Consensus and Community in Republican Rome

DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS AND ANCIENT HISTORY UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY 2014 THE TODD MEMORIAL LECTURES were founded in 1944 in memory of FREDERICK AUGUSTUS TODD Professor of Latin in the University of Sydney from 1922 to 1944 Published by the Department of Classics and Ancient History, University of Sydney ISBN 978-1-74210-332-7 ©Todd Memorial Lecture Committee, 2014 Publication of this lecture is supported by a subsidy from the Classical Association of NSW Consensus and Community in Republican Rome Harriet I. Flower Professor of Classics Princeton University The twentieth Todd Memorial Lecture delivered in the University of Sydney 18 July 2013 DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS AND ANCIENT HISTORY UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY 2014 TODD MEMORIAL LECTURE CONSENSUS AND COMMUNITY IN REPUBLICAN ROME Haec, patres conscripti, si vobis placent, statim signiicate simpliciter et ex animi vestri sententia: sin displicent, aliam repertite sed hic intra templum remedia, aut si ad cogitandum voltis sumere tempus fortasse laxsius, sumite, dum quocumque loci vocati fueritis, propriam memineritis vobis dicendam esse sententiam. Minime enim decorum est, patres conscripti, maiestati huius ordinis hic unum tantummodo consulem designatum descriptam ex relatione ad verbum dicere sententiam, ceteros unum verbum dicere “adsentior”, deinde cum exierint “diximus”. If this proposal meets with your approval, conscript fathers, give your opinion immediately, openly and sincerely. If it does not, ind some other remedy here within this consecrated space or, if perhaps you want more time for relection at greater leisure, take it; provided, however, that wherever you are summoned to meet, you will keep in mind that you are required to state your own opinion. For it does not accord at all with the dignity of this order, conscript fathers, that one person only, that is, the consul designate, should express an opinion here, and that phrased in the exact words of the question put by the consuls, while the rest of you utter the single phrase “I approve” and then when you leave say: “We debated.” The emperor Claudius speaking to the senate in the mid-irst century AD1 In this essay I am posing the following question: how should we understand republican politics in ancient Rome?2 The Roman community was administered under various forms of a republican government for about 450 years (from the late sixth to the irst centuries BC, according to tradition); subsequently, nostalgia for a lost republican past was a feature of Roman 1 2 Papyrus with some restorations (which I have omitted here for the sake of this epigraph). See Smallwood (1967) no. 367 = FIRA 1,44 = Bruns7 53. I would like to acknowledge help and advice from the following: Jeremy Armstrong, Alastair Blanshard, Samantha Brancatisano, Nicole Brown, Diana Burton, Michael Flower, Bryn Ford, Maxine Lewis, Kit Morrell, Frances Muecke, Dan-el Padilla Peralta, Arthur Pomeroy, Martin Stone, Jef Tatum, Matthew Trundle, and Kathryn Welch, as well as audiences at the universities in Sydney, Wellington, Auckland and in the SPQR reading group at Princeton. All errors naturally remain my own responsibility. 1 HARRIET I. FLOWER 2 literature throughout antiquity. Yet even the Romans themselves did not begin to write descriptively or analytically about their republican ideals and traditions until Cicero, in the 50s and 40s BC, who freely admitted that he was living through an age of political crisis with little hope for the emergence of a new and stable republicanism.3 The last thirty years have seen modern scholars debate iercely about the nature of Roman republicanism.4 While some, like Sir Ronald Syme, maintained that “the Roman Republic” was really an oligarchy (in other words, a system controlled by a powerful few), more recently, Sir Fergus Millar has argued forcefully for a fuller appreciation of the more democratic features of Roman political life.5 Over many generations, ancient Romans practiced and celebrated political habits of deliberation, consultation, voting, and public spectacle shared by the community. This paper explores some implications and potential for reading Roman republicanism (from the 4th to the 1st centuries BC) in terms of “consensus” within a traditional city-state. A generation of debate amongst modern scholars about the nature of Roman republicanism has now produced something of a stalemate, marked by limited dialogue, some misrepresentation, and a degree of personal animosity.6 The resulting lack of progress is characterized by a discourse that has become increasingly circumscribed within national boundaries and educational systems. As part of this debate, the term “consensus” has been put forward, especially by leading historians writing in German, including Egon Flaig and Karl Hölkeskamp, as well as by emerging scholars such as 3 4 5 6 Cicero’s political writings include most notably the De republica (set in 129 BC, written 54-51 BC) and the De legibus (in a contemporary setting, begun in 52 BC but uninished at Cicero’s death). In other words, both these projects were conceived in the very turbulent times of the late 50s BC. For an overall discussion, see Connolly (2007). For the debate about the nature of Roman politics, see Jehne (1995), Millar (1998) and (2002), Mouritsen (2001), Flaig (2003), Hölkeskamp (2004) and (2010), Beck (2005), especially 18 with n. 30, and Jehne (2006). For overviews see especially Hillard (2005) and North (2006), 273-275. Syme (1939) 15: “The Roman constitution was a screen and a sham” as opposed to Millar (1998) 215 about the crowd in the forum: “it itself was the sovereign body and as such exercised the legislative powers of the populus Romanus.” See Jehne in the introduction to his 1995 edited collection of essays with Hölkeskamp (2010) 98-124 on consensus and consent. Crawford (2011) is a detailed review of Hölkeskamp (2010). Flower (2007) reviews the earlier German version of Hölkeskamp’s book. Beck (2005) 22-30 on the role of the people is especially useful and clear. TODD MEMORIAL LECTURE Jan Timmer and Christoph Lundgreen.7 However, the semantic ield of “consensus” (which is not in fact exactly the same in English as its modern German equivalent Konsens8) has not been thoroughly explored, especially within the context of a pre-modern society. The American Heritage Dictionary (5th edition, 2011) gives the following deinition for “consensus”: “An opinion or position reached by a group as a whole; general agreement or accord”. The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd edition, 1989) says “general agreement”. Consensus is not a simple concept to comprehend, especially from our rather particular modern point of view. Diferent groups today use the term quite diferently in accordance with their own past experiences and objectives. Meanwhile, research on the sociology of science has also produced interesting results about how consensus about issues of common interest emerges, both within the scientiic community and amongst the general public.9 For example, how did scientists and others come to accept that smoking causes cancer? The answer to this question is neither logical nor straightforward. The original version of this lecture was delivered before I had access to Egon Flaig’s sweeping new cross-cultural study of majority rule.10 Flaig has much to say about consensus, including two chapters about ancient Rome. Ultimately, as in his earlier work, he consistently interprets “consensus” in its various manifestations as a way for an aristocracy or oligarchy to control public opinion and political decision-making, through a complex combination of intervention and image making. His model is based on the (a priori) assumption that ordinary Roman voters never had actual preferences or 7 For varying concepts of consensus, see Jehne (2001) (a climate of consensus), Flaig (2003), Timmer (2008) 320-321 (cf. 2009), Hölkeskamp (2010) and Lundgreen (2011) 259-273 on the “metarule” of Roman politics. 8 “Konsens” in German was a term adopted from Latin in the ifteenth century. It is deined as “Übereinstimmung der Meinung, Einigkeit, Einmütigkeit”. Older meanings include “Zustimmung” and “Erlaubnis.” In other words, over time this term has changed its meaning to suggest something much closer to “unanimity,” rather than simple assent or willingness to agree to a proposal. As in other cases, it is easy to miss the nuances in the meaning of words in various modern languages that all come from the same Latin root: the words look the same but are used diferently according to the development of each language in its own cultural context. 