Heidegger, temporality, and dialogical self theory

Chapter 10 Heidegger, temporality, and dialogical self theory Basia D. Ellis and Henderikus J. Stam PRE-PUBLICATION COPY 2015. In L. M. Simão, D. S. Guimarães and J. Valsiner (Eds.) Temporality: Culture in the flow of human experience (pp. 259-282). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishers. The question of time is important for cultural psychologists who study the unfolding of subjective life. For these scholars, human experience is observed as a dynamic process constituted by sociocultural structures and traditions as well as uniquely navigated by human agents (Kirschner & Martin, 2010). Selfhood is here regarded in cultural and temporal terms, observed as an ongoing practice of interpreting and reinterpreting varied cultural meanings. In recent decades, the dynamics of this process have been widely discussed via dialogical self theory, first proposed by Hermans and his colleagues (Hermans, Kempen & van Loon, 1992) and since then extensively elaborated (Hermans & Gieser, 2011; Hermans & HermansKonopka, 2010). The prominence of this theory makes it an important place for examining the relation of time and the self in cultural psychology, and this is our focus here. In this chapter, we investigate how time is taken up in dialogical self theory and attempt to elaborate the current view with an onto-existential understanding. In our view, such an elaboration is necessary because time in dialogical self theory is for the most part regarded abstractly, as a background—clock time—according to which the dynamics of a primarily spatial dialogical self are traced. We in turn conceptualize the dialogical self as a temporal structure in its own right, unfolding in lived time with others in the world.1 For this we take Heidegger as a contentious starting point, for with him we maintain that the question of time is not one of developmental accounts or narrowly conceived clock time but of our finitude in relation to Being. The question of time and the self, more generally, is one that is philosophically and theoretically extensive. Both “self ” and “time” are contested and the focus of limitless elaboration. Artificially separated through our notion of what we are here calling clock time and all that this implies for an instrumental world and a socially ordered life, psychologists limit the question of self and time by our ability to remember the past and predict the future. But this notion of cognitive “mental time travel” (Tulving, 1985) is premised on a functional account of the self, whose subjective life is beyond comprehension outside of a cognitive neuroscience. What if time were just part of what makes a self what it is? Our chapter begins with a discussion of Heidegger’s earliest and most recognized opus, Being and Time (1927/1962), from which we take temporality to constitute the ontological structure of existence. Next, to elaborate the sociocultural constitution of time, we examine Heidegger’s later works, which theorize the relation between time and language in relation to Being. As a whole, Heidegger’s philosophy allows us to develop an onto-existential, that is, an existentially founded ontology, and sociocultural conception of time, with which we then begin our critique of dialogical self theory. In our view, dialogical self theory assumes an abstract notion of time that fails to recognize the way existence is constituted by lived time. Accordingly, we draw upon Heidegger’s philosophy to elaborate dialogical self theory with an onto-existential understanding. However, as Heidegger does not recognize the key insight of dialogical self theory, namely, the dialogical nature of conscious life, we evaluate the critical insights from both accounts and conclude our discussion with a defense of an onto-existential theory of dialogical selfhood. Heidegger’s Being and time The bulk of Heidegger’s existential analyses are found in his major opus, Being and Time (1927/1962). It is important to note that these analyses are motivated by Heidegger’s broader interest in the meaning of Being.2 However, because Being can only be understood through our own relation to it, Heidegger begins with a study of the being of the questioner of Being, that is, with a study of our own existence. Dasein refers to the questioner of Being who already has some understanding of Being in general (Krell, 1993). Specifically, Dasein is “this entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 27). Heidegger formulates the designation “Dasein” by nominalizing the infinitive sein “to be” and da (adverb) “here, there, since, then” (Griffiths, 2006, p. 54). Literally, then, Dasein means “Being-there” (Dastur, 1998/1990, p. 17). The term deliberately opposes traditional conceptions of the subject that treat it either as single entity or duality made up of substantive body and abstract mind. Dasein refers to existence as a process that unfolds prior to being thematized into subject/object dichotomies; it is neither a substance nor a subject but an elementary, existential unfolding that conditions all possibilities of experience in the world. Put differently, Dasein is an “I can” that precedes all possibilities of existence (Griffiths, 2006). Given its primacy, Dasein cannot be understood by means of a presupposed essence or delineated idea; Dasein preconfigures all of these. Accordingly, Heidegger resists the analytical methods of philosophical anthropology and classic phenomenology for their ahistorical acceptance of preconceptions about existence. Because we ourselves are the beings to be analyzed and we are necessarily historical, Dasein’s nature must be worked out through a phenomenology that is ultimately hermeneutical—what Heidegger calls an existential analytic (existenziale Analytik). Specifically, the phenomenology of Dasein is hermeneutics in the sense that it recognizes Dasein’s historical formation and is the work of interpretation (Krell, 1993). Being and Time (1927/2006) comprises Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein, which begins as a study of the general Being of Dasein and moves progressively to more concrete interpretations of Dasein’s structure: first, studying Dasein in its “average everydayness,” Heidegger conceptualizes Dasein as Being-in-the-world; then, with further analyses, Heidegger translates Being-in-the-world into the more concrete structure of care; finally, the structure of care is exposed at the ontological level as temporality. In this way, moving from particular, existential determinants to the more general and concrete, Heidegger reveals an increasingly originary account of existence whose ontological structure is temporality. Our discussion of Heidegger’s philosophy aims primarily to defend the idea that existence at its fundamental level is ecstatic temporality and accordingly, it is always as temporalities that we engage with the world. Following his analyses, we conclude that existence achieves its unique form through the simultaneous work of all three temporal modes—past, present, and future— which together co-constitute the unfolding present. We live our past in the present and in the direction of the future. Temporality in turn refers to the unity of this tripartite structure that constitutes our basic mode of being, and as such, it forms the ontological structure of existence. From this, it also becomes apparent that abstract time, conceived as a succession of “now” moments, derives from a more basic, existential structure. We do not discuss the fundamental metaphysics implied by Heidegger’s Being in temporality since that has been the subject of considerable debate. Being-in-the-World At the first level of analysis—in its general, everyday existence— Dasein refers to Being-in-theworld. As Being-in-the-world, Dasein is not a predetermined entity situated “inside” a predefined, external world but the unfolding process of “Being there.” In