Assessing “Old” and “New” Parameters and Contours of Turkey’s Iraqi Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Challenges Ahead Emel Parlar Dal and Ferit Belder1 Abstract his paper aims to look at both the old and new parameters and contours of Turkish-Iraqi relations since the 1980s up until now. It also seeks to understand the “real change” in the current Turkish-Iraqi relations together with the challenges and opportunities that currently face the two countries in the Middle East. he paper starts from Saddam Hussein’s era and analyses respectively the post-Saddam era and its challenges, the Maliki government, the Arab Spring era, the rise of ISIS threat and Kobane assault. Résumé Ce travail vise à examiner à la fois les anciens et les nouveaux paramètres et les contours des relations turcoirakiennes depuis les années 1980 jusqu’à nos jours. Il cherche également à comprendre le « vrai changement » dans les relations actuelles TurquieIraq avec les déis et les opportunités que rencontrent actuellement les deux pays au Moyen-Orient. Ce travail evalue les relations entre les deux pays à partir de l’epoque de Saddam Hussein et analyse respectivement l’ère postSaddam et ses déis, les relations bilaterales sous le gouvernement de Maliki, l’ère du printemps arabe, la montée de la menace de Daesh et le siège de Kobane. 1- Emel Parlar Dal est Maître de conferences dans le département de relations internationales ál’Université de Marmara. Son dernier ouvrage collectif “Turkey’s Rise as an Emerging Power“ ( avec Paul Kubicek et H. Tarık Oguzlu (eds.) est paru chez Routledge en décembre 2014. Ferit Belder est doctorant en relations internationales et assistant de recherche dans le département de relations internationales á l’Université de Marmara. 133 n° 2-2015 Introduction 134 It can be clearly observed that in recent years Turkey has added new elements to its Iraqi policy by putting the Northern Iraqi reality at the center of its new foreign policy agenda. On the other hand, Turkey’s Iraqi policy, despite its ambivalence in times of crisis, still continues to draw upon its old parameters which remained unchanged. It is not possible to totally discern Turkey’s policy towards Iraq from the general framework of its Middle Eastern foreign policy. Turkey’s distant relations with its Middle Eastern neighbours throughout the Cold War years have also been clearly relected in Turkey-Iraqi relations. Turkey’s long-lasting securitization policies towards this region, as well as its geopolitical and civilizational imagination and perceptions with regards its Middle Eastern neighbours made it avoid pursuing a sophisticated and pragmatic approach to Iraq. In recent years Turkey has been witnessing a signiicant shit in its relations with Iraq. Four regional dynamics have driven this shit: the 2003 Iraqi War, U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, the Arab uprisings and the consequences of the deepening Syrian civil war and the rise of KRG as an autonomous quasi-state actor. Of course, with all these new developments, Turkey also faces a host of new challenges from the rise of ISIS threat in Iraq and Syria to the negative impacts of the expansionist agenda of the Islamic State on Turkey’s ongoing Kurdish peace process. In this backdrop, this paper aims to look at both the old and new parameters and contours of Turkish-Iraqi relations since the 1980s up until now. It also seeks to understand the “real change” in the current Turkish-Iraqi relations together with the challenges and opportunities that currently face the two countries in the Middle East disorder. In doing so, it also tries to assess under which circumstances and through which strategic agenda Turkey-Northern Iraq rapprochement has been achieved. Since the timeframe chosen is relatively long, the paper starts from the Saddam era, analyses respectively the post-Saddam era and its challenges, the Maliki government, the Arab Spring era, the rise of ISIS threat and Kobane assault. Accordingly, the irst part of the paper looks at “Iraq” in Turkey’s Middle Eastern Foreign Policy in the 20th Century through a brief retrospective analysis. In this irst part, initially the rise of Iraq in Turkish foreign policy agenda in the Cold War Era will be treated. Secondly, Turkey-Iraq relations in the Saddam era will be briely mentioned. hirdly, the emerging shit in Turkey’s Iraqi foreign policy will be explained together with the challenges of the Post- Saddam Era. he second part of the paper focuses on parameters and contours of Turkey’s new Iraqi policy ater 2003. In doing so, it irst looks at Kurdish and Northern Iraq dimensions of this new policy. hen it analyses the problematic relations with the Maliki government. Lastly, it uncovers Turkey’s ambiguous Turkmens policy. he third part of this study seeks to see the efect of Arab Spring on Turkey’s Iraqi relations. his third part irstly looks at Turkey’s pragmatic rapprochement with Northern Iraq in the midst of the Middle Eastern turmoil. Secondly, it explains the way Turkey faces ISIS hreat through hostage crisis and its implications on Turkish foreign policy. hirdly, it focuses on Kobane siege of ISIS and its impact on the current Turkish-Iraqi relations and Turkey’s Kurdish opening process. Assessing Turkey’s relations with Iraq requires a closer look at the country’s relations with the entire Middle East region since Turkey’s regional policies towards its Middle Eastern neighbours were merely drawn upon similar status quo-centered policies and security-oriented considerations. Two main foreign policy principles-status quo and Westernism- (Oran, 2001), together with the tradition of non-involvement in the third countries’ internal afairs, have long served as the cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy. Regarding the Westernism of Turkish foreign policy, it must be reminded that the Ottoman modernization project triggered in 19th century had already started to turn the country’s face to the West, but the existence of strong cultural ties with the Islamic civilization led to the emergence of ontological dilemmas and paradoxes in terms of the country’s identity and foreign policy related choices. his also associated with a negligence of the country’s Ottoman legacy in the expense of its unfolding pro-Westernism. In this section, in the light of 20th century international order, Turkish foreign policy toward Iraq will be analysed under three periods that are identiied by exclusive characteristics. he evolution of Turkish foreign policy on Iraq and its rising importance in the Cold War era is the irst period that will be explained. Secondly, Turkey’s construction of its Iraqi foreign policy in the Saddam era will be treated. Lastly, changes emerged in Turkish foreign policy on Iraq will briely be mentioned. 