Introduction
From Aquino II to Duterte:
Change, Continuity—and Rupture
Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel
Democratic practices of the Philippines, Asia’s oldest democracy and the
second most populous country in the ASEAN region, have been a puzzle
to many scholars and observers of democracy. While vibrant in terms
of voter turnout, civic engagement, and institutional protections, there
are widespread flaws in Philippine democratic processes—illustrated by
persistent pernicious elite politics, continued institutional weakness, and
widespread abuse of public office.1
The country’s economic record is as patchy as its democracy. The
long-standing description of the Philippines as the “sick man of Asia” has
been rebutted by the country’s rapid economic growth over the last decade
(2007–17). However, with regular boom and bust cycles, and persistent
deep-seated poverty and inequality—concerns remain about the equity
and sustainability of this type of growth in the Philippines.2 Built on the
legacies of Spanish and United States colonial rule, the Philippine state
remains confronted by constant challenges to its legitimacy—including
Asia’s longest communist rebellion, Muslim separatist insurgencies in
Mindanao, and large-scale public protests such as the first and second
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA 1 and 2) Philippine’s People Power
Revolution that forced changes in leadership through extra-constitutional
processes.3
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“Change” has therefore been a recurring theme in Philippine political,
economic, and social discourses. The discourse of change holds considerable
appeal and permeates the everyday lives of ordinary Filipinos with
remarkable intensity and frequency. The discourse informs the thinking
of political observers who identify competing reformist and populist
narratives of change in Philippine politics.4 Change seems to characterize
the transition from the administration of Aquino II (2010–16) to the
administration of current president Rodrigo Roa Duterte (2016–). Aquino II
was elected on a technocratic “straight path” (daang matuwid) reform
platform that challenged the widespread abuse of public office under the
presidency of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001–10). Duterte—a maverick
former mayor of Davao city in Mindanao— rode high on a campaign
promise in the 2016 presidential election of bringing about law and order in
a swift and decisive manner, embodied in his slogan “Change Is Coming”.
But how much change has actually taken place? What kind of change
is unfolding and for whom? Are we simply witnessing business-as-usual,
fragmented Filipino elite politics, as a feature of discordant democracy
in the Philippines? Or has there indeed been change—a rupture in the
transition to illiberal, undemocratic practices?
Since the People Power Revolution (EDSA 1) that toppled the Marcos
dictatorship in 1986, the Philippines has frequently cycled through recurrent
reforms and populism. But changes being introduced by the Duterte
administration seem unusually deep and far-reaching—suggesting a
concerted attempt to reorganize, or indeed replace, the liberal state-society
relations that previously characterized the post-1986 political settlement.
Academic observers have therefore described the election of Duterte as a
point of historical rupture, rather than merely another instance of populism
sweeping the world.5
After more than two years in office, Duterte seems to be leading the
Philippines towards illiberalism. First and foremost, violence has defined
his rule. While the Philippines has experienced political violence and
extrajudicial killings, Duterte’s war on drugs since assuming office in June
2017 has claimed more than 20,000 lives. Most of these deaths happened as
a result of police operations or were perpetrated by unknown assailants.
Dubbed as a “war against the poor”, most of the victims have come
from poor villages or squatter areas in Manila and nearby provinces.6
Extrajudicial killings of suspected communist rebels, journalists and local
politicians continue to dominate headlines.
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3
Another concerning development under Duterte has been sustained
and concerted attacks on independent constitutional bodies. Examples of
these attacks include the filing of impeachment procedures and subsequent
removal of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Maria Lourdes Sereno,
based on a quo warranto proceeding, a legal procedure for removing
public officials on the grounds that the officials have no legal right to
continue holding office.7 Impeachment complaints have also been filed
against the Ombudsman and the Vice President based on scant and trivial
evidence. Legislative threats and harassment were also directed against
the Commission on Human Rights and its officials, one example being
when the lower house voted to give the Commission a budget of PhP1,000
(approximately AUD20).
The Philippine Supreme Court, regarded as the bastion of democracy, is
now embroiled in contentious elite politics—undermining its independence
and further weakening constitutional checks and balances. The participation
of five members of the bench in the impeachment proceedings against
Chief Justice Sereno—pre-empting the Senate decision by ruling on the
quo warranto proceeding—has put a spotlight on the deep politicization of
the judiciary and the impact of this on constitutional principles and the
rule of law. Decisions of the Court involving important political issues
show a pattern of “judicial docility”8 that favours executive preferences or
deferment to political decision making. Examples of such cases include the
burial of the late authoritarian ruler Ferdinand Marcos, and the imposition
and further extension of martial law in Mindanao.
An ongoing constitutional reform initiative is in progress to facilitate
a shift from a unitary presidential to a federal parliamentary system. This
initiative—despite the absence of public support towards a federal form
of government9—is backed by the political rhetoric that federalism offers
the solution to oligarchic control by “imperial Manila” of the country’s
politics and the economy. A draft federal constitution formulated by the
Consultative Committee (Con-Com)—the body created by the president to
study and propose amendments to the 1987 Constitution—was submitted
in 2018 to the legislature and the president.
Martial law was imposed across Mindanao in response to the Marawi
City siege in 2017, with threats from the Duterte administration to declare
a revolutionary form of government and place the entire country under
martial law. Freedom of the press—except publications that favour the
Duterte administration—is under assault, as illustrated by revocation of
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Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel
the licence of the critical media platform Rappler.com. Many mainstream
media outlets, meanwhile, such as CNN, Philippines Daily Inquirer,
Philippines Star. etc.—although traditionally considered the most vibrant
in Asia—are now often seen as practising self-censorship.10
Despite arbitrary, coercive, or overt violent actions by the Duterte
administration, many of the developments eroding Philippine democracy
have been met with surprisingly little resistance from either political elites
or civil society actors. A majority of Filipinos have expressed continuing
approval of, and trust in, President Duterte and his administration.11
Contributing authors in this volume thus address the following
questions: What has allowed the Duterte administration to dismantle the
post-Marcos political settlement so rapidly and with little opposition?
Have Philippine elites abandoned their support for grounding the political
system in liberal-constitutional democracy and institutions? Or is this
political settlement not about agreement on liberal democracy per se but
merely a casual arrangement among the elites to facilitate transfer of power
and maintain their political salience? And why has the country’s broad
and vibrant civil society—previously a compelling force in any efforts to
weaken democracy and its institutions—failed to respond effectively to
Duterte’s attacks on the rule of law and human rights?
As further highlighted by the contributions to this volume, Deinla and
Dressel believe that some of the remarkable economic and political gains
made under the Aquino II administration had unintended consequences
that laid the foundation for Duterte’s illiberal democracy. The paradoxes of
elite democracy and unequal development brought to the fore latent illiberal
features that had previously surfaced in the form of authoritarianism
during the Marcos years. Both authors thus argue that growing social
and economic insecurity in middle class constituencies—rather than
elite fragmentation—has undermined the ability of civil society to act
collectively—thus accelerating the trend towards illiberalism.12
To explain the resurgence of anti-liberal forces in the Philippine
political landscape, this chapter begins by mapping the fault-lines in the
failures of the Aquino II administration then discuss the assault on liberal
institutions before focusing on the elite and civil society dynamics that
made this assault possible. Proceeding in this manner does not simply
fulfil an academic purpose. It also seeks to identify existing societal spaces
with the strength and capacity to resist—and even stand up against—the
debilitating impact of the new and dangerous monopoly of power.
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5
I. A SHORT MARCH INTO ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY:
FROM AQUINO II TO DUTERTE
Since the late 1990s, assumptions that economic development and liberal
democracy go hand in hand in Asia can no longer be sustained. As one of
the most diverse regions in the world in terms of governance—socialist,
democratic, semi-authoritarian and authoritarian—the region has seen
authoritarian and illiberal democracies emerge alongside rapid capitalist
development. While both modes of democracy may recognize the vibrancy
of a capitalist economy, authoritarian regimes generally deny free and fair
electoral processes. Illiberal democracies, on the other hand—although
adorned with the institutional and procedural trappings of democracy—
have low levels of participation and inclusiveness.13 Dominated by
elites—or controlled by an oligarchy—illiberal democracies also tend to
demonstrate persistent patterns of violence, gross human rights violations,
and a culture of impunity—which narrows and ultimately eliminates
avenues for political dissent and reconfiguring state and institutional
arrangements. While in many countries this scenario has led to outright
authoritarianism, there has been a trend in some Southeast Asian
nations—particularly Singapore and Malaysia—to combine features of
liberalism and authoritarianism, by segregating politics from economics
and pursuing some social and economic redistributive projects.14 This
type of regime is, however, not unique to the Southeast Asian region.
