sostanziale
nella misura in cui, determinata dalla quantità, questa diventa singolare. Ma, poiché a questo fine
è necessaria la previa attualizzazione della materia da parte della forma (secondo l’ordine
naturale), san Tommaso riassume la questione affermando che «presupposta la corporeità in
ragione della forma, sorge l’individuazione in ragione della materia».50”51
Renard explains Sylvester of Ferrara’s interpretation of the Angelic Doctor St. Thomas
Aquinas on materia quantitate signata as the principle of individuation as follows: “Ferrara
asserts that this ‘signate matter’ under its dimensions is to be understood as the matter actuated
and existing with its quantity, under its actual dimensions…Matter that is in act and extended by
reason of its quantity (as a condition, not as a cause) will be found to be this matter rather than
that. For quantity is the only accident which because of its actual situs (order of parts)
individuates itself not as of this individual, but as this quantity (non huius sed hoc). Matter, then,
because of its extension, becomes this matter and is able in limiting the form to individuate it.
“Difficulty. There is, however, in Ferrara’s doctrine a formidable difficulty which may
seem well nigh insurmountable. Fortunately, this difficulty is due to our imagination and can be
dissipated by serious reflection. The difficulty is this: if matter is the principle of individuation,
that is, if it makes the form become this form, then it must first be this matter. But in order to be
this matter, as we explained in presenting the doctrine of Ferrara, it must not only be in act, but it
must be ‘quanta’ or ‘signate matter’ as we call it, with its actual dimensions before the coming of
the form. This would seem to mean that matter must first exist alone without the form. For if
matter needed the form for its actuation, that is, for its ‘to be,’ and for all the other perfections,
both essential and accidental, such as quantity, which must follow, then the form would have to
be an individual first, since whatever exists is necessarily an individual. In either case, matter
existing first and individuating the form, or form existing first and individuating matter, we have
a denial of the fundamental principle of the limitation of act by potency and of the actuation of
potency by act.
49
La quantità già attualizzata può essere considerata come determinata o indeterminata. Ogni individuo, in ciascun
momento della propria esistenza, ha delle dimensioni perfettamente determinate (una certa statura, un peso, un
volume, ecc.), ma tale quantità non può essere quella che contribuisce all’individuazione, dato che varia
continuamente. Per questo, san Tommaso afferma che il principio di individuazione è la materia considerata secondo
le dimensioni indeterminate, cioè priva di ultimazione e completezza. Tale quantità indeterminata è sufficiente per
indicare l’hic (luogo) e il nunc (tempo), e spiega perché l’individuo sia il medesimo nonostante il continuo
cambiamento di dimensioni che lo domina.
50
De natura materiae, c. 3.
51
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 88-90.
13
“Solution. Now this difficulty is really no difficulty at all. It is, as we have mentioned,
merely due to our imagination which portrays all causality in terms of efficiency; for it is only of
the efficient cause that we can indirectly have a sensible experience. Of the other causes,
especially the intrinsic, the imagination knows nothing. Now it is true we generally experience
some priority of time in the agent, not, however, as agent (since it is impossible for the cause to
be actually causing without the effect taking place), but in the agent as a being in the existential
order. Applying this experience to the order of intrinsic causality, we demand that matter,
‘signate matter,’ which we say is the principle of individuation, exist somehow before the
coming of the form in order to be able to individuate it. Else, we say, the form should be the
principle of individuation, and exist first as an individual. Our conjecture, however, is wrong on
both counts! We forget that matter and form are in the order of intrinsic causality, and therefore
that there can be no question of priority of time as with beings in the existential order. Matter and
form are not beings, remember, but principles of being. We forget, moreover, that their causality
is not had by action, but by a mere communication of their own reality, and that the causality
exercised is mutual and simultaneous. Just as the form gives the ‘to be’ and the specific
perfection (with the proper accidents emanating from such a perfection), so matter at the same
time limits and individuates. And, consequently, to say that the matter must first exist in time and
be quanta (signate matter) in order to individuate the form, or to say that the form must exist first
in order to actuate the matter is pure nonsense and in truth a denial of the very nature of intrinsic
causality. It is the form which gives matter ‘to be,’ actuates it, and by union with it makes the
matter be a body; it is the matter which limits and individuates the form. The causality of these
two principles of being is mutual and simultaneous. True, we cannot imagine such a thing, for
such causality transcends all sense experience; with our intellect, however, we can understand
clearly why this must be.
