Marmaridou, S. (2000), "Pragmatic Meaning and Cognition (Pragmatics and Beyont New Series)", Amsterdam/Philadelphia, John Benjamins Publishing Company, ISBN 90 272 5095 2 (Eur.), 322 pp

García Númez. J. M. YMerino fcrradá, M' C. - Mal'mal'idou S. (2000), Pragmating meaning ... Marmaridou, s. (2000) Pragmatic Meaning and Cognition (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series), Amsterdam/ Philadelphia, John Benjamins Publishing Company, isbn 90 27250952 (eur.), 322 pp. García Núñez, José María Merino Ferradá, María del Carmen Universidad de Cádiz, Departamento de Filología Francesa e Inglesa, Facultad de Filosofiay Letras, Bortolomé Llompart s/n, 11003 CMiz. Tfno: (956) 015865 Y 015874, Fax: (956) 010001, e-mail: jmaria.garcia@uca.esymoricarmen.merino@uca.es (Recibido, julio 2001; aceptado, septiembre 2001) BIBUD [1133-682X (2000-2001) 8-9; 387-396J 1. Introduction In Pragmatic Meaning and Cognition Sophia Mannmidou presents a view oflanguage use and cognítive and social aspects of pragmatic meaning as emerging from cognitive sl.rucLures and conceplualisations built on the basis of the individuals' bodilyand social experiences. Experiential realism (ER henceforth) is presented as a theoretical framework capable of tackling the nuances of meaning so conceived. Besides this general theoretical objective, Marmaridou tries to demonstrate that ER can also shed light OH some of the puzzles posed or left unresolved by what she calls the societal and the cognilive approaches lo pragmatics. In so doing, ER is alleged lo have the beneficial side effect ofproviding the necessary bridge between these two approaches. Does it evelltually manage to do so? The mm of this papel' is to demonstrate that it does noL But before we deal ,\'ith the bones of this criticism, lel us review the different parts of the book in sorne delail. 2. Thc shortcomings and complemcntarity of cognitive and societal Ilragmatics In lhe firsl chaptcl', Marmaridou reviews the deficiencies ofthe cognitive al1d societal approaches 10 pl'agmatic meaning. The former includes a wide range of theoretical frameworks connected by their commitment to the idea thaí meal1ing is a mental phenomenon. 1 In the author's view wlüle these approaches concentrate on the kind of computations or inferential operations tllat are carried out in utterance production and 1 The array oftheoríes inc1uoes Gricean pragmatics (cE Gricc (1975, 1978, 1981)), Relevance Theory (cf Spcrber and Wílson (1995)), or Nco-Gricean pragmatics (t:f. Horn (1988, 1989». Pragmaiíngülstlca, 8-9, 2000-2001. 387 - 396 387 Gurcía Númez, J.M. y Merino Ferradá, M" C. -Marmaridou S. (2000), Pragmating meaning ... interpretation, they ignore the essential role that the content of the assumptions processed and the socio-cultural constraints play in this process. 2 A second problem the cognitive perspective faces is the erroneous idealisation concerning speaker s and hearers, who are assumed to share the same universal mental faculties and who are conceptually detached from any real social setting. A third problem concerns the concept of inference, a central issue in cognitive approaches to pragmatics. Marmaridou argues that the sociocultural aspects of the cOlmnunicative event excrt a crucial influence on the calculation of inferences. J In smn, the major weakness of cognitive pragmatics is, according to Marmaridou, that it considers cognitive and mental processing abilities as synonymous, while the latter are but one aspect of the fornler. 4 The societal approach also presents a number of deficiencies that makes it inadequate to account for aH aspects oflanguage use. Current developments in societal pragmatics leave unanswered the important questions of how and why social constraints operate in communication. According to Marmaridou the two fundamental issues in societal pragmatics are the interactional (or "reflexive") charactcr of communication and the concept of context of discourse. The concept of interaction relies heavily on a consideration of language as a "social institution" and communication as a "societal work" involving power relations among the individuals (cf. Labov (1972), Cameron (1990), Mey (1993). Besides, being socially given, context is also interactively built in the course of the interaction (cf. Gumperz (1992), and Duranti and Goodwin (1992». To make her criticism of societal pragmatics cIear, we can follow Marmaridou and focus on Bang and Door's (1979) theory of utterance interpretation. These authors analyse utterance meaning as consisting of two parts: a situational and a contextual one. In Mannaridou's view, Bang and Door do not explain how the interpretation in the situational part is effected. That is, no cognitive mechanism is mentioned that can be held responsible for the internalisation, and thus the interpretation, of social meaning, However