1.Rise of Iraq in Turkish Foreign Policy Agenda in the Cold War Era: Is here a Distinct Iraq Policy or Not? In the early republican period, Turkey was always in search of being part of the Western world and civilisation. Institutional and developmental attempts of the Republic aiming to reach the level of modern civilisations clearly relected this goal. Of course, in the Republican era, the foreign E. Parlar Dal and F. Belder : Assessing “Old” and “New” Parameters and Contours of Turkey’s Iraqi Foreign Policy I.“Iraq” in Turkey’s Middle Eastern Foreign Policy in the 20th Century: A Brief Retrospective Account 135 n° 2-2015 136 policy orientation of Turkish leaders cannot be dissociated from the country’s dominant Westernist ideology which also prevented Turkey to actively get involved in Middle Eastern afairs up until 1970s and 1980s. Here it must be reminded that Kemalist elites have long pursued distant relations with Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbours mainly due to their material and intellectual backwardness and as a result of their prevailing mistrust derived from the First World War toward these countries and their culturalist reading of the region (Parlar Dal 2012). In these years, Turkey considered the Middle East as a whole entity without developing speciic country by country policies. In the 1950s, the onset of the Cold War intensiied Turkey’s security concerns arose from Soviet Union and being a part of Western security alliance (NATO) forced Turkey to look at Middle East from the window of the Western-oriented ideology. he start of the detente period in the international system, the deterioration of the world economy as a result of the 1973 Oil crisis and Turkey’s search for support in the UN General Assembly with regards to the peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem led to the emergence of alternative approaches in its foreign policy orientation. he new challenges of the international environment of the 60s and 70s pushed Turkey to adopt a more autonomous and independent foreign policy line. Turkey’s quest for an alternative to its unbalanced Western-centered foreign policy made it rediscover its Middle Eastern neighbourhood mainly through the development of its economic ties with these countries. However, in those years the political atmosphere of Turkey and the Middle East did not provide a proper ground for a real lourishment of close relations. he psychological factors based on the fear of instability and chaos emanating from the Middle East associated with negative historical legacies inherited from the Ottoman period (Hale 1992) made it diicult for Turkey to overcome misperceptions about this region. In the two subsequent Gulf Crises respectively in 1991 and 2003, despite the high pressure from the USA to Turkish oicials for support, he Turkish public couldn’t be persuaded to fully support policy that would bring Turkey into the war. Even now, some parts of Turkish political elites describe the Middle East as a swamp that should be kept away from (Daily Sabah 2014). With the arrival of the Motherland party in 1983 under the leadership of Özal, Turkey started to pursue a more active and multi-directional foreign policy. Turkey’s new economic activism was enabled by Özal’s neoliberal opening approach. Regarding Turkey’s Iraqi relations, it can be said that with the onset of the IranIraqi war, the economic dependence of Iraq, as well as that of Iran on Turkey, considerably increased. E. Parlar Dal and F. Belder : Assessing “Old” and “New” Parameters and Contours of Turkey’s Iraqi Foreign Policy 2. Saddam Hussein’s Era (1979- 2003) It is true to argue that Turkey’s Iraq policy had not been seriously challenged until the end of the 1980s. When Saddam Hussein rose to power, he found a geographically and ideologically favourable context to construct a formidable identity. 1979 Camp David Agreements suspended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world. In the same year, Iran witnessed the irst Islamic revolution in the world. All these factors led to the rising of Saddam as an inluential actor in the Iraqi political scene. He tried to exploit regional power vacuum in the Gulf region and went to war against Iran. Eight-year Iran- Iraq war afected not only the regional balances but also Turkey’s Iraqi policy and its Middle Eastern policy as well. During Iran-Iraq War, Saddam intensiied its military power towards its southern border and this also facilitated the rise of inluence of Kurdish parties in Northern Iraq (Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu 2001). In 1979, Masoud Barzani, who has been the key igure in Northern Iraq for several years, took the leadership of KDP ater his father’s death. Within the eight year long Iran- Iraq war, Turkey’s political and economic importance for both these two countries and the entire region became more signiicant. Both sides needed manufactured goods imported from Turkey and the rest of the world coming to their countries through Turkish soil (Barkey, 2011). However, this war also created a power vacuum for PKK to carry out operations in Northern Iraq against Turkey. Besides, Saddam’s use of chemical weapons against Kurdish population in Halabja forced thousands of other Kurdish civilians to lee towards Turkish and Iranian borders. he 1980s also witnessed the transformation of the Kurdish issue into a destabilizing factor for Turkey’s security ater the start of the PKK’s irst military insurrection in 1984. he emergence of Northern Iraq as an autonomous region also led to an increase in Turkey’s traditional fear of secession. his perception has long dominated Turkish foreign policy discourse and action vis-à-vis the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular (Benli Altunışık, 2006). he 90s were also marked by continuous tensions with the Syrian government who hosted the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan for so long. In the same period, Turkey also searched for regional cooperation with its two neighbours, namely Iran and Iraq with the aim of containing its own Kurdish problem. While PJAK fought against Iranian military targets, Iraqi Kurds engaged in establishing an autonomous body in Northern Iraq. For Turkish leaders, Iraqi territorial integrity must be preserved at any price, otherwise a Kurdish independent state might be established next to Turkey’s borders. Added to this fear of Turks there is also the anxiety about the increasing inluence of Iran over the region. In this respect, it 137 n° 2-2015 138 can be argued that both Turkey and the USA viewed stable and benign Iraq as a balance against Iran. 1991 Gulf War represents a turning point in Turkey-Iraq relations. Despite the existence of domestic opposition to Turkey’s active involvement in the