“Order of the Perfections Received. In the mutual causality, then, there is no actual
sequence in the order of time. Since they are principles of being, the matter does not exist
without the form nor the form without the matter. Their union down to the ultimate pefection and
properties of the essence is instantaneous. Still, as St. Thomas says, we can with the mind
consider (præintelligitur) a certain order. In the first place, we may consider the form giving the
‘to be’ together with the actuation of the fundamental specific perfection. Consequently, just as
we consider the same substantial form giving the ulterior perfections according to the regular
sequence (not in time) of the different grades of specific acts, so must the proper accidents
follow each specific perfection. Consequently, quantity will follow corporeity. Now once the
matter is quanta with its dimensions, it is individuated, for quantity having parts outside of parts
individuates itself. The matter then being quanta and consequently being this matter individuates
the form. And now the form gives its ulterior perfections.
“This difficult point is clearly explained by Father Charles Boyer in the following terms:
‘It is true that the substantial form is one, and that it gives simultaneously all substantial
determinations, which consequently are not distinct. These determinations, however, or effects of
the form have a definite order: animality, for example, supposes life, and this in turn requires
corporeity. It is proper, therefore, for the mind to understand one effect before the others. Now if
we consider only the effect of corporeity, which is first, and from which flows quantity, it is clear
14
that by this effect matter receives interminate dimensions by means of which it individuates the
form. This is the solution of St. Thomas.’52
“This sequence, then, is perceived by the mind because of the logical order of generic and
specific perfections; but, let us repeat, this order or sequence is in no wise temporal, since the
causality is intrinsic and mutual.
“This profound and satisfying doctrine is aptly expressed by St. Thomas in the following
texts: ‘The more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms;
therefore, while remaining one and the same, it pefects matter according to the various degrees
of perfection. For the same essential form makes man an actual being, a body, a living being, an
animal, and a man. Now it is clear that every genus is followed by its own proper accidents.
Therefore, as matter is first apprehended as perfected in its existence, before it is understood as
corporeal, and so of the other [generic perfections]; so those accidents which belong to being are
understood first to exist before corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood first in matter
before the form, not as regards all its effects, but as regards the subsequent effect.’53
“‘Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the corporeity which belong to the
whole matter. Wherefore matter, once understood as corporeal and measurable, can be
understood as distinct in its various parts, and as receptive of different forms according to the
further degrees of perfection. For although it is essentially the same form which gives matter the
various degrees of perfection, as we have said, yet it is considered as different when brought
under the observation of reason.’54
“Interminate Dimensions. What are these dimensions spoken of in the last question? The
question of dimensions has caused a great deal of confusion in the minds of those who did not
understand the terminology of St. Thomas. To understand the significance of Thomas’ words we
must distinguish clearly between terminate, interminate, and deteminate dimensions.
“The expression determinate signifies that the dimensions are definitely these, that is,
distinct from any other. Thus Paul’s dimensions are determinate since they are his, not Peter’s.
Terminate is used to indicate the ultimate dimensions of a body. Thus the terminate dimensions
of Paul are that he is six feet tall, that he has a red face, a square head, flat feet, weighs two
hundred pounds, etc. On the contrary, when we speak of interminate dimensions, we do not
consider what the ultimate or terminate dimensions may be, but only that this object is in three
dimensions, that it has parts outside parts. Of course there are terminations to these dimensions,
but they are not considered. In other words, whether this individual is six feet or less, whether his
eyes are brown or blue is not taken into account. Now St. Thomas says that the dimensions
which are necessary for individuation are the interminate. He does not deny that these
dimensions have their terminations; he simply points out that these terminations make no
difference in the question of individuation.