Countries in this region have undergone alternating phases of authoritarian
and liberal governments, or coexistence of the two types of regime15—
vulnerable, however, to further authoritarian backsliding, particularly
when institutions are weak and civil society is divided, as in the case of
Cambodia.16
The situation in the Philippines exemplifies the phenomenon of illiberal
democracy. Duterte disavows being an authoritarian as do his throngs of
supporters who continue to profess allegiance to “democratic” values.17
Democracy with a liberal democratic constitution on paper, does not
preclude the emergence of an illiberal or authoritarian order. In fact, in
the last quarter century, democratic practices are increasingly flourishing
side-by-side with illiberal regimes in the region.18 A rearticulation of the
meaning of democracy is evident in the Philippines—neither an idealized
version, nor merely part of a “populist tide”. As political, economic and
social processes have become more dynamic and interwoven in the region,
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Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel
it is necessary to revisit binary conceptions of liberal versus authoritarian
regimes.
Except for the Marcos dictatorship from 1965 to 1986, the Philippines
seems to have shunned attempts at absolute authoritarian or illiberal
governments—with several unsuccessful military-led coup d’etats since
Aquino I. The Philippines has been described as “cacique democracy”19
or “low-quality democracy”20—notions based on the disproportionate
influence of traditional political elites and dynasties on political institutions.
Effective participation and true representation are therefore largely illusory
with elites taking turns in power nationally and locally. Political structures
that emerged from US colonial rule are characterized by disenfranchisement
of the masses, unstable patronage-infested political parties, dominance
of political dynasties, and a spoils system that has eroded bureaucratic
autonomy.21
These patterns of dynastic democracy and systemic institutional
weakness have proven remarkably stable. Despite the occasional emergence
of elite fractures—triggering new institutional arrangements as in the
post-Marcos 1987 Constitution—political elites in the Philippines have
remained consistent in their social composition and in their control over
state institutions. The political elites have proven resilient—colluding when
necessary—and emerging unscathed through political fractures. In the 2013
elections, it has been suggested 74 per cent of the elected members of the
House of Representatives came from political dynasties.22
The dominance of dynastic families has been so pervasive that the
Philippines has been cited to have one of the highest concentrations of
political dynasties in Asia.23 In a landmark 2012 study, Mendoza et al.
found districts controlled by political dynasties tended to have significantly
higher incidences of poverty.24 To our view, this happens because these
families have been adroitly capable at reaching accommodation amongst
themselves and with other political actors, despite electoral competition
and growing demands from civil society. Moreover, liberal features of the
post-1987 political settlement are maintained because most elites have more
or less equal access to legal and political institutions to generate economic
rents—thus lessening genuine elite conflicts.
Are these descriptions still accurate? Recent developments suggest
Duterte has actively erected an illiberal democracy by taking advantage
of weaknesses in the post-1987 liberal reformist order.25 Duterte also
flirts openly with a populist form of authoritarianism—examples such
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7
as his suggestion of a revolutionary government or his recent statement
prioritizing “human lives over human rights”26 reminding some observers
of past-fascist patterns in Europe.27
Consideration of elite-civil society dynamics are thus central to
understanding the current dynamics under the Duterte regime—whether
civil society is cohesive or fragmented often determines regime stability or
change.28 For instance, the cohesion of civil society and alliances formed
among segments of the elite generated regime change and resistance
to authoritarian tendencies in the Philippines such as EDSA 1 and 2.
From this vantage point, the divisions within civil society generated by
Duterte’s broader appeal for change seem problematic as his use of rhetoric
particularly resonates among the Filipino middle class, the traditional
backbone of civil society activism in the Philippines.29
Duterte was not, however, the first president to challenge the liberal
post-EDSA political settlement. There have been regular coup attempts
by conservative factions particularly during the administration of the first
post-Marcos democratic leader, Corazon Aquino (1986–92). Although Fidel
Ramos (1993–99) is generally credited with having presided over a stable
and progressive political and economic administration, his administration
did launch—albeit unsuccessfully—the Charter Change initiative to revise
the 1986 “Freedom Constitution”.
Challenges have also emerged from flagrant abuses of public office.
The second People Power revolution (EDSA 2) was mounted against the
government of President Joseph Estrada (1999–2001), whose moral authority
to govern was questioned based on massive corruption. Similarly, hopes for
Estrada’s successor—President Macapagal Arroyo (2001–10), a former civil
society and democracy champion—were quickly dashed by accusations of
large-scale corruption and allegations of rigged presidential elections to
which she responded by declaring a state of emergency and attempted to
curtail rights of assembly.30 Macapagal Arroyo was accused of committing
plunder or large-scale corruption in 2012 after she stepped down from
power but was acquitted in 2017 of the charge by the Supreme Court.
During the period of strong clamour for change in governance, a
relatively inexperienced Benigno Aquino Jr., son of democracy icon Cory
Aquino, was elected president in 2010 on a reformist platform to bring
daang matuwid to government. Benigno Aquino is widely credited with
restoring economic growth and political stability in the Philippines. During
Aquino II’s administration, the country averaged 6.5 per cent annual GDP
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Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel
growth, and reforms were initiated in budgeting, delivery of services to
the poor, and disaster preparedness.31 Aquino II enabled independent
oversight institutions such as the Ombudsman and the Supreme Court to
have larger roles—with both institutions forcefully holding public officials
to account on many occasions. The Supreme Court in particular—riding on
a wave of strong public support—combatted the main source of political
patronage, the congressional pork barrel much to the irritation of President
Benigno Aquino II.32
Yet the reformist drive of the Aquino II administration was also
beset with failures, neglect, and miscalculation—failures that culminated
in Duterte’s presidency. Filipinos are known to elect presidents who do
not belong to the incumbent’s party, with the exception of the Marcos
presidency. One of the Aquino II administration’s critical failures was
its inability to pass the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) following peace
negotiations with the Muslim secessionist Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF). This failure to pass the BBL was in large part due to Congress’
refusal to prioritize the bill after forty-four policemen were killed in the
Mamasapano clash in Maguindanao that was criticized by the public
nationwide.33 Public perception that economic growth had not improved
the situation of low-income groups—and that oligarchs continued to
monopolize power and wealth throughout the country—was rife.34 Poor
delivery of basic services most obviously in transport and communications,
high cost of living, and concerns over personal safety contributed to
the perception that the Aquino II administration had failed. Such issues
resonated deeply with not only the poor, but perhaps even more so with
the urban middle classes who have been particularly receptive to Duterte’s
strong-man rhetoric on “rapid change”.
II. THE DUTERTE PRESIDENCY: ERODING RULE OF
LAW MECHANISMS?
With so much attention focused on Duterte’s shadowy “war on drugs”,
a far more worrying trend unfolded before the public’s eye—a systematic
assault on and erosion of the salience of independent institutions and
institutions of the rule of law. Rule of law has been perennially weak in
the Philippines, with episodic periods of displays of independence by the
Supreme Court. A survey by a business organization in 2014 and 2015
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9
revealed that lower courts and the appellate court, the Court of Appeals,
are perceived as one of the weakest performing government institutions
in the Philippines.35 The rule of law index by the World Justice Project
illustrates the continuous deterioration of many aspects of the rule of law
since Duterte’s assumption to power.36
The Supreme Court—the highest court in the Philippines—has become
the particular object of vicious politics and politicization. In the first two
years of his presidency, Duterte’s allies within and outside Congress
have moved to remove—through impeachment—four high-ranking
officials—Vice President Leni Robredo, Commission on Elections Chair
Andres Bautista, Chief Justice Lourdes Sereno, and Ombudsman Conchita
Carpio Morales. These public officials stood firmly while performing
their functions and criticizing government policies. These impeachment
initiatives are commonly being used, or abused, to target critical voices
within the government and to dismantle accountability mechanisms of
the post-Marcos liberal constitutional architecture.37
Aggressive use of impeachment proceedings did not originate with the
Duterte administration. The Philippine Constitution—adopted in 1987 after
the 1986 revolution that ousted Ferdinand Marcos—provided for a stronger
tripartite system of checks and balances while creating independent
Constitutional Commissions and the Office of the Ombudsman (Section 2,
Art IX, 1987 Constitution). The President and Vice-President, Members
of the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, Chief Justice, and
Justices of the Supreme Court can only be removed by impeachment
under this provision. This instrument has been formally used a number
of times. The Philippine House of Representatives impeached former
president Joseph Estrada (1998–2001) in 2000 though procedural matters
ended his trial prematurely. Impeachment charges were filed against
Estrada’s successor, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001–10) in 2005, 2006,
2007, and 2008, though none prospered. In 2011, the House impeached
both Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez and Chief Justice Renato Corona.