9 See Shwed and Bearman (2010) for a succinct introduction to this ield. Flaig (2013) 41-42 points out that experts never use voting to reach consensus. Surowiecki (2005) discusses the so-called “wisdom of the crowds”. 10 Flaig (2013) especially 353-383. 3 HARRIET I. FLOWER 4 political opinions of their own, even about issues that afected them or candidates for oice whom they knew personally. In other words, his version of a particularly Roman form of consensus is based on powerful patronage networks that enabled the political élite to control the vote through inluence and favors. Meanwhile, he makes a passionate and well-argued plea for majority rule in contemporary politics in Europe, which he sees as under threat from other political practices, including consensus. The theoretical framework cited most frequently by these German scholars is that provided by the Italian political theorist Giovanni Sartori (publishing from the 1950s onwards), whose main ield of research was post-war twentieth century democracy.11 It should be clear at the outset, however, that Rome was neither a fully-ledged nation state nor a modern parliamentary democracy. Consequently, a theory of consensus politics built upon an analysis of twentieth century liberal democracies is not an obviously useful paradigm for explaining an ancient political community. In other words, “consensus” seems an interesting term but one that has not been fully deined or explained in existing treatments of Roman politics. Consequently, it can seem either obscure (since it is not much used as a concept in contemporary political theory today) or frankly simplistic (if it is deployed as little more than a synonym for oligarchy). From the point of view of modern political theorists, consensus practices appear unwieldy (except in very small communities) and essentially unworkable. As a result, “consensus” can easily be viewed as no more than a façade for a system manipulated by a political or religious élite. Outside the political practices of modern nation states, however, consensus is being invoked as a practical way of reaching decisions in a variety of current handbooks and discussions, especially in either religious contexts or in business settings. These applications are not overtly political, but ofer examples of small(er) scale communities of interest, who are working to shape their own individual decision-making cultures based on explicitly shared values and objectives. If we are to (re)deine what consensus could or did mean to the Romans, we should explore this concept in more detail and in terms that are (at least in some way) more applicable to the political landscape of the ancient Roman city-state. 11 See Sartori (1987) 30-31, 86-92, 102-103, 290-291 with Timmer (2008) 281-284 and especially Lundgreen (2011) 277-285. TODD MEMORIAL LECTURE Business Models For most practitioners “consensus” does not mean simple “unanimity”, which is to say everyone agreeing to a proposal in the same way and without any reservations. A popular recent description from a business setting is: “Consensus has been achieved when every person involved in the decision can say: ‘I believe this is the best decision we can arrive at for the organization at this time, and I will support its implementation.’” (Dressler 2006, 4) In other words, creating consensus involves consulting and deliberating within the group (a wide array of methods are described as having been successfully used) until a decision is reached that all can assent to and support with a view to furthering the shared aims of the whole group.12 The result will inevitably not be everyone’s irst choice, but will nevertheless be accepted and embraced by all. Unity and solidarity are the goal rather than an idealized and rarely attainable unanimity.13 Major companies using consensus-based decision-making have included such leading corporations as Mitsubishi, Nissan, and Starbucks.14 Attacks on consensus based methods, including in high-proile venues such as Forbes magazine, also attest to their use in a variety of corporate settings.15 These critiques usually advocate for a model of strong top-down leadership, further indicating that the consultative method is actually being practiced elsewhere. Criticisms and alternative suggestions clearly show that in contemporary business contexts consensus based decision-making is deinitely not described as being either a top-down model or a system controlled by an oligarchy consisting of an inner circle of inluential decisionmakers. 12 For applications of consensus, see Saint and Lawson (1994), Susskind, McKearnan and Thomas-Larmer (1999) (over 1000 pages of instructions!), and Dressler (2006) (a succinct and practical introduction). Covey (2007) (which has sold over 25 million copies in 40 languages) contains some similar ideas. http://www.seedsforchange.org.uk/ is an example of a website that ofers practical advice on using consensus at a grassroots level in local neighborhoods and organizations. 13 Dressler (2006) 7-11 presents four alternatives to consensus, namely: a spontaneously unanimous vote (rare); a majority vote; a compromise; or deferring to a leader. For a diferent perspective, see Flaig (2013) 41-51. 14 Dressler (2006) 13 mentions the following companies: Mitsubishi, Nissan, Saturn, Levi Strauss and Starbucks. 15 See, for example, Keld Jensen “Consensus is Poison! Who’s with me?” (Forbes 5/20/2013) http://onforb.es/Z8RjWN. 5 6 HARRIET I. FLOWER Within the contemporary literature about such business practices, the most commonly cited elements of consensus systems include the following (this list is my synthesis): – High-commitment decisions are reached through accepted, consultative methods on important issues. – A shared set of values and goals is an explicit pre-condition within the group. – Members need to understand and to participate actively in the process of seeking consensus as an objective in its own right (beyond any particular issue or personal consideration). – Disagreements and opposing points of view are openly solicited and addressed in designated settings. – Deliberations can and will be time consuming but payofs are (perceived as being) high when everyone commits to the outcome, which can then be implemented more efectively (and often faster). – Consensus diferentiates itself deliberately from either a majority vote system (as used by parliamentary democracies with two party systems) or a system of proportional representation (with close articulation of diferences and many sub-groups that make alliances to form a coalition government). – Consensus, therefore, seeks explicitly to avoid compromises, trade-ofs, coalitions, or lobbying groups. – As suggested by these precepts, the basis of consensus is often the understanding that decisions or policies can and will be revisited because a future consensus may suggest a new course in diferent circumstances. – Each of these features has some possible parallels in Roman politics, as I will go on to suggest in the rest of this paper. Quakers and Popes In contrast to contemporary, business or scientiic settings, consensus has historically been especially associated with religious communities, perhaps most famously with the Quakers (Religious Society of Friends), a Christian denomination that has its origins in mid-17th century England, at a time when the word “consensus” itself came into common usage in the English language.16 It should be noted, however, that the Quakers themselves do 16 For general bibliography on Quakers (Religious Society of Friends), see Pink Dandelion (2007) and (2008). TODD MEMORIAL LECTURE not call their vote-less system of decision-making a process of “consensus” (a term they explicitly reject) but rather of “discernment”.17 That is to say, they see themselves as guided by divine inspiration to “discern” (discover) God’s will rather than to discuss their own individual opinions or preferences. They do this in face-to-face meetings that often include extensive periods of silence. One of the four basic theological ideas shared by all Quakers, according to Pink Dandelion, is “a vote-less way of doing church business based on the idea of corporate direct guidance”.18 Other related terms important to Quakers include “unity” (rather than “unanimity”) and “concord”. Their example provides a useful reminder that, within a traditional setting, the idea of divine guidance or assent may play a vital role that is usually missing in the way we describe and analyze political decision-making in secular contexts. Quakers have been critical of democracy in general and the casting of ballots in particular as being contrary to a process of discernment that produces a “decision” (known as the “sense of the meeting”) that is endorsed by a non-hierarchical community of believers, each of whom has equal access to divine inspiration.19 In a traditional community, the high costs of timeconsumingdeliberation(s) and airmation(s), including their restatement of shared values and practices, are attractive in themselves. An interesting comparison and contrast presents itself between this voteless method of seeking “unity” in a Quaker meeting and the frequent balloting used by the cardinals of the Roman Catholic Church to choose a new pope.20 17 For the concept of discernment (rather than consensus), Sheeran (1996) remains the classic treatment, written by an outsider (a Jesuit priest). For a practical approach, see Fendall, Wood and Bishop (2007). Mitchell (2006) gives a concise history of the practice, which he terms a kind of “radical democracy”, including a case study of the New England Monthly Meetings of Friends. 