52
C. BOYER, Cursus Philosophiae, vol. 1, p. 487.
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 76, a. 6, ad 1.
54
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 76, a. 6, ad 2.
53
15
“It is clear from this that the term ‘determinate’ may be said indifferently of dimensions
that are terminate or interminate. And this St. Thomas does. At times as in the De Ente et
Essentia he uses the word determinate dimensions, to indicate the fact that they are these in
contradistinction to any others. At other times, as in the commentary of the De Trinitate of
Boethius, he indicates the dimensions required for individuation are the interminate and not the
terminate. A careful reading of the text will do away with any ambiguity: ‘Since matter,
considered in itself, is indistinct [without division], it is impossible that it should individuate the
form received in itself, except in so far as it is divisible [distinguishable]. For the form is not
individuated for the reason that it is received in matter, but only in so far as it is received in this
matter or that matter, distinct and determined for the here and the now. Matter is not divisible
unless it has quantity; wherefore the Philosopher in the First Book of the Physics says that, if
quantity is removed, matter remains an indivisible substance. And so matter is made this and
signate in so far as it has dimensions [terms]. Now these dimensions [terms] can be considered in
two ways. On the one hand, they can be considered according to a definite size and shape: and
thus, as perfect beings, they are placed in the genus of quantity: thus they cannot be the principle
of individuation, because such a termination varies in the individual, and it would follow that the
individual would not always remain exactly the same. On the other hand, the dimensions [terms]
can be considered interminate only [without determination] in the nature of dimension, although
they can never be interminate [without termination], just as the nature of color cannot be without
the determination of white or black; and thus they are placed in the genus of quantity, but only as
imperfect. From these interminate dimensions is brought about this matter, signate matter; and
thus it individuates the form. Thus though the matter is caused a numerical diversity in the same
species.’55”56
Explaining the position of the Thomist commentator Sylvester of Ferrara (Sylvester
Ferrariensis) regarding what is meant by signate matter under its dimensions, Dougherty writes:
“The great commentator on the Contra Gentiles does not say that matter exists without form
when he affirms that matter exists first and individuates the form. He is concerned here with a
mode of intrinsic causality. Causality in this order is mutual and simultaneous. The form gives
the specific perfection and the ‘to be,’ and the matter at the same time limits and individuates.
However, we should not attempt to imagine first of all something we call signate matter as an
existing entity to which we add form which is thereby individuated. It must be realized that the
principle of individuation cannot be imagined; rather it is conceived. Imagination is limited to
the sensible. Intrinsic principles of mobile being precede the sensible in nature. The real
sequence here is abstracted by the mind.
“Matter in act and extended by reason of its quantity under dimensions (as a condition) is
individual matter. St. Thomas explains what he means by the dimensions of quantity that bring
about this matter rather than that in the following passage of his Commentary on Boethius’s De
Trinitate: ‘…matter is made this and signate in so far as it has dimensions. Now these
dimensions can be considered in two ways. On the one hand, they can be considered according to
a definite size and shape: and thus, as perfect beings, they are placed in the genus of quantity:
thus they cannot be the principle of individuation, because such a termination varies in the
individual and it would follow that the individual does not always remain exactly the same. On
55
56
In Boeth. De Trinitate, IV, 2.
H. RENARD, op. cit., pp. 218-224.
16
the other hand, the dimensions can be considered interminate only in the nature of dimension,
although they can never be without termination…and thus they are placed in the genus of
quantity but only as imperfect. From these interminate dimensions is brought about this matter,
signate matter, and thus it individuates the form.’57
“The principle of individuation, therefore, is found ultimately in the matter rather than in
the form; in the matter that is quantified rather than in prime matter considered by itself and in
matter that is quantified under interminate dimensions rather than in terminate dimensions. One
cannot identify individuation on a time scale as one can identify the actualization of some mode
of efficient causality of the mobile. We are dealing with a type of principle that is intrinsic and
which is conceived on the scale of the order of nature rather than on the time-scale of activity.