Gutierrez resigned before the Senate convened the impeachment court, so
Corona’s 2012 conviction by the Senate for the betrayal of public trust is
the only successful impeachment case under the 1987 Constitution.
History illuminates the extraordinary nature of impeachment, the
primary function of which is to prevent those who hold power from
abusing their authority and subverting constitutional order. Criteria for
successful prosecution are deliberately set high as impeachment overturns
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Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel
the electoral and appointive procedures that brought the highest officials
to power. The 1987 Constitution limits the grounds for impeachment to
“high crimes and misdemeanours” (Art. IX)—that is, culpable violation
of the Constitution, graft and corruption, and betrayal of public trust.
While the definition in the 1987 Constitution does not obscure the fact that
impeachment is inherently political, adherence to strict legal standards
has prevented or short-circuited many previous attempts at impeachment.
In the Philippine context, impeachment was precisely directed against
the resurgence of authoritarian rule and arbitrary use of government
powers by high officials. It is not intended to remove officials because
they disagree with the executive leadership. Due to this anti-authoritarian
rationale for impeachment, Bueza opined that procedures at the lower
house, the House of Representatives, were set so low even citizens could
set in motion proceedings for impeachment.38 This is now the crux of
how this procedure became a weapon to remove critics and, ironically, to
institute unimpeded state power.
Increasing politicization of the process and a deliberate lowering of
legal standards—illustrated by cases filed in 2017—are therefore obvious.
Impeachment complaints filed against Vice President Leni Robredo in
March 2017 charged betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the
constitution, based on Robredo’s video message to the United Nations
criticizing the administration’s war on drugs, especially extrajudicial
killings. The complaint against Commission on Elections Chair Andres
Bautista filed in September 2017 by the Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption (VACC)—allied with Duterte—charged failure to declare
certain properties in his statements of assets and measures put in place
to prevent hacking of the Commission on Elections website in 2016.
Although the House Committee on Justice dismissed the complaint—
and Bautista had by then announced his resignation—the House voted
137–75 to overturn the Committee dismissal and transmitted articles of
impeachment to the Senate for trial. In the same month, a case was also
prepared against Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales—shortly after
the Ombudsman’s Office announced it was investigating the Duterte
family’s alleged multibillion-peso wealth—and the president threatened
an impeachment complaint, charging Morales with selective justice and
use of falsified documents.
The most significant effort of impeachment to date has been the
removal of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno from office—by her own
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11
colleagues—through a quo warranto proceeding. The quo warranto, a legal
instrument to remove a public official from office, is predicated on the
illegality of the office holder to hold office in the first instance. The quo
warranto proceeding against Sereno, filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, the government’s chief legal counsel, sidestepped the pending
impeachment proceeding against the Chief Justice before the House of
Representatives while using some of the grounds in the impeachment. In
an unprecedented ruling, the vote of 8–6 in the Supreme Court made a
distinction between impeachment and quo warranto proceeding, thus paving
the way for the Chief Justice’s removal by reason of non-declaration of
her statement of assets and liabilities.39
Looking at the impeachment proceeding initiated against Sereno—in
conjunction with the quo warranto suit—it is clear the aim was to remove a
government critic and ensure a pliant judiciary. In two separate complaints,
Sereno is accused of culpable violation of the Constitution, corruption, and
other high crimes. Charges include: failure to disclose assets truthfully,
delay in acting on retirement benefits for judges, falsifying Supreme Court
resolutions, manipulating the Judicial and Bar Council, and extravagant
use of public funds on a vehicle and official travel.
Chief Justice Sereno is also charged with betrayal of public trust for her
public reply to President Duterte’s allegations linking judges to the drug
trade. Other charges include: (a) criticizing the imposition of martial law;
(b) preventing Court of Appeals Justices from making courtesy calls on the
President; and (c) favouring some judicial personnel over others. While
Duterte disavows any hand in the proceedings, he has ordered speeding
up the impeachment process40—and filing of a new complaint for Sereno’s
failure to declare her earnings prior to entering government service.
Working at the intersection between law and politics, ouster efforts
draw critical attention to Duterte’s agenda for a political reordering of the
post-Marcos liberal architecture. What might first appear to be simply a
personal impulse of the president is instead calculated and strategic—
Duterte’s allies are using legal processes such as impeachment and quo
warranto proceedings to silence critics and dismantle critical veto gates in
the institutional system. Removal of the Chief Justice, for instance, would
clear a path for control of the Supreme Court in order to diminish both
the possibility that it would derail political plans for constitutional change
and its opposition to controversial policies such as the war on drugs and
martial law in Mindanao. The removal of an independent Ombudsman and
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Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel
Election Commissioner tampers with horizontal accountability mechanisms
that could control excessive presidential powers. The disproportionate
power of the president is a result of weak party politics and presidential
control of discretionary funds that can be allocated to favoured politicians.
Moreover, the removal of the Vice President would eliminate the possibility
of an agenda-threatening leadership change should President Duterte’s ill
health deteriorate further.
The Sereno ouster highlighted the fragile state of the institution of the
rule of law that is the bulwark against illiberal rule. It exposed the deep
politicization and division within the judiciary, with five justices even
testifying against Sereno in the impeachment proceeding in Congress.
The fragmentation in the bench can been seen as a rift between those
who are more accepting of claimed executive prerogatives and those who
seek to subject government actions to greater constitutional scrutiny—as
shown in the cases on martial law, the burial of Marcos and dismissal of
plunder charges against Duterte’s allies. The retirement of several justices
has meanwhile exacerbated concerns about a court stacked with Duterte
nominees as, during his term, the president will most likely appoint
eleven out of fifteen justices. At stake is therefore nothing less than the
independence of the judiciary, which has been the main safeguard against
executive abuse in the post-Marcos era.
III. EXPLAINING CHANGE: THE CURRENT
FRAGMENTATION OF ELITES AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Philippine democracy lacks the essential mechanisms of institutional and
social controls necessary to curb elite appetites for perpetuating power.
The constitutional safeguards of checks and balances are largely unreliable
because of structural and institutional infirmities. Civil society previously
filled this gap by pushing liberal agenda from the bottom up and acting as
a form of vertical accountability through elections and extraconstitutional
means. During the campaign and since Duterte’s election, civil society
has, however, become deeply divided—with voices from the left initially
in tactical alliance with the president’s party during the campaign and up
to Duterte’s first year in office.
At present, there is no voice loud enough to effectively resist Duterte’s
illiberal policies. Looking at the impact of Sereno’s ouster as a measure of
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13
the influence of civil society in political decision making, it is evident that
protest actions and opposition are still too weak to affect the actions of
political—and judicial—actors. Sereno’s removal, however, engendered a
common ground and a platform, the Coalition for Justice, through which
various splintered groups, lawyers, students, churches and non-government
organizations (NGOs), come together as a single voice to denounce erosion
of the rule of law and democratic institutions.
The 1987 Constitution put in place a system of separation of powers with
checks and balances, yet the executive always held the balance of power
because of control over the national budget and finance. Julio Teehankee
observed that a president who enjoys public support will also enjoy the
backing of a malleable Congress.41 As a populist leader, Duterte relies on
a high popularity rating, backed by a propaganda machine—promoting
his achievements, defending him, and disparaging or threatening critics
through social media. The huge popularity that Duterte enjoys allows
him to count on temporary loyalties of members of Congress and enable
congressional allies to push his agenda with little opposition. See Figure I.1.
There is also a mass movement being created called “Dutertismo”
embodying Duterte’s so-called vision of a “final solution” to the country’s
ills through drastic measures.42 According to Randy David, Dutertismo is
a contingent product of a culture that views leadership as the domain
of a few, rather than a leadership of shared responsibility—a belief bred
by a hierarchical system that “separates the powerful elites from the
impoverished masses”. The Dutertismo brand of leadership translates to
governance with little or no regard for the rule of law and constitutional
processes.
The lack of strong institutional and regulatory controls in Philippine
politics is demonstrated by the inability of Congress to pass anti-dynasty
legislation or provide a penalty for party-switching, which is the current
norm rather than the exception.43 Political dynasties are barred under the
1987 Constitution44 thus, politicians who were members of or identified
with the party of former President Aquino—the Liberal Party—readily
shifted allegiance to the new power-brokers, the Partido Demokratikong
Pilipino-Laban (PDP-Laban). In the May 2016 elections, there were originally
only three legislators who were members of the PDP-Laban. Once Duterte
assumed office in July 2016, 105 more members switched to PDP-Laban,
71 of them from the Liberal Party.45 Duterte’s coalition comprised a
“supermajority” in the lower house, placing him in a position of great
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FIGURE I.1
Net Satisfaction Ratings, Presidents since 1984
80
Aquino I
Ramos
Aquino II
Estrada
Duterte
60
40
Macapagal Arroyo
20
5/7/1990
10/28/1995
-20
-40
-60
Source: SWS Net Satisfaction Surveys 1984–2018.
