Innov High Educ (2012) 37:89–103 DOI 10.1007/s10755-011-9193-9 Leadership Transitions During Fundraising Campaigns Kimberly Nehls Published online: 9 August 2011 # Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 Abstract Capital campaigns are intense efforts to build the financial assets of an institution in a specified amount of time. This study provides an empirical view of how changes in leadership affected concomitant capital campaigns at ten colleges and universities. The transitions during these 10 campaigns influenced morale on campus, altered timing of the campaigns, created negative publicity, and caused lost momentum; however, all capital campaigns persisted to meet financial goals despite disruptive transitions. One area of note is the lack of fundraising training and development for provosts, many of whom assume interim or full-time leadership posts after a presidential departure. Key words College/university fundraising . President . Capital campaign Dear Simmons Students, Colleagues, and Friends: After much thought and conversation with the Board of Trustees, I have submitted my resignation as president as of June 30, 2006. Sue and I reached our decision after weighing carefully what would be best both for us and for Simmons. We take great satisfaction from our work at Simmons, but we have concluded that the College should welcome its new president well before launching the next major capital campaign. That campaign will be vital for Simmons’s future, and we cannot commit to the several years the next campaign’s timetable will require. And the campaign’s likelihood of success will be greater if there is not a leadership change while it is underway (Cheever 2006, p. 3). Kim Nehls serves as Executive Director of the Association for the Study of Higher Education (ASHE). She earned her doctorate in educational leadership from UNLV in 2007 and started working for ASHE the following year. Kim’s research interests are philanthropy in higher education and technology in student affairs. She can be reached at kim.nehls@unlv.edu. K. Nehls (*) University of Nevada - Las Vegas, 4505 S. Maryland Pkwy, Box 453068, Las Vegas, NV 89154-3068, USA e-mail: kim.nehls@unlv.edu 90 Innov High Educ (2012) 37:89–103 Daniel S. Cheever, Jr., the former president of Simmons College in Boston, wrote the above letter to the college community with the purpose of disclosing his resignation from the presidency. The letter was mailed to faculty, staff, students, and 50,000 alumni; and it was posted on the Simmons’ website. This resignation letter cited the main reason for President Cheever’s departure: an upcoming capital campaign. He did not want to disrupt the campaign with a presidential transition. Little is actually known about the impact of a presidential transition on a campaign. Thus, the study reported in this article offers analysis of the impact of the situation described in President’s Cheever’s letter. Successful leadership is a critical element of a modern fundraising program. Although “fundraising requires team effort, an institution’s president is typically the central player on the fundraising team” (Cook 1997, p. 73). An institution cannot initiate and persist in a campaign without adequate leadership to champion its cause. Bennett and Hays (1986) reported that the presidents’ “capability of performing effectively in this role and the time they make available for it will be an important element in the size and nature of the [capital] campaign” (p. 14). Comprehensive capital campaigns are the principal fundraising endeavors for institutions of higher education. The Chronicle of Higher Education and other popular news sources imply that “every” college is trying to raise $1 billion or more. This is not too far from reality: The Council for Advancement and Support of Education (CASE) reported that the average campaign goal in 2008 for all institutions was $373 million, a sharp increase from the mean goal of $174 million in 2001 and only $88 million in 1997 (CASE 2009). In order to raise these kinds of dollars, the same CASE report indicated that institutions of higher education engage in campaigns of six years or more in length; however, if a campaign goal is $1 billion or more, the average length was 10+ years. Additional research supports the idea of lengthy campaigns (e.g., Cook 1997; Dove 2000; Newman 2005; Quigg 1986; Symonds 2004; Worth 1993). Kihlstedt (2004) reported, “Organizations undertake capital campaigns when they are ready to take a major step forward – erecting a new building, renovating current facilities, adding equipment, or developing a major new program” (p. 1). Frequently all such expansions are part of an institution’s capital campaign goals (Newman 2005). Most capital campaigns are tools to enhance endowment funds so as to support the institution indefinitely. The lofty goals of a capital campaign can make a lasting impact on the vitality of the institution. Successful major capital campaigns are also able to initiate a dramatic, positive trajectory for the institution. Significance of the Study Fundraising used to be reserved for presidents of private colleges and universities that did not receive state support, but today efforts to secure philanthropic dollars pervade every type of post-secondary institution (American Council on Education 2007; Cascione 2003; Shay 1993; Worth and Asp 1994). Due to the frequency with which campaigns are conducted, most institutions of higher education and their leaders are involved in a campaign at some point in time. Some of a president’s campaign tasks include serving as chief spokesperson for the fundraising goal; cultivating major gifts; working with staff, trustees and volunteers; and donating money (Dove 2000; Essex and Ansbach 1993; Gearhart 1995; McLaughlin 1990; Quigg 1986). One of the main expectations of presidents is to solicit top donors for substantial gifts. A substantial gift ranges from $10,000 at smaller schools to multimillion dollar donations at larger institutions. Major gift donors Innov High Educ (2012) 37:89–103 91 expect to meet with the president and other top