18 Dandelion’s (2008, 2) other three basic theological principles shared by all Quakers are: the centrality of a direct inward encounter with God; the spiritual equality of all in the community; and a strong preference for paciism and peace. 19 Mitchell (2006) n. 3 notes that Quakers avoid terms such as “democracy”, “voting” and “veto” and sometimes even “agreement”. Quakers reject adversarial systems of political decision making, such as Roberts’ Rules of Order. For the “sense of the meeting” (often opposed to “consensus”), see Morley (1993) and Birkel (2010). 20 For the elaborate rules and customs used in a papal conclave, see Burkle-Young (1999) and Baumgartner (2003). For an analysis of the balloting in political terms, see Colomer and McLean (1998). 7 HARRIET I. FLOWER 8 Before the papal conclave, which takes place in secret and behind locked doors, the cardinals hear a series of speeches about the issues facing the community of believers, speeches that feature the leading igures who are potential candidates to become the next bishop of Rome. Once in conclave, each full day includes a possible four ballots (two in the morning, two in the afternoon). The ballots are written on paper and placed by each elector in person in urns at the front of the Sistine Chapel in a voting system not unlike that used by the Romans in antiquity (after the introduction of the secret ballot). Each round of balloting is advertised by the burning of the ballots to produce either white smoke (if a new pope has been chosen) or black smoke (if no result has been reached), so that those outside the conclave can follow the number of rounds of voting and the results of each one. In other words, most of the time is taken up with a ceremonial system of voting over and over again until a “supermajority” of at least 75% is reached. Usually more than the minimum three-quarters will end up supporting the chosen candidate, as momentum builds through successive rounds of voting. In recent elections, this system has operated eiciently and in a timely manner, but has produced results that were not necessarily predictable by journalists and pundits used to forecasting the results of more “democratic” elections. In March 2013 few predicted that Jorge Maria Bergoglio would be chosen to be the next pope, despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that he had apparently come in second in the previous election in 2005.21 Actually odds against him were running at 30:1. The speech he made in the meetings leading up to the conclave was very well-received but only lasted three and a half minutes. It was during the process of repeated voting, by the ifth ballot on the evening of the second day, that the future Pope Francis received 90 of 115 possible votes. In other words, the process of listening to speeches about issues, followed by the repeated voting, created an impressive but unexpected consensus within a short time. The largely silent and vote-less decisions of the Quakers and the multiple balloting of the cardinals are both systems designed to produce a result owned by their respective communities and perceived as being in harmony with divine will. 21 For the election of Pope Francis in March 2013, see Vallely (2013) 149-170 with an explanation of how events unfolded. 22 For an introduction to Roman religion, see Beard, North and Price (1998), Scheid (2003), and Rüpke (2007). 23 Scheid (2003) interprets the gods as fellow citizens, but of diferent rank and inluence. TODD MEMORIAL LECTURE Similar patterns of assent, consent, and collaboration can be identiied in practices traditional within the Roman republican community. Roman culture placed less stress on the individual and his personal self-realization than we do. Rather, individual Romans found fulillment and lived their lives within the traditional context of family and community. Voting in the assemblies always took place within a voting unit rather than by the one-man-one-vote system (such as was used in ancient Athens). Endorsing the community’s choices therefore will have had a diferent signiicance and range of incentives than for a modern voter in a liberal democratic nation state. Without political parties or articulated policy platforms or deined ideological camps, the stress fell on the community as a whole, whether for those who sought recognition as leaders or for others who played the role of ordinary citizens. Consequently, both individual and group identity looked particularly Roman. Meanwhile, the gods also had a vital part assigned to them and their assent was directly and repeatedly sought at various stages of the political process. I will go on to discuss Roman practices that seem to contain elements of “consensus”. Three general areas will be discussed below; I will speak irst about religious and political identity, then move on to voting and the veto, and inally look at deliberative practices. Religion and Politics at Rome It is not an easy matter to elucidate the precise role played by the gods in Roman political life.22 Many scholars who set out to analyze the workings of Roman government have tended to leave the religious aspect to one side or to subsume it (without further discussion) under the category of life in general. By contrast, John Scheid has argued that within the ancient citystate the gods were treated as fellow citizens.23 The image of the (specially inluential) fellow citizen is useful in suggesting the role of the gods, who are addressed in prayer and must assent with auspices at the beginning of every political meeting in order for anything to happen at all. In Rome the gods could also interrupt with omens or signs during an assembly, an intervention that usually stopped business for the day.24 From early times, the comitia 24 Interrupting because of unfavorable signs from the gods is called obnuntiatio. See Beard, North and Price (1998) 110 and Rüpke (2012) 123. Rüpke (2008) 1450 sees divination as another means towards fashioning consensus. 9 10 HARRIET I. FLOWER curiata, a special assembly organized by archaic voting units that bestowed formal oicial power (imperium) on the highest magistrates, featured a inal consultation with Jupiter at the very end, after a magistrate had been both elected and conirmed in oice.25 Without being inaugurated and receiving his auspices from this assembly, a magistrate had no recognized political or military role. Consequently, Jupiter had a veto assigned to him and the whole process began and ended with the assent of the gods. It is notable that religious obstruction became an increasingly prominent feature of Roman politics, especially in the irst century BC.26 Meanwhile, Roman poets regularly imagined their gods sitting in council together, not only in imitation of Greek epics but also in a context with profound cultural resonance for their own community. This Roman political system, although it does not coincide in a precise way with the Quaker search for discernment, nevertheless has a deeply religious aspect that is absent from secular consensus practices. Romans consulted the gods at each stage, essentially giving them veto power, but, interestingly, without simply deferring every decision to them. The somewhat limited use of the drawing of lots (sortitio) in Roman politics conirms this general impression, since lots were used by many in antiquity (including by early Christians) to discover the divine will.27 Romans sought to express their own opinions as citizens, as long as the gods assented, both to the political process in general and to the particular content of each decision. The fact that the gods (especially Jupiter) were consulted repeatedly at each stage also indicates that a change of endorsement on their part was at least envisioned as a possibility. In this way, the auspices and the system of divine signs known as prodigies mirrored the pattern of repeated consultations with diferent voting units or deliberative councils used by the mortal citizens. Consensus was prepared for, aimed at, and veriied yet again at the end within the community of citizens and between that community and its gods. 25 Humm (2012) opens a fresh approach to discussing the comitia curiata and its role in Roman politics. 