‘No lasting peace'? Labor, Communism and the Cominform: Australia and Great Britain, 1945-1950

Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, Inc. No Lasting Peace? Labor, Communism and the Cominform: Australia and Great Britain, 1945-50 Author(s): Phillip Deery and Neil Redfern Source: Labour History, No. 88 (May, 2005), pp. 63-86 Published by: Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27516037 Accessed: 10-06-2015 13:49 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Labour History. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions No LastingPeace? Labor,Communismand the Cominform:AustraliaandGreat Britain,1945-50 I PhillipDeeryandNeilRedfern* Theformation of theCominform in 1947 was a decisive moment in theCold War. Although many rank-and-file activists in the Labor and Communist parties in Great Britain and Australia continued to cooperate with each other, theformal relationship between the two parties sharply deteriorated. In Britain, theformation of the Cominform shattered the Communist Party's class peace. of post-war hopes Communists'critical to the Labour attitude Party became openly hostile. However, no fundamental change toCommunist Party policy occurred. In approach that involved an to pursue continued but, generally, was In Australia, the situation became more militant the Party industry, more collaboration than confrontation. different. Cominform perspectives significantly altered theposition of theCommunist Party, which shiftedfrom conciliation to intransigence, from a desire to cooperate with the Labor Party to an intention to 'liquidate' reformism. Enmity was mutual: influenced by both the ColdWar environment and the increasingly powerful anti-communist Industrial Groups, the to communism of Labor hostility became The article palpable. examines the post-war decline of both communist parties in the context of the interplay between Communist Party policy, Labor Party antagonism, and the international environment of the early Cold War. When the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) and the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) held their national congresses in 1945 they were both in positions trade union of unprecedented strength. World War II had given their members, and influence, overall was representation won Paterson, a dramatic prestige in achieved In Australia, parliamentary a communist when April in the Queensland of Bo wen the seat boost. 1944 state Fred barrister, In Britain, election.1 Willie Gallacher, the Party's sole Member of Parliament (MP) since 1935, was joined by Phil Piratin, returned for Stepney in the General Election of July 1945. The membership of both parties soared: the Australian from 3,569 in 1938 to 22,052 in 1944;2 the British from 15, 781 in 1938 to 45,435 in 1945.3 Electoral support and membership figures disguised the extent of trade union influence. The Australian Party had majorities or on numerous near-majorities state and and was Unions to dictate able Labour of the Australian of trade the policies and Trades provincial had its resolutions adopted at the 1945 Congress unions which Councils, Council of Trade covered basic every industry at the federal level except theAustralian Workers Union.4 The British Party did not enjoy this level of influence, but the election of Bert Papworth to the General of the Trades Council in the trade Union And unions. while more seemed, than in 1945, in the Australian had days communist The both Jerusalem' influence of the the potential parties' for prospects importance and the future growth assured. By 1950, the two Communist defensive. case,5 'New of Attlee's in Great Britain circumscribed strength of labourism CPGB its growing demonstrated (TUC) Congress the construction reservoir evaporated. Industrial of public Membership Groups would Parties were had levels soon defeat isolated and on the diminished, consolidated sympathy plummeted. communists the during In Australia, in leadership 'Red Army' the anti ballots 63 This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions in 64 Number 88 LabourHistory all nearly to outlaw legislation to The the Communist in internment communists from the TUC had banned its from expelled the In Britain, communists and plans Government had scientific positions, office and the Labour Party had several party parliamentary preparing contingency the Labour the government from holding was government Party and implementing camps.6 service civil Menzies elected newly communists place purged unions. trade key May 2005 of Members 'crypto-communist' Parliament. the routes that labour in the slide sharp two parties' is a central fortunes aim of this both were similarly shrunk and cut-off, the paper will demonstrate each common to this took fate were movement, the especially Itwill different. the isolation of both parties were to understanding the a such Explaining paper. Although between relationship that argue central the changing dynamics within the communist parties and the labour parties of the two countries. This paper will therefore focus on this domestic relationship against the international backdrop of an escalating Cold War and the formation and impact of the Cominform. This approach, which locates the histories post-war comparative of the two communist the relevant the context within parties has not previously both local and international developments, of in been attempted literature.7 TheColdWar and theCominform the term 'Cold War' was When relations the between had Differences been Soviet first used by Bernard Baruch on 16 April Union and over at the papered three 1947, in a state of transition. Yalta conferences Teheran, were the West allied and Potsdam - held in 1943-45, but the formation of theNorth Atlantic Treaty alliance in 1949 the destruction confirmed of the war-time and alliance the of polarisation into irreconcilable blocs. For many in theWest the fight against Nazi had been displaced by amore protracted though no less vital fight against Germany the world not For communism. Soviet had Nazi replaced between territorial of the headquarters and aggression a battle ideologies, of entire as for moral movement communist international Germany about merely the States reaction. It was and it was desires; expansionist superiority, the United international a quest to win also the a clash allegiance populations. The of the Communist conference inaugural Information Bureau, or Cominform, at Szklarska Poreba in Poland inOctober 1947 was a benchmark in post-war Soviet policy.8 Its division of the world into two camps, imperialist and anti-imperialist, and its strategy meant that to within allegiances polarise and accommodation cooperation official line from 1941 to 1947 - was of the order For the the day. Soviet new role the French the as to War these democratic jettisoned. Antagonism had new split international movements, world - the between blocs was now commenced. merely perspectives Activities, the Truman reflected reality. In the the eastern For countries European the Cominform the West, communist movement, an America's proclaimed from had been expelled - a Plan disguised barely had Union from the Soviet Doctrine communists the policeman of the 'free world', the Marshall Italian and and governments, announced. labour the non-communist theUnited States Congress had breathed new life into theHouse on Un-American Committee been Cold Union, previous sixmonths attempt The social with away Soviet symbolised to resurrect attempt leadership the disbanded This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions of Deery & Redfern Labor,Communism and the Cominform, 1945-50 65 Comintern, and the imposition of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. The bolts of the Iron Curtain were slamming shut. By the end of 1947, many in theWest were convinced that Stalin sought to dominate Western Europe aswell as entrench Soviet control east of the Elbe.9 At time the uncensored there Andrei especially reports the USSR'.10 that conceive in addition to the this. Cominform as of allmembers the Cominform, a sort of European to the security interests communist guaranteeing and minutes of promoters the Cominform implied 'the subordination And to substance suggest did Zhdanov, Comintern which of to be appeared delegates' in an unity Eastern communist parties against Europe now occupied by the Red Army, and mobilising the Marshall Plan and Western policy in Europe, the Cominform also provided slogans, directives and overall political guidance for foreign Communists. As Spriano has noted, with the Cominform, 'the various Communist parties [in theWest] could be constantly influenced, both collectively and singly, without any orders appearing to come the Kremlin'.11 from in 1948 did not allay Western Events in Czechoslovakia, d'?tat the the dramatic expulsion electoral of sharpening and Italy; events these Secretary, the most perhaps Ernest told Bevin, decisive dangerously in occurred Ambassador Bevin Prague a more into intransigent coup Plan; of communist itwas since perceived Soviet blockade of Berlin. Prague. on 25 in a crucial period of six to eight weeks which will decide entrenched the Marshall the possibility of an 11month the American on attacks - and, most as an act of incipient war - the beginning Of Soviet of Tito from the Cominform; in France victory fears. They included the communist The British Foreign 'We are now February: the future of Europe'.12 Even position. the so-called 'Red Flag' elements within the British Labour Party found the Czech crisis to be a defining event: according toMichael Foot, effectively the editor of the highly influential left wing Tribune, itmeant the 'bridge between the East and theWest [was] shattered'.13 Thus, a consensus anti-Soviet powerful Stalin's USSR was amenacing was perception to the Australian of Churchill's sent telegram Prime Minister this gloomy diagnosis Soviet in 'strictest in early of Soviet ideology Clement a belief that in arms. Indicative of that from secrecy' 1948. Expressing control, on it centred and forged, Prime the British sentiments Minister reminiscent but now overlaid by the 'Iron Curtain' speech two years previously entrenchment