leaders of the institution. As an example, former Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) President Charles Vest personally met with the top prospects for his institution’s capital campaign, and these individual meetings proved worthwhile: “Big donors will make or break a campaign. At MIT, the top 200 gifts ultimately totaled $1 billion” (Symonds 2004, p. 90). The importance of the president to a capital campaign cannot be overemphasized (Foote 1986). The American Council of Education indicated that fundraising, followed by budget and financial management, were the primary uses of time for presidents, according to the Council’s 2007 report, The American College President. New college and university presidents, especially those who have risen through the academic ranks, may not be prepared for the extreme amount of time and effort necessary for a successful fundraising program because the academic track is poor training grounds for an institutional leader (Carter 2001; Dennison 2001); but some disagree with the assertion that strong scholars do not make strong fundraisers, e.g., Goodall’s (2009) Socrates in the Boardroom. However, Goodall’s book focused on the top 100 universities worldwide, centering upon interviews with 26 leaders – five of whom were at Harvard, the oldest and richest U.S. institution (p. 5). Overall, the individualized nature of research endeavors and scarcity of fundraising efforts expected of academicians, other than obtaining grants, provides few opportunities to raise funds on behalf of the institution. At major research institutions, deans and department chairs may participate in fundraising, but this is atypical at smaller institutions and community colleges. Therefore, fundraising becomes one of the most demanding, and sometimes unfamiliar, roles for a new president. Ability to raise funds was cited as the key reason “why a good college chief is hard to find” according to Marcus (2001, p. 46). Marcus concluded, “It’s fundraising prowess that makes presidents famous, and while the job may pay well, it’s never been harder to find the right person to fill it” (p. 46). Also to be noted is the fact that fundraising fatigue is commonly cited as a significant stressor for college leaders and a reason for resignation (Martin and Samels 2004). In fact, former Harvard University President Neil Rudenstine took a leave of absence from his post in 1994 citing “severe fatigue and exhaustion” due to his commitment to Harvard’s $2.6 billion drive (Bulkeley and Stecklow 1994). President Rudenstine did return to the presidency, but he eventually resigned in 2001 as the University began deliberating another capital campaign. Dr. Lawrence Summers was appointed Harvard’s president following Rudenstine’s departure; but Summers resigned in 2006, which affected another campaign. The ivy-league institution postponed the launch of its multi-billion dollar capital campaign until a permanent president was in office, which was perceived as a disruption in the fundraising momentum. Three major donations to Harvard that would have totaled $275 million stalled following President Summers’s departure (Bombardieri 2006). Bombardieri attributed the donation lull to the fact that “No one makes a mega-gift when there’s no president” (p. 1). The return of permanent leadership in 2009 gave hope that the capital campaign would finally get off the ground, and the University has now established a new date of 2011 as the potential launch date for the campaign to begin (Marks 2008). Cook (1997) reported, “Capital campaigns often require huge commitments of time and energy from presidents and contribute to the growing stress level and rapid turnover rate associated with the position” (p. 75). The average term of a college president is now 8.7 years (American Council on Education 2007), a significant increase from ACE’s 2002 report of a six-year tenure for president, just a few years ago. Although term length is on the rise, turnover is still commonplace: the American Council on Education (2007) reported that “one in four of the college and university presidents who held office in 2001 left their 92 Innov High Educ (2012) 37:89–103 position over the next five years” (p. 6). Presidential transitions will happen during capital campaigns, especially because campaigns are increasing in goal size and length. Clearly presidents play a crucial, strategic role in institutional advancement. When a president leaves office, institutions of higher education may lose fundraising momentum affecting planning, productivity, staff morale, and institutional reputation (Basinger 2001; Gaylor 2004; Richter 1995). This article started with a letter from the Simmons College President that stated, “The campaign’s likelihood of success will be greater if there is not a leadership change while it is underway.” While this statement appears to make sense, presidential transitions during campaigns have not been previously analyzed. This is a topic worthy of further inquiry. Specifically, in this study I analyzed the impact of a leadership transition during a capital campaign from the perspective of the informal leaders. This research is exploratory in nature since no existing studies formed the basis of this research and no previous studies have been conducted on the topic. Methodology For this study I employed a qualitative, multiple-site, descriptive case study method, an appropriate approach for this exploratory study because the goal was to address the contextual nature of presidential transitions during capital campaigns and the effect of the transition on institutional culture. The case study approach is regarded as particularly useful to understand a complex, social phenomenon, especially one that has not been previously studied (Merriam 2002; Patton 1990; Yin 2003). The impact of presidential transitions during fundraising campaigns fit this description. The primary data source for the study was electronic mail (email) interviews. I conducted online, asynchronous interviews consisting of 26 initial questions posed to campus leaders at 10 institutions. In-depth interviews