26 The classic example of later republican religious obstruction is Bibulus in 59 BC. For an overview of the whole period in its religious context, see Beard, North and Price (1998) 114166. 27 For the lot (sortitio), see Cicero Att. 1.19.2-3 with Rosenstein (1995) and Lundgreen (2011). TODD MEMORIAL LECTURE Roman republican politics, it has been argued, was characterized by a high degree of consensus about the basic rules of the political game.28 It was this social contract that enabled a republican city-state led by an elected oice-holding élite to maintain a stable internal government, while thriving in and coming to dominate an increasingly complex and aggressive international landscape of war and diplomacy. No modern historian is likely to dispute this basic picture. It is important to note, however, that any functional political system can and must include a high degree of agreement about how the political rules and practices work on an everyday basis. In this way, a Greek tyrant may have been a popular igure who is accepted by the majority of the people in his community as a charismatic leader whom all look up to. But a political theorist would not call tyranny a system of consensus politics. In other words, it is crucial that we distinguish between diferent ways of talking about political consensus that are both understandable and useful so that we can have a clearer conversation about what (we think that) the Romans were doing. The names the Romans chose for their community were SPQR (senatus populusque Romanus = the senate and the Roman people) and res publica populi Romani ( = the public thing of the Roman people). The irst phrase describes the community in terms of its designated constituents: the advisory body (composed of former magistrates, priests, and other leading citizens) and the citizen body as a whole (the populus would actually have included the senators). The politically or socially prominent are named irst but as a group and in their capacity as “advisers” rather than as executives. In other words, it is not the magistrates and the people but the senate and the citizens as a group. The senate gave advice to magistrates but also (and at the same time) to the whole citizen body. Meanwhile, the res publica (the political sphere) was described speciically in terms of openness and sharing between all citizens. This description (by deinition opposed to a monarchy or oligarchy) is, however, deliberately vague and means something like “politics in the open and belonging to all” rather than being more distinctly descriptive of a particular system of government. Politics at Rome comprised 28 According to Steel (2013) 51 n. 27 the current consensus model proposes that “free choice between limited options conirmed the status quo of narrow aristocratic government enacting the importance of the people.” For examples, see Beck (2005) 10-11 and 28 and Lundgreen (2011) 280-284. 11 12 HARRIET I. FLOWER the life of the community itself, under the non-binding but highly inluential moral leadership of the senators, with its culture of public deliberation and dissemination of information (such as the public calendar or written law code or public speeches). Voting and the Veto A particular feature of Roman politics was the frequent voting in a variety of diferent assemblies, to elect magistrates or to vote on legislation and policy.29 Voting took place in units that were tribal or based on army rank or other group identities (curiae). Roman voting rituals were elaborate and time consuming; an assembly might last most of the day, especially for an election in which a variety of candidates received support. As far as we can tell from our evidence, many elections for higher oices seem to have been hotly contested.30 All oices (other than censor) were annual, with the result that the political rituals were integrated into the yearly cycle of life in the city. Every year was an election year in Rome. In other words, the same kinds of people (those able and willing to attend the voting assemblies in Rome) voted often but in diferent conigurations and settings. Diferent assemblies drew on distinct identities depending on the task at hand and followed their own speciic voting procedures. Through the voting of all the relevant units, the citizen body as a whole was represented at each casting of ballots. Variations of this system endured for centuries. During the decade of the 130s BC the secret ballot was introduced to all voting situations and subsequent reforms soon aimed to bolster the privacy of the individual voter.31 In this way, the voting assemblies stressed group identity, without losing sight of the individual ballot and its expression of consent or dissent. In the announcing of the results, the community was described as having come together behind a single choice (yes or no) or a single slate of magistrates (one for each oice). There was, therefore, little room to 29 For voting assemblies and their procedures, see Taylor (1966), Lintott (1999) 40-64, Hollard (2010), and Brennan (2014) with a useful summary chart. 30 See Yakobson (1999), and Feig Vishnia (2012) who re-examines the evidence for Cicero’s time. Beck (2005) ofers an invaluable reassessment of the cursus honorum and the development of political careers through repeated election to high oice. 31 For the secret ballot, see Jehne (1993). Lundgreen (2009) gives a convenient recent overview that argues the secret ballot made little diference. By contrast, Flower (2010) 72-5 presents the change in voting procedures as a watershed in Roman politics. See also Crawford (2011) 110: “I would hazard the hypothesis that the initial support of Aemilianus for the secret ballot was precisely that it would serve to conceal an incipient breakdown of consensus.” TODD MEMORIAL LECTURE recognize minority views or to measure a close election. All the defeated candidates were put in the same category and would reappear as “old candidates” (veteres candidati), if they chose to run for oice again.32 Every choice represented simply the will of the community with an emphasis on unity and airmation, always within an explicitly religious framework. A magistrate presided over the election of his successors in oice or proposed a new law. It was his role to orchestrate the whole undertaking: from taking the auspices and accepting the candidates or reading the proposal (rogatio), to announcing a result after due procedure had been observed and veriied. Obviously, tampering or procedural errors could occur, but that is the case in any system of voting. There is every indication that Romans took their voting assemblies seriously and that many might attend when an important law was being proposed.33 Much discussion, whether in a public meeting (contio) or in more informal settings, would precede the day of the voting. Such testing of the waters could cause a bill to be withdrawn or a candidate to give up in favor of trying again another year. Moreover, there are so many aspects we are only partially informed about. Perhaps most importantly, we simply do not know how often an assembly voted “no” on a piece of legislation. Not surprisingly, ancient writers are mainly concerned to record legislation that became law rather than initiatives that failed. A few examples show that the voters could and sometimes did reject a bill or a decision to go to war.34 At the same time, the regular contesting of elections and the lively competition between élite candidates for high oice shows that Roman voters were fully accustomed to making choices with their ballots every year. Some have described voting in legislative assemblies as little more than a rubber stamp or automatic endorsement.35 Yet, if elections for magisterial oice were often too close to call beforehand (as 32 33 Pina Polo (2012) builds on earlier research but proposes a new synthesis. Attendance at voting assemblies was famously low, for a whole variety of logistical reasons. See Flower (2013) for the issue of voters from outside Rome being mobilized for key issues. 34 We only have 10 recorded examples of rejections in the voting assemblies. These are discussed by Flaig (2003) 175-180. For the (limited) ancient sources, see Livy 5.30.7, 5.55.2, 6,39.2; 8,37.11, 27.21.4, 31.6-8.2; Livy Periochae 49; Cicero de Amicitia 96 (two examples); and Cicero de Oiciis 2.73. 