Cominform's was and implacable Atlee gave Ben line from Chifley of the European problem: Government have formed a solid block behind the the to the Black Sea. Countries behind through along in and is no prospect there that line are dominated by Communists them. with normal relations immediate future of our re-establishing is exerting Soviet In Germany, Trieste, France, policy Italy and Greece, ... The a of Western countries pressure Europe constantly increasing Baltic sense already of salvation.14 The shock alarm was Trieste the Oder of 1948 the Soviet some became Union's Communist the paranoia successful peril are and of 1949 detonation - seeking leaders may have believed assurance The biggest 'year of shocks'. This banished of an atom bomb. that sense of that the American omnipotence lingering imminent III now both War seemed World provided. any some atomic monopoly and inevitable. in their ideological righteousness. previously In London, But they knew theWest This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions a 66 LabourHistory no longer had technological and complete superiority. With abroad anti-communism, the Chifley administration was profoundly in turn, on its stand shaped this realisation, polarisation at home, and May 2005 Number 88 extreme. became became In Canberra, influenced by this environment and this, in Australia.15 communism Australia:Laborand theCommunistParty For the Australian political Labor Party body, was ideology, Party as a to the Communist (ALP), opposition as an and Communism and long-standing unequivocal. In the years immediately following the formation of the CPA in 1920, the faction which received official Comintern recognition in late 1922 had been pursuing a united front it approach: cases in many and sought, achieved, into entry the ALP. From June toOctober 1923 the CPA and the ALP were affiliated inNSW. This brief honeymoon ended in a quick and final divorce. At the ALP's triennial Federal Conference in October 1924, a resolution was passed that denied the CPA the right to affiliate with, the right tomembership of, theALP. As far as the Labor Party was the ruling of 1924 governed all future consideration of its relationship and itsmembers concerned, with the Communist on communism declarations Thus, Party. at innumerable passed subsequent conferences confirmed the inherent incompatibility between the platform and constitution of the ALP and the policies and structures of the CPA. The CPA's the counter-productive during its zig-zagging the late during conduct and 1930s class' 'class against for which, in the early period to a according 1930s contemporary ALP publication, itwas 'impossible to find fit language to describe'16 - sealed the fate of the Communist Party insofar as political unity with the ALP was concerned. The spirit of flexibility and co-operation that entered communists' activities after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 did little to dent Labor's persistent of CPA malevolence. memories first was the conviction clash hourly British were that Australians 'living between of political ideologies The of formation Communism'.17 clash. in the ALP's three Labor's and Third, Labour Party, this should which sent in which moderate forces a thousand of Harold copies its - an is a daily there and world-ambitious and exemplified was be under-estimated, and strength the onset of the Cold War: in a world the Cominform not anti-communism. communist of how this might be used. The second was perception this new elements important awareness of unprecedented there were 1947, By The the exacerbated influence of the authoritative Laski's 1946 booklet, The Secret Battalion: an Examination of the Communist Attitude to the Labour Party. The state secretary of the Victorian branch of the ALP sent copies to all more to the Communist antagonism strident and more With the Communist to the Chifley challenge with consistent seemed, became Industrial methods of the underhand explanation Labor's and imperative encompassing Party throat'.19 in an recommended, for the Labor Party It was clear that declarations ever and disrupt attempts to combat bluntly against a result, Party'.18 As more II became the Communist after World War active, before. the will possessing government the Kremlin's of Party than them by the throat', one Labor politician the and Groups letter, that Laski's book should be read closely since it 'gives a very accompanying lucid branches metropolitan and, the apparently, economy declared, strength a challenge, Plan the Marshall to disrupt the communists. communism the - we 'Unless 'they will at state it - it take take us by and This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions federal I Deery & Redfern and tightening conferences were of actions Labor,Communism and theCominform, 1945-50 167 source ability chosen by the Labor Party to fight communism was - its of to damage on in the Western - indeed, formation. The alarm about Labor's onset The of where and the but so, the It was also was of communism War was it 'assembled events, particularly to. His opening economy its greatest. through what to communist displace into 'Groupers' during an in the unique the nature was the Groups the Cold in April industrial arena, the Australian that tangible prompted of expression War. context all-important in the shadow to deal way in Great Britain or, of history the threat of the most the early held one is only movement'.20 for 1948. As of the second annual their president, events'.21 Tom of these Some fast-moving in and Berlin, have been alluded unfolding Prague already to the conference if delegates expressed accurately, luridly, towards communism within the ALP: those address the dominant and was and organise 'there industrial the by it seemed, emergence to attack it at its influence sought Groups parliamentarians: through intervention the Cold remarked, Junor, The of the Industrial Groups, conference forms of the ALP. The fight, then, must be carried is world. movement their was and supported by the Labor Party, had no parallel sponsored labour that the Significantly, government Groups. not unionists, and communism, This into the workshops 'trusted' members trade by unions. the Labor as the Industrial known primarily trade carry its banner union officials with with in the strength the ALP, The ALP would became be insufficient. Alternative necessary. The method the of ALP rules would sentiment our rests the of defending heavy responsibility it has ever encountered the greatest menace the menace of The leaders of our to to look curb the tide you Party growing to check and if of Red Fascism; eradicate the cancerous of possible growth in our trade union movement; Communism to defend the achievements shoulders your Upon Party against Communism. of our Red the against and white Party gangsters slanderous, anters.22 undercover sinister, attacks of the The term 'Red Fascism' had already entered Cold War lexicography but Junor gave it a further twist: 'is that Hitler that and conference he Fascism', stated, a resolution considered the Communist to overthrow, establish in their or Communism 1948 to be an of Australia aim whose Party organisation arms if necessary, in Australia democratic and government by a ruthless totalitarian It also to do all instructed members regime. Group to unseat within their unions in office power any communist respective declared was 'The only difference between and Stalin is not'.23 The is dead any challenge office. seeking The resolution, the penetrated that Second, in earnest broken. Industrial the Labor and would This Group Party's continue movement fight determination, ipso facto, communists against and relentlessly which lasted flower, had deeply sections large in the unions and, indicated endorsed, unanimously two things. First, that the Cold War, in its full anti-communist unremittingly for the next five years, until was their of the ALP. had hold begun was summarised by one ALP official: "Thefight will be bitter. Itmay be long. But no matter how bitter or how long the fight is there can only be one - result the ALP will be victorious'.24 At the 1948 annual state conference of the NSW branch of the ALP, unanimity between This had the Groups been achieved and the Labor neither Party previously over nor the issue subsequently. of communism The 400-odd prevailed. delegates This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 68 Number 88 LabourHistory May 2005 carried by an overwhelming majority a Grouper resolution that prohibited allALP from associating or cooperating with the CPA, its auxiliaries or 'front' organisations in any form. This represented the furthest any ALP conference had ever travelled along the path of hostility to the CPA. This was aimed at, inter alia, members Labor activists who the distinction were Groups At last, in the communists the Groups' proclaimed 'an unbridgeable and Party with trade where unions, the two parties was perhaps most blurred. The Industrial jubilant. Coulter, MP), Labor to work continued between (W.R. secretary organising gulf has thus been blasted between the Australian Communism'.25 Thus, the ALP insulated itself against the possibility of communists wielding political influence in the Party through affiliation, unity agreements or even issues. around cooperation particular to such an extent that nearly members have could concern perennial all or even directions would communists to influence seek had been tightened over which party the Labor destroy As we Party. shall was, Party seek to the Communist see, The away. swept the Labor than the immediate fear that communists would after 1947, less pronounced undermine bridges in both and its rules two parties had been the between walked, that the mid-1940s, By Party for the second time in less than 20 years, to a position of implacable to the ALP leadership. As that leadership noted, correctly, in 1948: antagonism and 'Communist attempts to discredit Labor leaders have been both multiplied anti intensified'.26 This, plus the development of the Cold War, which had virulent communism as itsmost typical feature, made it easy for theALP to believe that 'the is that the Labor Party must be eradicated before philosophy of the Communists had moved, can they advance late this 1940s, of the CPA's attitude and an hostility was mirrored by the Communist direct the two parties made over the labour for hegemony 1940s, the By power'.27 its behaviour. This mounting between of political the ALP as a description held within for explanation seizure the towards belief was widely almost conflict This was movement. Party. Reciprocal hatred as each inevitable not in the vied, late in however, apparent, the afterglow of victorious war. At the 14thnational congress of the CPA inAugust 1945, its general president, J.B.Miles, assured the Chifley Labor government of its continued was not and support be was issue immediate the the also and Party's of Browderism the hey-day then, position He cooperation. 