conducted online are typically semistructured in nature and involve multiple email messages (Meho 2006; Young et al. 1998). Online interviews have the convenience factor of garnering responses at any time of day or night, without regard to time zones or geography separating the researcher and the participant. These factors were important considerations to garner responses from a variety of institutions throughout the U.S. The final sample included small, large, urban, rural, public, and private colleges and universities. When possible, the incoming and outgoing presidents were interviewed for this study. Beyond the institution’s president, the primary senior staff member I interviewed was the Chief Development Officer. Richter (1995) indicated that it is generally the “senior staff who must maintain the institution’s momentum in developing programs and resources” when a president departs (p. 1). Chief Development Officers organize all the fundraising endeavors for the institution; and, customarily, they have a high degree of managerial skills as well. Worth (2002) suggested that this position has both internal (administrative) and external (fundraising) responsibilities. These individuals generally work at the rank of vice president or vice chancellor and report directly to the president (Dove 2000; Worth 2002; Worth and Asp 2004). Lindahl and Conley (2002) reported, “Lead institutional fundraisers [are] recognized as one of the new ‘power brokers’ on university campuses” (p. 99). Overall, Chief Development Officers deliver structure, direction, guidance, and support to all fundraising endeavors and staff at their institutions and ensure that the fundraising strategy is conducted in accord with the educational mission of the institution. Innov High Educ (2012) 37:89–103 93 Ten Chief Development Officers, as well as other leaders from institutions that had experienced presidential transitions during capital campaigns were interviewed for this study. Participants were from Millikin University, Muhlenberg College, University of Redlands, Florida State University, University of Indianapolis, University of North Florida, University of Wisconsin – Whitewater, Villanova University, and Wake Forest University. Only one of the participants requested anonymity, and that institution is named as “Rural State University.” These institutions were selected by purposive, nonrandom sampling to determine a group of colleges and universities that met predefined criteria. The criteria were as follows: (1) the institution of higher education was a four-year degree-granting college or university located in the United States, (2) it had completed a capital campaign within a four-year period of 2003 to 2007, (3) it had experienced a change in executive leadership during any stage of the campaign, and (4) the chief development officer of the institution had been present for the duration of the capital campaign and was willing to participate in the study. Based on the above criteria, I identified a sample of 27 institutions through a variety of search methods, and the 27 Chief Development Officers were contacted to participate in the study. One institution participated as the pilot study (“Rural State University”), and the advancement leaders of nine additional institutions were able and willing to participate in the final analysis. Three additional development officers indicated willingness to participate, but then did not complete the interviews. Therefore, 17 institutions did not participate in the study of the original 27 identified. The final sample consisted of a diverse range of institutional types throughout the United States with student populations that ranged in size from 1,200 students to more than 44,000 and capital campaign goals that ranged from $5 million to more than $500 million. The size of the institution did not determine the size of the campaign goal. This study was approved by the researcher’s institutional review board, and data collection via email interviews began the same month and continued for seven months in 2007. The author is deeply indebted to the institutional leaders who were willing to share their time and their stories about transitions during campaigns. They were proud of their successes – all having reached campaign goals; and they were pleased to share their narratives for this research project. Most interviews involved three or four email exchanges, and some continued for more than two months. Thus there were several opportunities to clarify questions and concepts within the email interviews. The researcher did not personally know any of the Chief Development Officers, but has met two of them in person since completion of the study. In addition to email interviews, I used document analysis to triangulate the data provided by the participants; and I obtained documents both from the campus leaders who were interviewed and through a review of institutional websites and local newspaper archives. An examination of foundation annual reports, meeting minutes, correspondence, speeches, media clips, press releases, campaign materials, newspaper and magazine articles, and campus publications provided background and understanding of the campaigns, the transitions, the timelines, and records of activities. In the next section I offer the analysis of the role of leadership in three different transitional situations: changes in leadership under good conditions, changes in leadership under negative conditions, and multiple changes in leadership – all during major fundraising campaigns. The way in which a president left the top post affected the campaign in many ways. In four instances, the presidents left under well-intentioned conditions. However, some transitions were more contentious in nature; and in two instances the institution had experienced multiple leadership transitions within the period of the campaign. 