35 See Flaig (1995) and (2003) with Timmer (2008) 295-317 for arguments in favor of the assemblies as formal endorsements of decisions made in other venues. 13 14 HARRIET I. FLOWER much ancient evidence indicates), then why would other voting situations be completely predetermined? Indeed the introduction of the secret ballot (in the 130s BC) in itself, as well as the elaborate laws designed to limit bribery and corruption (ambitus), suggest that voting was not centrally or locally rigged in a way that was completely predictable or expected.36 Why pay money for a vote that could be secured without cost? To get to the heart of the matter, given the rotation of oices within a political élite that was always open to newcomers or to those who aimed to outdo men in their families who had held oice before, elections could only function efectively and authoritatively if they were not predetermined. It was the speciic role of the voters to choose between candidates who were mostly well qualiied and highly motivated, candidates who competed on the basis of merit and worth as measured by a complex combination of prestige, status, achievement, and character within a traditional system of Roman values.37 A number of observations about Roman voting assemblies, therefore, reveal patterns typically found in consensus systems. These elaborate and time consuming rituals of airmation and endorsement have too often been seen either as cumbersome and archaic (no longer relections of the community’s needs) or as elaborate ways for the political élites to make the people think they were participating in decisions that were actually being made for them behind closed doors. Consequently, modern scholars have often asked the question “where (or by whom) were political decisions really being made?”38 This question is simply less relevant in the context of a deliberative system based on consensus. That is to say, the how of the process itself should be appreciated more fully as an integral part of the political system and of the policies it tended to espouse. 36 For the secret ballot and bribery, see Jehne (1993) and Lundgreen (2009). Flaig (2013) 363 argues that the practice of bribery presupposes voters without articulated political preferences of their own. 37 It should be noted that all sides in the long debate over the character of Roman politics stress the fact that the voters did decide between élite candidates. See, for example, Millar (1998) 203 and Beck (2005) 27-28. 38 Flaig (2013) 366-371 neatly sums up the position that argues decisions were not made in the voting assemblies. Voting, therefore, was a ritual of airmation (according to this way of thinking). TODD MEMORIAL LECTURE Even for a Roman from one of the well-established political families, it was not necessarily an easy matter to win an election, to pass a law, to start a war, or to make peace. The meritocratic system that created and sustained Rome’s oice-holding political élite (nobiles) from generation to generation put remarkable pressure on politicians to perform and to compete in the eyes of fellow citizens across a wide range of competencies. A variety of constituents needed to be seen publicly to sign on to a choice. Meanwhile, that choice needed to appear to be in harmony with traditional values (mos maiorum) and to be broadly popular within the Roman context.39 At the same time, powerful forces consistently supported the status quo of the day and did not ascribe special cultural value to innovation or to individualism. It is implausible, therefore, to argue either that the voters in the assemblies must always have agreed with any proposal or that such a postulated rubber stamp could be said to constitute a form of “consensus”. A proposal could and often was irst presented and given a “test drive” in a public meeting (contio).40 Nevertheless, only a small segment of voters could come to such meetings. They did not fully represent those who would be present to vote on the day of the assembly. An endorsement in a public meeting could, therefore, only ever be partial. Indeed the enthusiastic reception of a political speech might be staged much more easily than the outcome of the actual vote itself. In this sense, public speeches may often have been more like advertisements and could be counteracted by negative publicity of various sorts, most obviously in rival public meetings that presented an opposing point of view, perhaps before an equally enthusiastic crowd. Moreover, the larger and more diverse the citizen body became over time, the less predictable the exact composition of the crowd of voters on any given day would have been. Meanwhile, Roman politics was shaped in decisive ways by the possibility for initiatives to be halted at almost any point by a veto, either from one of the ten tribunes of the plebs or from one of the senior magistrates or from the gods.41 Such a feature is also to be found in many consensus systems. 39 40 For the mos maiorum, see conveniently the essays collected in Linke and Stemmler (2000). For the contio, see Morstein-Marx (2004), Flaig (2013) 369-371, and Steel and van der Blom (2013). 41 For the veto, see de Libero (1992) and Lintott (1999) 32-33, 45-46, 84-85, 122-123. For issues surrounding the notorious veto of Octavius in 133 BC, See Badian (1972) and Linderski (2002). 15 16 HARRIET I. FLOWER It is hard to say how often a veto was actually employed in Rome, but the threat of a veto was always real. In practice this meant that political initiatives needed to have widespread support amongst the magistrates in oice that year, and within their various constituencies. Obvious anomalies or breaches of form would simply be stopped short by a veto: no declared reason was needed and no appeal (other than a purely personal one) was part of the traditional system. Only the magistrate in question could withdraw his veto; no one else had the legal right to overrule him. Consensus systems typically deploy signiicant veto power (or other ways to obstruct business) in order to prevent controversial or divisive initiatives from gaining ground or even from being proposed.42 At the most basic level (such as in a Quaker meeting) every participant can potentially prevent an initiative.43 In practice, the deliberative process will explore and address individual or minority concerns in order to create a sense of collective purpose, while clearly acknowledging that the outcome may not be everyone’s irst choice. The brief tenure of one year in oice in Rome, combined with the pressure to achieve a result that could enhance a man’s overall standing and future career prospects, will have further encouraged Roman magistrates to seek a broad consensus amongst their peers before proceeding with an initiative. There were few second chances within a single year in oice. According to Plutarch, Gaius Laelius (consul 140 BC) gained for himself the cognomen Sapiens (“the wise man” or perhaps “wise guy”) after he withdrew an initiative for land reform.44 Meanwhile, angry scenes in front of hostile crowds and insults shouted in the theater or the forum made a man look less like a leader within the context of the Roman community. In Rome, leadership meant creating and maintaining a sense of cohesion and decorum within the community even in the face of genuine diferences of opinion, a vigorous culture of debate, and the unforeseen challenges of everyday life. 42 43 For the role of the veto within a consensus system, see Sheeran (1996) and Flaig (2013) 31-51. Mitchell (2006) 5: “Actual vetoes, or in Quaker jargon ‘inability to unite with a proposal’, are vanishingly rare. It is considered tactless and pointless to propose a sense of the meeting that obviously contravenes someone’s wishes.” 44 For Gaius Laelius (RE 3), see Plutarch TGracch. 