4/19/2001
10/10/2006
4/1/2012
9/22/2017
Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel
0
11/14/1984
17/4/19 9:59 AM
Introduction: From Aquino II to Duterte (2010–2018)
15
strength and allowing martial law to be imposed without the legislature
and Supreme Court undertaking a stringent review, plus basing the conduct
of impeachment proceedings against Sereno on lower legal standards. In
September 2017, 119 members—against 32 opposed—voted to slash the
Commission on Human Rights budget to just PhP1,000 (approximately
AUD20) although the budget was restored after a major public outcry.46
Even so-called “left” politicians joined the PDP-Laban coalition,
especially those with the National Democratic Front (NDF) purportedly
in the hope that Duterte would make good on his promises to undermine
the oligarchs, adopt substantive redistributive programs, and pursue
a peace agreement with the Communist Party of the Philippines-New
People’s Army (CPP-NPA).47 The NDF and PDP-Laban alliance has
since evaporated—as have negotiations with the CPP-NPA for a peace
settlement.48 The Duterte administration has in fact moved to declare the
CPP-NPA a terrorist organization. As a result, since mid-2017, a string
of suspected leftist rebels or supporters have been killed by unknown
assailants, and criminal charges are being revived against well-known
political left leaders.49
The continued dominance of political dynasties has been a fixture
of the Philippine Congress post-EDSA.50 Many political dynasties were
built by members of the opposition in the Marcos years, with some newer
members erecting their own dynasties during the later resurgence of liberal
democracy. The Marcos family and their allies have been undertaking a
political renaissance—aligning themselves with other marginalized elites
of the post-Marcos period—the same elites cast aside after the Estrada
impeachment, and those from Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s exit from power.
This latter group and the elites that coalesced around Duterte in his run
for the presidency are seen by the public as populating Duterte’s new
elite coalition.
The 17th Congress under Duterte is composed of political dynasties.
Of the 293 House members, 153 (52 per cent) are serving their second or
third term, and only 140 (47 per cent) are first-time representatives.51 Many
of the first-time representatives have experience in local government and
relatives who are politicians. An estimated 190 representatives have links to
political dynasties by either blood or marriage—at least 131 with relatives
actively serving in a political position and another 25 with relatives who
previously served. In the Senate, 13 of 24 members have links to political
dynasties—8 of these have relatives currently occupying another political
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16
Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel
seat, and 5 succeeded a relative as senator. There is also a “minority bloc”
in the House whose members are mostly party-list representatives.52
Unsurprisingly, those in the “majority bloc” are solid supporters of Duterte’s
agenda. Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo—now Duterte’s key
ally—recently wrested control of the Congress on 23 July 2018 on the
occasion of the President’s second State of the Nation Address (SONA)
by being elected Speaker after a brief power struggle.
The Senate, however, remains diverse, as PDP-Laban accounts
for only 5 of 23 members. Consequently, the Senate elections in 2019
will be critical in determining whether Duterte will control the whole
Congress.
Civil society in the Philippines is not monolithic—tending to be
ideologically diverse.53 Civil society groups have in the past been willing to
come together on major political issues to advocate for or oppose important
government policies particularly initiatives that risk undermining
constitutional democracy. Civil society has also been influential in shaping
public opinion—contributing to the government in reconsidering policies—
or the courts invalidating policy measures.
To manage civil society, Duterte has adopted a divide-and-rule
strategy that relies heavily on co-optation, appointing, for example, civil
society activists to the Cabinet.54 Duterte has also devoted considerable
time espousing issues advocated by civil society groups, for example,
speaking out publicly on the importance of environmental protection, and
the eradication of illicit drugs and crimes.55 The effect has been to widen
existing divisions in civil society. The former presidential spokesperson,
Harry Roque, was a well-known human rights lawyer and university
professor—expelled by his own party-list organization—Kabayan—for
pronouncements contradicting party principles.56
The wedge between those who support Duterte and those critical of
him has become very wide—reflecting polarization in civil society. Duterte’s
supporters call his detractors “dilawan”, for supporters of the previous
administration and the Liberal Party.57 Duterte’s critics call his supporters
Dutertards and accusing Duterte supporters of being dumb.58 Social media
has become the battleground of competing ideas and norms among civil
society and within groups and families. The little space available for
safe and robust discourse has made it even more difficult for embattled
institutions and officials to harness support from the public—critical in
influencing or mitigating the Duterte administration’s policies.
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17
Introduction: From Aquino II to Duterte (2010–2018)
Civil society fragmentation, however, reflects deep-rooted structural
issues. The period between Aquino II and Duterte created more opportunity
for poor and middle-class Filipinos to express their political views. Strong
economic growth during the Aquino II presidency resulted in an explosion
of jobs and income, which helped to expand the country’s base of middleincome earners—many of them young, technologically adept, and seeking
a good life.59 Many Filipinos who now have considerable disposable
incomes are in their late twenties to early forties.60 This demographic
is most open in expressing opinions and their dissatisfaction with poor
delivery of services, painful traffic problems in Manila, anomalies at
airports, and slow and expensive internet connectivity.61 This group also
blames the failure of the law and the rule of law when there are no effective
government services, in the face of rampant corruption, and privileging
the influential and rich.62
Income disparities in the Philippines are extremely wide. Standard
practice for market and opinion researchers is to classify respondents
into socioeconomic classes of A, B, C, D, and E—a classification based on
proxy measures for income, wealth and assets—such as conditions in the
community where homes are located, materials used in construction of the
home, furnishings, and whether respondents own or rent.63 In 2009 Social
Weather Stations (SWS) released a report, “Family Income Distribution
in the Philippines from 1985 to 2009”, with percentages of the Filipino
population by class in 1985 and in 2009.64 Key results of the SWS report
are included in Table I.1, demonstrating stark income inequality problems
in the Philippines.
TABLE I.1
Percentage Distribution of Families and Incomes,
by Modified Socioeconomic Class, 2009
Class
Population Percentage
Average Annual Income
Proportion of
National Income
AB
11%
PhP1,857,000 (US$38,579)
19%
C
19%
PhP603,000 (US$12,527)
26%
D
60%
PhP191,000 1(US$3,968)
56%
E
30%
PhP62,000 1(US$1,288)
19%
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18
Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel
A new survey by the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA) in 2016 found that the typical Filipino had “middle-class
aspirations” to live a “simple and comfortable life”.65 In practical terms, this
means owning a medium-sized home and a car, enough money to cover
daily needs, and being able to afford a good education for their children.
According to NEDA, to achieve this dream per capita annual income must
be at least US$11,000—roughly the same as the middle-income earners in
Class C. However, those in this category are still “at risk” and in an unstable
position because of the high cost of living and the constant uncertainty
about economic conditions in the Philippines. This group of Filipinos are
typically concerned about crime and corruption, ineffective government
services, systemic justice and serious flaws in the administration of justice.
The fragility of this class is expressed in their desire to lead a deep-rooted,
comfortable, and secure life.
Duterte has considerable support from the middle class and
more educated Filipinos. As Julio Teehankee remarked: “The Duterte
phenomenon is elite-driven. It is not the revolt of the poor. It is the angry
protest of the new middle class: BPO workers, Uber drivers, and OFWs.”66
The exit polls in 2016 presidential elections showed Duterte was elected by
voters from a variety of socioeconomic backgrounds—but the majority of
votes for him were from larger percentages of more affluent and educated
people.67 Since Duterte took office, this group has continued to support
him and his policies clearly demonstrated by his trust and satisfaction
ratings over time. Figures I.2 to I.4 illustrate that Duterte has enjoyed
particularly strong support from Filipinos aged twenty-five to forty-five,
the high-middle-income earners, and college graduates.
The division in civil society can also be inferred from examining
Duterte’s supporters. Members of this group—although not formally
organized—demonstrate collective aspirations through social media that
is effectively harnessed by the government to support its policies and
measures. Duterte admitted that his presidential campaign utilized social
media campaigners,68 but denied the government currently employs an
army of social media bloggers and “trolls”.69 However, several enthusiastic
bloggers—such as Mocha Uson and Trixie de Guzman—have been
appointed to the government.70 Many Duterte supporters are very active
in social media, particularly Facebook—known for trolling and vilifying
Duterte’s critics, and sometimes aggressively threatening people with
violence.