Heidegger’s words, “the entity which is essentially constituted by Being-in-the-world is itself always its ‘there’” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 171). As the “there” of being-there-in-the-world (Schürmann, 2008), “Dasein is its disclosedness” (Erschlossenheit) which also means that “the Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being is to its ‘there’” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 171). The term Erschlossenheit implies an “openness” and unconcealment of what otherwise remains concealed or closed off from coming into presence (Griffiths, 2006). Further, disclosedness relates to the question of truth as unconcealment of the world. But the world in Being-in-the-world is not a predetermined space external to Dasein; rather, it is a constitutive component of Dasein’s being. As an onto-existential concept, the world unfolds as an undetermined worldhood that reveals itself (or unconceals) uniquely for every Being (Dastur 1998/1990, p. 21). Disclosedness in general is seen to be constituted by four equiprimordial dimensions. Attunement or disposition (Befindlichkeit) implies that existence always unfolds according to moods that are not under our control. Falling (Verfallen) refers to the fact that in everyday existence, Dasein is absorbed in a world of other beings, existing alongside them. Understanding (Verstehen) describes our most basic ability to grasp the world in our own particular way—to actively “cease it” according to our own way of being. The latter is in turn made possible by discourse (Rede), which, as a fourth existential dimension, articulates understanding and explains how our existence is permeated by speech (Schürmann, 2008). Importantly, speech does not refer to spoken language but to the “existential-ontological foundation of language” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 203). As such, speech provides the conditions for spoken language; more specifically, it articulates disclosedness, manifesting it as such and such regardless of whether this is orally expressed (Dastur, 1998/1990). Constituted by these fundamental existential dimensions, Dasein is characterized as Geworfenheit (Being-thrown). Heidegger derives the term from the verb werfen, which means “to project, to cast, throw,”3 and which is generally translated as “being-thrown” (Grifitths, 2006). Importantly, by “being-thrown,” Dasein is both passive to the world and directed toward the future. Moods reveal how Dasein is Being-thrown in a passive sense, for through moods, Dasein recognizes that its plight is influenced by events taking place beyond its control; Dasein always finds itself “already in” a world that it does not itself create. At the same time however, moods also reveal our possibilities. Heidegger explains, “Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its Being; and in this way it has been delivered over to the Being, which, in existing, it has to be” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 173). Accordingly, despite “being thrown” in a passive sense, Dasein always understands itself in terms of possibilities. Heidegger writes, “as thrown, Dasein is thrown into the kind of being which we call ‘projecting’” (p. 185). Projecting has no relation to a thought-out plan but describes the very character of understanding. “As projecting,” Heidegger explains, “understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as possibilities” (p. 185).4 Because Dasein relates to its Being in the mode of projecting, Dasein “is always more than itself in any given moment, since it holds its own Being before itself as possibility” (Schürmann, 2008, p. 88). That is, Dasein exists not as totality but as potentiality, as Being-toward-the-future. This experiential incompleteness does not signify that Dasein is not structurally whole however; rather, the incompleteness is its very structure. In Heidegger’s (1927/2006) words, “das Dasein ist ihm selbst überantwortetes Möglichsein, durch und durch geworfene Möglichkeit” (p. 144), translated as “Dasein is Being-possible which has been delivered over to itself—thrown possibility through and through” (p. 183). Care Having outlined the existential features of average everydayness, Heidegger reexamines his account in relation to Dasein’s concrete possibilities. Here, the experience of anxiety is paramount for revealing Dasein’s broader structure as care (Sorge). Unlike in fear, where one is drawn to a particular threatening object, Heidegger argues that in anxiety, “that in face of which one has anxiety [das Wovor der Angst] is Being-in-the-world as such” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 230). Accordingly, in anxiety, Dasein experiences itself as detached from itself, isolated, and individuated. The uncanniness of this experience constitutes anxiety’s heuristic function, for it reveals that in its basic mode of Being, Dasein is concerned about its Being; that is, in its Being, its very Being is an issue for it. Treating anxiety as mode of Being-in-the-world, Heidegger writes, That in the face of which we have anxiety is thrown-Being-in-the-world; that which we have anxiety about is our potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Thus the entire phenomenon of anxiety shows Dasein as factically existing Being-in-the-world. The fundamental ontological characteristics of this entity are existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen. (p. 235) The experience of anxiety concretizes Dasein’s more basic concern for its ownmost potentialityfor-being. “This potentiality,” Heidegger (1927/1962) writes, “is that for the sake of which any Dasein is as it is” (p. 236). In anxiety, then, Dasein is revealed as “Being free for its ownmost potentiality” at a fundamental level. With this, Heidegger reinterprets Dasein’s basic structure: “ontologically, Being towards one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being means that in each case Dasein is already ahead of itself [ihm selbst ... vorweg] in its being” (p. 236); in caring for its Being, Dasein is being-ahead-of-itself (sich-vorweg-sein). But whereas Being-ahead-of-itself explains Dasein’s existentiality, it does not yet involve the whole of Dasein’s constitution. As the uncanniness of anxiety establishes, Dasein is always already thrown into a world already absorbed in it; and thus, in the same movement, the world constitutes Dasein’s possibilities for Being. This fundamental entanglement constitutes Dasein’s facticity and elaborates its care-structure as Being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-Being-in-a-world. Further, “Dasein’s factical existing is not only generally and without further differentiation a thrown potentiality-for-Being-the-world; it is always also absorbed in the world of its concern” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pp. 236–237). It is in this entangled Being-together-with that anxiety announces itself, revealing Dasein in its basic mode as “fallen,” which means that Dasein is absorbed in the world with others. Taken together, these three existential determinants constitute Dasein as care-structure: “the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 237). (Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-[der Welt] als Sein-bei [innerweltlich begegnendem Seienden]) (Heidegger, 2006/1927, p. 192)]. Heidegger (1927/1962) concludes, “This Being fills in the signification of the term ‘care’ [Sorge], which is used in a purely ontologicoexistential manner” (p. 237). Care itself is understood in three senses: care (Sorge) refers to Dasein itself; concern (Besorgen) relates to Dasein’s activities in the world; and solicitude (Fürsorge) refers to Dasein’s Being alongside others. Despite these distinctions however, the three concepts are posited simultaneously in the care-structure so that the term “care” always refers to “concernedsolicitous care” (besorgend-fürsorge Sorge) for the