war, Turkish government under the pressing inluence of President of Republic, Turgut Özal, who viewed the Gulf War as an opportunity for Turkish national interests, took part alongside the coalition forces. Ater the end of the Gulf War, Shias in the south and Kurds in the north rose in rebellion and both were suppressed by Saddam Hussein. his caused another refugee crisis for Turkey. In order to cope with rising number of refugees, Turkey supported “safe haven” solution for civilians in Northern Iraq (Charountaki 2012). Moreover, Turkey stopped Iraq’s oil exports through Turkish pipelines in accordance to UN sanctions. In order to keep Saddam’s air force under control to prevent him from launching a violent strike against Kurdish citizens, Turkey allowed the deployment of 100,000 US troops along the Iraqi-Turkish border. he Gulf War led to the emergence of a Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq as a result of the establishment of a no-ly zone in this region with the aim of protecting the Iraqi Kurdish population from Saddam’s violent attacks. he establishment of a non-ly zone prevented a huge refugee low towards Turkey; however, Turkey indirectly helped the institutionalization of Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq and the settlement of PKK in the region. In the following years PKK established bases for attacks against Turkish soil and also exploited the availability of arms from Iraqi troops (Barkey 2000). hroughout the 1990s, Turkish leaders constructed their foreign policy on the basis of these two major challenges,-Kurdish secessionism and political Islam-, which led to the securitization of politics in the country. he securitization of politics created misperceptions with regards to Turkey’s neighbours, especially in the Middle East. In Saddam era, Turkey foreign policy towards Iraq was mostly determined by political and economic factors. At the political level, Northern Iraq emerged as a securitized zone in the eyes of Turkish leaders due to the PKK’s operations towards Turkish targets and the emergence of Northern Iraqi Kurdish autonomous entity. Economic sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council against Iraq negatively afected Turkish economy, as well. With the lack of a strong economic dimension in bilateral relations, Iraq policy of Turkey was dramatically securitized and, as a consequence, the preservation of the territorial integrity of Iraq appeared as the most important security and foreign policy concern of Turkish decision-makers. E. Parlar Dal and F. Belder : Assessing “Old” and “New” Parameters and Contours of Turkey’s Iraqi Foreign Policy 3. Towards a Shit in Turkey’s Iraqi Foreign Policy: Turkey vis-à-vis the Challenges of the Post- Saddam Era Turkey’s main concern with regard to Iraq remained unchanged in the post-Saddam era: preserving Iraq’s territorial integrity. For instance, Bülent Ecevit, former Prime Minister of Turkey of the DSP-MHPANAP coalition government, had expressed his fears about the negative consequences of a possible war and the changing dynamics in Iraq in case of a regime change (Benli Altunışık 2006). It is clear that Saddam’s downfall opened up a new political era for the future of Iraq. Formerly excluded groups such as Shias and Kurds were integrated into the government bodies at the expense of the alienation of formerly dominant Sunni groups. he existence of ethnic and religious imbalances in the post-Saddam regime created a political lacuna for the further expansion of the activities of some fundamentalist groups. For instance, ISIS also emerged as a consequence of the political disorder and injustice of the post-Saddam era, as well as of the rising discontentment of the Sunni groups largely excluded from the Shii-dominated Iraqi government. Under these circumstances, the sectarian conlicts, the Northern Iraq region increased its autonomy and was de facto separated from the rest of Iraq thanks to its high oil revenues, its own trade activities and the strong American support. Of course, KRG’s (Kurdistan Regional Government) increasing autonomy also made Turkey takes some new scenarios about the future of KRG into consideration. On the other hand, the uniication agreement signed between KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and PUK (the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan), two former rivals helped KRG reinforce its institutionalization Here it is important to remind that in the 90s the inspiring efect of Northern Iraqi experience for Kurdish people in Turkey was seen as a security concern by Turkish oicials (Kirişçi 1996). However, as a consequence of the deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the central Baghdadi government, Turkey had to revise its strategic orientations regarding the future of Iraq and this forced them to further cooperate with the KRG. In fact, with the refusal of 1stMarch 2003 motion allowing the transit of American soldiers to Northern Iraq through Turkish soil by the Turkish Parliament, Turkey was largely excluded from the statebuilding process in Iraq (Çakmak 2011). On the other hand, the rapid deterioration of Turkish-American relations with Turkey’s rejection of 1st March motion, the Northern Iraqi Kurds appeared as a new and reliable ally for the Americans in the absence of Turkey. he US’s rapprochement with the Kurds also increased Turkey’s fears about a possible Kurdish secessionist movement that might have given way to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. However, Turkey’s rejection of 1st March 139 motion also caused an increase in Turkey’s prestige in both regional and international arena (Aras 2009). II. Parameters and Contours of Turkey’s New Iraqi Policy after 2003 n° 2-2015 With the arrival of the AKP in power in 2002, Turkey’s relations with the Middle East took a new dimension in terms of politics and discourse (Parlar Dal 2012). Of course, Turkey’s changing Middle East policy cannot be read independently from both the shiting strategic outlook of Turkish foreign policy and the transforming domestic environment in the country. he end of the militaristic hegemony over Kurdish issue, notable economic growth, self- conidence of the AKP government and new foreign policy orientations embedded in Turkey’s new neighbourhood policy conceptualized through zero- problems with neighbours principle all accelerated this transformation process of Turkish politics in general (Benli Altunışık 2006). he uncertainties and political instability of the post-Baath era also added new parameters to this shiting Turkish foreign policy thanks to its more nuanced multidimensional foreign policy. he regional developments such as the emergence of KRG as an inluential actor and a more stable region in the Middle East also impacted the way