8 with Astin (1967) 81, 307-310. Some have questioned the historicity of this explanation, but it can still be used as evidence for a Roman mindset. TODD MEMORIAL LECTURE Roman Consensus If consensus politics was as important as I am claiming, then we might expect to ind this situation relected in a language of consensus in Latin.45 While not developed in a theoretical or analytical sense, a vocabulary of consensus can certainly be identiied in a number of well-known instances. I will cite just two obvious examples that are almost 250 years apart. The irst is in the wording of an epitaph for Lucius Cornelius Scipio (consul of 259 BC) from the tomb of the Scipios on the Via Appia near Rome.46 L. Cornelio(s) L.f. Scipio aidiles cosol cesor honc oino ploirume cosentiont R[omane or Romai] duonoro optumo fuise viro… Lucius Cornelius, son of Lucius, Scipio, aedile, consul, censor,most Romans/at Rome agree that this one man was the best of the good men… The connection of this sentiment of excellence with public opinion was not unique to this epitaph at this time period but relected a robust ideal of community consensus. Prestige was clearly and explicitly linked with public recognition. The second example is contained in one of the most important and discussed passages of Augustus’ account of his political achievements (Res Gestae Divi Augusti), which he inished shortly before his death in AD 14.47 In this highly selective and carefully crafted self-portrait published all over the empire soon after his death the irst princeps uses a concept of consensus to describe and to justify his position of supreme power in Rome after his victory at the battle of Actium over Antony and Cleopatra in 31 BC. In consulate sexto et septimo, postquam bella civilia exstinxeram, per consensum universorum potens rerum omnium, rem publicam ex mea potestate in senatus populique Romani arbitrium transtuli. (RGDA 34.1) 45 For consentio and consensus in Latin, see the entries in the TLL for an abundance of passsages. Livy 29.14.8 describes the interesting and mysterious example of the apparently harmonious choice of the young Scipio Nasica as optimus vir. 46 L. Cornelius Scipio (RE 323): CIL 12 8-9 = ILLRP 310 = ILS 1 and 2. For discussion, see Flower (1996) 160-80. Etcheto (2012) gives a diferent interpretation. 47 For the Res Gestae Divi Augusti, see Scheid (2007) and Cooley (2009). Scheid (2007) 86: “le consensus universorum constituera l’un des fondements du pouvoir imperial, et pour ainsi dire sa seule légitimité.” 17 18 HARRIET I. FLOWER In my sixth and seventh consulships, after I had extinguished civil wars, by everyone’s agreement having power over everything, I transferred the state from my power to the control of the senate and Roman people. ἐν ὑπατείαι ἕκτηι καὶ ἑβδόμηι μετὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐνφυλίους ζβέσαι με πολέμους [κ]ατὰ τὰς εὐχᾶς τῶν ἐμῶν πολε[ι]τῶν ἐνκρατὴς γένομενος πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐκ τῆς ἐμῆς ἐξουσίας εἰς τὴν τῆς συνκλήτου καὶ τοῦ δήμου τῶν ῾Ρωμαίων μετήνεγκα κυριήαν. In my sixth and seventh consulships, after I had extinguished the civil wars, I had come to be in control of all afairs in accordance with the prayers of my fellow citizens, I transferred rights of ownership from my power to that of the senate and people of Rome. The Latin text makes “consensus” central to Augustus’ whole situation. By contrast the locally produced Greek version refers to the “prayers” (euchai) of Augustus’ fellow citizens, recalling concepts more familiar from Hellenistic monarchies, and does not use the term for consensus (homologia) already deployed earlier in the text (section 6).48 By the late 30s BC Octavian’s legal position under the triumvirate had expired and his emergence as sole leader (after the death of Sextus Pompeius and Antony, as well as the retirement of Lepidus) was essentially and obviously based on his military position as victor at the end of the civil war.49 However, rather than openly turning to the army in the way later emperors eventually would, Octavian worked to create a (real/perceived) consensus in society, partly by the administration of an oath of allegiance that served to support his position in 32 BC (RGDA 25.2) and also by other means.50 It was from this position of universal recognition that he claimed the vantage point and authority to hand over supreme power to the senate and the Roman people, a process that culminated in January 27 BC. As part of a meticulously staged exchange of gifts he then received in return the new name Augustus, together with his honoriic symbols of the oak wreath, twin laurels, and shield inscribed with his virtues, in the general context of his position as leading citizen (princeps).51 48 49 This detail has not received much attention in the recent commentaries. For the overall picture, see Osgood (2006). Welch (2012) ofers an important new interpretation. 50 The oath of allegiance is mentioned in RGDA 25.2. Syme (1939) 284 remains the classic treatment. Cooley (2009) ad loc. gives a full bibliography. For the shaping of consensus in the imperial period, see Ando (2000) and Lobur (2008) 12-36, 131-205. 51 Cooley (2009) ad loc. is excellent in exploring the symbolism and signiicance of Augustus’ wellknown emblems, which were much reproduced in art, both at the state and at the local level. TODD MEMORIAL LECTURE It is interesting to see that the third century BC epitaph of Lucius Scipio speaks of a consensus felt by a plurality (plurimi), whereas Augustus grandly claims that everyone in Italy spontaneously (tota Italia sua sponte) recognized and even prayed for him to hold his position of supreme power. It is perhaps ironic but not surprising that a new system of de-facto autocratic government was built upon a “new” version of traditional consensus politics. In other words, how did republican government come to be replaced by one-man rule in Rome? Ultimately, at least according to Augustus, through consensus. To sum up the topics discussed so far: within the Roman political system the name given to the community, the vocabulary of consensus, the practices of voting, and the use of the veto can all be understood as ways of working towards consensus. Simultaneously, the religious system known as the pax deorum represented a vision of an ideal community in cooperation with the gods, who endorsed each political action and might even suggest their own initiatives by sending prodigies. With these aspects in mind, I want to turn now to the role of giving and receiving advice through deliberation, which was enshrined in the use of a body of advisers (consilium) consulted while making any important decision.52 The most prominent such “council” was the Roman senate itself. Deliberative Decision-making Many modern scholars have thought of the senate as the leading organ of government and the best representative of the Roman political system.53 Yet it remained a purely advisory body, which only met when called by a senior magistrate and in order to debate the question he posed, although senators could raise other issues once it was their turn to speak. Its decisions carried great prestige but were never technically or legally more than “recommendations”, to the consulting magistrate and to the community in general. The practices of the senate relect the characteristically Roman custom of deliberating with a group (consilium) before taking any major decision, whether in public or private. Not to follow this practice was viewed as unwise in a family setting and tyrannical in public life. 52 53 For the consilium in Roman culture, see Liebenam in RE (1901) and Voss in BNP. The republican senate is discussed by Willems (1968, originally 1878-85), Bonnefond-Coudry (1989), Ryan (1998), Lintott (1999) 65-88, Graeber (2001), and Santangelo (2006). Jehne (2013) discusses the senate’s role in preserving and fostering a common sense of purpose within the Roman community. 19 20 HARRIET I. FLOWER A focus on the use of a group of advisers or consilium in decision-making can move us beyond an analysis of voting in the various assemblies and their relationships to the presiding magistrate and his peers in the senate. Deliberation and debate was deeply ingrained in the lives of the élite Romans whom we know most about from our surviving sources. At home, in the senate, on campaign, and in the provinces, Romans summoned and consulted groups of various sizes, sometimes in open public settings but most often in closed venues where views were (apparently) freely and frankly exchanged before a common approach was formulated. Giving and receiving advice was, therefore, central to leadership; policies set without consultation recalled notorious examples going back to the regal period, when the last king of Rome Tarquin the Proud showed the autocratic nature of his rule by not consulting the senate when he made independent decisions.54 After the expulsion of the kings, the Romans called themselves SPQR, in other words a deliberative body consilium mentioned irst but closely associated with the citizen community. A comparison can also be made with many other ancient societies, starting with the picture of debate and consensus formation painted in the Iliad.55 The senate of republican Rome is the best-attested consilium, as well as the most inluential, but remains relatively understudied in contrast with either the magistrates or the voting assemblies or the rhetoric of the orator in front of the crowd (contiones).56 As already noted, the senate met to debate questions put to it by the senior magistrates in oice. Its inal opinion was recorded in writing and called a senatus consultum, often somewhat misleadingly translated “senate’s decree”. This vehicle allowed the senate to speak consistently with one voice in giving advice in public, although everybody knew that discussions could be prolonged and heated within each meeting.57 The consultative nature of the senate’s advice is underscored by the fact that a magistrate was held fully responsible for the legality and consequences of his actions, even when these had been supported by 54 55 See Livy 1.49. See Werlings and Schulz (2011) and Elmer (2013) for thought-provoking discussion of decision-making. 