'liberal the Labor around and mass organise policies.28 that acceptance As period'.29 later, of the British Party. after all, will 'Socialism demonstrated Communist support This, post-war the associated in the post-war and to delegates urged progressive' below, The this conciliatory and benevolent attitude towards the ALP was highlighted by a resolution adopted on 12August. It reaffirmed belief in the united front, the desire to affiliate with the and ALP, 'much the belief in common'. in regard The resolution return the demanded that of Labor also that declared at the next election.30 In the lead-up to the 1946 federal election, sought defeat an to reach of Menzies' no hint all'.31 There and curtly the perceived categorically of sectarian rejected of a united sentiment the CPA front with here. 'offer' of the CPA the Central Committee Executive the Federal with agreement to 'wider to open and the way unity was efficacy had the parties policies, of Australia interests' 'the vital reconstruction to post-war in and Although 'this or the Labor Party the ALP of a brighter the Federal in any was to not other 'ensure the future for Executive election',32 dented. Except, This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Deery & Redfern Labor,Communism and the Cominform, 1945-50 69 that is, for some discordant voices inVictoria. Jack Blake, the Victorian state secretary 1934, was since the most 1946. The on debate articulate relations for a spokesperson at ameeting Conflict crystallised the Labor with adopted the formation of which Party, areworth examining since Blake's minority after tougher government and fascism that this was the meeting, the position the Party the Cominform.34 the common been on 14-16 March dominated line foreshadowed Blake argued that the only basis for earlier Communist had to the ALP.33 approach of the CPA's Political Committee of war pursuit removed when aims was fascism Party support of the Labor determined defeated. by The the threat prevailing of policy of support for the Labor Party modified only by 'constructive criticism', he stated, should be revoked. Instead of seeking rapprochementwith the ALP, the Party should now 'begin to mobilise loosening we must Blake for was of united Party. Furthermore, with the bourgeoisie the Chifley (and in a of 'betrayal policy Labor shift: the 'from support as a government, of period the workers'), should class 'imminent' be to subjected criticism.35 spoke on this issue at themeeting, Of those Political Committee members who all fundamental the ALP and the pursuit of mass meant compromise a to tantamount front with of compromise such struggle intense be the objective of exposing the true role of the Labor set ourselves the objective democratic leaders; we must ... the worthlessness of their leaders. the masses the Communist government should to its side: social advocated abandonment below' for revolutionary The Party struggle'. and the workers democracy winning to social set ourselves Party and of teaching What the masses the adherence Blake's repudiated analyses. Typical was this comment from Ted Rowe, an official Engineering Union: of the Amalgamated we would In Comrade he would Blake's go back to 1930 where approach, is not even a question of the that [support for the ALP] say to the workers are both evil. I do not think we have the stage reached lesser evils, they we have to from social democracy.36 dissociate ourselves where sharply In two years, that stage was in three reached; the Party's years was approach similar to 1930. The epithets may have altered but not their substance nor the vitriol with which they were hurled. For his oppositionist line, Blake incurred the wrath of Party leaders, who him of narrowness accused is seven the stenogram Dimitrov, applauded Labor Party After all, Dixon quite he only clear is not 'Left long partial from continued, convinced'.38 Blake's line of 1946 became This the writings as 'Left against struggle and denunciation lengthy and Stalin of Lenin, sectarianism' and the front with of a united speak rank and file of the Labor Party'. T the for the Labor is a continuation of support 'Our policy his retreat in the face of such pressure, Blake did step back Although and perfunctory. Comrade Dixon's sectarianism'. on drew the intensification of the urged front strategy the present united the top as well which includes Governments'.37 was and pages advice As the general concluding was forgotten secretary, remarks when remarked: J.B. Miles, that he does Blake's not deviant, understand, discredited the accepted, official line of 1948. This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 'It is 701 May 2005 Number 88 LabourHistory At the next top-level meeting of the CPA, a Central Committee plenum in June 1946, Blake retreated further and engaged in customary self-criticism. Yet a close that he never reading of Party documents and the tone of his recantation suggests lost - at least Itwas of his views. saw position, - 1953-5439 in the veracity conviction atwhich Blake publicly withdrew the rationale for a new, emerge policy tougher the Labor Party. The justification was the perception of widespread on relations with the with disenchantment working-class of crisis 'consolidation' ironic that this very meeting, 'left sectarian' his from the until Labor the many of One government. communist trade union leaders who testified to the growing militancy of theworkers was JackHughes, federal vice-president of the Federated Clerks Union. According 'we are witnessing to Hughes, of discontent in this the country, surge It industry, a lack of faith in the Labor Government'.40 throughout the since this to underscore is important the masses of left swing the argument source the is that here the of Communist Party's intransigent (and, ultimately, self-defeating) outlook in the late that it slavishly adopted, but 1940s was not simply the Cominform perspectives on front. These developments industrial the also domestic developments, especially the Cominform of establishment but, subsequently, were slotted into preceded the Zhdanov. first enunciated Thus, after 1947 the domestic and the the framework by the new produce - forces international or, at least, Therefore line. hard in many recovery of efforts contemporary new feature the 'real Western is to see countries',41 part only economic the picture. heard Dixon was in Australia situation of the present of setting' lying in the the post-war to hamper the Cominform In February 1947, Central Committee members chief do, to in tandem worked and general coal strike of 1949, for example, of the communist-supported 'wider - were interpreted they did to see, as many how confirm that the the growing mass criticism in the ranks of the working class of the economic policies of the Labor Party. He felt this hostility, this leftward shift of the workers was of 'the utmost importance for us'. the aims Party and alternative he Nevertheless drew draw a from back anti-Labor Party, 'we must accordingly: over to the shaped the masses Government, side on attack Party'. but... more 'In Labor: it into see is that we don't just develop anti-Chifley, as the Party present the Communist of un-variegated sweeping, our campaign what we must developing anti-Labor be should to the sharply is occupying'.42 The relationships in this period between the position thatMenzies unions' campaign for the 40-hour week and their deteriorating relationship with the Communist Party functionaries and communist Chifley government; between the trade union officials; and between the strike wave of 1946-47 and the exaggerated conclusions the CPA leadership extracted, have been discussed elsewhere and will not be revisited here.43 Suffice it to say that, in its relations with the Labor Party, from mid-1947 the CPA commenced the shift from critical support to outright hostility, from by to sectarianism. conciliation of the pronouncements This trajectory the Cominform. was both Significantly, and accelerated itwas not a confirmed trajectory was paralleled by the CPGB. As we have seen a world enunciated the inaugural irrevocably of conference into split two in October the Cominform camps: one warmongering that 1947 and the other peaceful and progressive led by the imperialist led by the United States, on its policy was This Soviet Union. adopted by the CPA and impinged dichotomy towards the Labor Party. Davidson has argued that Communist Party This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions policies Deery & Redfern 'emanated Labor,Communism and theCominform, 1945-50 from Moscow' from 1946. early This in a broad correct be may 71 sense, but itwas only from late 1947 that the Communist Party, shaped by Cominform perspectives, adopted policies and pursued strategies that were ultra-leftist: inflexible, and aggressive into slipped was slotted deluded. self-confirming into the same Communist dogmas.44 leaders as pigeonhole lost the Chifley reactionaries. the in 1928, Congress to the working Dr class. Evatt all social democrats became, in the words became government Reminiscent it was not Evatt the of initiated by the Sixth or actual of Sharkey, the traitors potential 'errand dollar' and his foreign policy the tool of the 'war plans' of American But and reality Labor 'social fascist' typology during the 'class against class' period Comintern with touch a result, As of the boy imperialism.45 was but communist the