Turkish foreign policy decision makers reconigured Turkish regional foreign policy agenda. With regard to Iraq, the status of Kirkuk and the rights of Turkmens have also become a subject of concern for the Turkish leaders. Maliki’s rising sectarian and authoritarian attempts considerably afected Turkey’s calculations about the Northern Iraq as well as its relations with other groups including Turkmens. Another important development of post 2003 period, which also afected Turkish foreign policy, was the removal of long standing UN sanctions against Iraq. his led to a considerable increase in trade volumes between Turkey and Iraq. 140 1. Kurdish and Northern Iraq Dimensions Ater the Iraqi war in 2003 Turkey’s main concern regarding Iraq was about the establishment of a stable government in the country. In this respect, in 2008 Turkey tried to persuade Iraqis to sign the “Status of Forces Agreement”, which predicted the withdrawal of US troops within three years. he continuity of American military forces in Iraq disturbed Iranian government whilst Turkey envisaged this agreement as a counter- pressure to Iranian inluence in the region (Barkey 2011) It is evident that Kurdish political entity in Northern Iraq is at the heart of the Turkish foreign policy just like in the past and it is likely to be so in the future. However, in some periods or circumstances, Turkey sotened its approach to the Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq, especially at times of the absence of conlicts with the PKK in Turkey. E. Parlar Dal and F. Belder : Assessing “Old” and “New” Parameters and Contours of Turkey’s Iraqi Foreign Policy Basically, Turkish strategic orientations regarding Iraq closely concerns Iraq’s territorial integrity and its willingness to assure the security of its southeast border despite the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish government in Northern Iraq. Turkey has been witnessing PKK operations against military targets and -to a lesser extent- civilians since the 1980s. Since then, PKK has gained a strategic and operational depth in Northern Iraq as a result of the lack of strict control of Turkey-Iraqi border. It is important to remind that due to Turkey’s ongoing mistrust towards the Northern Iraqi Kurdish population throughout the 80s and 90s, Turkey pursued a rapprochement policy towards Iraqi government. And, as a consequence, the two countries signed hot pursuit agreements respectively in 1983 and 1984 allowing both sides to pursuit combatants beyond their borders (Sönmezoğlu 2006). Based on these agreements, Turkey launched several military operations against Northern Iraq. Of course, these operations were harshly criticized by the Northern Iraqi Kurds. In some cases, Turkish military forces conducted operations in coordination with Peshmerga forces, especially in the years of partial alliance between Turkey and Barzani against Syria, Iran and PKK triangle (Barkey 2011). However, Turkey mostly accused the KRG of not having prevented and eliminated the PKK militants in Northern Iraq (Cagaptay and Evans 2012). 2009 witnessed some policy changes in Turkish Iraqi policy as a result of evolving domestic and international dynamics. he idea of irreversible outcomes of Iraq war forced Turkish oicials to develop alternative paradigms to adopt the newly emerging order in the region. In domestic politics, Turkey launched “Kurdish Reform Package” that also included a Northern Iraq dimension. his reform package aimed to further improve democratic standards for all citizens, especially the Kurdish citizens and thus to bring long-standing conlicts to an end. For this reason, the negative impact of beyond border operations on the newly launched Kurdish process as well as the rise of hopes regarding a possible resolution to Turkey’s chronic Kurdish problem were other variables that can be argued as new dynamics pushing Turkey to alter its mainstream Kurdish approach (Barkey 2010). In the democratization process, Turkey started to think of the KRG as a counter Kurdish image against PKK and tried to use KRG to persuade PKK to stop ighting against Turkey. hus, Iraqi Kurds were seen as an important part of Turkey’s peace process. (Barkey 2011). As Henri Barkey stated, another crucial reason behind Turkish democratic initiative is the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and the uncertainties regarding Iraq’s future. Considering the Northern Iraq as a bufer zone between itself and other fundamental groups Turkey sought to expand its engagement in the Northern Iraq throughout coercion (beyond border 141 n° 2-2015 military operations) and consent (KRG’s dependence on Turkey for both politically and economically). KRG’s increasing anxiety derived from the rising Iranian inluence over Iraq and Maliki’s sectarian authoritative attempts made Turkey as plausible future ally for KRG. he irst step for rapprochement between KRG and Turkey was realized upon Barzani’s encouragement of Turkish businessman to invest in Northern Iraq (Cagatay and Evans 2012). his was followed by an increasing interest of Turkish construction irms on the reconstruction projects in Iraq. Bilateral relations between Ankara and Iraqi Kurds continued to further develop in 2009 and 2010 in terms of trade, economics and politics. he two sides signed an agreement for direct oil-sales in 2009. In the following year Turkey opened its consulate in Erbil, one of the major cities of the KRG. his can also be seen as a sign of the rise of Northern Iraq in Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. Energy partnership between Turkey and the KRG overshadowed past tensions between the two sides (Tol, 2014). 142 2. Problematic Relations with the Maliki Government: What Went Wrong? Turkey’s traditional Iraqi foreign policy was based on its support to central authority rather than to the other religious and ethnic groups. Despite all the cruelties and deiciencies of Saddam, his regime constituted a stabilizing factor for Turkey’s national security. Ater the downfall of Saddam regime, Shiite people, who had been previously excluded from the government under Saddam rule, gained power under the Maliki government. Trilateral cooperation between Turkey, Iraq and the USA was established to struggle with PKK. In the initial stages of Maliki era, there was no challenging dispute between Turkey and Iraq. Davutoğlu’s principle of “zero problem” with neighbours had also contributed to the further development of relations between the two governments. However, the increasing sectarian stance of Maliki and his demand to centralize power started to alienate both Sunni Arabs and Kurds. Furthermore, Turkey was also disturbed by Maliki’s political attempts that might enable Iranian inluence over Iraq to grow. As a result, in 2010 elections, Turkey