56 For magistrates, see Brennan (2000) on the praetors and Pina Polo (2011) with Beck, Duplá, Jehne and Pina Polo (2011) on the consuls. For the assemblies, see note 29 above, for the contiones, see note 40 above. 57 For the senatus consultum, see Lintott (1999) 75-93. Brennan (2014) is a very useful discussion of overall procedures. TODD MEMORIAL LECTURE the senate at the time of their undertaking.58 In other words, the senate gave advice but the magistrate actually carried out each action on his own authority. Nineteenth-century scholars imagined a senate that was very formalized and hierarchical, in which the order of speaking by seniority and a strictly enforced hierarchy constrained debate to the views of only the most senior members.59 According to this model, the same men would have done much of the speaking and many senators would never have had the chance to speak at all. These low-ranking senators apparently came to be called pedarii (“foot-men”), because they moved to stand by the man whose opinion they supported.60 Represented as essentially disenfranchised, they were thought of as simply endorsing the views of the inluential by standing near them. By contrast, Frank Ryan’s important research has shown that senatorial debate was actually much more open and free lowing, with members from every rank having a chance to participate in almost any debate, even at a crowded meeting (frequens senatus).61 It is clear that senators were called upon to speak in order of seniority according to the magistracy they had last held, but that this order of speaking did not impede a rigorous exchange of views in which many could participate. Moreover, magistrates in oice were disqualiied from speaking. In fact, to take Ryan’s arguments a step further, the order of speaking can just as well be interpreted as a practical mechanism for allowing less senior members their turn, not giving complete freedom to a discussion that might otherwise indeed have become dominated by a few inluential voices. We have very few descriptions of senatorial debates (especially any recorded by senators who had actually been present) and even fewer records of votes in the senate. It is not clear whether formal voting was even the 58 Cicero’s execution of the Catilinarian conspirators in 63 BC is the most famous example that has come down to us. Both he himself and his political rivals held him solely responsible for the decision to impose the death penalty, although he had not been the original author of the proposal to execute the conspirators without a trial and the senate had agreed with the decision. Neither side apparently returned to any analysis or critique of the debate in the senate or of how the decision had been taken at the time. 59 Mommsen (1888) is the classic study. 60 Aulus Gellius NA 3.18 mentions the obscure term pedarius, which is probably not a technical designation. 61 Ryan (1998). 21 22 HARRIET I. FLOWER norm or something exceptional.62 In practice, the habit of moving to stand near a speaker (whose position one supported) in itself suggests that opinion was continually being reassessed without using a formal voting mechanism. The sight of many tending towards one direction will have helped others to weigh their options, whether to join an emerging majority or to hold out against it by “taking a stand”. The very few votes (only three) we know of in which the results were handed on all have tiny minorities recorded, another phenomenon that points towards consensus rather than a more democratic system.63 In light of these procedures, it makes sense to take the senatus consultum at face value, as an opinion that was endorsed by most or all in the senate. The interpretation of the senate as a deliberative body that aimed at unity must also relate to its size. In 2006 Federico Santangelo persuasively argued that the reforms of Sulla in the late 80s did not create a senate as large as 600, as had been traditionally assumed.64 Rather Sulla added a signiicant number of new senators (most of them coopted from the equestrian order) but to a body that was heavily depleted by the casualties of civil war. Santangelo’s research also implies that the senate before Sulla was probably smaller than the standard number of 300 cited in textbooks.65 The oldest extant senatus consultum, the SC de Bacchanalibus of 186 BC, mentions a quorum of 100 senators needed for a decision about an exception to its provisions.66 A smaller number of senators would support the overall picture painted by Frank Ryan of a body in which there was a real opportunity to contribute and to make one’s views heard. Before 80 BC the oicial list of 62 63 64 65 66 Sallust BC 50-53 is the fullest description (of the famous debate about the fate of the Catilinarian conspirators) but it has obviously been rewritten for historiographical purposes some twenty years after the event. Pelikan Pittenger (2008) ofers a useful and stimulating discussion of the heated debates about the awarding of triumphs in the second century BC, which are recorded in Livy. The three occasions are: February 61 BC a result of 400:15 (Cicero Att. 1.14.5); July 57 BC a result of 416:1 (Cicero Red. Sen. 26), December 50 BC a result of 370:22 (Appian BC 2.30). See also Cicero QFr. 2.1.1.3, Mil. 12, Phil. 10.2. See Santangelo (2006). Even less work has been done on this topic, which nevertheless remains a key question. Moreover, it is quite unclear how many came to meetings, perhaps far fewer than the c. 400 suggested by the voting igures for the late 60s and 50s BC in note 62 above. Senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus (186 BC, discovered at Tiriolo in Bruttium in 1640): CIL 12 581 = ILS 18 = ILLRP 511. TODD MEMORIAL LECTURE senators was revised by the censors every 5 years, so that membership was far from static.67 Meanwhile, the growth of Rome’s empire took many senior magistrates and former magistrates away from the city for extended periods of time, leaving the more junior to debate and to make decisions in the senate in their absence.68 It seems plausible, therefore, to imagine dynamic debates that were not limited or necessarily predictable or dominated by a few opinion makers in each generation. The aim of the senate meeting was to produce practical advice for the magistrate who had summoned it and asked a speciic question (rogatio). By deinition, therefore, a single answer to the question was being sought (although other agendas could obviously always be at work behind the scenes). The senate’s answer would carry more weight if it was supported by all or very nearly all present. A clear consensus would not need a vote but could be measured in more traditional ways, such as by everyone “standing together”. The presiding magistrate should be the one who judged the “sense of the meeting”. In the end, however, he was not bound legally or otherwise to accept the opinion of his peers, although most eventually did. A divided senate that failed to produce a speciic recommendation, whether or not they had actually voted, would thus have risked losing its inluence as an advisory body. In the irst century BC, the senate did indeed lose ground in an increasingly partisan atmosphere dominated by factions and by powerful individual generals. Looking at other advisory groups (consilia) can also help to conirm my reading of the senate. Two useful parallels are ofered by the consilium of the general in the ield and by the board of ten senators (decem legati) sent to make decisions in a province, both of which are usefully elucidated by Pamela Johnston (1998). In the irst case, the general could choose his own consilium but was well advised to include on his staf or in the province a variety of people who were experienced or inluential.69 In the second example, the 67 For the censors and the lectio senatus, see Suolahti (1963), Pieri (1968), Nicolet (1980) 63, and Lintott (1999) 68-72, 115-120. 