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75.00%
73.00%
71.00%
70.00%
71.00%
65.00%
66.00%
65.00%
63.00%
61.00%
60.00%
58.00%
55.00%
69.00%
68.00%
67.00%
66.00%
70.00%
64.00%
72.00%
64.00%
63.00%
61.00%
59.00%
63.00%
59.00%
58.00%
58.00%
56.00%
55.00%
53.00%
50.00%
48.00%
45.00%
52.00%
56.00%
54.00%
52.00%
50.00%47.00%
48.00%
45.00%
46.00%
Introduction: From Aquino II to Duterte (2010–2018)
19-J05490 01 From Aquino II to Duterte.indd 19
FIGURE I.2
Net Satisfaction Ratings for Rodrigo Duterte by Age: September 2016 – June 2018
46.00%
45.00%
43.00%
44.00%
40.00%
18-Aug-16 26-Nov-16 6-Mar-17 14-Jun-17 22-Sep-17 31-Dec-17 10-Apr-18 19-Jul-18 27-Oct-18
40.00%
Overall
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55+
19
17/4/19 9:59 AM
20
19-J05490 01 From Aquino II to Duterte.indd 20
FIGURE I.3
Net Satisfaction Ratings for Rodrigo Duterte by Class: September 2016 – June 2018
70.00%
65.00%
65.00%
64.00% 64.00%
63.00%
61.00%
67.00%
66.00%
60.00%
60.00%
56.00%
55.00%
66.00%
65.00%
64.00%
63.00%
66.00%
63.00%
59.00%
56.00%
58.00%
57.00% 57.00%
57.00%
56.00%
52.00%
52.00%
49.00%
48.00%
50.00%
48.00%
40.00%
35.00%
35.00%
18-Aug-16 26-Nov-16 6-Mar-17 14-Jun-17 22-Sep-17 31-Dec-17 10-Apr-18 19-Jul-18
Overall
ABC
D
E
27-Oct-18
Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel
45.00%
43.00%
45.00%
17/4/19 9:59 AM
80.00%
75.00%
70.00%
65.00%
60.00%
55.00%
76.00%
71.00% 72.00%
68.00%
65.00%
64.00% 63.00%
64.00%
63.00%
60.00%
57.00% 57.00%
56.00%
54.00%
76.00%
68.00%
66.00%
69.00%
62.00%
63.00%
58.00%
56.00% 56.00%
54.00%
69.00%
58.00%
56.00%
54.00%
53.00%
52.00%
50.00%
48.00%
50.00%
46.00%
45.00%
45.00%
41.00%
38.00%
40.00%
40.00%
35.00%
18-Aug-16 26-Nov-16 6-Mar-17 14-Jun-17 22-Sep-17 31-Dec-17 10-Apr-18 19-Jul-18
Overall
non-elementary
high school graduates
college graduate
Introduction: From Aquino II to Duterte (2010–2018)
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FIGURE I.4
Net Satisfaction Ratings for Rodrigo Duterte by Education: September 2016 – June 2018
27-Oct-18
elementary graduates
21
17/4/19 9:59 AM
22
Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel
IV. STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
The introductory chapter draws attention to patterns of continuity and
rupture as the Philippines transitioned from Aquino II to the Duterte
administration. The goal of the contributors of this book is to enrich
debates on Philippine politics and society with much-needed recognition
of the unfolding of an uncertain political trajectory. With the unravelling
of the post-1986 political settlement and seeming illiberal turn of the
Duterte government—and consolidation of a new elite coalition—there is
much food for thought. What is of concern is the growing fragmentation
of civil society that has traditionally been the champion of liberal values
and democratic institutions. This is in part because of the Philippines
middle class’ divided stance of the president’s law and order agenda and
his declarations in eradicating the oligarchy. Since the dismantling of the
Marcos dictatorship in 1986, the Philippine Supreme Court—hailed as the
“bulwark of democracy” for its previous records of resisting constitutional
encroachments and attempts at eroding protection of civil liberties—is
now at its weakest point.
With all this in mind, what do individual contributions in this volume
offer? Authors were invited for their informative insights into issues
identified in four critical areas.
Part I brings together contributions on politics and governance:
• Mark Thompson discusses recent developments in the Philippines
from a comparative perspective, and draws attention to how the rise
of illiberal democracy is embodied in President Rodrigo Duterte’s
“right” populism—using Duterte’s violent war on drugs as the
central case study. Comparing contemporary Hungary with the
Philippines, Thompson suggests why and how Duterte has been able
to establish illiberal democracy in the Philippines, and considers this
illiberalism in the context of formally democratic institutions. The
chapter concludes with a forecast and proviso that, despite some
setbacks—given Duterte’s continued popularity and new “friends”
abroad (closer relations with China and Donald Trump’s approaches
to his fellow “populist”)—violent strongman rule is likely to continue
in the Philippines for some time.
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Introduction: From Aquino II to Duterte (2010–2018)
23
• Steven Rood’s contribution further explores recent political and
institutional changes in the Philippines based on in-depth study of
the federalism debate that has dominated recent public discussions
on constitutional reform. Rood argues that the politics of the move
to federalism should be understood in terms of three main issues:
(1) the concerns of the national (= Manila-centric) elites who have
long blocked political-institutional change; (2) the perspective of
democracy advocates worried that change will merely entrench local
elites; and (3) the concerns of business people about the uncertainty
of increased local regulation. Rood concludes by discussing the
potentially complex relationship between the thrust for federalism
and the Bangsamoro peace process.
• Kidjie Saguin offers insights into the capacity to combat corruption
of the administrations of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Benigno S.
Aquino III. Saguin argues that what is most critical in controlling
corruption is the legitimacy of political leaders and leaders of
anticorruption agencies. Saguin’s chapter invites critical reflection
on the Duterte administration’s recent attacks on oversight agencies
despite its formal commitment to eradicating corruption.
Part II analyses economic governance:
• Socorro Gochoco-Bautista examines the Duterte administration’s
10-Point Socioeconomic Agenda, intended to promote inclusive
growth. Gochoco-Bautista presents her analysis in the context of
the push towards federalism—Duterte intends to use federalism
to promote regional development, and as a means to decentralize
political and economic power away from “Imperial Manila”. Noting
major policy changes are underway, Gochoco-Bautista questions
whether the move towards federalism will deliver on the inclusive
growth agenda any better than a unitary government.
• Christopher Cabuay’s and Hal Hill’s chapter with a narrative of the
country’s recent economic performance complements GochocoBautista’s critical analysis. Hill looks at the Philippine’s rapid
economic growth during the Aquino II administration and the
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24
Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel
continuing dynamism under Duterte—the country having now
outgrown its description as the ‘sick man of Asia’. Cabuay and Hill
explore some of the main development challenges for the Philippine
in particular the need to map a path to more inclusive and peaceful
growth.
• Part II ends with a detailed case study by Rachel Burgess on
competition law and inclusive growth. In force since 2017, the
Philippine Competition Act was envisioned to break down cartels
and reduce the price of goods and services to consumers especially
the millions of Filipinos living below the poverty line. Yet, as Burgess
makes clear, whether the law succeeds in promoting inclusive growth
will ultimately depend on uncertain exogenous factors. Burgess
specifies the importance of technical expertise, acceptance by Filipino
business, and the actual and perceived success of the regulator—the
Philippines Competition Commission (PCC)—in applying the law
fairly and transparently.
Part III focuses on the unfolding peace process in Mindanao:
• Matthew Stephens draws attention to aspects of the Duterte
administration’s approach to building peace in Mindanao—
including convergence between the two major Moro fronts, putting
constitutional change on the table, and offering the prospect of
federalism. Stephens expresses concern that these approaches fail to
address deficits in local governance and the role of local governments
perpetuating a status quo of instability and poverty. Stephens
considers the situation in Mindanao has been worsened by the lack
of a credible plan for socioeconomic recovery—requiring fifteen to
twenty years of dedicated financial and technical assistance—and
concludes the root causes of conflict in Mindanao cannot be resolved
during the term of this government.
• Georgi Engelbrecht complements Stephens’s perspective with a
detailed study of the peace agreement between the government and
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed in 2014 seeking to
establish a meaningful form of self-governance in the “autonomous”
region of the Bangsamoro. Engelbrecht points out serious failures
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Introduction: From Aquino II to Duterte (2010–2018)
25
that led to the current situation. Central to these failures is the
Aquino II administration not passing the Bangsamoro Basic Law
(BBL), resulting in MILF forces not having been decommissioned.
As a consequence, the national military was not redeployed. In
essence, the critical security component of ‘normalization’ never
occurred—nor is it likely. Engelbrecht then raises questions about
the best way forward as Duterte charts a new path for the peace
process based on ambitious goals of the recently passed Bangsamoro
Organic Law and inclusivity.