strongly supported Allawi’s Iraqiyah bloc, which is Shiite in origin with secular orientation. In doing this, Turkey also tended to encourage various Sunni groups in the country to participate in Iraqi politics. Turkey’s attempts were also suspected by Baghdad government as it had been intervening in Iraqi domestic afairs and violating Iraqi state’s right of sovereignty (Reuters Africa, 2012) Ater 2010 elections, Maliki strengthened his authority and consolidated his power and this led to the a deterioration of the relations between Turkey and Iraq. Ater the US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, III. The Arab Spring Effect on Turkey’s Iraqi Relations: Challenges and Dynamics Turkey’s new strategy of opening to the formerly neglected geographies in its foreign policy agenda, such as the Middle East and Africa, was one of the main characteristics of new Turkish foreign policy outlook. he new neighbourhood policy of Turkey formulated by Ahmet Davutoğlu, current Prime Minister and former Foreign Minister and chief adviser to Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan which was based on the famous zero problems with neighbours envisaged, indeed, a proactive and multidirectional foreign policy in both Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood and extra-regional zones. (Davutoğlu, 2010) hese new regional policies of Turkey included the signature of visa-free agreements with the neighbouring countries, economic cooperation agreements for increasing trade volumes among each other, mediation attempts in conlicted zones (for instance, Turkey’s mediation eforts respectively between Syria-Israel and Israel-Hamas). hen Turkey was surprisingly caught by the unexpected Arab revolts, - a revolutionary wave in its initial stage- surrounded most of Middle East and North African E. Parlar Dal and F. Belder : Assessing “Old” and “New” Parameters and Contours of Turkey’s Iraqi Foreign Policy Turkey’s eforts to create a uniied pluralist bloc against Maliki failed. his attempt of Turkey was also perceived as an efort in creating a Sunni alliance against the Shiite-dominated Maliki government and Turkey was blamed by some of its neighbours such as Iran for having pursued a sectarian policy in the region. Another source of tension between Turkish and Maliki government was about Turkey’s hosting of Tariq al- Hashimi, former vice president of Iraq who was sentenced to death penalty because of alleged several crimes including an assassination plan for Maliki. Despite Interpol’s red bulletin, Turkey declared that Hashimi was hospitalized and this caused new controversies between Ankara and Bagdad. Maliki considered Turkey as a state pursuing interests opposed to the ones of the Arab (Yeğin and Özertem 2013). Maliki’s removal from power with some concessions (for instance, he is appointed as vice president of Iraq) as a consequence of US pressure opened up a new era in Turkey-Iraq relations. In this respect, it is no surprise that Turkey became the irst country to oicially congratulate al Abadi ater the establishment of the new government (Duman 2014c). Since then, Turkey has engaged in the restoration of its deteriorated relations with the central government through its attempt to balance its relations with the latter and KRG. Davutoğlu’s recent visits to Baghdad and Erbil can be read, in this respect, as a willingness of the Turkish government to reconstruct its relations with Iraq on a brand new and more efective ground. (Turkish Weekly 2014). 143 n° 2-2015 countries which overthrew Zine El Abidine Bin Ali in Tunisia, Gaddai in Libya, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Ale Abdullah Saleh in Yemen. Moreover, an attempted overthrow in Syria turned into a deepening civil war which caused the death of millions of civilians, a huge refugee problem and the emergence of new Al-qaeda ailiated violent non-state actors in the country, such as the ISID (ISIL or Islamic State) with its expansionist agenda. hese unexpected consequences of the Arab uprisings have also led to signiicant changes in foreign policy preferences of major powers and regional countries. Under these rapidly changing regional circumstances, Turkey’s ethical approach to the regional crisis evidenced in its strict opposition to the Egyptian coup d’état, in its regime change policy towards Syria and its humanitarian approach to the increasing number of the Syrian refugees on its territory clearly illustrates the foreign policy path taken by the Turkish government in the Arab Spring era. Another consequence of the Arab uprisings for Turkish foreign policy relates to the emergence of new security challenges emanating from its uncontrolled borders, huge economic losses and lastly, the rising ISIS threat near its borders. In this Middle Eastern disorder, the Northern Iraqi region appears as a stable political and economic ally for Turkey who, in recent years, had very distant and problematic relations with the central Maliki government. 144 1.Turkey’s Pragmatic Rapprochement with Northern Iraq in the Midst of the Middle Eastern Turmoil: Quo Vadis? he emergence of new security challenges, political and economic instabilities, disorder and the ongoing civil war in Syria made the existing alliance relations in the Middle East more fragile and volatile. In this atmosphere of increasing humanitarian tragedies and political uncertainties it seems likely that regional countries like Turkey seek to establish new alliances which could serve them in inding new areas of cooperation on the basis of common economic and political interests. Turkey’s new approach to the Northern Iraqi reality may also be read and assessed from this perspective. Certainly, there also exist other reasons and motivations that have pushed Turkey for rapprochement with the Iraqi Kurds. he Iranian factor, Iran’s political weight in Iraqi policy due to its close links with the Shia dominated Maliki government and its “special” relations with the Assad regime with which Ankara broke up since August 2011, made the KRG appear as a sole reliable actor against the unfolding Shiite coalition in the eyes of the Turks (Cagaptay and Evans 2012). In addition to that, the KRG was also seen by Ankara as a Kurdish balancer to both the PKK and the PYD, the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Party which are accepted as terrorist organization by Turkey. E. Parlar Dal and F. Belder : Assessing “Old” and “New” Parameters and Contours of Turkey’s Iraqi Foreign Policy On the other hand, the rise of the KRG as a new political ally for Turkey has also become a matter of concern and criticism for the opposition in the country who mistrust Barzani mainly due to its previous support to PKK and to its separatist objectives. In this regard, it can be argued that Turkey’s