these cognitive mechanisms and processes are invoked when it comes to the analysis of how interpretations are carried out in the contextual partS , To sum up, societal pragmatics seems to Marmaridou to be unable to offer an account of the intemalisation of sociocultural meaning that goes beyond a vague recognition of the role of cognition in language use. The natural consequencc of Marmaridou's revision of cognitive and societal pragmatics is tbat these two broad perspectives on pragmatic meaning are somehow complementary, the former leaving too much of society and culture out and the larter missing the cognitive point almost entirely. It is in this theoretical space ibat Marmaridou' s work strives to carve up a place for experiential realismo 2 This is, for example, Ihe position held by Sperber and Wilson (1995) and theirfollowers (e.g. Blakemore (1992)). According to relevance theorisls, lhe faet thal different individuals may inierpret Ihe same utterance in diJIerenl ways is due to fue difierent complltations they perform when fuey process lhe lltterance against a specific set of contextual assumptions. 3 This is the viewdefendcd byWierzbicka (1991). 4 Inthis she follows Sweetser (1990). The same criticism applies lo olher societal approaehes like e.g. that ofMey (1993). Pragmalingt'listlca, 8·9, 2000-2001,387 - 396 388 García Númez, .T.M. y Merino Ferradá, M" C. -lvfal'marldo1l S. (2000), Pragmatmg meaning... 3. Experiential realism The substance of ER is the embodiment-of-meal1illg hypothesis. This hypothesis has it that a11 fonns of meaning are the result of the neura] entrenchment of some bodily experience. As experiences can be physically or culturally constraincd, it follows that both physical and cultural c"'"Pcriences will go ínto the fonnation of meaning. The idea has achieved relative success i.n the field oflexical semantics, where it originated through the work ofMark JoJ:mson and George Lakoff (cf. Lakoff and Jolmson (1980, 1999), Lakoff (1987)). Thc book is very explicit, at times to the point of excessive repetition, about the cOl1l1ectiomst viewpoil1t on cognition. Everything meaningful must be lhe result of some stable, or at least occasional co-activatiol1 routlne. Repeated co-activation leads to neural entrenchment As usual, whatever cannot be examined under lhe miscroscope will ouly be cOllsídered as a possíble hypothesis. The route followed by Marmaridou is to apply ít to pragmatic phenomena with a double objective: to solve problems left unresolved by other approaches, and to lend fUMer support to the embodiment-of-meamng hypothesis. The remaining four chapters follow the same prograllune: a central pragmatic problem is taken up, the inadequacics of societal and cognitive pragmatic accounts are pointed out, and an approach in experientialíst terms 1S rehearsed w11ich supposedly solves the problems and lends support to the theory. Specifically, Marmaridou addresses four pragmatic phenomena which havc reccived considerable attention in the literature: deixis, presupposition, speech acts and implicature. Experiential realism provides her ,'",ith fue adequate tools to propose a particular cognitive strucÍllIe in each case, in terros oC which particular sociocultural understanding arise whenever these phenomena appear in language use. The point of departure ofMannaridou's analysis is the internal conceptualisation of the four phenomena in terms of idealised eognitive lllodels (ICMs) In the case of deixis the ICM is one of 'pointing out'. According to Marmaridou, tlle link between person and social deixis on the one hand, and space, time and discourse deixis on the other is represented by means of a number of metaphors, explained by the spatialization-of-form-hypothesis (cf. Lakoff 1987), and requiring a metaphorical mapping from a physical space onto a conceptual space. In the case of prcsuppositions, the ICM is built in tenns of thc ei\.1)ressions that trigger them. In order to explaín why certain uses of thosc triggers serve to create or cancel off presuppositions, Mannaridou argues that parts of the ICM are cognitively backgrounded, while others are foregrounded. In the case of speech acts, the ICM is socioculturally determined and presents a dual nature w11ich reflects utterances as a mode of speaking and as a mode of action, both domains being linked, via metaphorical mappings, through the concepl o[ force. According to Mannaridou, force can be established in two ways: by conventional means or, in their absence, in terms of interaction goals, negotiated \o/ithín a set of sociocultural nonns depending on the social roles of the interlocutors. The proposed ICMs account both for the stmcturing of a mental space and the prototypical structure of tlle phenomena. At the same time, the internal structure of the categories is analysed in terms of protot}'Pe theol)', and the relationsbip among more specific categories in terms of a network of conceptual metaphors. Observed in detail, the outcome of the process is not as positive as initially foreseen. Thore are two main weaknesses in the argumentation that Marmaridou puts forward against Pragmalingüislica. 