“For example, this man is this man not because of his substantial form, but rather because
of the material principle that is in him, which limits and individuates. But it cannot be the prime
matter of this man simply that individuates him in that prime matter is itself indifferent. Why
should pure potency have an order to this rather than to that quantity? It is in the quantified
matter that we must look for the principle of individuation, the matter that is in act and that is
divided from others, while it is actually undivided in itself. But it cannot be terminated matter
under this particular set of dimensions for the reason that such matter varies while the individual
man does not vary as an individual, which would have to be the case if terminated matter would
be the principle of individuation. This man, Peter, does not become another individual by
changes of height, weight, and so forth. Thus the principle of individuation of this man must be
found in matter under quantity of interminate dimensions which is conceived although not
sensibly perceived; for what is perceived is already the individual sensible mobile being.”58
What about the individuation of accidents? The Angelic Doctor in Summa Theologiae, I,
q. 29, a. 1, c., teaches that accidents are individuated by the substance into which they are
received. Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo explain that accidents are individuated, not by prime
matter, but by their substance: “Accidents are individuated by their substance…«It must be noted
that accidents are individuated, not by prime matter, but by their own subject, which is already
in act (the substance)…».59 It is clear that the individuating principle is always the potency
which multiplies and limits the perfection received. Thus, it is the substance, as the proper
subject of the accidents, that individualizes them…
“Within the context of individuation, quantity has a special character which distinguishes
it from the other accidents: through quantity, the rest of the material accidents inhere in the
substance. Hence, all the other accidents are multiplied to the extent that they are affected by
quantity. For example, two instances of whiteness of qualitatively equal intensity can only be
multiplied by being received in different parts of matter, and they cannot even be imagined
unless they are mentally located in two different places.”60
57
In Boeth. De Trin., q. 4, a. 2.
K. F. DOUGHERTY, Cosmology, Graymoor Press, Peekskill, NY, 1956, pp. 134-136.
59
De principio individuationis.
60
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 104.
58
17
“Los accidentes se individuán por su sustancia…«Hay que advertir que los accidentes no
se individúan por la materia prima, sino por el sujeto propio, que ya es en acto (la
sustancia)…».61 Como se ve, el principio individualizador es siempre la potencia, a la que
corresponde multiplicar y limitar la perfección recibida. De ahí que competa a la sustancia, como
potencia propia de los accidentes, el individualizarlos…
“En el contexto de la individuación la cantidad presenta, sin embargo, una peculiaridad
que la discrimina del resto de los accidentes: a través de ella los accidentes materiales inhieren en
la sustancia. Por esto, todos los demás accidentes se multiplican en la medida en que están
afectados por la cantidad; y así, dos grados de blancura cualitativamente idénticos sólo se
plurifican por estar recibidos en partes diferentes de materia, y no pueden ni siquiera ser
imaginados si no los situamos mentalmente en dos lugares distintos.”62
“Gli accidenti sono individuati dalla loro sostanza…«Bisogna notare che gli accidenti
non vengono individuati dalla materia prima, ma dal proprio soggetto che è già in atto (la
sostanza)…».63 Come si osserva facilmente, il principio individuante è sempre la potenza, la
quale moltiplica e limita la perfezione ricevuta. È per questo che compete alla sostanza, in
quanto potenza propria degli accidenti, individualizzarli…
“Nel contesto dell’individuazione, la quantità presenta, però, una peculiarità che la separa
dagli altri accidenti: attraverso di essa gli accidenti materiali ineriscono alla sostanza. Per questo,
tutti gli altri accidenti si moltiplicano in quanto vengono determinati dalla quantità; così due
diversi gradi di bianchezza qualitativamente identici, si moltiplicano perché sono ricevuti in parti
diverse di materia, e non possono neppure venir immaginati se non li situiamo in due luoghi
distinti.”64
Finally, Alvira, Clavell and Melendo explain that subsistent forms are individual in
themselves: “In the world of the spirit, individuation clearly does not arise from matter. This,
however, does not hinder pure spirits from being individuals; otherwise, they would be abstract
realities. Since it cannot be received in matter which multiplies the form, each angelic form is
automatically an individual essence which exhausts its entire species, that is, there are no other
individuals of the same species, and the perfections of every angelic form are fully present in the
individual essence. Aristotle had said that ‘those things which have no matter are all absolutely
and essentially individuals.’65
“Finally, God differs from every creature precisely because He is Pure Act. His esse is a
perfection which is not received in any potency that would restrict it. God is an individual by
reason of His infinity: «Any act becomes limited only by being received in something distinct, a
potency which restricts it. In the divine essence, however, nothing is received in anything else,
since His act of being is the subsistent divine nature itself, and this does not happen in any
61
De principio individuationis.