68 As Rome’s wars and her empire expanded, many magistrates will have travelled abroad to command armies or govern provinces or serve on embassies to states or famous shrines such as Delphi. Consequently, these men and their relatives acquired property outside Italy, which they would visit from time to time. They would also travel for business, pleasure, or for educational or informational reasons. 69 There is a quite a bit of information about the general’s consilium in Polybius and Livy. For discussion Johnston (2008) is essential. 23 24 HARRIET I. FLOWER senate chose ten members for a speciic task and these men worked with the Roman magistrate in the province.70 Both of these groups included junior members and deliberately mixed the obscure with the grand. In this way, they functioned as “mini-senates” by including more points of view rather than limiting advice to an inner circle of personal friends or to a group of senior politicians of the same generation. The use and composition of such consilia conirms the deliberative nature of the advice a magistrate sought or was required to hear. The use of a consilium was regularly recorded in documents issued by magistrates. Before standing for political oice, Polybius tells us, it was expected that a young Roman would serve ten campaigns in the army.71 In this setting, the ambitious or well placed soon became part of their commander’s consilium, some even in their late teens. Obviously, this was a way for a young man to learn about decision-making and policy in a real setting on campaign. However, his views also made contributions, as he gained experience in the ield and in debate.72 It makes sense to see the time of deliberation on the general’s consilium as preparation for debate in the senate, once elected to political oice. Why would an ambitious young senator stay silent in Rome after years of deliberating and debating with consuls and praetors on campaign? By the same token, why would the senate send ten men on a commission overseas, as many as half of whom might be junior members, if everything was being decided by the top three or four men? The consistent use of such consilia strongly suggests that young Romans learned to deliberate and to give advice by practicing from an early age in a variety of settings. Their participation was a traditional and integral part of the Roman system. Some of those attested in consilia went on to stellar careers; others remained relatively undistinguished.73 Their training prepared them to be active participants, who were ready to voice an opposing argument or to represent a diferent point of view, rather than ranks of silent backbenchers, who had no contribution to make to the res publica. 70 For the decem legati, see Johnston (2008) 63-112 with treatment of the individual boards of ten senators whom we have detailed information about. 71 See Polybius 6.19 with Lintott (1999) 145. 72 Johnston (2008) 19-24 discusses the consilium as a training camp for future leaders. TODD MEMORIAL LECTURE Conclusion In conclusion, the drawing together of a variety of threads reveals a pattern in which practices associated with the seeking of a deliberative consensus were at the heart of Roman political life. In many diferent settings, inluential Romans resorted to elaborate and time consuming processes of consultation and deliberation in order to build support for a policy or decision. In this process the use of a consilium was fundamental, whether in an individual family or at the level of the city-state. Matters of importance were usually referred to the senate for discussion, which carried a great deal of authority throughout most of the republican period. Religious airmation and reairmation was also customary; the gods were asked their opinion both before (and during) any undertaking. The result of this deliberative habit was that Romans rarely took decisions on their own and even more rarely advertised their initiatives as individual or personal. Leadership was exercised and recognized in a group setting. Consequently rhetoric and persuasion was important, both within élite culture and in interactions between magistrates and crowds of citizens or soldiers. All these practices in themselves constituted “politics” in Rome rather than concealing the locus of real political decision-making. In other words, these deliberations, collections of endorsements, and reairmations from gods and citizens should be taken seriously and not dismissed as a façade or a power game. The high cost of consensus, because it takes time and can fail, which so often makes it seem impractical in the modern world, was part of what made it so attractive, especially in an environment in which other city-states often experienced internal factional struggles (stasis) and the Romans themselves believed that their early history had been characterized by crippling civil discord between patricians and plebeians. In this general context, the culture of spectacle that was particularly on view at the triumph, the aristocratic funeral, or the public games ofered simply the most visible manifestation of a whole world of consensus politics, 73 Notable examples of consilia attested in inscriptions include the following: RDGE 14, 75-76, the consilium of the consul L. Calpurnius Piso (in 112 BC); RDGE 12, S.C. de agro pergameno, the consilium of a praetor (in 101 BC? with 55 members (!) listed in order of rank, two-thirds apparently being of lower rank, perhaps also including non-senators, a majority of the names still being legible but without cognomina included); RDGE 23 the consilium of the consuls M. Terentius Varro Lucullus and C. Cassius Longinus (in 73 BC with 15 members, all senators). The latter document also makes reference (l. 55-59) to earlier consilia of Sulla in the 80s. 25 26 the tip of the iceberg (albeit a large tip of a massive iceberg). The community’s identity and the role of its oice-holding political leadership was conirmed and articulated through such public ritual and spectacle. But policies and decisions were not made on these celebratory or commemorative occasions. Rather, republican political culture was characterized by loose rules that did not give individuals or small groups much chance to make executive decisions on their own authority. Magistrates and priests (and other experts whose advice was solicited) submitted opinions and recommendations to the senators, most of whom were in fact private citizens, since only a few men held oice in any given year. Subsequently, the senate’s opinion (even when unanimous) still needed to collect further endorsements from gods and citizens in order to become recognized and legally efective. Participation and due process through frequent deliberation and voting aimed at cohesion (whether real or constructed). Traditional decision-making built community through a process of crafting consensus, while at the same time carefully limiting both individual initiative and the formation of long-term political parties or platforms. Roman politics showed that a community could build on tradition and be open to innovation through its stress on habitual consensus decisions. In this context, it makes sense that the Romans did not make use of a written constitution: rather the consensus of the community at any one time constituted Roman politics. In this milieu, it also made sense for Octavian to claim legitimacy, even for supreme power, based on consensus rather than constitutional or political precedent. In republican Rome solidarity, shared values, and a sense of common destiny allowed the elaborate taking of turns in diferent political roles: from magisterial oices to participation in voting units to serving on juries or delegations. Meanwhile, by far the most commonly exercised role, even for the most distinguished, was that of private citizen. The nuances and complexities of traditional republican politics had deep roots in the many deliberative practices in Roman culture, rituals of consensus that were enacted at length both in public and in domestic contexts. In all of these settings, the religious dimension was essential to any and every decision. Religion provided the framework within which Roman politics (and Roman life) operated. Roman consensus practices were central to the political culture of the community and combined features found in other consensus systems, from the transparently commercial to the deeply religious. 27 BIBLIOGRAPHY Ando, C. (2000) Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire, Berkeley, CA. Astin, A. (1967) Scipio Aemilianus, Oxford. Baumgartner, F. J. (2003) Behind Locked Doors: A History of the Papal Elections, New York. Beard, M., J. North and S. 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