Australian leaders. sycophantic to the Soviet world view meant that slogans and Their unquestioning subservience were to Eastern with doctrines little fastened, Europe appropriate, perhaps, onto the Australian Stalin used the Cominform adaptation, political landscape. to pull the French and Italian Communist not merely Moscow's over hegemony a new international communist vitriolic- and will need no reminder were Secretariat Holy therefore state: T do not doubt his Writ; with national almost Front' from all readily as themodel and for their Scholars centralism' 'democratic from the Central Committee statements, not that confidence complete to which leaders in Australia, of down policy to establish the Cominform.46 model were also interest, embrace of Yugoslavia expulsion they but its Moscow-trained decision-making for guidelines could Sharkey will endorse the stand already and the Secretariat in support of the Information that the Central Committee taken by the Political Committee Bureau Soviet and that the views handed to akin It was discussion. after the hierarchical countries for a 'People's the quest of Tito denunciation with familiar designed That the CPA by their eulogistic Democracy' Parties into line and enforce 'Iron Curtain' to serve adhere. is evidenced 'People's the emerging framework, must parties acquiesced a who Tito'.47 against In contrast to the publicly accessible opinions of the Communist Party (via Communist Review, Tribune and the various weekly newspapers published by State CPA branches), the internal records of the Party reveal clearly the influence of the the official position of the Cominform. We have seen that, Blake notwithstanding, CPA leadership in 1947 prior to the establishment of the Cominform was to delineate between the Labor and Liberal parties, to attack the economic policies of the Chifley challenge after three months us from the world perspectives Cominform the before the was the Cominform saturated and itself, to Labor's leadership the Cominform's to refrain of from the working-class with the new 'of great But importance'.48 and strategic analytical in of the nine parties Europe meeting ... That into two camps become divided and tactics publication, of the 'correctness the enemy, was 'enemy' but now in the period For a Lasting to come'. He itself for Less a addressed noted that the formation his 11 page 'the essential framework: the recent has now, positioning movement. Sharkey meeting, inaugural of the Political Committee. He had previously full meeting of the government a mounting than not but government [ie, the Cominform] is the at starting report thing was was for that for our point from the initial length to reinforce Democracy, not of line put forward, away backing unremitting struggle, with the 'two camp' Consistent the offensive'. thesis, taking 'a party Labor the Australian It included evident. Party Peace, For quoted a People's This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 11 LabourHistory of betrayal7 - and, specifically, of the most the Chifley section reactionary of the which was government, was and bourgeoisie', Number 88 May 2005 'in the camp as 'as rotten that of Blum or Bevin at their worst7. In this context, Sharkey advised Political Committee members to 'recall the declaration of the Nine Parties [at the Cominform meeting] that branded that of the several months concluded Front like Bevin, people forward was The way favoured with is the line and Blum away), 'we must was which of apotheosis leave this meeting for our Party of advance class'. working the convinced ... there especially was ex-communication (Tito's Party the to the traitors of the 'People's Democracies', Communist Yugoslav as others to follow themodel 'People's in our minds can be no still Front'. that doubt that Sharkey the People's it is the way of the European parties, [so] the way we might fight is the People's Front'.49 The first Central Committee meeting after the formation of the Cominform was held in February 1948. At precisely the time rank-and-file discontent was being assuaged by the granting of the 40-hour week, the relaxation of wage-pegging regulations and proclaimed that the 'the for a very maturing on breakthrough class big with break the margins is struggle sharpening' on reformism case, Communist and that 'all the part of leaders Party the are conditions the workers'.50 This belief, that workers were on the brink of severing their allegiance with the Labor Party, informed much of the discussion at the Fifteenth National Congress held three months later, inMay 1948. This congress represented the final stage in themovement towards the 'formal' adoption of both the Cominform aggressive Labor. in early 1946, was position industrial content toward policy front, of and was congress given by Blake's iconoclastic on the by developments the Cominform's Secretariat by with credence apparent concrete line and an intransigent and commenced process given made reports The 'two members camp' their echoed thesis. The derivation: they reflected international imperatives more than local realpolitik. In deciding to go on the offensive, communist that leaders had concluded the time for a showdown had arrived: the decisive contest for the leadership of the movement labour now must be fought. As Dixon as the organiser of the people's struggle against 'the Labor said, reformist betrayers must be isolated and the Communist forward Party brought reaction'.51 The Labor and Party must Party be attacked because it collaborated with the capitalists instead of fighting them; its leaders were 'identifying themselves completely with the ruling class'; it had moved into the camp of imperialism; and it had embraced the 'sabotaging role' of social democracy.52 The last 'internal' Communist Party meeting for which records are extant, and the last before the fateful general coal strike in the winter of 1949, was the Central Committee meeting of February 1949. Here, the Communist Party's grip on reality was not merely Notwithstanding tenuous. Chifley Its myopia and made Evatt's that it susceptible determination 'in no iota do to political to nationalise differ hallucinations. the private from Menzies except Sharkey they argued were since all promoted and Labor leaders 'monopoly imperialist polices'. with and his echo, in 'complete alliance' with Churchill 'United States imperialists, and the People's These leaders Democracies'.53 for war upon the Soviet Union Bevin, banking in words', were system, not 'milk and water the sentimental reformists'; they represented be exterminated. of social democracy that must customary Sharkey's plant' to watch in 1947 of the mark, 'we have very any overstepping carefully 'poisonous hesitancy not to go This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Deery & Redfern ahead with such propaganda Government's - defeat'54 in the policy Labor,Communism and theCominform, 1945-50 was working and tactics that we will be the driving in 1949. absent the Instead, was movement class 73 'to force for the 'immediate and reformism'.55 liquidate decisive' The verb, 'liquidate', was telling: itnot only mimicked Stalinist rhetoric, it also exemplified the Party leadership's (or at least Sharkey's) capacity in this period formixing arrogance, and naivety self-delusion. The CPA Central Committee meeting of February 1949 removed all doubts that the Party did not intend to challenge openly the Labor Party for the allegiance of its Guided Cominform it had almost moved, supporters. by perspectives, inexorably, to a that made position leadership's of four closely class struggle, to a class radicalisation Moran vision the tea party... the working to else for them go'.57 nor modification they confirmed on to the itwas of the way', Stan the last one look to communism; left, the CPA's overriding increasingly subjected prompted intransigent On praxis.58 the contrary, the Party in the absolute correctness of its judgement and led it to even more adopt move a measure its of economic is well 'and itwill make class will It was re-evaluation a sharpened of the working crisis and mass depression, the movement and workers, that the savage attacks towhich ultra-leftism any economic of reformism, of Wollongong The inescapable. vision consisted government retreat. That The correlation between position.56 axiomatic: 'The especially depression told ameeting is nowhere neither role the Labor prevented imminent features: treacherous revolutionary was with lay ahead interwoven like an afternoon there confrontation of what aggressive After policies. these all, attacks the represented last gasps of the capitalist system and 'there [was] no fury like the lash of dying capitalism'.59 an was this Thus, historic moment, we the moment two steps a time tomake All are forward. 'reformists' in'60 so this was living Itwas not a time subtle distinctions were lumped with pregnant opportunity. Dixon had reminded delegates not immense revolutionary to the 1948 congress of the 'urgency of a time to take or to show to weaken one step back about political differences within in one together of capitalism. All must be exposed, reactionary challenged mass. but at least was Nor weakness. this the Labor Party. All were lieutenants and liquidated. Britain:Labourand theCommunistParty In 1941-45 the CPGB had vigorously supported the allied war effort.61 Teheran, Yalta it that thewartime international united front between liberal and Potsdam convinced and communism democracy more version nuanced of could be 'Browderism', followed by theAmerican Communist a continued the into openly the peace. It developed class-collaborationist its own, policies Party in thewake of the Teheran Conference. it and progressive reconstruction, post-war supported a Labour in 1945 its The election of Government reconquest Empire. as a was on the road hailed and to socialism. peace, step prosperity giant Though a was its domestic Labour's programme grievous disappointment, policy foreign was of nationalisation, national and welfarism reconstruction critically supported. was to work In a industrial hard the class enjoined 'productionist' policy, working Assuming Britain's As politics the of to eschew and peace lasting strikes. late as the Spring and Summer of 1947 the CPGB was of Teheran. leadership Two instructed still promoting will In the 'fuel suffice. 