rapprochement with Barzani lacks a strong societal support mainly due to the enduring conlicts between Turkey and PKK for more than 30 years. he non-resolution of the Kurdish problem at home appears as the main source of mistrust and misperceptions about KRG. Here it is important to remind that in 2007 even the former Prime Minister and current president of the Turkish Republic, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had described Barzani as a tribal leader claiming that he had actively supported PKK (Hürriyet Daily News 2007). In the same year Turkey declared its opposition to any changes in the KRG’s capital, Kirkuk’s existing status and underlined that Kirkuk’s separate entity could not be given to any groups (KRG) or authorities. Obviously, all these new developments led to the strengthening of all these antiKRG sentiment in Turkey. Ater 2008, Turkey engaged in increasing its economic and political ties with the KRG. Ater the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and in the political turmoil caused by Arab Spring, the Kurdish authority had transformed into a strategic partner. his initial change of view about KRG has been criticized by opposition parties in Turkey. However, the AKP government is trying to deepen its ties with the KRG who is not seen as an enemy anymore, instead a stable neighbour who can be useful for PKK operations, controlling Syrian Kurdish entities and balancing Iranian inluence and Shiite collation. Besides that, the Northern Iraq is an important economic market for Turkish import goods and a signiicant oil exporter. Here it must also be reminded that in its relations with Iraq, Turkey also uses sot power mechanisms together with the ones more related with hard power (Özcan 2011). It is also striking that despite the existing controversies between Iraq and Turkey, trade volume between two countries has been considerably increasing. In Turkey’s increasing economic engagement in Northern Iraq, energy factor and Turkish investments occupy a central place and this also reinforces the interdependence between Turkey and the KRG. In 2012, KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani stated that Northern Iraq’s economic scale with Turkey in energy area is signiicantly rising (Ministry of Natural Resources, Kurdistan Regional Government, 2012). While economic interdependence between Turkey and Northern Iraq have considerably been growing in recent years, Turkey has also been on the quest of furthering its cooperation with the new Baghdad government ater Maliki’s removal from power. Facing the rising ISIS 145 n° 2-2015 threat, Turkey’s search for balance between the KRG and the central Iraqi government seems to be more crucial than ever. Of course, Turkey’s balance strategy towards Iraq needs to be attentively followed since the possible attempts of the KRG for independence in a near future might change the calculations of Turkey and other regional actors. 146 2.Turkey Faces ISIS hreat: Hostage Crisis and Its Implications on Turkish Foreign Policy ISIS is a rising inluential, violent and armed non-state actor involved in Middle Eastern politics ater the onset of the uprisings in Syria. Despite that its outstanding proile has been observed by Western countries since 2012, roots of Islamic radicalism in Iraq go back to the guerrilla resistance against US troops in Iraq. (Çubukçu 2006) Jihadi groups composed of local Sunni radicals and ighters coming from all over the world took advantage of the legitimacy of resistance against the US in the eyes of ordinary Iraqis. Post- Saddam order could not integrate Sunni groups into the newly established political system in Iraq. One of the main inluential actors of radical elements, Abu Musab el Zarkawi, not only used this disappointment but also deepened the division between Shia and Sunni clashes, which violently took place in 2006-2007. In both the Syrian and Iraqi cases, it seems clear that the authoritarian policies of these governments provide a ground for radical elements. (Orhan 2014) For Turkey, ISIS is a consequence of the instable political system, the ongoing sectarian disputes in Iraq and of the power vacuum that emerged in Syria as a result of the deepening civil war since 2011. In this regard, one of Turkey’s main concerns with regard to Iraq has become the possible spill over of the sectarian disputes to the entire region and its possible efects on Turkey’s own border security. For Ankara, the marginalisation of Sunnis in the Iraqi political structure constitute the main source of the current conlicts in Iraq (Kardaş 2014). Of course, the rising conlicts in Syria, the lack of strict border control and the unfolding power vacuum provided a suitable ground for the radical jihadists to extend their expansion towards Syria. Currently, ISIS controls more than one- third of the Syrian territory and 30-35% of Iraq’s territory (Ali, 2014). As seen clearly in Turkish leaders’ oicial declarations, ISIS has been considered an extremely violent terrorist organization massively threating the regional and international security. US Secretary of State John Kerry depicted ISIS as a common threat to all countries in the region including Iran. Turkey sees no diference between ISIS and PKK in terms of security threat against Turkey (he Guardian 2014). Turkish leaders emphasize the need for a more integral strategy to neutralize the ISIS threat. For them, unless the Assad regime is removed from power, the ISIS threat could not be totally overcome in the region. E. Parlar Dal and F. Belder : Assessing “Old” and “New” Parameters and Contours of Turkey’s Iraqi Foreign Policy he President of the Turkish Republic, Erdogan also reminded social and political dimensions of the ISIS threat, and highlighted that this threat could not be overcome only through air strikes (Al Arabiya News 2014). Currently, ISIS does not constitute a direct territorial challenge to Turkey; however, it has potential to organize terrorist attacks against Turkish territory. Recently, in March 2014, three ISIS members carried out an attack in Turkey which caused the death of one policeman, one non-commissioned gendarmerie and a truck driver (İdiz, 2014a). his also demonstrated the diiculty to prevent ISIS ighters from crossing the border. To criticisms addressing Turkey’s indirect support to ISIS in terms of allowing ISIS’s foreign ighters crossing to Syria, Turkey reminds that most of the foreign ighters of ISIS in Syria are European citizens and are initially allowed to freely pass through the borders of their countries of origin. It is evident that due to its geographical proximity Turkey is more open to ISIS threat than any other Western country (Orhan 2014). On the other hand, the hostage crisis emerged between Turkey and ISIS added a new dimension to the