94 Innov High Educ (2012) 37:89–103 The Impact of Leadership Transitions Under Good Conditions Four institutions – Wake Forest University, University of Indianapolis, Villanova University and University of Redlands – experienced presidential transitions under good conditions. At Wake Forest University (WFU), the campus had enjoyed one of the longest presidential tenures in American history with Thomas K. Hearn, Jr. Preceding his retirement in 2005, President Hearn served 22 years as the leader of WFU during which time the institution gained national recognition, enjoyed a rising level of selectivity of applicants, and came to be ranked among the top 30 schools in U.S. News and World Report (2011). With regard to fundraising at WFU, Hearn worked on two capital campaigns while in office. The first, a $150 million “Heritage and Promise” campaign, ended in 1995 with $173 million raised. The second campaign was “Honoring the Promise,” which ended in 2006 with more than $689 million raised. One year prior to the completion of the campaign, President Hearn officially retired. However, during the last two years of his presidency, he had limited involvement in the campaign due to his failing health. The transition in leadership was seen as beneficial because the new president was able to devote more time and energy to fundraising. Additionally, the campus was able to focus on fundraising as a tribute to the outgoing president’s long history with WFU. According to the WFU chief development officer, “I do think his [Hearn’s] health and lack of energy had some negative impact on the campaign. On the other hand, we had a great push leading up to his retirement when many wanted to help get us over goal by his retirement date. This was really a recognition of his 22 years of leadership” (personal communication, April 17, 2007). Similarly the University of Indianapolis sought to raise funds during a campaign that honored the outgoing president. In 2002, the “Campaign for UIndy” was launched with an original goal of $50 million. After the original $50 million goal was met in 2003, way ahead of schedule, the goal was extended to $65 million. Before long, another goal of $75 million was announced; and the campaign finally concluded on June 30, 2006, having raised $76 million, more than 150% of its original target. One of the successes of the campaigns was amassing donations to honor Dr. Jerry Israel, who had served UIndy for seven years (1998–2005) as president. His tenure was considered a successful one. President Israel was perceived as a student-oriented leader, often seen helping new freshmen and their parents unload their cars on move-in day during the fall semester. He was also credited with launching two academic centers and an international campus in Greece. Upon President Israel’s retirement, the UIndy’s Foundation established the Jerry and Carol Israel Endowed Lecture in Public Policy. The lectureship was designed to bring distinguished speakers to campus each year. According to Vice President Mike Ferin, “It was funded via a $150,000 gift. … Future lectures will be open to the public, but we used the first lecture as part of our campaign stewardship strategy” (personal communication, June 27, 2007). Vice President Ferin had nearly 40 years of development experience; and the institution relied upon his experience and passion, seemingly more so than any other leader on campus, to navigate the campaign during the CEO departure. A strategy employed by Villanova University, a private institution near Philadelphia, was to have the new president attend a multitude of fundraising events around the country at regional alumni events. These events served as a way to introduce the president to Villanova constituencies at the same time that funds were raised for their progressing campaign. The $300 million “Transforming Minds and Hearts: The Campaign for Villanova” had begun publicly in 2004, and the new president stepped into office in 2006, at a time when the campaign welcomed a boost. The previous president had retired at Innov High Educ (2012) 37:89–103 95 age 71 after having served Villanova for an impressive 18 years. The new president had an abundance of energy, which revived the campaign and the constituencies of the institution. Rev. Peter Donohue, Ph.D., was chosen for the next era of leadership, having previously served as chair of the Villanova theater department. He immediately started with the “traveling Villanova road show,” as he described it in an email message. Despite the welcome change in leadership, the Chief Development Officer at Villanova said, “We underestimated the impact a presidential transition would have on a campaign. Our new president has a very clear set of priorities that were not part of the current campaign’s case statement. Prospective donors were in a holding pattern, waiting to participate in the campaign designed by the new president” (personal communication, Feb. 1, 2007). Not surprising for a thespian, Fr. Donohue’s number one priority as the new president was raising funds for a performing arts center on Villanova’s campus. This had not been a high priority for the previous president. At the mid-point of the campaign, shifting strategies was a challenge for the Villanova development office, despite the infusion of energy with a new leader. The fourth university that welcomed a new leader during the mid-point of the campaign was the University of Redlands, a mid-sized liberal arts school in Southern California. The “Redlands Centennial Campaign” sought to raise nine figures for the University, the most significant fundraising event in the history of the institution. The goals of the campaign were to increase the endowment, improve facilities, and offer program support. The campaign was launched publically in October 2004, and just two months later the President of the institution resigned, having completed an 18-year term similar to Villanova’s president. The campus was “concerned about losing his leadership, especially in the midst of a capital campaign” (Appleton and Dorsey 2009). However, in an unusual twist, the president stayed on campus and assumed the new title of “Chancellor” in order to aid with the completion of the campaign. A new president was named in June 2005, and the University exceeded its $100 million goal under the guidance of the two