8-9, 2000-2001, 387 - 396 389 García Númez, J.M. y MerinQ Ferradá, M' C. -Marmal'ldou S. (2000), Pmgmatmg meamng .. current cognitíve and sodetal perspectíves and in favour of ER On the oue hand, the alleged theoretical benefits of the proposed approacb He more in tbe conceptllal tban in the empírical domain, where lhe contributioll of tbe proposed framework ís relatívely poor. The conceptual argumentation deployed does little more than promote the proposed analysis to the range of a mercly plausible conceptual alternative to existing cogtútive pragmatic tbeories. Tbis will hence be called the methodological i5sue. On the other hand, Marrnaridou's analysis disregards a number of important empirical issues tbat have long been part of the debate in cognitive pragmatics witbout introdncing llew ones. Tlús casts doubt on t11e theoretical elaboration tilat lS put forward. \Ve call this tlle empírical issue. To make OUT crilicism concrete and clear, we will concentrate on two of the pragmalÍc phenomena tbat Marmaridou addresses, presuppositions and implicalllres. 4. The metbodological issue In her trea/ment of presllpposition, Mannaridou focuses on the thorny issue of metalingttistic negation. Basically, she agrees wifu the standard position Lhat what gets negated in melalinguistic negatíon is sometlúng presupposed rather than asserted by the speaker's utterauce. There is a long list of empírical issucs regarding tlús difficult problem. First of aU dIere is the ünportant problem of fue existel1ce of one or two negations. Some authors (cf Martín (1982), Bnrton-Robc11s (1987») defend that negation lS ambigtlOus between an interna!, presupposition-preservil1g reading and an external, presupposition-cancellillg reading. Sorne other authors (cf. AtIas (1981), Kempson (1986), Carston (1996,1998)) favour the view 1hat therc is but one negatio11 that can be applied to different parts or memúng layers of an utterallce. Second, !llere is the questioll oftI1e grammatical, semantic or pragtnatic nahrre of metalinguistic negation. Metalingtustic negatioll does not have an overt grammatical reflex in natural langtlages over thc world (í.e. is 110t expressible by affixed negatioll, does not trigger negative polarity, etc), is not recol1cilable with a cIear-cut distinction betweell tme and false propositions, and is more directIy related to the cOllcept of assertability tban lo Lhe conccpt of truth (cf. Rom (1985, 1989)). These ane! other problems constitute tite empírical arena on which muchofthe theoretical debate fu1S taken place ever since Bertrand RussclJ pointcd out the apparent ambiguity of sentences like the king oj'.France is not bald. Intersil1gy~ Mannaridou' s account Louches on these issues only as part of a revicw of the coglútive pragmatic vie\v. Her OWIl contribution to tI1e topie quickIy S\vitches to the lúghly conceptual field o[ the mental schemas triggeling and constraining tile appearance of presuppositiollS. It i5 in such a field, \Ve are infonned, that a principled eOl1llection betlveell the social dimension of comrmmication éUld lts cognitive basis can be fruit:fillly pursued. The basic premise is that metalinguistie llcgatioll, and presupposítion-cancelling generalI)', ls the result of an ICM that conceptualises power relatíons at a h1gh level of abstraction. Tbe participant who cancels (or else brings focus on) a presupposition is, in so doing, displaying and makillg recognisable a power position in the verbal interchange. More simply, by cal1celling or highlighting presuppositions, the spealcer takes fuII control of the cognitive background against which eOlllmUllÍcation tal(es place. The questioll arises ofw11at trivial connection tllere can be between the alleged social import of tbe phenomena at issue and the empi rical problerns Usted above. Mannarídou' s Pragmalingiíistíca, 8-9, 2000-2001.387 - 396 390 GarcÍa Númez, J.M. y Merino Ferradá, M' C. - UCI/'marido!t S. (2000). Pragmating meaning... account of presuppositiOll docs not improve in this respect. However thc point we want to make in this sectÍon is slightly different. Seen in a broad, methodological perspective, Mannaridou's applicatíon of ER to presuppositions (or to other pragmatic phenomena for that matter) is objectiollable on purely tbeoretical or methodological groullds: it sets liS in a11 empírical rcalm, and shows liS the (supposed) theoretical weaknesses of a number of theories which are hence allcged to be in nced of revision; however, as soon as it comes to the alternatíves, aH we are offered is a conceptual elaboratío11 that does 110t directly relate to, or at least is not hOlllogeneous with, the range alld qualily of lhe empirical problems raised; and neither does the proposed theory reveal new problems regardillg the chosen phenomena. Thc upshot of this revisio11 of lhe oyerall methodology of the book is that it can hardly qualify as a proper alternative to the theories it sets out lo improvc, símply because it i8 not 011 a par wíth them on purely methodological grounds. 