Being that is at issue (Inwood, 1999). In sum, by designating “care” as the basic structure of Dasein, Heidegger broadens the scope of Being-in-the-world and translates its thrown/projectional character into Being-ahead-of-itself, where ahead-of-itself entails “Being-already-in” and “Being-alongside.” Notably, Being-ahead-of-itself is given a kind of phenomenological pre-eminence in the carestructure, for in characterizing Dasein’s care for its own Being, it outlines the structure of the self (Schürmann, 2008). Heidegger (1927/1962) asks, “Who it is that Dasein is in its everydayness” (p. 149) to which he responds, “Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself ” (p. 150). But I or myself does not mean to imply a substantive self that can be made objectively present in some way. Instead, the “who” that is experienced is a way of Being—a project and task to be achieved, albeit always already in the world and Being-alongside other entities. Facticity (Being-already-in) means that Dasein cannot freely choose its project; as always already thrown into the world, Dasein’s possibilities are constituted by that world. Moreover, as Being-fallen (or Being-with), Dasein’s possibilities are also constituted by other beings. Referring to Dasein’s collective constitution, Heidegger explains that the “who” in the question who it is that Dasein is “is not this one, not that one, not oneself [man selbst], not some people [einige], and not the sum of them all. The ‘who’ is the neuter, the ‘they’ [das Man]” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 164). The concept of “the they” accounts for others whose meanings and practices permeate Dasein’s existence and in this contribute to its making. So basic is their constitutive role that Dasein in its everyday existence is regarded “neuter” rather than any one in particular.However, anxiety reveals that even as factical and fallen, Dasein is free for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being and this means that Dasein is free for the possibility of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) or inauthenticity (Uneigentlich-keit( (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 186). In anxiety, Dasein is stripped of its usual concerns and involvements and is exposed as bare freedom to choose itself (Inwood, 1999). This experience carries implications for Dasein’s everyday existence, as it implies that while Dasein cannot escape facticity or fallenness, it can, in its existentiality, choose to live its own everydayness. That is, even as Being-already-in and Being-with other beings, Dasein can cease its Being in its own way, even if this too can only be done within a factical world and “in the way that others do” (Schürmann, 2008). Authenticity thus requires that Dasein resists its tendency in everyday-ness to define itself in terms of “the They,” and instead cease ownership of its Being. The motive for such a project cannot be found in anxiety alone, however. To will an authentic life, Heidegger explains, Dasein must come to recognize its own finitude. As we proceed to show, impending death constitutes another existential determinant, which reveals Dasein’s basic structure as finite possibility “stretched along between birth and death” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 426). Authentic being is predicated on Dasein’s realization of its finitude, based on which Dasein can resist Beingtoward-concrete-possibilities and transform itself into Being-toward-death. Temporality In his final analysis, Heidegger shows how Dasein’s care-structure translates into a more basic, finite and ecstatic temporality. This formulation is motivated by another existential determinant, the experience of death. Death, from the existential perspective, is something that impends without ever becoming objectively present, for its actual occurrence would require an end to existence altogether. Thus, death is something that is now, experienced as an ongoing “not-yet” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 289). But whereas Dasein can never actually experience its death, “death reveals itself as that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped [unüberholbare]” (p. 294). This is to say, death is something that is always mine, that cannot be performed by others in my name, and beyond which there is nothing more encompassing (Schürmann, 2008). As Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being, death exposes Dasein’s finitude, revealing Dasein itself as “thrown Being towards its end” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 295). With death, Dasein’s existentiality finds its meaning in the future, that is, in “what is to come” (p. 375–376). Since “what is to come” is Dasein itself (i.e., the completion of Dasein), Dasein “stretches along between birth and death’ (p. 426). Heidegger writes, “Dasein does not exist as the sum of momentary actualities of Experiences which come along successively and disappear. Nor is there a sort of framework which this succession gradually fills up” (p. 426). Heidegger concludes, “Factical Dasein exists as born; and as born, it is already dying, in the sense of Being-towards-death” (p. 426). Death in this sense configures Dasein’s existentiality, revealing its temporal structure by pointing to its inescapable finitude. The recognition of finitude is significant, for through it, Dasein realizes that there must also be something like Being. Finitude is in this regard not an accidental or abstract cognition but a fundamental need to understand Being as well as submit to it (Dastur, 1990/1998). Only because Dasein realizes its finitude does it care for its Being and choose to engage in creative possibilities. Put differently, only by apprehending that there is both Being and freedom toward death, can thrown Dasein cease its Being authentically, albeit never in detachment from “the they” and its natural world. With the significance of finitude revealed, Dasein’s ontological structure can be defined as finite temporality, constituted by three central temporal aspects. First, futurity denotes Dasein’s ability for projection. Futurity is not “the future” in the sense of a “now” that is yet to come but a basic constituent of Dasein’s ontological makeup that conditions its ability to “let itself come toward itself ” in projecting (Heidegger, 1962/1927, p. 372). Dasein must be futural in order to selfproject for its own sake (p. 375). But “to come toward itself futurally” is possible insofar as Dasein is as an “I-am-as-havingbeen” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 376). Thus, another aspect of temporality, namely, that of having been, provides the basis of Dasein’s facticity. Factical Dasein takes up its previous ways of being and projects them as present possibilities only because its past remains alive in the present rather than dissolve as something long gone. Finally, the unique process that constitutes the present explains how Dasein exists alongside other beings: the present unfolds on a ground of potentiality, as a projecting and factical Dasein lets things come toward itself. Disclosedness ultimately takes shape through the three temporal modes: past, present, and future. Dasein, as this very disclosedness, is for this reason deemed temporality: “This phenomenon [that] has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as ‘temporality’ ” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 374). Thus, temporality constitutes Dasein’s ontological structure. That is, at the ontological level, Dasein is ecstatic temporality, standing out ahead of itself as a radical openness, unified by a future that reformulates a “having been” into a unique present. Temporality, then, refers to the basic, tripartite process that configures past, present, and future into an existential whole. What Heidegger argues is that the traditional conception of time, the tradition from Aristotle to