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 105-106.
63
De principio individuationis.
64
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 90-91.
65
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, VIII, ch. 6, 1045b 23.
62
18
creature. For every reality outside God has a received (and therefore limited) act of being. The
divine essence is distinguished from everything else by not being received in anything else».66”67
“Las formas subsistentes son en sí mismas individuales. En el mundo del espíritu, la
individuación, obviamente, no procede de la materia; pero eso no quita que los espíritus puros
sean también individuos, y no realidades abstractas. Al no poder ser recibida en una materia que
la multiplique, cada una de las formas angélicas constituye automáticamente una esencia
individual que agota toda su especie. «Las cosas que no tienen materia -escribe Aristóteles- son
todas absolutamente y esencialmente unidades».68
“Por último, Dios se distingue de todo lo creado justamente por ser Acto Puro; su
perfección de ser no está recibida en ninguna potencia que la coarte. Dios se individúa en razón
de su infinitud: «cualquier acto sólo se limita por estar recibido en algo distinto, a cuya potencia
queda restringido. Sin embargo, en la esencia divina no hay nada recibido en otro, ya que su Ser
es la misma naturaleza divina subsistente, cosa que no sucede en ninguna creatura: pues toda otra
realidad tiene el ser recibido y, por eso, limitado; y de ahí que la esencia divina se distinga de
todo lo demás por no estar recibida en otro».69”70
“Le forme sussistenti sono in se stesse individuali. Nel mondo dello spirito
l’individuazione, ovviamente, non può dipendere dalla materia; ma ciò non toglie che gli spiriti
puri siano individui e non realtà astratte. Non potendo essere ricevuta in una materia che la
moltiplichi, ciascuna delle forme angeliche costituisce di conseguenza un’essenza individuale
che esaurisce l’intera sua specie. «Le cose che non hanno materia – scrive Aristotele – sono tutte
essenzialmente delle unità».71
“Infine, Dio si distingue dalla creazione in quanto é Atto Puro; la Sua perfezione d’essere
non è ricevuta in alcuna potenza che la restringa. Dio è individuo in ragione della sua infinitezza:
«Ogni atto viene limitato soltanto dall’essere ricevuto in qualcosa di diverso, alla cui potenza
viene ristretto. Tuttavia, nell’essenza divina nulla viene ricevuto in altro, poiché il Suo essere è la
stessa natura divina sussistente, cosa che non avviene in alcuna creatura: ogni altra realtà ha
l’essere ricevuto e perciò limitato, e l’essenza divina si distingue da tutto il resto perché non è
ricevuta in altro».72”73
66
Quodlibetum VII, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 105.
68
Metafísica, lib. VIII, c. 6, 1045b 23.
69
TOMÁS DE AQUINO, Quodlibetum VII, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.
70
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 106-107.
71
Metafisica, lib. VIII, c. 6, 1045b 23.
72
TOMMASO D’AQUINO, Quodlibetum VII, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.
73
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 91-92.
67
19