5. The empírical issue The consequenee of putting the conceptual cart before thc empírical horsc is that a numbel' of attested facts appear obscured, if not oyertIy questiolled 01' negated, foI' no jllslified reaSOIl. Obviously, thcre is nothing objectionable abaut casting doubt OH matters that have long been taken for gmtlted. This is a heaahy and widespread practíce in science. The problem comes when the revisioll is undertaken on purely conceptual grOlUlds. Tbis is, we believe, the case ofMarmaridou' s criticisl1l of some of lhe most important distínctions ofcognitivc pragmatícs. One such case i5 the distinction between conventional al1d pragmatic meatúng. Accepting, as Marmaridou does, that the cntrenchment of a neural co-activation in a connectiOlúst network is the sol e source of meaning, the distillctions betweell different types of meaning becomc blurred. In the cognitivc paradigm convelltiollal meanÍllg i8 more or less automaticaHy retrieved, whilc pragmatie meaning and context1m1 infoflll.t'ltion are the result of a reasoll-guided infcrentíal process. To show the differcllccs more elcarly, we wiII take up Marmaridou's account of implicatures and compare it with a standard cognitive account. Chapter 6 offers a study case of the applícatíoll of ER to implicatures, what follows is Marmaridou' s example and diseussioll (Marmarídou (2000: 267)). (l)A parclIt-daughtcr conversaban: DI: DidI tell yau? Fínallywe'l! be going to the diseo Ihis Saturday. Pl: 1 didn 't getthat. D2: Don't you rcmcmber thal we had agre:ed to go to a disco once? P2: D3: P3: D4: Who's 'we'? The girIs and me. Ah~ Don't tell me YOIl're not lctting me gol Mannaridou'g account of the recovery ofthe hnplicated assumptíon in tbis dialogue relies on two points: (a) the situation in which it takes place activates a certain cognitive scenario: Pragmalmgfllstica, 8-9. 20aO-200], 387 - 396 391 García Númez, J. M. Y Merino Ferradá, M" C. - Marmarido1l S. (2000), Pragmating meaning. .. Significantly, the last utterance oftbe above dialogue reveals an implicit interactive scenario typical ofthe wider sociocultural framework in which it originates, namcly that pemússion must be typically sought and granted before an adolescent's cvcning outing. n is in terms ofthe assessment onhe situation as instantiating this institutionally groundcd scenario that cont1icting goals are being set and power relations are challcnged in this case. (Marmaridou (2000: 267)) (b) an inferenrial process which relies heavily on the cognitive scenarios made accessible by the lexical items used in the interchange: In the abovc dialogue, the inferences that appear to have been drawn by thc father upon hearing D2, as his utterance inP2 merely indicated, relate to the permission seeking scenario, itself involving consent and agrecment. Associated conceptual framings of experiencc are lcxicalised as' agrecing', whilc agents are lexicaliscd bypronoulls such as 'we', 'you', 'who', cOllí1ict by 'not', etc. For examplc, a possiblc inference that the father derives from D2 is that his daughtcr wants to present the future outing as an already agreed upon cvent by an partied concemed and hence that his consent is not being sought now. Ihis inference at leas! partly arises from the experiential scenes activated bythe lexical frame 'agreed' and the agent pronominalization 'we': 'agree' lexicalizesa conceptualisation 01' experience whereby there is an issue 01' inlerest to two or more parties; the parties potentially hold different views or have different interests with respect to this issue; fue issue ofinterest may relate to future action; the issue ifinterestis negotiable, etc. The pronoun 'we' typically lexicalises reference to the current speaker and sorne other party including ar excluding the addressee. (Marmaridou (2000: 268-269)) What wonId be the standard cognitive account of the recovery of the implicature you are not really allowed lo go out? Simply to posit an inferential process at sorne point in the in the example at issue this point corresponds to the [ather's interchange. Suppose tha~ exclamation in P3 (as the girl's annoyed reply seems to suggest). (2) depicts a plausible inferential chain leading from P3 lO the intended mesag~. (2) Al: A2: A3: A4: AS: Ihe father finds relevant the in1'ormation about who exactly is denoled by "we". The father points out the relevance ofthe people involved in the agreement including bim. He is not part ofthe agreement that has been made on this occasíon. Thc agreement is not valid as it stands. The daughter is not really allowed to go to the disco. This is one possible inferential routine of the type typically advocated by cognitive praglllatists (with differences among them pertaining to the reason why they are triggered6 ). In Marmaridou's proposed model the informarion that permission must be typically sought and granted before an adolescent's evening outing gets conventionally activated. But then the question is: why? Is it simply because fue conversarion is between a father and bis daughter? 