leaders the following year. Interestingly, twenty-six donors gave $1 million or more. The new president, Dr. Stuart Dorsey, explained that he was “fortunate in that the retiring president stayed on as ‘Chancellor,’ specifically to continue to work on the campaign and to mentor me in this role. He and I quickly developed a good working relationship that focused only on fundraising, not institutional policy” (personal communication, Feb. 26, 2007). The two leaders, Chancellor Appleton and President Dorsey, documented their unique yet successful transition in a recent issue of The Presidency, a magazine for college leaders published by the American Council on Education (see Appleton and Dorsey 2009). Presidential Transitions Under Contentious Situations Not all presidential transitions during capital campaigns were seen as positive for the institutions. In the three cases of Florida State University, the University of WisconsinWhitewater, and Muhlenberg College, some unfortunate situations made for difficult transitions and negatively impacted the campaigns. Florida State University embarked on a massive $600 million fundraising campaign from 2000–2005. The campaign, called “FSU Connect,” topped its goal at $637 million when it concluded in December of 2005. One of the largest donations was a $7.5 million real estate bequest given by FSU’s own president, T. K. Wetherell, who had assumed office at the mid-point of the FSU Connect campaign in 2003. This gift represented the largest personal donation of a sitting college president to a public university in United States’ history. Soon after taking office as the FSU leader in 2003, it was widely publicized that 96 Innov High Educ (2012) 37:89–103 President Wetherell was diagnosed with prostate cancer, which prevented him from overseeing the day-to-day operations of the institution –and the progressing fundraising campaign– for the first few months of his term (Silva 2003). The cancer diagnosis and treatments forced Wetherell to be out of the office during a crucial time in the campaign. The Vice President at Florida State indicated that there was “nothing helpful” about the change in FSU’s leadership: “In fact, I’d judge that the change distracted the University and thus some momentum was lost, and some donors wanted to make their gifts to the successor” (personal communication, Dec. 19, 2006). The campaign halted, but Wetherell sought treatment at the Mayo Clinic and eventually returned to office in remission. He excelled at the post after that time, including achieving a successful completion of the campaign. The University of Wisconsin-Whitewater (UWW) conducted a relatively small $5.5 million campaign from 2000–2006 specifically intended to fund a capital project, i.e., a new campus building for their College of Business. The public launch of the “Beyond Tradition” campaign at UWW took place in 2004. In that same year, the Chancellor of UWW, Jack Miller, announced his resignation to become President of Central Connecticut State University (the Wisconsin universities are led by chancellors instead of presidents). Dr. Miller encouraged a controversial keynote speaker to visit campus right before his departure. He had announced his resignation prior to the speaking engagement. Chancellor Miller supported the speaker, while many students, faculty, and alumni did not. The Chancellor received hundreds of emails expressing displeasure with the University’s decision to allow the speaker on campus, and the speech had a negative effect on fundraising and the “Beyond Tradition” campaign. Some alumni indicated that they were not going to give to the Whitewater Foundation any longer (Stitt 2005). The Vice Chancellor, Jon Enslin, said that the speaker “turned off a number of our donors – many of whom were considering proposals to support the campaign. Since our former chancellor supported the speaker, it also turned a number of people off on him as an individual and a leader” (personal communication, Jan. 19, 2007). Following the tumult, the UWW campus was eager for a new leader to take the chancellor’s seat. A few months after the controversial guest speaker had appeared, Dr. Martha Saunders became Whitewater’s leader. Chancellor Saunders had previously served as Vice President for Academic Affairs at Columbus State University in Georgia, where she had been a part of the leadership team for a successful $100 million capital campaign. Her campaign experience was an asset to Whitewater. Enslin said, “She has a very high regard for the need for fundraising at a public institution of higher education. She understands the need for a constant, high quality message. She is of the highest integrity” (personal communication, Jan. 19, 2007). Enslin also praised her talent in getting along with others: “I think amongst some of our major donors, even those who had already made commitments [to “Beyond Tradition”], they felt more comfortable with our new chancellor. … It was refreshing to work with a new chancellor, especially one who did not want to ‘rock the boat’” (personal communication, Jan. 19, 2007). Despite the negative publicity surrounding the campaign due to a controversial speaker, the campaign did reach its goal in a timely manner; and the institution made plans to embark on an even bigger one under President Saunders’s leadership. In the third negative situation, the change in leadership impacted the length of the campaign. Right before the campaign at Muhlenberg College was publicly launched in the fall of 2002, the campus was abuzz in discussions over the President’s behavior. President Arthur R. Taylor had served as President of Muhlenberg for a decade, from 1992–2002. The last year of his presidency was mired in accusations of sexual Innov High Educ (2012) 37:89–103 97 harassment and abrasive behavior toward staff (Farrell 2002). On July 12, 2002, the Board of Trustees voted to end Taylor’s presidency. An interim president was named for the 2002–03 school year, and Peyton Randolph Helm then permanently assumed the position in July 2003. During this time, the Muhlenberg development office continued to raise