rising ISIS threat. Initially, on 10th June ISIS took Turkish truck drivers as hostages in Mosul. In the following day, the Turkish Consulate in Mosul was raided by ISIS members and 49 Turkish citizens including the consul general, staf members and family members were taken hostages. Truck drivers were released on 3rd July whereas staf members and their families were retained longer. Obviously, the hostage crisis prevented Turkey from taking part in the unfolding anti-ISIS coalition process, and thus Turkey pursued a very sensible policy against ISIS with the aim of not provoking ISIS and endangering the lives of Turkish nationals (Hürriyet Daily News 2014b). On September 20, all Turkish nationals were realised by a strictly hidden “diplomatic operation” conducted by the Turkish oicials. As Henri Barkey argued, hostages are just one dimension of the current crisis alongside the real threat posed by the deepening of the Syrian civil war and ISIS’s invasion of Iraq’s second largest city, (Mosul) with a population of 1.8 million (Barkey 2014). One of the concerns of Turkey related with the capture of Mosul was about the possible refugee low towards Turkey. Furthermore, ISIS’s invasion of Mosul also raised Turkey’s concerns about the energy security in Iraq since Mosul has one of the richest oil reserves in Iraq (Orhan 2014). On the other hand, ISIS also constitutes a threat to Turkish interests in Northern Iraq. he ISIS threat also had a negative impact on Turkey’s trade towards Iraq. he increasing ISIS threat in Iraq would certainly jeopardize Turkey’s economic and political relations with both the KRG and the central Iraqi government. ISIS’s expansion in Iraq also makes Kirkuk’s status 147 n° 2-2015 more problematic since ater Mosul’s fall it was seized by the KRG’s peshmerga forces on the pretext of the increasing ISIS threat (Orhan 2014). It seems clear that the ambiguities about Kirkuk’s future status will render Turkey- Iraq- KRG relations more complex and Kirkuk’s status will continue to be a controversial topic in trilateral relations. On the other hand, the Turkmen groups are also currently under ISIS threat and a signiicant number of Turkmens are compelled to immigrate to the other parts of Iraq. (Duman, 2014a) Another dimension of the ongoing ISIS threat with regard to Turkish foreign policy is related with the Kurdish dimension. ISIS’s Kobane assault clearly illustrates how regional balances have become more sensible than ever in this geography of the world and how the emergence of ISIS made the Syrian civil war more complicated not only for the regional powers but also for the major powers. 148 3.Kobane Siege and Turkey’s Search for Balance With the intensiication of the civil war in Syria in 2012, Assad regime was forced to revise his strategy by centralizing his entire forces to strengthen its position around Damascus. he Assadi forces’ withdrawal from the Northern part of Syria enabled the Kurdish militant group, PYD forces, to control the Kurdish populated region in northern Syria (Al Jazeera 2012). In cooperation with other minority groups, in 2013 Kurds announced their de facto government in the region (Rudaw, 2013). In 2014, three separate cantons (Kobane, Efrin and Cizir) were established and they were declared as an autonomous region (Rudaw, 2014). here is no doubt that the unfolding of a new autonomous Kurdish region in northern Syria puzzled Turkish leaders in many aspects. Here it is important to mention that Turkey’s traditional foreign policy was mostly based on searching for cooperation with the central governments rather than with de facto governments or non-state actors. In this regard, Turkish foreign policy has long remained status quoist. For instance, Turkey preferred for so long having direct contacts with the Bagdad government rather than the KRG and this policy illustrates clearly Turkey’s status quo-oriented policy in ethnically conlicted areas. Direct talks might symbolize a de facto recognition. Regarding the Syrian Kurds, Turkish position was very clear since the beginning. he Syrian Kurdish groups should also be integrated to the mainstream Syrian opposition. However, this policy became unsuccessful due to the conlicting interests. Salih Muslim, co- chairman of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria claimed that the Syrian National Coalition that was formed in Istanbul denied their political rights in the new constitution to be drated and did not want to recognize the newly established Kurdish autonomous administration in Rojava (Zaman, 2014a). In the view of E. Parlar Dal and F. Belder : Assessing “Old” and “New” Parameters and Contours of Turkey’s Iraqi Foreign Policy Turks, the Syrian National Coalition should be based on the functioning of a central leadership and must acknowledge all religious, ethnical and minority groups as an integral and equal part of the Syrian political life. Turkey also feared that such a semi-independent Kurdish region might easily turn into a base for PKK like the one established in the Northern Iraq in the 90s. One can argue that the development of relations with Barzani also helped Turkey to neutralize PKK activities in the Northern Iraq. On 6-7 October, thousands of people protested ISIS’s attack on Kobane and blamed Turkish government’s position of turning a blind eye to ISIS. hese events let at least 40 deaths behind and showed the vulnerability of the process (Al Jazeera, 2014). Some members of the Kurdish party in Turkey, as well as the leading igures of the PKK, harshly criticized Turkey for not allowing the passage of PKK militants to Kobane via Turkish borders with the aim of defending Kobane and accused Turkey for having helped ISIS in an indirect way (Zaman 2014a). he Kobane assault caused the rise of chaos in the country and raised tensions between the Turkish government and the Kurdish party who have been in direct talks since 2012 in the framework of the government’s Kurdish opening process. On the other hand, ISIS’s Kobane assault in September 2014 has rapidly been internationalized and led to the intervention of the international coalition forces in Kobane through limited air strikes. Some critics were also raised in the international media about Turkey’s being reluctant to join anti- ISIS coalition (İdiz, 2014b) and its strict opposition to Kurdish self-rule in the region by YPG (Zaman 2014b). With the start of ISIS’s Kobane assault, Turkey faced a dilemma. Turkey tried to convince its Western allies about the impossibility to defeat ISIS without the removal of the Assadi regime claiming that the ISIS threat is a consequence of the deepening civil war in Syria and it could only be overcome through an integrated regime change strategy in Syria. However, the US’s reluctance to actively intervene in Syria and its