1947, during examples early to urge to the membership the working class the crisis',62 This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 74 LabourHistory Number 88 May 2005 in with the Government and against to solve the the Tories rally solidarity ... the whole crisis of the people and the present particularly organised labour movement must work to to solve the crisis.63 help the Government As it had since Teheran, movements, revolutionary conference the CPGB believed should end communist of Empire stated parties not that the great powers, A declaration colonialism. that they adopted would aMarch by oppose Anglo American foreign policy and fight for the 'restoration of the Three Great Powers' and for 'full support for the United Nations [and]... acceptance of the principles of democratic self-determination international [and] economic to Prior co-operation'.64 the conference, Harry Pollitt, the CPGB's leader had - while seeking approval from the Colonial Secretary for delegates from Singapore to attend - obligingly provided the authorities with a full list of the names of these delegates.65 Though such policies were independently developed by the CPGB, they were conditioned externally and by, a rationalisation essentially of, Soviet foreign policy. Smart footwork was required by the left-turn in Soviet foreign policy in 1947-48, particularly with the formation of the Cominform. But, significantly, unlike in Australia the Cominform made no fundamental change to the CPGB's outlook, which remained into locked albeit collaboration, to 'establish used Milovan in communism' the Red the cause Army Djilas that It cannot be otherwise'.66 1935-39, the fundamental 'whoever so in a national occupies issue parties, was addressed also territory, the non-Soviet For Party. nation, form. As of socialism. a the Labour that the aim of Soviet foreign policy was it did Europe, to advance with critical, Though Atlee was correct in believing Soviet The is well-known, Union Stalin told ... system imposes as in the Front of just Popular was not class. The Cominform his social as part of the Soviet Union's attempts to build an international united front against the United States. Zhdanov, the Soviet delegate, had made this quite clear at the founding Congress of the Cominform. US imperialism, he argued, was established the national threatening 'a special countries. must They of the other independence to fell task' Parties the Communist 'take up the banner of of defence capitalist France, of countries Italy, and Britain the national therefore and other independence and sovereignty of their countries'.67 Just as the CPGB had once had the task of enrolling Britain in a front against Nazi Germany it now had the task enrolling Britain in a front against the USA. Attlee and Bevin were now held to play the roles once and Halifax. by Chamberlain performed a this necessitated Obviously, for the Labour - But Government. to the CPGB's previous support adjustment in contrast to the CPAthe Party was again, sharp and, unsure how to respond to the formation of the Cominform. Itwas not invited to the initial Congress and seems to have had no forewarning of themeeting. Though the French communist out what Party was line report in full detail in briefing 'a Party Douglas Hyde, apostate itwas all about'. On his return 'a confidential known with charged industry'.69 generally supporting the industrial front. The CPGB's to the effect ... it would Hyde's to first public that, mean recollection generally response the member gave Hyde although the gradual is consistent opposing Party,68 according sent to Belgrade editorial the Daily Worker was the Cominform reversal with the Labour to the formation to British line was the Party's the CPGB's of Government, of the Cominform the to find team not yet previous from shift notably was extremely This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions on Deery & Redfern Labor,Communism and the Cominform, 1945-50 175 terse. Circumspectly, are Parties it commented of great international of the militant attention even that urgent, there is no and will significance workers of a discussion of took on at place the Party's the was in Australia, the close the Party, of no and significant the inner leadership, unlike a united to formulate struggling levels highest bodies,71 leading comment in the Party press until June 1948. Presumably, its counterpart receive course, it seems highly probable of Britain'.70 Though discussions frantic, record that 'the steps initiated by the nine Communist stern The response. criticisms by the Yugoslav delegate Kardelj of the French, Italian and 'other' parties that they had slipped 'down into the positions of Social-Democratism and bourgeois were nationalism'72 been involved. to the CPGB. clearly applicable new line would The have been Procrastination extremely have also may to most disagreeable of the CPGB's leaders and certainly to the Party's Secretary, Harry Pollitt, who more than was anyone been especially aware of the too only inhabited until 1941. wilderness A desire to deny ammunition involved. These members, with associated certain the post-1941 policy. They would a return of the new policy: consequences left was to the Party's small but militant Eric Heffer notably a to become (later have to the prominent also left-wing Labour MP), were already criticising Party policy. During the Party's pre-Nineteenth Congress debate, in February 1947, they had argued that the Executive Committee's Congress resolution could The congruity opportunist'.73 as be described 'only of this criticism with Left i.e., Social-Democratic, was strictures Kardelj's striking. Later in 1947, shortly before the formation of the Cominform, several CPGB members were expelled for 'infantile leftism'.74 In 1948 Edward Upward and Michael Shapiro, prominent members of the London Party, invoked Kardelj's critique in a dispute with the Executive Committee regarding its handling of a row with the Australian critique of their post-war Party.75 The CPA had sent to the CPGB a Yugoslav-style policy;76 yet again, this silhouettes parties. the CPGB's Clearly, the significance Cominform's in Pollitt's with imperialist in the partner this period strongly was not a renewed class', but and speech an commitment opposition coincided with Thereafter, Party came orientation in December (referred to only in passing) was clearly Executive to the Cominform, with camp, anti-imperialist imperialist suggests the Cominform.78 from 'deviations of the Yugoslavs the new on based to that month's report Zhdanov's an of press saved by the 'Titoites'. statement public accordance against as for 'Titoism', of discussion But they were for the two between of a wide to be wary Party the influence of the Cominform detectable active the Yugoslav in the CPGB's discussion first major 1947, when into reason had in June 1948.77 The disgrace be denounced could The of denunciation the first major the sharp political differences of the formation of the Cominform. Marxism-Leninism' leftists leaders But a close camp'.79 that the underlying to class struggle to the government's claimed, a Labour of certainly with alliance an Government of CPGB statements in left-turn the CPGB's not in is divided 'the world that reading rationale and He Committee. a return to 'class States the United of America. At the CPGB's 20thCongress in February 1948 Pollitt argued in his report, tellingly entitled For Britain Free and Independent, that the British out selling to preserve ruling toWall their the Labour Government... class, and its spokesman of their country St. the national independence own class and privileges. position are in order This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 76 Number 88 LabourHistory May 2005 But Pollitt did indicate that the Party was reassessing its 'productionist' approach to British industry in thewake of the formation of the Cominform. He pledged 'full support to all those Trade Unions which have already tabled their claims forwage advances'.80 Practical expression of the new policy quickly followed. Whereas in September in the National Union of 1947 Arthur Horner, the Party's influential member at miners had accused Mineworkers, Grimethorpe Colliery on strike in opposition to a new pay and productivity deal of holding the rest of theNUM (who supported the 'to ransom',81 deal) were period not on miners criticised.82 strike Though in the Scottish the Attlee British industry,83 the Party's reassessment turn to greater class struggle June by falling communists had 1949, and were industry, resembled strategy scarcely to an extended In a report earlier. 