Part IV concludes the contributions by drawing attention to the international
environment:
• Noel Morada explores the prospects for Philippine-China relations
under Duterte noting the Philippines has traditionally used bilateral
and multilateral (mainly ASEAN) mechanisms to deal with China
on issues arising in the South China Sea (SCS) and the West
Philippines Sea (WPS). Morada also considers the implications of
the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s decision favourable to the
Philippines. After drawing attention to internal and external factors
that could influence policy on the SCS/WPS, Morada examines the
challenges the Philippines confronts in attempting to effectively
enforce the decision of the international court and defend its
maritime claims.
• Aries Arugay provides a sober analysis on the potential of civil society
in the Philippines. Looking at the period 2000–10—otherwise known
as Philippine democracy’s lost decade—Arugay argues several events
further fragmented civil society, decreased legitimacy to challenge
state authority and embody popular interests, and weakened the
position of civil society to influence policy. Filipino civil society has
been significantly weakened since 2010—and unable to influence key
political outcomes during the Aquino II administration as seen in
cases such as the pork-barrel scandal, the Reproductive Health Law
debate, and the 2013 mid-term elections. Arugay ends his chapter
by discussing prospects of civil society action and resistance against
the current erosion of liberal democracy in the Philippines under
the Duterte administration.
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26
Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel
CONCLUSION
The contributions of this volume demonstrate the Philippines has entered
a critical period—one of continuity and rupture in significant policy areas.
Now past its second year, the Duterte administration is shaking up the
entire spectrum of Philippine society with “unconventional” approaches to
solving what Duterte perceives as the nation’s ills. An illiberal democratic
regime is being fashioned in a systematic way under the façade of antiManila, anti-oligarchy, and anti-church rhetoric—facilitated in part by
Duterte’s populist appeal and well-oiled propaganda machine—and
encouraged by a rising insecure middle class that continues to give high
support to his administration’s policies.
Illiberal democracy—and liberal capitalism, are mutually exclusive
and can coexist. These terms have been used by many strongmen and
illiberal regimes in their “playbooks”—to induce the public into giving up
fundamental rights and dignity—in return for promised prosperity and
security. This also explains the disjuncture between economics and politics
that sees continuity and expansion of liberal economic policymaking yet
drastic shifts and breaks in the political arena. As history has shown,
most populist—or authoritarian leaderships—have failed in both
political participation and economic redistribution.71 Worse, these types
of governments have compromised legal and institutional constraints
on executive power. The Philippines only need look back at the time of
Marcos when his family and cronies plundered the Philippines, curtailed
human rights and emasculated the rule of law.
As the authors have shown, we are witnessing continuity of Aquino II
policies that stimulated economic growth and directed government
agencies to deliver more inclusive, pro-poor growth. Duterte’s first two
years sustained robust economic growth—6.9 per cent in 2016 and 6.7 per
cent in 2017. Management of the economy was largely left to technocrats,
thus ensuring continuity with the previous administration. The same can
be said for high-profile pro-poor social development programs like the
4Ps—Pantawid Pamilya Pilipino Program—conditional cash transfer and the
AmBisyon 2040 agenda. There have been, however, criticisms over slow and
disjointed progress on the agenda which are growing—particularly with
regard to health and education.72 A major infrastructure programme, Build
Build Build, has been announced in 2018 to fast track big infrastructure
projects and spur growth. Significant tax reform legislation, and the Tax
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Introduction: From Aquino II to Duterte (2010–2018)
27
Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN) law, have also been
passed to enhance and increase tax collection while exempting low income
groups. However, this new tax initiative has been blamed for the rapid
acceleration of inflation now affecting prices of major commodities such
as rice and petroleum.73
On the other hand, there has been a distinct break in the political
narrative—almost a rupture with the past. The president has made a
deliberate, sweeping effort to replace the liberal constitutional order with
an illiberal model. “Dutertismo” targets dissent in independent media and
the opposition and shows little regard for the rule of law and institutional
checks and balances. The politicized use of impeachment procedures and
other legal processes against the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and
members of constitutional bodies has undermined the system of checks
and balances and mechanisms of accountability. This politicization has
also eroded the professionalism—and even the functioning—of critical
independent oversight agencies at a time when the country is confronted
by unrestrained use of power—demonstrated by the war on drugs and
the ever-growing number of related extra-judicial killings.
These developments are not new per se. In the past, there have been
presidential assaults on institutions, declarations of martial law, and
allegations of corruption such as those of Fidel Ramos (1992–98), Joseph
Estrada (1999–2001) and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001–10). Current
political developments however, show a more decisive push towards
illiberal rule that started with the bloody war on drugs. What sets Duterte
apart from his populist predecessor Joseph Estrada is his unapologetic
endorsement of violence and—as with Marcos—his unabashed contempt
for institutions and legal processes.
While the draft federal constitution calls for institutional strengthening—
including political parties—the political policies and actions of the Duterte
administration demonstrate dismal regard for institutions and legal
processes. Added to these developments is the restoration to power of those
accused of large-scale corruption, whose cases against them were dismissed.
Following the retirement of Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales in July
2018—highly regarded for her integrity and independence—the newly
appointed Ombudsman Samuel Martires moved to remove personnel who
investigated Duterte for allegedly holding bank accounts not declared in his
assets,74 despite the Duterte government’s bold campaign promises to end
corruption. The appointment of Ombudsman Samuel Martires on 26 July
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28
Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel
2018 raises concerns about the future of democracy in the Philippines and
its current development trajectory.
Perhaps it is too early to evaluate long-term damage to legal institutions.
However, undermining the courts has obviously created politicization—
and divisions among members of the bench and the legal profession. The
decision of the Supreme Court in quo warranto is perceived by many to be
politically motivated rather than a reasoned independent legal judgement.75
Such a ruling could have severe consequences for an independent judiciary
and salience of the rule of law in securing liberal democracy.
Broad dissatisfaction with systematic injustice bred discontent with the
previous political system—thus propelling Duterte to power in the first
place. The politicization—or as some Philippine commentators would term
“weaponizing”76—of legal mechanisms is counter intuitive. Politicization
of legal mechanisms might also jeopardize the sustainability of the current
trajectory of policy and growth over the next few years which depends on
stability and effectiveness of legal rules and regulation. As the Philippine
government mounts regular assaults on critical institutions of independent
oversight and justice, the Philippines’ ranking on the 2017 Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI), Transparency International (TI) has fallen from
101st in 2016 to 111th in 2017.77
The divisions within civil society that have made collective action
largely ineffectual are of particular concern. Although civil society did
foment a public uproar over proposed cuts to the budget of the Human
Rights Commission and the Sereno ouster initiative more sustained and
broad opposition seems unlikely at this point in time. This lack of opposition
is due in large part to waning participation of traditional middle class in
civil society advocacies, and implicit endorsement of Duterte policies that
could promote “safety” and economic well-being for the middle class in
more ways than a liberal democracy. There is little indication that the
broader political reordering now underway might be opposed by political
elites—who seem committed to accommodation as long as Duterte’s
approval ratings stay high and the economy continues to expand.
The lack of opposition by political elites does not necessarily mean
that authoritarian backsliding is unstoppable. Heated public debates
about the impeachment of the Chief Justice and proposed far-reaching
constitutional changes also suggest there may be limits to the potential
for illiberal excesses. Since the Marcos regime, both the middle class and
the elites supported independent institutions like the Supreme Court
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Introduction: From Aquino II to Duterte (2010–2018)
29
(though not necessarily for the same reasons), allowing the judiciary to rise
above “politics”, particularly when constitutional stability was threatened.
This did not happen, however, in the Sereno ouster even when the issue
provoked a constitutional confrontation with the Senate.
With a deeply divided civil society—including the legal profession—the
Senate adopted restraint in so far as it only called the Supreme Court to
reconsider its decision on the Sereno ouster. The Court, confident there
will be no effective repercussions against their action, stayed firm on their
ruling. This issue, however, has revitalized the civil society and brought
new alliances. The Coalition for Justice was loosely formed around “justice
and rule of law” to denounce the impeachment and subsequent removal
of Sereno. Whether this can be sustained and potentially expand into
broad-based activism or opposition is something that is uncertain—given
the Filipino tendency for forgetting vital issues and penchant for salacious
controversies.
The Philippine Congress—like most opportunistic political dynasties—
has been known to follow the direction of power. However, the Congress
has been known to resist —or turn against—executive power when the
president’s popularity declines (as in Joseph Estrada’s fall from power) or
when public opinion is strong (as in the non-passage of the BBL during
Aquino II). Duterte’s illiberal turn is contingent on the continued support
of the Congress—and the public. Similarly, the post-1987 consensus on
building up oversight and justice institutions, for example, independent
budgets, more transparent appointment processes, collegiality, and the
post-EDSA legacy, was due to benefits on offer for resolving elite conflict
as well as addressing middle-class concerns about abuse by powerful
interests. If the process of deinstitutionalization further deteriorates, these
two constituencies—the Congress and the people—might reunite to combat
illiberalism—although by then the damage to important constitutional
institutions may be irreversible.