6 In Relevance Theory, fbr example, (!he principie of) relevance accounls for any inferences entertained during the cornmunicative process. Pragmalingiiistlca, 8-9, 2000-2001, 387 - 396 392 Garcia Númez, .I.M. y Merino Ferradá, 11' C, -Mm'marldolí S. (2000), Pragmatmg meaning, .. 15 it because ofthe father's question about "we"? 1s it because ofthe father's exclamatioll? At least in the last two cases, it is hard to see how tIle relevant information can get jnto the communicative process unless it 1S part of an infereutial process like tbe one sketched aboye, Jf the former option is chosen, \Ve are foreed to admit that a number of snch scenarios, which are in principie indefinite, are activated evel)' time commul1icatiou is established (whích is a rather Ímplausible hypothesís). In arder to examine to what extent Marmaridou's cognitive frameworks are as part of the inrerential process as tbe premises than lieense them alld the consequences that they yield, let us introduce a refinement oí her own example: a mature daughter talks to an old father and bis pal, makes the "who are "we"?" question to her íather, and directs the final illteIjection to both her father and his friendo In snch a context, the e:x-pression could have plausibly been directed to the father' s friend to make accessible to him the conte:x1:ual assmnptionl cogtútive rramework tbat in that house pernússion from the daughter must be typically sOllght and granted before the father' s evening outing. The point 1S not onIy tllat this information can hardly be cognitively accessible to fue puzzled old man due to sorne HeuraIly elltrenclted sociocultural background, bui, most importantly, tilat it becomes cognitively accessible to bim (in the context at hand, for the first time in bis lile) as a result of rus trying to make scnse of the daughter's expression, wmch turns out to bear a somewbat prolúbiting attitude towards the outing. In relation to point (b) aboye, Mannaridou' s listing oí the cognitive scenarios activated by the lexical ítems contained in the different utterances in (1) is 1101 very different (or can be easily assirnilated) to the set of assumptions making up the cognitive-like inferentiaI routine described aboye. The differences come from diverging conceptual choices and herree ultimately depend on theoretical tastes. The conclusion is that, as cognitive pragrnatics holds, and contrary to her account, Marmaridou's proposed cOgIútive scenarios or ICMs are part of the inferential processes which are characteristic of ostensive cornmunication rather than automatically activated pieces of meaning. However, conceptually comIrÚtted as it is to the idea that there is but one meaning, and that it shows up through the sallle process (neural co-activation), Marmaridou' s analysis has little margin to tackle these simple facts, no matter how well attested they are from an empirica! point of view. 6. Conclusions On the basis ofthe aboye review, it can be stated thatthe general objective ofMannaridou's endcavour (i.e. the bridgíng between societal and cognitivepragruatics), promising and attractive as it may appear at fust sight, ls far from being eJIectively achieved through tllC displayed amt1ysis. The mmn criticism tbat can be made to fue proposed theory 15 tbat it reHes heavily 011 conceptual arguments wlúch are at present far from being empirically testable, This ine'vitably leads it to (a) contributing little to tile important points of a by now longstanding empirica! debate, and (b) neglected sorne empirically supported notions and distinCtiOllS. Tlús outcome casts doUbt on Mannaridou's critica! review of socíetal and cognitive pragmatics, and discards ER as a suitable candidate to provide a bridge belween fuem, let alone to replace either oI them, It could be said that societal and cognitive pargmatics, the two main lines of pragmatic research to date, have not been so mist:aken in c1aiming ~at ~eir oq,jects of study and theír goals are too distant for there being even the prospect of a múfication. Pragmalmgtlístíca, 8-9, 2000-2001. 387 - 396 393 Garda Númez, .T.M. y Merino Ferradá, M" C. -Marmaridou S. (2000), Pragmating meaning .. References ATLAS, J. 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