20 years could advance criticised Pollitt for example, a moderate only the of relative years in peace real wages, abandoned great some among sections a of the embraced 'productionism', strike on the London Docks.84 industrial policy may have appeared, the overall Party's years in a active the CPGB's new militant However 1949, By in were of its industrial policy coincided with spurred militancy, class. working in the post-Cominform coalfields intransigent Central programme adopted nearly in meeting February Committee collaboration' 'class ('fight to the approach of social-democracy, standards living improve yet ... cut prices, limit profits') in opposition to Labour.85 Similarly, in 1950, in opposition to Labour's colonial war inMalaya, the CPGB could only tamely call for support for 'amassive peace petition, launched by the [Party's front organisation] British Peace have The Committee'.86 already once CPA, its readiness witnessed again to was in contrast, challenge, far more aggressively, aggressive. social We democracy. In regard to the so-called Malayan Emergency, it described Australian support for inMalaya as 'criminal' and dictated by 'the Collins the British counter-insurgency House extensive have who monopolists tin and rubber interests in Malaya'.87 respond to these developments? (Party and Government) The dominant right expected nothing else. Morgan Phillips, Labour's fiercely anti communist General Secretary argued in June 1947, in the wake of the expulsion did Labour How of from communists Communist Party ismore to the formation response and French the a conspiracy of Italian than the Cominform governments, a that Party'.88 Unsurprisingly was robust and signalled 'in Britain, then, that the Labour's relations the CPGB could only get even more frosty. In an editorial clearly inspired by Phillips, the Daily Herald, voice of the right-wing dominated Trades Union Congress, with thundered: are to concentrate their energies of Europe upon parties the where in countries those the socialist except parties against ... All of are to obey Communist socialists pretence leadership willing The is class between for co-operation desire dropped. parties working are to be and the British Labour of western socialist Party Europe parties ... In the British is only as enemies the Labour warning Party regarded of in the fair words few years in the past have believed for those who our with of their honest and in the possibility communists co-operation is off. It is as well.89 Party. The mask The communist a war In December, Morgan Phillips fulminated against Pollitt's report to his Central Committee: This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Deery & Redfern The Labor,Communism and the Cominform, 1945-50 British Communist come has Party now it has indecision, war against of sabotage full pledged socialism. to heel. some After for support can therefore weeks the Cominform's of 'cold' We that a campaign expect the Labour Government and all it stands for will be against out by the Communists and their fellow travellers the carried during ... Now to go out on a is the time for all Labour coming months people Communist and infiltration inside the great campaign against intrigue Labour Movement.90 democratic CPGB-Labour soon relations Party the CPGB's 20th Congress In a tactic Labour during the 1945 General Tike those are totalitarian other their country became L.J. Solley be to a but Cold War - were foreign expelled but in 1948-49.93 Party as labour) trading not great conclusive.94 They were and we fight in Czechoslovakia owe 'men who the Labour (communists is persuasive, 'cryptos' MPs Labour is on as well travellers' L. Hutchinson, 'Fellow against that communists events the Columnists', power'.92 from that argued 'Fifth Three casualties. 'crypto-communist' were Morrison were ... This of takeover smear 'Gestapo' claimed the Hitlerites conclusion the communist of Churchill's Election, Attlee fanatics, communists that showed reminiscent in it'.91 Herbert all enlisted coincided with approximately in Czechoslovakia. The deteriorated. sharply not loyalty 'fifth columists' as and J. Platts-Mills were These MPs. The were the only to to alleged evidence that these to MPs Labour the two Communist MPs, Willie Gallacher and Phil Piratin, and D.N. Pritt MP Labour (a expelled in 194095) against the acceptance ofMarshall Aid.96 They and Pritt took the CPGB line on the Soviet-Yugoslav breach and stood as 'Independent vote with 'did not that in the General candidates Labour' differ of Election observably'97 1950, the CPGB's from a common issuing the CPGB or banning As far is known from the archival evidence, proscribing was publications not considered. seriously manifesto manifesto. now communists Nevertheless, its received the attentions of the British state. Attlee cited the Prague putsch as a justification for a purge of communists from the civil service started inMarch 1948, though this was almost a certainly in Britain eastern against a Europe, and unionists Although was significant MPs were political Press and Wall Tory of civil purged Though compared with the next government two to three to non-sensitive some justification, out carried Street,'100 over policy.98 servants, transferred Pollitt claimed, with measure 'a to be scarcely number were that most decided already were Labour however, noted, an for pretext communists for political had sanctions scientists, years.99 not work, in activities trade It should be dismissed. that the civil service purge to win ends, the Government state such more of the approval to confront than the the CPGB's open opposition. Though the CPGB curtailed its espionage activities after the apparent expulsion of Dave Springhall in 1943 for spying,101 it had by then, according state, These to MI5, people including were still largely to such people China a member The opinion. infiltrated in 1950. with Presumably access in situ is evidenced arms into various of the and sympathisers on the atomic to information project. Anglo-US attitude relaxed in 1948.102 The CPGB's continued members by Springhalt's he was in good standing.103 were also part of purges A year or so after Phillips's no longer a process circular, correspondence paying of dues, creating the TUC but with he was the CPGB from demonstrably anti-Communist issued two public anti-communist This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 78 LabourHistory It was circulars. was claimed that to wreck 'attempting 'in servile the CPGB economic the dock strike of 1948, the Minister During with correspondence were arguments at delegates annual were conference for of to ban Deakin, communists the Transport from office. and role of the state consider in General of the Union Workers' this decision Following nine full-time by the Berlin also motivated was sentiment anti-communist mobilising in Such also 'positive vetting' was not initiated by the Chifley administration, potent. Although did in Australia power'.104 Isaacs, alleged the call by their general secretary, officials were dismissed.106 No doubt delegates were blockade that had started the previous month. The foreign responsible.105 directly a substantial majority instance, in July 1949, who voted by 426 to 208 to endorse Arthur of a interests of Labour, George communists to convince, sufficient the that Attlee ... the Cominform' to obedience in the recovery Number 88 May 2005 methods of communists excluding the armed from services.107 it Moreover, the dismissal of a London-based Australian scientist from the Commonwealth Scientific Industrial Research Organisation inAugust 1949 - for protesting against Australian in that direction.108 the during did occur under What measures communist War. Cold action government that significantly Judicial September 1948, Gilbert Burns was secretary, general in November 1949, but prosecuted L.L. Kevin was of hypothetical context of World War the CPA towards the Soviet Union three sedition trials, activities'.110 a The powerful to one historian, in the form of regular, full-page advertisements, the coal a CPA strike. Its focused campaign propaganda years' were imprisonment; state was president, was in made both the motivated politically anti-communist domestic the mainstream by The was press press also by the Chifley government on In 1949, the that would be adopted by in the event of war. These to these trials given publicity to the anti-communist crusade. generous contributor the sedition. inOctober utterances as part of the [Chifley] government's and 'exploited was according to three III and the position and the Red Army of government, for prosecuted Australian seditious pointed of anti range temperature for sixmonths; sentenced their similarly extensive commonwealth were the Western Healy, Each acquitted. imprisoned Sharkey, an domestic the actively supported by In 1948-49, three CPA officials this.109 and the - strike was Chifley raised action, epitomises CPA coal general the claim that the used, during strike was conspiracy.111 What was the attitude of the British Labour left to the deteriorating international situation? Space does not permit a full discussion: here we will consider mainly those left-wing MPs loosely grouped around Tribune. The key figures in the Tribune group were Michael Foot and Aneurin Bevan, theMinister of Health. In 1945 they were more firmly in the Soviet than theAmerican camp: Tribune declared 'friendship with the Soviet Union is the keystone of world peace'112 and was 'appalled' that Bevin advise was on the same to who used 'for advice Office experts Foreign relying were most into the and Halifax'.113 1949 Tribunites corralled Anglo By Plan and the Marshall formation of the Cominform, Cold War pen. The Eden American the communist coup d'?tat to the in Czechoslovakia Soviet increasing hostility the Comintern', Paul Sering to Leninism it was 'Belgrade of intransigence' would nevertheless Union. each that argued 1947 rather 'compel played In a perceptive the Cominform than Moscow socialists significant article, did 1917' to confine roles 'The in Tribune's Exhumation a return not signal but 'Communist their work This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions more Deery & Redfern Labor,Communism and the Cominform, 1945-50 79 and more to theMarshall sphere', to act as a progressive force within theWestern World'.114 A few months later, Tribune hailed George Marshall for saving Europe: had it not been forMarshall Aid, western would Europe Since starvation. the prospect of war be much closer.115 to Tribune, According Tribunites The to another of service far-reaching, States would Rubicons of history' which in Czechoslovakia are necessary the civil widespread for applies construction socialist in Britain'.116 Consequentially, the communists owed the not accept the premises of democracy they do to trust Communist should be prepared Party seems secrets absurd.117 state... security were on the United 'one of the great necessary equally that Ministers Tribunites and Union dictatorship the purge with elements coup was and are they supported members the Soviet for Great Britain: 'all that applies If force allegiance ... to ask some between the Prague had clear implications to Britain. equally in Czechoslovakia and civil war and despair of Communism would be more face the inroads now firmly ensconced left swam the Labour the Cold among against War But warriors. Ian Mikardo, the tide. for instance, resigned from the editorial board of Tribune in 1949 in protest at its anti-Soviet line,118 whilst Konni Zilliacus opposed both western imperialism and, when he thought it wrong, the Soviet the purge of led him gradually that such MPs Labour Forty-three in March 1948. There were Union.119 service civil activists. constituency files the J. Schneer's to conclude pro-Soviet if true, is which, hardly In persisted. Finsbury, declined, sentiments a motion such of Morgan investigation that tabled more sentiments surprising. 