The Philippines is now at a critical juncture of continuity and change
having seen continuity of economic growth. Whether such growth will
translate into equitable and redistributive development depends, however,
on how politics is shaped in pursuit of this goal. The popular appeal of
illiberal or authoritarian regimes has depended on the leader’s promises
to deliver on economic redistribution and greater political participation.
With methodical circulation of fake news and ingenious use of social
media—present-day authoritarian leaders may attain more longevity
19-J05490 01 From Aquino II to Duterte.indd 29
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30
Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel
than their predecessors—and not deliver on their promises. As currently
witnessed in the Philippines, institutional and legal safeguards can easily
be dismantled with an ill-informed citizenry who value “quick fixes” rather
than the building of stable and effective institutions.
Much is at stake for the Philippines as the Duterte presidency
unfolds. External changes are also unravelling—as documented in the
compilation of these chapters. A realignment in the Philippine’s foreign
relations policy—aimed at fostering closer relations with non-traditional
allies such as China and Russia—is also causing internal unease among
the general population. Duterte’s constant praise of China and seeming
lack of interest to enforce the Philippine’s legal victory in the international
court of arbitration case involving the South China Sea (see Morada in
Chapter 9), is of particular concern. External powers (e.g., United States,
Japan, Australia) are watching this development with great interest and are
aware of the high stakes involved—regional peace and stability, freedom
of navigation, and the international rule of law.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank Rory MacNeil and Kent Marjun Primor
for providing research and editing assistance.
Notes
1. Paul Hutchcroft and Joel Rocamora, “Strong Demands and Weak Institutions:
The Origins and Evolution of the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines”, Journal
of East Asian Studies 3 (2003): 259–92; Bjorn Dressel, “The Philippines: How
Much Real Democracy”, International Political Science Review 32, issue 5 (2011):
529–45.
2. Arsenio Balisacan and Hal Hill, “The Philippine Development Puzzle”, in
Southeast Asian Affairs 2002, edited by Daljit Singh and Anthony L. Smith,
pp. 237–52 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002); Emmanuel
de Dios and Paul Hutchcroft, “The Philippine Political Economy: Development,
Policies, and Challenges”, in Political Economy, edited by E. de Dios and
P. Hutchcroft, pp. 45–75 (Oxford University Press, 2003).
3. Imelda Deinla, The Development of the Rule of Law in ASEAN: The State and
Regional Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Dante
Gatmaytan, “The State of Liberal Democracy”, Global Review of Constitutional
Law (University of the Philippines, 2018).
19-J05490 01 From Aquino II to Duterte.indd 30
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Introduction: From Aquino II to Duterte (2010–2018)
31
4. Mark Thompson, “Reformism vs. Populism in the Philippines”, Journal of
Democracy 21, issue 4 (2010): 154–68.
5. Mark Thompson, “Populism and the Revival of Reform: Competing Political
Narratives in the Philippines”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 32, no. 1 (2010):
1–28.
6. Matt Wells, “Philippines: Duterte’s ‘War on Drug’ Is a War on the Poor”,
Amnesty International, 4 February 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/
news/2017/02/war-on-drugs-war-on-poor/ (accessed 7 September 2018).
7. Imelda Deinla, Veronica Taylor, and Steven Rood, “Philippines: Justice Removed,
Justice Denied”, Lowy Institute online, 17 May 2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.
org/the-interpreter/philippines-justice-removed-justice-denied (accessed
14 August 2018).
8. Gatmaytan, “The State of Liberal Democracy”.
9. Gaea Katreena Cabico, “Pulse Asia: 6 out of 10 Filipinos Oppose Charter
Change”, PhilStar Online, 2 May 2018, https://www.philstar.com/
headlines/2018/05/02/1811466/pulse-asia-6-out-10-filipinos-oppose-charterchange (accessed 7 September 2018).
10. Euan McKirdy, “Philippines Revokes License of Rappler, News Site Critical of
Duterte Administration”, CNN Online, 16 January 2018, https://edition.cnn.
com/2018/01/15/asia/philippines-rappler-sec-license-revoked/index.html
(accessed 7 September 2018).
11. Ellalyn de Vera-Ruiz, “SWS Survey: Net Satisfaction Rating of Duterte
Administration Still Very Good”, Manila Bulletin, 5 August 2018, https://
news.mb.com.ph/2018/08/05/sws-survey-net-satisfaction-rating-of-duterteadministration-still-very-good/ (accessed 18 October 2018).
12. Imelda Deinla, “Duterte and the Insecurity of the Philippine Middle Class”,
seminar series on Governance and the Power of Fear, School of Regulation
and Global Governance, Australian National University, 30 November 2017,
http://regnet.anu.edu.au/news-events/news/7036/duterte-and-insecurityphilippine-middle-class (accessed 7 September 2018).
13. Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6
(1997): 22–43, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20048274 (accessed 24 April
2018).
14. Deinla, The Development of the Rule of Law in ASEAN.
15. Sheri Berman, “The Pipe Dream of Undemocratic Liberalism”, Journal of
Democracy 28, no. 3 (2017): 29–38.
16. Young Sokphea, “Transnational Advocacy Networks in Global Supply Chains:
A Study of Civil Society Organizations’ Sugar Movements in Cambodia,”
Journal of Civil Society 13, no. 1 (2017): 35–53.
17. Miguel Syjuco, “I Thought Democracy Had Failed Filipinos. But it Is We Who
Have Failed It”, The Guardian, 22 October 2017, https://www.theguardian.
19-J05490 01 From Aquino II to Duterte.indd 31
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32
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel
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Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”.
Benedict Anderson, “Cacique Democracy and the Philippines: Origins and
Dreams”, New Left Review, no. 169 (1988): 3–31.
William Case, Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less (Richmond: Curzon,
2002).
David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1988); Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso, State Society
in the Philippines (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005; Walden Bello,
Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy (London and New York:
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Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem and Eduardo C. Tadem, “Political Dynasties
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Ronald Mendoza et al., “Inequality in Democracy: Insights from an Empirical
Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress”, Philippine
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doi/pdf/10.1080/01154451.2012.734094?needAccess=true (accessed 27 April
2018).
Ibid.
Mark Thompson, “Duterte’s illiberal democracy”, East Asia Forum, 7 August
2017, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/08/07/80706/ (accessed
6 September 2018).
Rodrigo Duterte, “State of the Nation Address 2018”, PhilStar Online, 23 July
2018, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/07/23/1836195/full-textdutertes-2018-sona-speech (accessed 6 September 2018).
Walden Bello, “Rodrigo Duterte: A Fascist Original”, Foreign Policy in Focus,
6 January 2017, https://fpif.org/rodrigo-duterte-fascist-original/ (accessed
6 September 2018).
Eva-lotta Hedman, In the Name of Civil Society: From Free Election Movements to
People Power in the Philippines (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006).
Eva-lotta Hedman, “The Philippines in 2005: Old Dynamics, New Conjecture”,
Asian Survey XLVI, no. 1 (2006): 187–93; Jose Magadia, “Contemporary Civil
Society in the Philippines”, in Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, edited by Daljit
Singh and John Funston, pp. 253–68 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 1999); Sidney Silliman and Lela Garner Noble, Organizing for Democracy:
NGOs, Civil Society, and the Philippine State (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1998).
Benjamin Muego, “The Philippines in 2004: A Gathering Storm”, Southeast Asian
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Introduction: From Aquino II to Duterte (2010–2018)
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
33
Affairs 2005, edited by Chin Kin Wah and Daljit Singh, pp. 293–312 (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005).
Chris Schnabel, “Beyond the Numbers: How Aquino Fuelled the Economy”,
Rappler Online, 18 June 2016, https://www.rappler.com/business/economywatch/136536-president-aquino-economy-legacy (accessed 6 September 2018).
Imelda Deinla, “Public Support and Judicial Empowerment of the Philippine
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Marc Jayson Cayabyab, “House Panel to Stall BBL Passage Pending Mamasapano
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Keren Blankfeld, “Philippines’ 50 Richest 2016: President Rodrigo Duterte’s War
on Oligarchs”, Forbes Online, 24 August 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/
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2014”, Makati Business Club, https://mbc.com.ph/2014/08/29/mbc-executiveoutlook-survey-second-semester-2014/ (accessed 6 September 2018).
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Bank, https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP_
ROLI_2017-18_Online-Edition.pdf (accessed 6 September 2018).
Cristina Regina Bonoan and Björn Dressel, “Dismantling a liberal constitution,
one institution at a time”, New Mandala, 24 May 2018, http://www.newmandala.
org/dismantling-liberal-constitution-one-institution-time/(accessed 2 October
2018).