funds for the campaign, already having committed nearly four years of time to “Pride and Progress,” as well as having received pledges and gifts totaling half of the $70 million goal. Most people associated with the College felt like President Taylor’s departure was the best option given the damaging publicity and negative morale on campus. The College then extended the campaign length and dollar goal under its new President. Muhlenberg’s “Pride and Progress” campaign originally concluded in 2006 having met its $70 million goal, but upon taking office the new President extended the campaign until 2010 with a new $105 million goal. Muhlenberg Vice President Tilghman Moyer stated, . . . the presidential transition took place at the worst possible moment – the transition occurred during the summer proceeding the fall when the campaign was to go public. … Under the termination agreement, all employees of the college were obliged to follow a confidentiality agreement. We could not talk about the reasoning behind the termination. This was very awkward and caused people to be suspect of the institution (personal communication, March 1, 2007). The incoming president was a welcome change for several reasons. His experience in higher education spanned more than two decades, nearly all of it working within the field of development, fundraising, and college relations, which was an advantage for Muhlenberg in overcoming the Taylor controversy and moving the capital campaign in a positive direction. President Helm said, “I enjoy campaigns. The president should be totally committed to the campaign’s success and a full partner with the development staff in making it succeed. He is the chief solicitor and closer, but in addition plays an important leadership role in ensuring that the campaign is an expression of a shared vision for the institution’s future and that the campaign objectives are clearly linked to the institution’s strategic priorities” (personal communication, February 23, 2007). It is fortunate that President Helm at Muhlenberg College was fully committed to the campaign; under his tutelage the campaign extended until 2010. Multiple Presidential Transitions During Capital Campaigns New leaders are not always supportive of capital campaigns started under previous administrations, and this is particularly true when multiple leaders are involved. In the cases of Millikin University in rural Illinois and the University of North Florida in the state capitol, Jacksonville, both institutions endured campaigns led by several presidents. During the seven-year, $65 million “Access to Excellence” campaign, the University of North Florida (UNF) employed two permanent and two interim presidents. First, UNF was in the quiet phase of the campaign when the President left to oversee the entire postsecondary Florida system. Second, an interim President was hired for a year, which delayed the campaign kick-off until a permanent replacement was found. Then, Dr. Anne Hopkins was appointed president in 1999, and UNF publicly announced the campaign right after she took office. Three years into her presidency and the campaign, she resigned, citing health reasons. According to Vice President Pierre Allaire, Hopkins’s departure was beneficial for the campaign since “she was not in good health and could not devote the time 98 Innov High Educ (2012) 37:89–103 needed [for the campaign]” (personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006). Another interim President was appointed at the end of the capital campaign. On June 30, 2003, the “Access to Excellence” campaign officially concluded while the interim President was in office. The campaign had raised $38 million over the original $65 million goal. It was the institution’s first capital campaign and was considered a resounding success, despite having had multiple presidential leaders. Allaire reported, “My expectations were met and went beyond what I thought we could do. The strength of the campaign was in the volunteers and reputation of UNF. The president is certainly important, but not exclusively” (personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006). The campaign volunteers and foundation board at UNF were key players in propelling the campaign forward and through the multiple leadership transitions – more than the other formal campus leaders, according to the Chief Development Officer. After the campaign concluded, the mayor of Jacksonville, John Delaney, was inaugurated as the permanent UNF president. He continues to serve as the University’s leader today, and the endowment has doubled under his leadership. Another resilient institution that underwent multiple transitions during a campaign was Millikin University, a co-ed, independent liberal arts college in Illinois. The institution had originally planned a $75 million campaign, but it was extended under several new campus leaders. After ten years of campaign fundraising from 1996–2006, Millikin’s “Advancing the Vision” campaign commitments totaled $125 million, which exceeded the original goal by $50 million. Curtis McCray held the presidency when the campaign began, but three years later McCray resigned. Thomas Flynn was then inaugurated and served until 2002. John Reynolds was acting president from 2002–2003, until alumnus Doug Zemke took office. Zemke has been Millikin’s president since 2003. The presidents at Millikin each left office under different circumstances. The first one, Curtis McCray, left after a five-year tenure to pursue another college presidency. Vice President Peg Luy stated, “It took a while for folks to get beyond that [transition] and realize that the campaign could still be successful” (personal communication, Jan. 10, 2007). The second president, Thomas Flynn, resigned from the Millikin presidency under pressure because of contentious financial issues he created at the university and a lack of confidence in his leadership. The Decatur, Illinois, newspaper published a front-page article (Ingram 2002) that indicated Millikin faculty members had voted 102-1 to send a letter to the University’s Board of Trustees outlining