27 Labour Phillips's opposing among people constituency activists among constituency some But he presents councillors evidence against protested Platts-Mills' expulsion in a letter to the local press while in Coventry East members 'maintained friendly relations with the British-Soviet Society'.120 Members of the Coventry Council Trades fellow-travellers - invited - Phillips In contrast, inAustralia, anti-communist line some emerged were undoubtedly at a peace conference.121 of whom to speak only the and the Labor Party to the 'official' Left opposition within after communists federal Labor government flagrantly the Party platform by using troops in an industrial dispute - the 1949 coal strike deemed by Labor to be a communist conspiracy. On 21 August 1949, about 200 ALP members met in Sydney and formed a Committee for the Defence the Committee called for of Labor Principles and Platform (CDLPP). Although the immediate disbanding of the anti-communist ALP Industrial Groups, itwas violated - as its name implied - a response to the actions taken by the Chifley government and endorsed by the ALP during the coal strike. Much of the support for the CDLPP came from the inner Sydney area (especially Summer Hill, Paddington and albeit those as and trade unions, from several from Lithgow branches), Darlinghurst in the press was It was widely communist. whose reported leadership a Labor of split.122 harbinger in the manner threaten Labor did not seriously the CDLPP However, unity the that the Tribunites had inGreat Britain. The raison d'?tre of this Left opposition was disgust This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions m Number 88 LabourHistory and disillusionment lost their intensity. to close preferred May 2005 the leadership of the ALP; these were emotions with With a ranks, forget election general most approaching, the government's and actions, that soon rank-and-file direct members to energy keeping Labor in office. The demise of this incipient breakaway group was hastened when its leading members were expelled from the ALP and branches which provided were sustenance restructured. of the ALP leadership, voices seemingly sympathetic was existence the Committee's to counteract, Unable let alone the match, hegemony a hostile Cold War environment and faced with to the communist short and cause its influence were to reduced all its in which whispers, feeble.123 Conclusion In the Cold War contest between labourism and communism, itwas clear by the early 1950s that the first had convincingly overcome the second. Although the CPA embarked a direct upon of the working-class for the leadership challenge movement, the CPGB merely criticised - albeit sharply by the late 1940s - the policies of the Attlee administration, both were shadows of their organisational strength in while 1945. reasons The factor of was, course, as well Australia, as services security chilliness of are numerous. decline post-war parties' increasing A in which War the Cold by - were a more afforded movement. the key anti two The courts, governments, context to launch favourable were sides imbalanced. in the press assaults, a However, reason was the longevity, legitimacy and resilience ifmore powerful less discernible - of the state instruments the in the union and publicly the crusade by TUC leaders in Great Britain and the Industrial Groups communist and for the communist in rare and circumstances, exceptional Only or movement be would the working-class such revolution, impending to and its traditional labour reform from detached parties, piecemeal allegiances in Australia in the immediate The bond was weaker constitutional post-war change. was Britain. New Attlee's than in Great trade union years, when militancy higher was more Post-war Reconstruction. than Chifley's seductive Jerusalem of social in both democracy countries. as could both communist In those years, 1945-47, prior to the formation of the Cominform, remained parties return not of, Labour to this opposed industrial labour the Victorian Only meanwhile, controls, Both they line. post-war to subjected around from come. with programmes, hostility criticism', were J.D. Blake, soon time would Their the for campaigned 'constructive gathered government increasing generated or supported, comrades, quasi-collaborationist front, market which governments, attack. political to labourism. committed On the their the working tight The class. - but not the initiators - of CPA and CPGB were the spearheads and mobilisers this discontent. This domestic shift, in turn, helped propel both communist parties more than the British) the Australian (although economic policies. governments' rather influences international After 1947, We perspectives. orientations enunciated by Blake strategies how the influence than of 'two-camp' the Cominform by 18 months in the trade earlier, union thesis with confirmed of a more movement domestic speed and accelerated and on posture. permeated the adoption, This shaped both parties' Communist determination. militancy its doctrinal The the upon realities the Cominform and militant attacks sharper starkly differed. The leadership of the Australian the embraced seen have towards Party new line foreshadowed shaped standpoint This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions its on 81 Labor,Communism and the Cominform, 1945-50 Deery & Redfern In contrast, the CPGB found the new line disagreeable and accepted it reluctantly, belatedly and perfunctorily. The criticisms, irrespective of their correctness reformism. or motivation, and the of and 'collaborationism' communist Italian made parties nationalism' 'bourgeois at the the Yugoslavs by of the French Cominform inaugural conference applied to the British but not to the Australian Communist Party. to find a new course. Despite denunciations of the The CPGB struggled Labour 'imperialist' an and Government fundamentally, changed, to socialism to a road peaceful crisis economic strategy. and and - and must warmongers and militancy was committed position, believing and were potential itself with Wall exposed of repudiation revolutionary allying -be could indeed, nothing remained wholesale from and collapse, capitalist the corner. Social democracy all around back stepped CPGB The the CPA adopted amore militant the Labour Party. InAustralia that war, industrial accompanying in communist defeated. Street and Consequently, itwent on the offensive against the Labor Party and the Chifley government. The time was ripe, itmistakenly believed, to challenge Labor for the leadership of the working-class movement. Symptomatic of the differing degrees towhich Cominform perspectives were being pursued was the frosty exchange of letters between Party leaders in 1948. For two the labour the parties, was the Cominform of impact also dissimilar. the British Foreign Secretary, Bevin, was drafting a benchmark Cabinet document entitled, pointedly, The Threat toWestern Civilisation,m and Labour Party While was Healey, Sea was boots',125 the North was that arguing in Australia, Denis activist, the Thus, of the Cominform influence and, in order needed Army the Minister for External to find a 'third way' between still struggling Union. 'all the Red to reach Dr Affairs, Evatt, States and the Soviet the United coup and the Prague subsequently, the Berlin blockade, was more oblique on theALP than on themore geographically BLP. Yet both proximate 1950 and with alliance the antagonism or the of industrial in the of 1945 between posture of the wartime the collapse echoed resumption entrenched long-standing, late and peace post-war 1940s, with dealt While reconstruction. of embryonic McCarthyism each Party as an the Communist viewed governments the ugly excesses administration This project. and Attlee disruptor potential both eschewed Truman and the Bolshevik Both the Chifley actual to the visceral. Union Soviet towards anti-communist their escalated parties the ambivalent from by the displayed communist 'the in threat' different ways. Attlee preferred to purge the civil service while Chifley backed the ALP Industrial Groups in that unique and successful experiment in fighting the on communists The own their relationship in the ground, the unions between unions. trade two and communist was parties dissimilar. From 1945 to 1950, the CPGB position remained roughly consistent. Although strategy that culminated moderate There 1951. militancy to be no was within the for in fought gains a reluctance greater its post-Cominform with and to commitment its earlier it abandoned its unrelenting return trade the was social further By the late direct declining. Many had been won its capacity democracy, action. Yet in Australia, 1940s of years post-war on hard-line, on class'. against movement immediate the in the adoption of the British Road to Socialism in to 'class union to embark attacks productionism, by 1948 to develop it continued the and the CPA, and for dogmatism to intensify sought industrial there was consistent self-delusion, and politicise This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 82 N D O T * LabourHistory Number 88 May 2001 p industrial action. This occurred at precisely the time that the Cold War atmosphen was becoming more hostile and the propaganda of the Industrial Groups gainec a sturdier and platform reached a wider and more But audience. receptive even i Nthe CPA badly misread the situation, and the CPGB did not, their slide into politica - and even before the impotence was the same. By themid-1950s crippling impac of 1956 labourism had triumphed decisively over communism as the ideology most preferred social system. evenly matched movement by the working-class In this contest for the workers' and, given the enduring and the particular historical environment - was for organising allegiances, structural the economic the combatants attachments to social were anc no democracy