Michael Bueza, “Fast Facts: How Does Impeachment Work?”, Rappler Online,
20 May 2017, https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/164340-fast-factsimpeachment-process (accessed 6 September 2018).
Republic of the Philippines vs. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno in G.R. No. 237428,
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2018/
may2018/237428.pdf (accessed 14 August 2018).
Dane Angelo M. Enerio, “Duterte: ‘Fast-Track’ Sereno’s Impeachment”, Business
World Online, 9 April 2018, http://www.bworldonline.com/duterte-fast-trackserenos-impeachment/ (accessed 14 August 2018).
Julio C. Teehankee, “Electoral Politics in the Philippines”, in Electoral Politics
in Southeast and East Asia, edited by Aurel Croissant, Marei John, and Gabriel
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(accessed 14 August 2018).
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34
Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel
43. ABS-CBN News, “Why the Philippines Needs an Anti-Dynasty Law”, ABS-CBN
News Online, 21 August 2015, http://news.abs-cbn.com/nation/08/20/15/
why-philippines-needs-anti-dynasty-law (accessed 14 August 2018).
44. See Art. II, sec. 26 of the 1987 Philippine constitution, http://hrlibrary.umn.
edu/research/Philippines/PHILIPPINE%20CONSTITUTION.pdf (accessed
14 August 2018).
45. CNN Philippines, “More LP Members, Political Parties Vow Alliance with
Duterte”, CNN Philippines Online, 23 May 2016, http://cnnphilippines.com/
news/2016/05/23/liberal-party-LP-members-lakas-cmd-nup-vow-allianceduterte-alvarez.html (accessed 14 August 2018).
46. Audrey Morallo, “House Gives CHR a P1,000 budget”, PhilStar Global Online,
12 September 2017, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/09/12/1738419/
house-gives-chr-p1000-budget (accessed 14 August 2018).
47. Eimor P. Santos, “Duterte Gov’t, NDF Set Peace Talks for July”, CNN Philippines
Online, 17 June 2016, http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/06/16/GPHNDF-peace-talks-set-for-July.html (accessed 14 August 2018).
48. Presidential Communications Operations Office, News Release, 24 November
2017, https://pcoo.gov.ph/news_releases/duterte-formally-ends-peace-talksreds/ (accessed 14 August 2018).
49. Edu Punay, “DOJ Wants NDF, CPP Leaders Back in Jail”, PhilStar Global Online,
2 July 2018, https://pcoo.gov.ph/news_releases/duterte-formally-ends-peacetalks-reds/ (accessed 14 August 2018).
50. Tadem and Tadem, “Political Dynasties in the Philippines”.
51. Carmel Abao. “Pluralism, Populism and Their Perversions: Congress in the
Time of Duterte,” Rappler Online, 17 September 2017, https://www.rappler.
com/thought-leaders/182416-pluralism-populism-perversions-congressduterte-part-1 (accessed 7 September 2018).
52. The party-list system was included in the 1987 Constitution to give representation
to marginalized groups. In practice, most of those on the lists are professional
politicians and members of elites “representing” marginalized groups.
53. Silliman and Noble, Organizing for Democracy.
54. Nestor Corrales, “Duterte Offers DENR Post to Gina Lopez of ABS-CBN
Foundation”, Inquirer.Net Online, 20 June 2016, http://newsinfo.inquirer.
net/791532/duterte-offers-denr-post-to-gina-lopez-of-abs-cbn-foundation
(accessed 14 August 2018).
55. Ali Ian Marcelino Biong, “Duterte Declares Environmental Protection as Priority,
Slams Mining Industry”, PhilStar Global Online, 23 July 2018, https://www.
philstar.com/headlines/2018/07/23/1836168/duterte-declares-environmentalprotection-top-priority-slams-mining-industry (accessed 16 August 2018).
56. CNN Philippines, “Kabayan Partylist removes Harry Roque as member,
Representative”, CNN Philippines Online, 24 January 2017, http://
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Introduction: From Aquino II to Duterte (2010–2018)
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
35
cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/01/24/kabayan-partylist-removes-harryroque.html (accessed 16 August 2018).
Frances Mangosing, “Now an Army Resource Speaker, Mocha Gets Back
at Critics”, Inquirer.net Online, 15 March 2017, http://newsinfo.inquirer.
net/880909/now-an-army-resource-speaker-mocha-gets-back-at-critics
(accessed 15 August 2018).
Mong Palatino, “Beware Duterte’s Troll Army in the Philippines”, Diplomat
Online, 18 November 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/bewaredutertes-troll-army-in-the-philippines/ (accessed 15 August 2018).
Dennis F. Quilala, “The Philippines in 2014: Unmasking the daang matuwid”.
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Chrisee Dela Paz, “How the Millennial Consumer Is Reshaping the PH
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2018).
Imelda Deinla, “Rule of Law Deficit Behind Voter Dismay in the Philippines”, East
Asia Forum Online, 4 May 2016, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/04/
rule-of-law-deficit-behind-voter-dismay-in-philippines/ (accessed 7 September
2018); Imelda Deinla, “What Is Australia’s Stake in Philippines Chaos”, Diplomat
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See, for example, Nielsen’s explanation of ABCDE categories. http://www.
nielsen-admosphere.bg/files/2014/06/ABCDE-socio-economic-classificationMEDIARESEARCH-specification-2015.pdf (accessed 15 August 2018).
Tomas Africa, “Family Income Distribution in the Philippines, 1985–2009:
Essentially the Same”, Social Weather Stations, 18 March 2011, https://www.sws.
org.ph/downloads/publications/pr20110321%20-%20Family%20Income%20
Distribution%20by%20Mr%20Tomas%20Africa_FINAL.pdf (accessed 27 April
2018).
National Economic and Development Authority, “Highlights of the National
Survey on the Aspirations of the Filipino People”, Ambisyon Natin 2040,
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AmbisyonHighlightsBrochure-rev2.pdf (accessed 17 April 2018).
R.G. Cruz, “Why Duterte is Popular Among Wealthy, Middle-Class Voters”,
ABS-CBN News, 1 May 2016, http://news.abs-cbn.com/halalan2016/
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36
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
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74.
75.
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Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel
focus/04/30/16/why-duterte-is-popular-among-wealthy-middle-class-voters
(accessed 27 April 2018).
ABS-CBN News, “More Millennials Voted for Duterte, Exit Poll Shows”,
ABS-CBN News Online, 14 May 2016, http://news.abs-cbn.com/halalan2016/
focus/05/14/16/more-millennials-voted-for-duterte-exit-poll-shows (accessed
15 August 2018).
Catherine S. Valente, “Dutere on Use of ‘Troll’ Army: I Have Followers”, Manila
Times Online, 25 July 2017, https://www.manilatimes.net/duterte-on-use-oftroll-army-i-have-followers/340560/ (accessed 15 August 2018).
Ibid.
Jessica Bartolome, “Mocha Uson appointed as assistant secretary at Duterte’s
comms office”, GMA News Online, 9 May 2017, http://www.gmanetwork.
com/news/news/nation/610076/mocha-uson-appointed-assistant-secretaryat-duterte-s-comms-office/story/ (accessed 15 August 2018).
Christian Houle and Paul D. Kenny, “The Political and Economic Consequences
of Populist Rule in Latin America”, Government and Opposition 53, no. 2 (2018):
256–87.
Rahael Baladad, “Duterte’s Social Development Agenda: Radical Change or
Business as Usual?”, Global South Online, 9 June 2017, https://focusweb.org/
content/duterte-s-social-development-agenda-radical-change-or-businessusual (accessed 15 August 2018).
Jess Diaz, “Consumer Prices up due to TRAIN”, Philstar Global Online,
28 February 2018, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/02/28/1792093/
consumer-prices-due-train (accessed 15 August 2018).
Rey E. Requejo and Rio N. Araja, “Ombudsman to Enforce Dismissal Order
vs Carandang”, Manilastandard.net Online, 6 August 2018, http://thestandard.
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Elmor P. Santos, “Sereno Ouster Shows SC Bowing to ‘Aggressive’ SolGen—
Justice Leonen”, CNN Philippines Online, 16 May 2018, http://cnnphilippines.
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Rey Panaligan, Ben Rosario, and Jeffrey Damicog, “IBP cautions Congress
on misuse of impeachment”, Manila Bulletin Online, 6 September 2017,
https://news.mb.com.ph/2017/09/06/ibp-cautions-congress-on-misuse-ofimpeachment/ (accessed 15 August 2018).
See 2017 Corruption Perception Index results conducted by Transparency
International, https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_
perceptions_index_2017#table (accessed 15 August 2018).
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