their concerns about then-President Flynn. The concerns included, . . . a lack of fiscal planning and processes for creating and implementing realistic budgets; the absence of systems for shared, information-based decision making; poor judgment in the use and development of human capital; failure to communicate accurately and consistently with all members of the community including faculty members, administrators, staff members, students, trustees, and the public; and divisive leadership, creating an atmosphere of mistrust and uncertainty (Ingram 2002, p. A1). Certainly this was not desirable front page news for Millikin’s campaign. Vice President Luy noted, “The publicity over the resignation of the second president was not helpful and took some extraordinary work on the part of the development staff to overcome” (personal communication, Jan. 10, 2007). Constant communication and reinforcement of the campaign goals were two strategies employed to weather this change. Following the tumultuous presidency of Flynn, a one-year, interim president had a relatively inconsequential role on the campaign. Luy indicated that the most challenging Innov High Educ (2012) 37:89–103 99 time during the campaign was between the time of Flynn’s resignation and the term of the subsequent interim president. She noted, “The resignation of the second president in the campaign made a positive change in the climate on campus. Some tough times followed during the interim’s service, but the arrival of our fourth president in the campaign brought restored confidence to the University, which has only grown” (personal communication, Jan. 10, 2007). Doug Zemke, the current leader of Millikin, has long ties to the institution. He graduated in the class of 1966, was the parent of a student, and had served as a member of Millikin’s Board of Trustees. In 2001, he retired as Dean of Millikin’s Tabor School of Business and was appointed as president in 2003. President Zemke has been highly regarded by the campus and the community. Upon taking office, Zemke saw himself as the “leader of the campaign” and “someone who carries the message to the constituencies who can contribute” (personal communication, March 5, 2007). The Formal Leaders The types of formal leaders at the ten institutions varied greatly. The presidents featured in this article had various backgrounds, ages, health issues, degrees of dedication to the campaigns, and support from their constituencies. These presidents also left office under a variety of circumstances: retirement, resignation, illness, and transfer to different institutions. The chief development officers also varied greatly: Their work experience in higher education development spanned from 15 years (Enslin at UWW) to 39 years (Ferin at UIndy). One of the development offiers, Robison at Florida State, had overseen six capital campaigns during his career; however, the average number was two campaigns per development officer. Interestingly, four of the development officers were alumni of the institution where they worked; and two of the presidents were alumni. I have not been able to find any information or studies that report on the percentage of presidents nor vice presidents that are alumni of their institutions. The only thing that the presidents and the vice presidents seemed to have in common with one another was a true passion to advance the missions of their institutions and a sincere desire to meet campaign goals. In the case of a capital campaign, there is an overwhelming expectation of success. The capital campaigns all met their fundraising goals despite the transitions in leadership. Some colleges delayed the kick-off of the campaign, stalled a mega-gift announcement until the new president could publicize it, or extended the length of the campaign to meet goals. Failure to reach campaign goals was not an option. One campus president said, “The president must be the leader of the capital campaign whether he/she started it or inherited it. Under any circumstances, the capital campaign must be successful or the institution is negatively effected” (personal communication, Feb. 26, 2007). The Informal Leaders “Informal” leaders emerged in several instances when there was an absence of a permanent campus president. Members of the development staff, the Board of Trustees, and senior staff at the institution (deans and vice presidents) were most often cited as valuable supports to the capital campaign in the absence of or transition to a new president. When I asked Dr. Allaire, the vice president from UNF, what it took to be resilient during an difficult change in top leadership, he replied, “You have to keep your focus. I’ve been through a few 100 Innov High Educ (2012) 37:89–103 presidential changes in my career (three to be exact) and have found that a strong campaign plan, coupled with strong volunteers, will weather most transitions. You gotta [sic] be smart about how you convey the message of transition and show that you are not scared of the change because once you do as the VP, others will pick up on it and lose confidence in you and the campaign” (personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006). The development staff was cited as particularly helpful by participants in this study. The Vice President at Wake Forest noted that his very experienced staff helped overcome any difficulties in the campaign due to the presidential transition. Robison from FSU said that his “staff never waivered”, and that made an impact during the transition. Millikin’s Luy continuously gave credit to her development employees and credited the team philosophy for their campaign success in spite of four presidents. At Florida State University, the University of North Florida, and Wake Forest University, the presidents were out of office for several months due to health concerns. Nonetheless, the campaigns continued to function and raise money despite the lack of daily executive leadership. Generally the offices of institutional advancement [development] would cover the executive duties of cultivation of donors and solicitation of funds during the