Kant, is derivative from experience; it does not dictate experience. In his commentary on Kant and the problem of time he notes that although space and time as pure intuitions both belong “to the subject,” time dwells in the subject in a more original way than space. Time immediately reduced to the givens of inner sense, however, is at the same time only ontologically more universal if the subjectivity of the subject exists in the openness for the being. (Heidegger, 1973/1997, p. 35) Put differently, time is not a spatial, coordinating structure, thing, or entity but rather comes to us by way of living toward the future through the past. Further, Heidegger argues that “world time” (taken as “pure sequence of now moments”) is achieved via consensus with others: Dasein as ecstatic temporality first goes into the world, wherein it soon encounters natural, cyclical processes, which it then validates with others who experience them also. As it is only together with others that a world time is formed, lived time is attributed ontological priority (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 377).In his focus on the primacy of onto-temporal structure of existence however, the early Heidegger does not yet elaborate what is sociocultural. This is because it is only after his study of Dasein that Heidegger reexamines the question of Being and addresses the question of our inherence in language. We find his later work relevant for this reason: it provides an understanding of how Being as presencing arises both in relation to humans and in the mode of language. After summarizing Heidegger’s position, we draw upon it to reexamine the dialogical self, theorizing it as finite existence co-creating meaning with others. The later Heidegger As early as 1930, Heidegger starts to think differently about the relation between Being and time, no longer conceptualizing the meaning of Being on the basis of Dasein’s projection but, conversely, viewing humans from a broader perspective, as standing within the truth of Being to which they must respond (Dastur, 1998/1990, referring to Heidegger’s “On the Essence of Truth”). This turning in Heidegger’s thought refers to his recognition of Being as “historical in itself, and not only through the intermediary of Dasein” (Dastur, 1990/1998, p. 55). Based on this realization, Heidegger elaborates his previous position from a new approach to the question of Being (Heidegger, 1947/1993). Having shown in Being and Time that Dasein has an implicit understanding of Being (as distinguishable from concrete “beings”), Heidegger maintains that Being itself can be expressly and conceptually apprehended. From a broader perspective however, Being is no longer “the ground of beings” understood via Dasein’s projection; it is the unfolding of world through the co-belonging of “time and Being” in their reciprocal relation (Heidegger, 1969/1972). Heidegger explains, “Being, by which all beings are marked, means presencing,” where “to let presence means to unconceal, to bring to openness” (Heidegger, 1969/1972, p. 5). Being lets beings come forth in nonconcealment, allowing them to show themselves in the clearing. Notably, the clearing here no longer refers to Dasein’s disclosedness but to the open-ness revealed by the co-belonging of Being and time. Presencing implies this precisely, referring to Being as temporal unfolding rather than as that which is present. Heidegger (1969/1972) argues that presence is always given in a particular manner: it always involves an approaching “not yet present” (relating to the future) and a declining “what is no longer present” (relating to the past) that reciprocally bring about one another; as these processes always take place at the same time, their reciprocal bringing about gives rise to the present (p. 13). Presence is in this way “given” in the form of a three-dimensional temporal unity, always unfolding as a “mutual giving to one another of future, past, and present” (p. 14). With Being now recognized as co-belonging with time, the later Heidegger reconceptualizes Being as Ereignis, which he translates from the German as “the event of Appropriation” that determines Being and time in their co-belonging (Heidegger, 1969/1972, p. 19).5 Heidegger emphasizes that Ereignis is not a an indeterminate power, so long as we consider Being as presence and time as the realm of the open, “where, by virtue of offering, a manifold presencing takes place and opens up” (1969/1972, p. 17). As the “the relation of all relations” that determines Being and time together, Ereignis is not an “event” in sense of occurrence, but it is the appropriation that makes all occurrences possible (p. 19). Kockelmans (1970) goes so far as to argue that Ereignis is the unveilment that makes unnecessary the absolutes of history and relativism at once, leaving one only with the experience of Being. But how does Ereignis occur? That is, how does Being let beings unfold in presence? The answer is found in language or specifically, in the mode of saying (sagen, die Sage) (Heidegger, 1959/1993b, p. 424). Importantly, for Heidegger, language is never merely speech in the sense of an expressive phenomenon, nor does it refer to mere concepts as representations of images (Heidegger, 1971, p. 191). Heidegger understands language in the broadest possible sense, as “everything by which mankind brings meaning to light in an articulated way” (Kockelmans, 1972, p. xiii); this equally includes audible speech as it does visual art and religious institutions. Studying how language perjures as language, Heidegger maintains that it is not humans who speak and engage language but language itself that speaks and engages humans (Heidegger, 1971, p. 195). This is not to say that humans are not beings who speak; for humans are in fact distinguished from both plants and animals on the basis that speech enables them to be humans (Heidegger, 1971, p. 187). What Heidegger means to establish is the prevalence of language that comes from its correspondence with Being. Earlier in his writings, Heidegger famously states, “Language is the house of Being” (Heidegger, 1947/1993a, p. 237), claiming that humans exist by dwelling in language, and in this way inhering in the truth of Being and guarding it. Later, Heidegger returns to this statement, emphasizing, “we are within language, at home in language, prior to everything else” (Heidegger, 1959/1993b, p. 398). In the context of Ereignis, the essence of language as a whole is the saying (Sagen) that shows (Zeigen)6: “What unfolds essentially in language is saying as pointing. Its showing does not culminate in a system of signs. Rather, allsigns arise from a showing in whose realm and for whose purposes they can be signs” (Heidegger, 1959/1993b, p. 410). Importantly, showing cannot be attributed exclusively or even definitively as human doing. Self-showing as appearing characterizes the coming to presence or withdrawal to absence of every manner and degree of thing present. Even when showing is accomplished by means of our saying, such showing or referring is preceded by a thing’s letting itself be shown. (Heidegger, 1959/1993b, p. 410) It is because of this priority of the thing’s letting itself be shown (in language) that in speaking we are also listening. The two are not opposed to one another, but neither do they happen simultaneously; rather, speaking is a hearing in advance: “Such listening to language precedes all other instances of hearing, albeit in an altogether inconspicuous way. We not only speak language, we speak from out of it” (Heidegger, 1959/1993b, p. 411). [Dieses Hören auf die Sprache geht auch allem sonst vorkommenden Hören in der unscheinbarsten Weise vorauf. Wir sprechen nicht nur die Sprache, wir sprechen aus ihr” (Heidegger, 1985/1959, p. 243)] Language speaks by saying, which is showing; humans in turn hear this saying in advance, in this way speaking by listening to language. Finally, speech