passive and selective engagement strategy towards Syria led to the formation of an anti-ISIS coalition with the participation of some Western and regional countries. Turkey and some Western countries like France pointed that this anti-ISIS coalition also risks to reinforce the Assad regime which has engaged in increasing its attacks against the opposition forces. Ater the release of hostages, Turkey started to raise its voice against ISIS and Turkish leaders deined ISIS as a terrorist organization (Vatan, 2014). As a result of both domestic and international pressure on the government, Ankara allowed Peshmerga forces to cross into Syria via a corridor established on Turkish territory (Yeğin and Özertem 2014). his decision clearly shows Turkey’s search for a middle 149 ground to the Kobane crisis without allowing the PKK to actively intervene in the Kobane afair. On the other hand, it must be reminded that PYD has close relations with another strong Iraqi Kurdistan party, PUK rather than KDP of Barzani which is currently the ruling party in Iraqi Kurdistan. In this regard, it can be argued that KDP’s desire to help PYD could be seen as Barzani’s attempt to increase his inluence over Syria and the Syrian Kurds (Duman 2014d). YPG (People’s Protection Units) which is armed wing of PYD is known as PKK’s Syrian branch. However, Northern Iraqi experience can be a model for future TurkeyNorthern Syria relations. As the Kobane siege clearly demonstrates, in dealing with its own Kurdish problem, Turkey has to take into consideration other factors of the Kurdish issue remaining outside its borders. It seems likely that the resolution of the Kurdish issue requires a multilateral process since this issue has been intermingled among three countries and could only be peacefully solved with the integration of national policies to the regional policies and vice-versa. It seems likely that Turkey expects from Barzani to inluence Syrian Kurdish politics at the same time. n° 2-2015 Conclusion 150 Turkey’s current Iraqi foreign policy can be seen as a mixture of old and new parameters of Turkey-Iraqi relations since the 80s. he historical contours of the relations between the two countries clearly show to what extent domestic and foreign policy choices of the two countries were impacted by the “Kurdish issue”, US’s Middle East policy and other regional developments and crisis. Turkey’s Iraqi foreign policy has long been securitized by Turkish leaders mainly due to its strong Kurdish dimension that has been considered a major security threat to Turkey. It can also be argued that the Northern Iraq and Kurdish question linkage conditioned and dominated the foreign policy preferences, identity, discourses and practices of the two countries. In fact, the demise of the Saddam regime did not lead to rapid changes in Turkish-Iraqi relations. However, the Post-Saddam era provided new opportunities for the changing Turkish foreign policy agenda based upon a new neighbourhood approach and multidirectional regional perspectives. he “unimaginable” rapprochement between Turkey and the KRG would never have been achieved if the Saddam regime still prevailed and Turkey added a lexible and less security-oriented approach in its neighbourhood policy. Of course, the onset of the Arab uprisings and its unattended devastating consequences that have still been inluencing the entire Middle East also provided a suitable ground for cooperation between Northern Iraq and Turkey. Added to this picture, Turkey’s problematic E. Parlar Dal and F. Belder : Assessing “Old” and “New” Parameters and Contours of Turkey’s Iraqi Foreign Policy relations with the sectarian-oriented Maliki government which has been replaced by Al-Abadi government. he combination of all these factors allowed Turkey to revise its Iraqi foreign policy on the basis of a new regional and cooperation approach. his new Iraqi political environment also forces Ankara to search for a new equilibrium in its relations with both the central government and the KRG. In the current circumstances of the Middle East, it is certain that not only Turkey but also other regional countries need to establish alternative alliance relations. he ISIS threat also appears as a common enemy to be overcome with a uniied regional approach. he ongoing Syrian war and its humanitarian disaster constitute another important challenge for Turkey and Iraq, as well as other regional countries to be responded collectively. Faced with all these challenges, Turkey and Iraq seem to have no other option rather than strengthening their cooperation. he uncertainties related with the future stance and expansion of the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria make these two actors more dependant and cooperative than ever. On the other hand, in the background of Turkey’s economic and diplomatic engagement with the KRG lie other interconnected challenges. As seen clearly in the recent Kobane crisis, it is not possible to see Turkey’s own Kurdish problem and its Kurdish peace process solely independent from the developments in other Kurdish-populated regions outside Turkish borders. As a thirty-year long problem, Turkey’s Kurdish problem has deep regional and international connections. his also means that in its democratic peace process, Turkey needs a more balanced and a more global Kurdish approach which will also take into consideration other regional developments related with the Kurds in the entire Middle East. With the normalization in Syria, it is more probable that Turkey would pursue a still cautious but more tolerant and lexible approach towards the newly declared autonomous Syrian Kurdish region. However, the uncertainties regarding the deepening civil war in Syria and the rejection of the Syrian Kurds to take part in the Syrian opposition that Turkey has been supporting since the start of the uprisings make Turkey adopt a “wait and see” approach towards the Syrian Kurds. Here it must also be emphasized that Turkey’s opening of its borders to a signiicant number of Syrian Kurds ledging from ISIS’s Kobane assault since the irst day of the attacks clearly show Turkey’s humanitarian approach to the Syrian Kurds.. Similarly, Turkey’s allowing of the passage of Barzani’s forces through its borders via Kobane is a good indicator of Turkey’s indirect help to the Syrian Kurds in Kobane. 151 Last but not least, a new era seems to be unfolding in Turkey-Iraq relations that needs to be more closely observed in the upcoming months. he two countries are conscious about the fact that a more close cooperation is needed vis-à-vis the rising ISIS threat and reality. he Syrian crisis and the Egyptian coup d’état made Turkey isolated-to some extent- among its Middle Eastern neighbours. 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