presidents’ absences (e.g., UNF). Senior staff colleagues, including vice presidents and deans, were also supportive and accommodating of campaign demands, especially when the president was out of office. While Florida State’s president recovered from surgery, the FSU college deans were helpful in securing gifts and working as the “faces” of the university. Senior staff colleagues also banded together because of their familiarity with the campus and the demands of the positions and the campaigns. These informal leaders often met with prospective donors and championed the cause in the absence of formal leadership. The Board of Trustees, foundation board members, and campaign volunteers at several institutions also provided informal leadership for campaigns. Board members served as donors and volunteer spokespersons. The institutions discovered these informal leaders to be indispensable. For example, Vice President Moyer from Muhlenberg College indicated that “The [presidential] transition pulled the existing members of the Board together. They realized that they would have to increase their own support, which they did, to demonstrate their own belief in the institution” (personal communication, March 1, 2008). Informal leaders contributed both financial support and support in the form of advice/counsel as well as human and social capital. They connected prospective donors to the institution. Vice President Ferin at UIndy reached out to trustees during the leadership transition at his institution: He “sought the advice of trustees he believed could be influential in making sure the campaign plan would be continued” regardless of who held the top post. Monetary support – notably from the Board of Trustees – was also used to send a message to the community that the campaign still had backing and was continuing as planned despite the leadership transition. Clearly, informal leaders had a significant impact on the success of the campaigns. Interestingly, what did not emerge in this study were comments indicating reliance on leadership by the provost or chief academic officer for capital campaigns in transition. This is interesting because 1) The American Council on Education report of 2007 indicated that the majority of campus leaders are recruited from provost positions and 2) the provost is generally identified as the “second in command” after the president. Perhaps the provost/chief academic officer is seen only as an administrative leader, not a fundraising leader. This culture may need to change if we want to better prepare our future leaders for the top positions. A recommendation would be intentionally to train Innov High Educ (2012) 37:89–103 101 future chief academic officers in institutional advancement or to establish a more direct relationship between provosts and advancement offices. Institutional Foundations or development leaders could institute individualized fundraising goals and tasks for provosts. Fundraising goals and tasks are frequently established for deans of academic colleges and specific departments on college campuses, and the same could be done with and for the chief academic post. Conclusion The goal of this study was to seek to understand the effect of leadership transitions during capital campaigns. It is important to reiterate that all of the capital campaigns proceeded as planned despite the transitions and that the ten institutions I studied met and exceeded their campaign goals – several ahead of schedule. However, even when the transition was a welcome one, the transition still impacted the campaign in a negative way, either by delaying it, confusing donors, producing negative publicity, or contributing to poor morale on campus. Strong informal leadership, coupled with an experienced Chief Development Officer, diminished the difficulties of the transition periods. This study investigated the leadership viewpoint when presidential turnover occurs during a capital campaign, and the following statement from the chief development officer at Villanova University sums up the sentiment of individuals interviewed in this study: “We underestimated the impact a presidential transition would have on a campaign” (McRae, personal communication, Feb. 1, 2007). College presidents are rarely staying in office more than eight years, yet capital campaigns are occurring with greater frequency and greater length. The need for capital campaigns mostly stems from reduced state support – an evergrowing problem today. Another problem is the impact of the looming retirements of sitting presidents. According to the American Council on Education report (2007), The American College President, only 9% of presidents are now 50 or younger, compared with about 42% who were aged 50 or younger in 1986. The average age of a president has risen from 52 to 60 over the last 20 years. These data suggest that, because the typical president is now a sexagenarian, more turnovers can be expected due to impending retirements. The other leaders on campus, including chief development officers, deans, and other vice presidents, may be tapped for more fundraising work in light of future retirements. Also, because provosts or chief academic officers are most likely to become college presidents (ACE 2007, p. 47), it would behoove institutions of higher education and organizations like CASE, the Council for Advancement and Support of Education, to provide more fundraising training for these top academic positions. Provosts were never mentioned as important to the campaign in this study of presidential transitions. This is a big area of disconnect between campuses and future leadership roles. Future leadership changes are going to take place while competition for resources among institutions is greater than ever before. Institutions must be mindful and strategic about their leaders and their fundraising competencies. While the president generally serves as the public personification of the college or university, it is possible to maintain continuity during a capital campaign and to ensure its successful completion. 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