can only let itself be told the saying if we ourselves are “granted entry” into the saying; that is, we must belong to the saying in order to hear it (Heidegger, 1959/1993b, p. 411). Heidegger thus redefines the intimate relation between humankind and Being: “Man is only man because Being itself addresses itself to him in the unfolding of presence, and not because he is, in virtue of his ecstatic essence, the ‘place’ of the self-address of Being” (Dastur, 1990/1998, p. 67). Being thus calls on humans, requiring them to “bring the soundless saying into the resonance of language” (Heidegger, 1993b/1959, p. 418); and humans must respond to Being by speaking, which is also to say, by listening to language. Heidegger (concludes that as mortals, we are “those who are needed and used for the speaking of language” (1959/1993b, p. 423). Language, on Heidegger’s account, is never just an expression of thinking, feeling, and willing. It “is the primal dimension within which each man’s essence is first able to correspond at all to Being and its claim, and, in corresponding, to belong to Being” (Heidegger, 1952/1977, p. 41). For Heidegger, this too is thinking, the express carrying out of corresponding. To summarize Heidegger’s account, whereas his initial writings in Being and Time (1927/2006) reveal temporality as our ontological structure, his later works help us understand how, within the greater context of Ereignis, presence unfolds through the co-belonging of humans and Being. While the continuity between Heidegger’s early and later philosophy is subject to debate, it is his ongoing concern with an onto-existential understanding of time as well as its relation to language that we take to be especially relevant to the current discussion. Having shown how Heidegger develops these ideas, we think through them to address time in dialogical self theory. Dialogical self theory and its temporal elaborations Thus far only a handful of scholars have expressly addressed time in relation to dialogical self theory (Baressi, 2011; Bertau, 2011; Bhatia & Ram, 2001; Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010; Linell, 2010; O’Sullivan-Lago & de Abreu, 2010; Raggatt, 2010; Valsiner, 2007), and their approaches to the question have been varied. Some situate the dialogical self as a phenomenon germane to the contemporary, postmodern era (Bhatia & Ram, 2001; Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010); others focus on the dynamics of I-positions as a means to make sense of the self ’s development (Hermans, 2003; O’Sullivan-Lago & de Abreu, 2010; Raggatt, 2010); still others address the development of the dialogical self as it transforms more generally over the lifespan (Baressi, 2011; Bertau, 2004, 2011; Linell, 2010). However, few researchers expressly theorize the dialogical self as it unfolds in lived or existential time (Baressi, 2011; Valsiner, 2007), and of their accounts, none theorize selfhood as temporal structure at the ontological level. We argue that without an ontological grounding, the dialogical self ’s meaning-making processes tend to be treated abstractly and functionally, studied in an abstract time rather than one that is lived.7 As we have seen with Heidegger, time is fundamentally neither abstract nor functional; it is what makes consciousness possible, or rather, temporality precedes our consciousness of time. Accordingly, we argue that dialogicality must be understood as an ontoexistential process that unfolds in lived time for a finite temporality. What is needed, then, is a theory of dialogical selfhood, one that studies how finite, temporal existences co-create meaning with others in the world. Here dialogicality must be seen as a feature of a more basic, ontotemporal existence and conversely, onto-temporal existence too must be elaborated with a dialogical configuration. Our attempt at such a theory is discussed below. Specifically, after disclosing the limited notion of time in dialogical self theory, we draw upon Heidegger’s ideas to show how the self is not just temporal but coexistent with temporality, and dialogicality is itself a feature of time, or in Heidegger’s sense, it is the self ’s coming to awareness of time in language. We conclude that temporality and dialogicality co-constitute the (temporal) unfolding of (dialogical) subjective life. Time in dialogical self theory Hermans (2002) defines the dialogical self as a “dynamic multiplicity of I-positions in the landscape of the mind, intertwined as this mind is with the minds of other people” (p. 147). According to this view, the self emerges from a dialogue between multiple, spatially positioned I-positions, and it is their ongoing dialogue that constitutes the very structure of the self. Such a conception of “I-positions in conversation” arises from the theoretical pairing of late 19th century Western accounts of self with notions of dialogue put forward by European thinkers, especially Bakhtin. From James and Mead, dialogical self theory borrows the distinction between the subject-self and the object-self, wherein self experience is conceived as a felt I always observing an objectMe. It is this I-Me distinction that constitutes the structure of the dialogical self ’s I-position and provides the first extension of the self in space. Adding the reflected sense of “Me” distinguishes the dialogical self from other Cartesian theories that treat the self as an autonomous, volitional center (Hermans, 2003). The dialogical self understood in its I-Me structure includes within it all things that the self appropriates and calls “mine”; in the Jamesian version, these include one’s body, others, and things in the world. Drawing on Mead, Hermans (2003) stresses the social constitution of the self. Specifically, whereas the I in the I-Me composition stands as “agentic capacity” that continuously appropriates and rejects a multiplicity of Me’s, the Me’s are necessarily acquired from the given individual’s society. Hermans and Gieser (2011) elaborate that within a globalized world with increasing intercultural contacts, a diversity of perspectives exist that can be appropriated by any given I, making the case for a complex and even contradicting multiplicity of Me’s within a single self. Whereas the basic structure of the I-position provides the first extension of the self into physical and social space, Bakhtin’s notions of dialogue and polyphony multiply the I-Me structure and create a self that is made up not of a single I-position but of many I-positions who voice their concerns in ongoing conversation. Each I-position is said to speak its world from a unique ideological stance and it is the I-positions’ ongoing dialogical exchange—through tension and détente, agreement and disagreement, questioning and answering—that defines the self ’s unfolding in time. Bakhtin thus gives further impetus to a dynamic understanding of selfhood, since in dialogue, the Jamesian and Meadian self grows from a single voice to a vibrant cacophony of voices who engage one another in animated and continuously developing relations. Dialogicality here implies that the self is dynamic and communicative, unfolding not as a monological train of thought, but as a vibrant cacophony of utterances directed at others, whether those others are real or imaginary. Furthermore, the self only comes into being through the other, as it is always with an other that the self exists as a self. While such a conception of selfhood is readily thought dynamic, it is significant that this dynamism is presumed according to an abstract understanding of time and is not grounded in the lived time of a given ontological being. In our view, I-positions are abstracted from lived experience as soon as they are relocated within the spatial metaphor of a mental landscape. In their most recent statement on dialogical self theory, Hermans and Gieser (2011) argue that Bakhtin’s dialogical construction “makes it possible to contract temporally dispersed events into spatial oppositions that are simultaneously present (in this way creating a ‘landscape of the mind’)” (p. 6, emphases added). This is possible because the dialogical construction translates the inner thought of a given character into an utterance directed at an other and in this brings together temporally divergent voices into a spatially envisioned mental landscape. This landscape stands as a defining image for dialogical self theory (Hermans, 2002, 2003) and with this recapitulates the spatial metaphors of time dominant in Western thought from Aristotle to Kant (Bambach, 2011). This metaphor regards time to be movement in space and lays the foundation for the creation of clock time, that is, a time that is measurable. What we claim is that through this metaphor, temporally divergent voices are reduced into spatial oppositions conceptualized within an abstract, linearly unfolding time. In emphasizing space, Hermans and Gieser (2011) assume time to be abstract and linear, treating it as an indefinite series of “nows” within which a configuration of spatial oppositions could be mapped. Time, from their perspective, unfolds objectively and independently from the lives of particular individuals; it is not a lived structure through which I-positions are organized and experienced, but an independently unfolding, Newtonian succession. The self is then studied as a dynamic system whose transformations can be mapped in time; whereas the self as a particular temporal structure is left unaddressed. Similar concerns can be expressed about Raggatt’s (2010, 2011) temporal elaboration of dialogical self theory as a triadic process of mediation. Drawing upon the semiotics of Charles Peirce, Raggatt maps the dynamics of “dialogical triads” (composed of an I-position, a counterposition, and an ambiguous third) into unique positioning histories, illustrated as a chain of triads unfolding along a temporal axis. The final image achieved is that of a “personal chronotope” that depicts the self as a series of transformations meaningfully connected by triadic relations. However, despite Raggatt’s special emphasis on the self ’s dynamism, time in the personal chronotope remains abstractly understood: time is the temporal axis along which chains of dialogical triads can be mapped and different configurations of I-positions located. Recognizing time as undertheorized in dialogical self theory, Baressi (2011) proposes a revised, three-dimensional model of the dialogical self, which elaborates the self ’s I-positions by attributing to them unique temporal dimensions. Baressi argues that the self grows increasingly aware of itself as temporally extended, developing in this increasingly complex I-positions that are capable of observing their dialogical activity across time (p. 49). In his developmental theory, it is when children first gain the capability for self-reflection in their fourth and fifth years that they begin to move imaginatively in time; then, as further development motivates conflict among dispositional and situational selves, the self resolves these inconsistencies by structuring them into coherent narratives. This begins in adolescence, when various temporally distributed positions grow integrated into metapositions; whereas more stable and minimally conflicting narrative positions are achieved in adulthood. Baressi’s (2011) elaboration of time in dialogical self theory is significant, in our view, since it observes time from the first-person perspective. However, his elaborations refer to the temporal dimensions of I-positions and not to the self as a single, ontological structure. Baressi’s position relies on the development of an awareness of oneself as temporal being, but it does not explain the temporal structure of the ontological being for whom this awareness develops. Moreover, despite questioning time from the first person perspective, Baressi ultimately observes the self along an objective, developmental trajectory and not within the context of a lived time. We take Valsiner’s (2007) elaboration of the dialogical self ’s temporal dimensions as the most comprehensive to date, as Valsiner describes selfhood expressly as temporal structure. This is already the case in his well-known theory of semiotic mediation, but since Valsiner also connects this theory with that of the dialogical self, we consider both of them here. Semiotic mediation describes how persons construct signs in their ongoing experience. Valsiner (2007) explains, “The whole of our psycho-logical system is set up to make distinctions in the field within which we are constantly moving” (p. 127). Thus, Valsiner studies personal experience as an ongoing, selective, and semiotic process. The oppositional nature of signs is a central feature in this process, for new meanings are formed when sign oppositions are galvanized into dynamic, temporal relations. This “galvanization” does not unfold merely within an abstract flow of time however; sign oppositions come to life always within a perpetually unfolding, personal present. More succinctly, Valsiner (2007) states that our sensory apparatus recognizes forms-inmovement whose perceptual inputs are further “sieved” (p. 127) via unique attention mechanisms; the attention mechanisms in turn make the sieved inputs available for semiotic reconstruction and presentation, and in this, prepare us for future meaning formulations. The personal present is here regarded as an ongoing, selective, and semiotic process, one involving a continuous reconstruction of acquired meanings within a particular context and according to a unique orientation toward the future. The entire process of semiotic mediation thus unfolds within a present that is essentially liminal. By definition, the present is liminal in that it “takes place” on the border between the past and future. But taken as a lived, personal experience, the present, explains Valsiner (2007), is an infinitesimal moment that unites the past and future through a basic temporal tension. Whereas the past imposes itself onto the present and organizes experience into a particular configuration of an “as-is” (p. 88), the unknown future pulls the present toward further possibilities, elaborating it with a goal-oriented “as-if ” (p. 88). The present is thus a temporal opposition between an “as-is” and “as-if ”—a perpetual moment of experience uniting past and future within a single structure. Valsiner (2007) integrates this understanding with dialogical self theory in order to account for the social character of the semiotic process. This is possible because dialogical self theory too conceptualizes experience as an ongoing tension, albeit between differing I-positions, each of which is ascribed a unique past and distinctive goal orientations. Valsiner identifies within this tension between differing I-positions a temporal opposition between an “as-is” and “as-if ” that characterizes the personal present and instigates the production of new meanings. The opposition between the “as-is” and the “as-if ” can thus be translated into the opposition between an I-position in dialogue with an other I-position, and in this way the social dimensions of the semiotic process are elaborated. Ultimately, the tension between the I-position-that-is and the I-position-that-is-to-be reveals “the birthplace of becoming—the movement into a new state” (p. 149). By conceptualizing the semiotic process within the perpetually unfolding present of a dialogical self, Valsiner (2007) explains the microdynamics of meaning generation as they relate to the lived time of a single existence. In this way, he avoids the individualist problem and instead offers a way to think about how the dialogical self unfolds in lived time. However, because Valsiner gives priority to the sociocultural constitution of experience, treating selfhood primarily as semiotic process unfolding “at the level of meanings” (p. 154), it is the nature of signs that ultimately comes to define the possibilities of existence, not temporality. Notably, Valsiner’s (2007) position is comparable to Heidegger’s in that Valsiner too regards the present as an ongoing “taking up” of the past in the direction of the future. However, with semiotics as the explanatory framework, Valsiner’s account of time serves as a coordinating formula for sign construction. Having related the semiotic process to a particular existence, in focusing on the microdynamics of a perpetually unfolding present, Valsiner’s account does not integrate these processes within a broader conception of a finite, onto-temporal existence at the level of personal lived experience for which it is meaningful. Time serves as an organizing principle for semiotic processes rather than as an ontological structure of selfhood, and accordingly, selfhood achieves its unique form not because of the nature of everydayness but because of the nature of signs—and particularly, their oppositional structures. In sum, in Valsiner’s account, it is semiotics and not temporality that determines the unfolding of experience. Discussion of dialogical self theory Generally speaking, dialogical self theorists tend to prioritize the constitutive role of semiotic and linguistic dimensions, since they study subjectivity primarily as an interplay of variably opposed voices in dialogue, continuously agreeing and disagreeing, questioning and answering, and creating new meanings in turn (Hermans, 2003). This kind of approach is noteworthy for having taken seriously the sociocultural constitution of human experience, which, despite being widely recognized during the linguistic turn in the social sciences, has not been addressed in mainstream psychology. However, in theorizing subjective life primarily in semiotic and linguistic terms, dialogical self theorists have paid less attention to how these processes are grounded in the lives of finite, onto-temporal existences. Indeed, in our view, the nearly exclusive focus on dialogue and sociocultural meanings suggests an implicit dualism between the self as a linguistic phenomenon, socioculturally understood, and the self as a category of experience, ontologically understood. It thus remains undetermined in dialogical self theory how a cultural subjectivity comes to be experienced at all. By focusing on the dynamics of sociocultural meanings and moreover, by observing these within an abstract temporal framework, dialogical self scholars have not theorized how unique forms of subjective life emerge as a result of their connection to particular ontological Beings. Accordingly, we argue that what is needed is an understanding of “dialogical selfhood” that addresses how finite existences in the world co-create meaning with others. As we have seen with Heidegger, existential time involves a threefold process wherein a “having been” is taken up in the “present” and trans-formed into a new possibility directed toward the future. Furthermore, it is only on the basis of this primordial temporality that abstract time can be derived together with others. Given such an analysis of temporality and subjectivity, what might a dialogical self look like when considered in this light? Recognizing that the dialogical self is not a full-fledged theory,8 nor is it meant to carry the weight of a metaphysics, we can nevertheless make some suggestions for theoretical advances. Already we have argued that time in dialogical self theory cannot be regarded as an abstract, unidimensional series of “nows” along which trans-formations in I-positions could be mapped. Instead, we argue for a “thick” and existential consideration of time that ought to be seen as constitutive of the dialogical self ’s organization. Specifically, the configuration of I-positions ought to be related to a single and finite temporality that chooses its future in the present on the basis of its having been. I-positions then are unfolding conversations whose horizons are shifting and labile because they envelop the past. Notably, our suggestion to relate I-positions to a single existence does not imply a return to a Cartesian understanding of a single self that autonomously chooses its course, nor to a neo-Kantian transcendental subject. Rather, we want to ground the multiplicity of I-positions by configuring them within a single temporality ontologically understood. Such a grounding is necessary if we are to understand why a given I chooses to appropriate particular Me’s. As per Heidegger’s account, it is only because we recognize ourselves as finite existences directed toward death that we are motivated to choose creative possibilities directed at the future. Similarly, we argue that theorizing the dialogical self as a single, onto-temporal existence is necessary for justifying the particular choices of a given self ’s I-positions, for otherwise there is no one for whom their developmental trajectory can be meaningful—without a single, temporal existence, I-positions belong to no one who cares for them or their particular configuration. To ground the dialogical self in a single ontological existence means reconceptualizing the dynamics of I-positions as a lived process rather than an abstract unfolding taking place “in the landscape of the mind,” or in “the realm of meaning.” In our view, the latter accounts are inadequate because they imply a dualism between an ontological being and a mental realm of psychological phenomena and in so doing they separate the self from the real, ontological consequences of its thinking. Not only the later Heidegger but the entire linguistic turn has focused on our fundamental inherence in language. However, in Heidegger’s terms, it is not language alone that is constitutive of Being, for we too participate in unveiling presence by speaking. Heidegger explains that speaking names, and in naming, it calls or invites things into presence, bringing the things it calls closer, “so that they may bear upon men as things” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 197). Therefore, what we speak—or think or dialogue—has a bearing on what is cleared in the opening of presence. We are in this sense co-responsible for what appears in presence by virtue of our relation with Being, for we are in speaking, allowing the saying to unconceal itself. Heidegger indirectly addresses the theoretical shortcomings of dialogical self theory, as researchers thus far have not theorized how the dialogical self unfolds as an onto-temporal process (in language). However, what Heidegger does not address in his elaboration is how existence unfolds with others. Whereas in his early works he explains the social constitution of experience through the concept of “the they,” in his later works he maintains that presence is unveiled in our speaking with one another: “to speak to one another ... implies a mutual showing of something, each person devoting himself or herself to what is shown” (Heidegger, 1959/1993b, p. 409). But neither “the they” nor the mutual engagement of “each person” expresses the chief insight of dialogical self theory: that experience itself involves a multiplicity of others in dialogue. Conversely then, dialogical self theory can also elaborate Heidegger’s account by revealing in the “presencing” of presence a social dimension that goes unaccounted for in the philosopher’s view. From a dialogical perspective, the unconcealing, ontological process that is “speaking” emerges in each case through a lived dialogue with an other, whether that other is real or imaginary. Presence in this sense is populated by others who maintain dialogical relations. Using Heideggerian terms, the meaning of Being unconceals historically through dialogues with others. In our view, that dialogicality characterizes selfhood carries implications for its onto-temporal structure. Accordingly, if we see dialogicality as existentiality, we may think of existence itself as thrown-Being-in-dialogue-toward its end. Our conception does not mean to suggest a simplistic bridging of Heidegger and dialogical self theory but invites an under-standing of dialogical selfhood as a genuinely (onto-)temporal process constituted through dialogical relations with others. For whereas death discloses the dialogical self as a temporal whole (existing as potentiality), dialogicality (as existentiality) exposes its temporal structure as Beingmultiple. With this perspective, to care for one’s Being means to care for one’s dialogical relations with others, and conversely, it means that these relations constitute the structure of care. With impending death, it is the entire self-system (ontologically whole and dialogically unfolding) that is at issue and not one or even any number of I-positions. Accordingly, to respond to one’s finitude entails reconfiguring the multiplicity of relations that constitutes the self and not simply transforming any one position taken independently. Furthermore, the self only comes into being through and with others, which means that its creative responses always entail a multiplicity of divergent voices.9 We realize that this complicates the question of authentic existence, but it is beyond the scope of this chapter to address it here. What we have proposed is a way to think of dialogical selfhood as an onto-temporal process, maintaining in this how it is always single and finite existences that co-create meaning with others in the world. Final remarks In this chapter, we have examined the dialogical self through a rudimentary study of Heidegger’s work. We realize the difficulty in both interpreting and applying a Heideggerian position to a concept that has been broadly influenced by numerous contemporary perspectives in the social sciences. Furthermore, we have been mute on the critical work both on Heidegger and his philosophy that has flourished since the 1920s. In addition, we do not expect to come to any rigorous conclusion for Heidegger’s philosophy demands the acceptance of a philosophical language that would exclude most work in contemporary psychology. Hence, this is not an attempt to create a “fusion” of Heideggerian philosophy and dialogical self theories. Instead, we hope we have mined Heidegger’s insights for a conception of lived time that is at odds with the tradition of mechanical, spatial, clock time. In so doing, we hope to have shown that in reconsidering time, we also reconsider the dialogical self as a project of and in time. Notably, if cultural psychologists are to take seriously the temporal structure of subjectivity as we have argued it here, then the basic view of subjectivity as deeply cultural must be complemented with a corresponding view of culture as deeply temporal. That is, culture cannot be treated as mere system of signs and meanings whose transformations can be traced along the line of an abstract temporal axis. Rather, culture ought to be studied as a lived process, one whose developments emerge through the onto-temporal organization of selves involved in dialogical relations with others. One way to do this, our study may suggest, is to consider culture in the broad and dynamic sense of Heidegger’s language; from here, culture may be thought to engage ecstatic temporalities that, through this engagement, structure the nature and development of cultural meanings. To summarize, our discussion of Heidegger, temporality, and dialogical self theory aimed to address the limited notion of time in dialogical self theory and elaborate it with insights from Heidegger’s approach. In so doing, we have proposed to ground the self ontologically, claiming that selfhood unfolds as finite temporalities speak the world with others in dialogue. By presenting the dialogical self in this way, we have argued that the self is coexistent with temporality, and dialogicality is itself a feature of time. In dialogue with others, the self comes to awareness of time in language. Acknowledgments We thank Lívia Mathias Simão, Jaan Valsiner, and Danilo Silva Guimarães for their astute comments and helpful suggestions on an earlier version of this chapter. Notes 1. The distinction between “objective” and “subjective” time is also discussed by Cornejo and Olivares (this volume), who explain its importance for advancing a culturalpsychological approach to time. Specifically, these authors distinguish between (objective) time as “linear sequence of moments” and (subjective) temporality as “the sense of time,” tracing the roots of this distinction to 19th century phenomenology. Whereas our discussion will arrive at a similar distinction, because we come to it by way of Heidegger, “temporality” and “time” are introduced in their unique, Heideggerian senses. Accordingly, “temporality” is explained as the ontological structure of existence, whereas “time” (discussed in Heidegger’s later work) is understood in terms of its co-belonging with Being. Once these terms are clarified, we will consider their implications for the nature of time assumed in dialogical self theory. 2. Being does not refer to any being in particular but means “that which deter-mines entities as entities” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 25) and refers to “the B  eing of entities” (p. 26)  3. Geworfen is the past participle of werfen, whereas Geworfenheit reflects Heidegger’s propensity to nominalize verbal forms (Griffiths, 2006).  4. Understanding does not grasp thematically that upon which it projects (i.e., possibilities) for “in projecting, project throws possibility before itself as possibility, and as such lets it be” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 183).  5. Heidegger (1969/1972) writes, “What determines both, time and Being, in their own, that is, in their belonging together, we shall call: Ereignis, the event of Appropriation. Ereignis will be translated [from the German into English] as Appropriation or event of Appropriation” (p. 19). Inwood (1999) translates Ereignis as “event” and relates it to sich ereignen, “to happen, occur.” Until the 18th century, the latter were spelt Eräugnis, eräugnen, arising from Auge (meaning “eye”) and meaning “placing/to place before the eye, becoming/to become visible” (p. 54).  6. For Heidegger, showing is implied in saying, “Yet what is it we call saying? To experience this, we shall hold to what our language itself calls on us to think in this word. Sagan means to show, to let something appear, let it be seen and heard” (Heidegger, 1959/1993b, pp. 408–409). In his translation of this essay, Krell recognizes the difficulty in connecting in English “saying” (Sagen) with “showing” (Zeigen); Krell suggests that “the Latin dico brings both senses together: ‘I say’ originally means ‘I show through words’” (footnote, p. 409 in Heidegger, 1959/1993b).  7. Here our discussion corresponds with that of Cornejo and Olivares (this volume) who, after tracing the historical development of the distinction between “objective” and “subjective” time, discuss its relevance to cultural psychology.  8. Hermans and Gieser (2011) refer to dialogical self theory as a “bridging theory.”  9. Readers may be interested in Ricoeur’s (1990/1992) Oneself as Another for an alternative phenomenological theory of selfhood that comes into being with others.  References  Bambach, C. (2011). The time of the self and the time of the other. History and Theory 50, 254–269. Baressi, J. (2011). Time and the dialogical self. In H. J. M. Hermans & T. Gieser (Eds.), Handbook of dialogical self theory (pp. 46–63). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Bertau, M.-C. (2004). Developmental origins of the dialogical self: Some significant moments. In H. J. M. Hermans & G. Dimaggio (Eds.), The dialogical self in psychotherapy. New York, NY: BrunnerRoutledge. Bertau, M.-C. 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