of the Cold War, the outcome - arguabl} inevitable. Endnotes * 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. We thank the two anonymous referees for their valuable comments. See Ross Fitzgerald, The People's Champion, Fred Paterson: Australia's Only Communist Party MP, Press, St Lucia, 1997, ch. 3. University of Queensland Len Donald, Organising the Second Round of the Victory Campaign, [np], Sydney, 1945, [p.2]; Communist Party of Australia Central Committee, Report of theWork of theCentral Committee from the 13th to the 14thNational Congress, Current Book Distributors, Sydney, 1945, pp.15-18. The British Communist and Moscow 1920-1943, Manchester University Press, Andy Thorpe, Party 2000, p. 284. Manchester, Herbert Weiner, "The Reduction of Communist Power in the Australian Trade Unions', Political Science Quarterly, vol. 69, no. 3, September 1954, p. 396. J.E.Henry, who incorrectly stated that the Communist Party actually 'captured' the ACTU in 1945, inflates this figure to 400,000 unionists under communist control. J.E.Henry, 'Communist Strategy inAustralia', Quadrant, vol. 1, Spring 1957, p. 59. A more sober judgement, referring to 'fairly effective [communist] control of 275,000 is contained, interestingly, in a lengthy Central trade unionists' classified Intelligence Agency publication, Communist Influence inAustralia [Washington], 1949, p.l. President's Secretary Files, Box 159, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. See Jim Tomlinson, 'The Labour Government and the Trade Unions, 1945-51', inNick Tiratsoo (ed.), The Attlee Years, Pinter, London, 1991, pp. 90-105; Peter Hennessey, Never Again: Britain 1945 and 1951, Jonathon Cape, London, 1992, chs. 4-5; Michael Cunningham, 'Labour, Keynesianism theWelfare State', in Jim Fyrth (ed.), Labour's High Noon: theGovernment and the Economy, 1945-5, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1993, ch. 2. The first scholar to reveal these remarkable plans was Les Louis in 'Pig Iron Bob Finds a Further Use for Scrap Iron: Barbed Wire for his Cold War Concentration Camps', The Hummer, no.35, January/June 1993, pp. 1-6. See also David McKnight, Australia's Spies and their Secrets, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1994, pp. 117-22. See J.D. Playford, Doctrinal and Strategic Problems of the Communist Party of Australia, PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1945-62, unpublished 1962; Alastair Davidson, The Communist Party ofAustralia: a Short History, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1969; Robin Gollan, Revolutionaries and Reformists: Communism and theAustralian LabourMovement, Australian University Press, Canberra, 1975; Tom O'Lincoln, Into theMainstream: theDecline ofAustralian Communism, Stained Wattle Press, Sydney, 1985; Francis Beckett, Enemy Within: theRise and Fall of the British Communist Party, John Murray, London, 1995;Willie Thompson, The Good Old Cause, Pluto, London, 1992; Noreen Branson, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain 1941-1951, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1997; John Callaghan, Cold War, Crisis and Conflict: theHistory of the Communist Party of Great Britain 1951-68, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 2003. The best accounts of the formation of the Cominform are those that draw on recently released Soviet archives; see, especially, Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside theKremlin's Cold War: From Stalin toKrushchev, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1996, pp. 125 137; Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons (eds), The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53, Macmillan, London, 1996, chs. 13-18. Between mid-1945 and late 1947 British estimates of Soviet policy, concluded D. Cameron Watt, 'passed from considering the Soviets to be "difficult" to considering them "impossible" and then and society finally to a deep belief in their fundamental hostility to all that British government comprised'. See 'Britain, the United States and the Opening of the Cold War' in Ritchie Ovendale (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945-1951, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1984, p.59 and Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, theDivision of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, chs. 7-8. Anna Di Biagio, 'TheMarshall Plan and the Founding of the Cominform, 1947', June-September inGori and Pons (eds), The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, p. 218. This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Deery & Redfern 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. Labor,Communism and the Cominform, 1945-50 83 Paolo Spriano, Stalin and the European Communist, Verso, London, 1985, p. 296. For a sketchy discussion of this influence on the CPGB, see Branson, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain 1941-1951, pp. 157-8. The Cominform's newspaper, For a Lasting Peace, for People's in 14 languages and line. Itwas published Democracy!, was one transmission belt forMoscow's in 57 countries, including Australia. See Nataliia I. Egorova, 'Stalin's Foreign Policy distributed and the Cominform, 1947-53', in Gori and Pons (eds), The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53, p. 203. The clumsy title was designed by Stalin himself, 'a fact which silenced the objections of some [Cominform] delegates that... it departed from the usual brisk nomenclature of Communist journals'. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: theHistory of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1916-67, Praeger, New York, 1971, p. 460. One of these objecting delegates, Eugenio Reale, told Zhdanov: T cannot visualise', I said, 'an Italian worker saying to the [newspaper] vendor: "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy". Let's pick a shorter title'. Zhdanov then told him it tome over the telephone this that 'itwas Stalin who thought up this name and communicated inMilorad M. Dreachkovitch morning'. Cited in Eugenio Reale, 'The Founding of the Cominform', and Branko Lazitch, (eds), The Comintern: Historical Highlights. Essays, Recollection, Documents, Praeger, New York, 1966, p. 259. Cited in Peter Hennessy, Never Again: Britain 1945-51, Cape, London, 1992, p. 350. Daily Herald, 27 February 1948. Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office, 13 January 1948, Public Record Office, London [henceforth PRO]: PREM 8/787. L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley, Longmans, Melbourne, 1963, pp. 358-9; Christopher Waters, The Empire Fractures: Anglo-Australian Conflict in the 1940s, Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 1995, 'Hot and Cold: Dr Evatt and the Russians, 1945-1949' inAnn Curthoys p. 140;Meredith Burgmann, and John Merritt (eds), Australia's First Cold War Volume 1: Society, Communism and Culture, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1984, p. 104. Communism Against Labor, Trades Unions Research Group, Melbourne, n.d., [p.3]. The context for Pact in September 1939. this statement was the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Standard Weekly, 19 August 1947, p. 7. Records, Victorian branch of the Australian Labor Party, National Library of Australia (hereafter NLA), MS 4846, Box 12, Industrial Groups file [nd 1948?]. New South Wales Parliamentary Debates, vol. 188,2 November 293. 1948, p. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (hereafter CPD), vol. 197,9 June 1948, p. 1841. Standard Weekly, 18 June 1948, p. 9. Standard Weekly, 9 April 1948, p. 6. Standard Weekly, 18 June 1948, p. 9 Standard Weekly, 25 June 1948, p. 6. Standard Weekly, 25 June 1948, p. 6. Australian Labor Party, Victorian Branch, Report of 1948 Conference Decisions, [p.l], Records, Victorian branch of the Australian Labor Party, NLA MS 4846, Box 12,Miscellaneous 1949. CPD, vol. 196, 7 April 1948, p. 617. J.B.Miles, Jobs, Freedom, Progress: Communists in Congress, No. 3, [np], Sydney, 1945, pp. 13-14. Richard Dixon to Central Committee plenum, 18 February 1945, p. 5,Mitchell Library, Sydney 1936 5(76). Unless otherwise indicated all subsequent citations to (hereafter ML), 5021 ADD-ON statements and Congress reports are located at this and Central Committee Political Committee source. Draft Resolution for 14thNational Congress, Australian Communist Party, [np], Sydney, 1945, [p. 10]. 1946, p. 20. Ralph Gibson, Communists Are Changing theWorld, International Bookshop, Melbourne, dated 1August 1946 from P.J. Kennelly, P.J Clarey papers, NLA MS 2186, Series 2, Correspondence Folder 4. J.D. Blake remained state secretary until July 1949 when he was elevated to the Central Committee secretariat. For biographical details, see J.D. Blake, Revolution From Within, Outlook, Sydney, 1971, 'Critical Communist Cultivated the Cause', Australian, 11 December 2000. pp.8-9; Stuart Macintyre, For an 'inside' account of this, see Bernie Taft, Crossing theParty Line:Memoirs of Bernie Taft, Scribe, 1994, pp. 55-58. Melbourne, 15March 1946, pp. 3-6. J.D. Blake to Political Committee meeting, 15March 1946, p. 4. E.J.Rowe to Political Committee meeting, 14March 1946, p. 6. R. Dixon to Political Committee meeting, 16March 1946, p. 9. J.BMiles to Political Committee meeting, 1949 Phillip Deery 'The Sickle and the Scythe: Jack Blake and Communist Party "Consolidation", 56', Labour History, no.80, May 2000, pp. 215-24. to Central Committee plenum, 2 June 1946, p. 1. J.R.Hughes Crisp, Ben Chifley, p.361. R. Dixon to Central Committee plenum, 15 February 1947, pp.3-5, 6. See Tom Sheridan, Division of Labour: Industrial Relations in the Chifley Years, 1945-48, Oxford 1989, chs. 7, 9 and 10. University Press, Melbourne, As Sheridan {Division of Labour, p. 226) has metaphorically noted, by 1949, communists ceased being 'eager surfies' riding favourable industrial waves, and became instead Tatter-day Canutes, sea at will'. imagining themselves able to direct the changing This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 841 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. LabourHistory Number 88 May 2005 L.L. Sharkey, 'TheMeaning of Dr. Evatt's Policy', Communist Review, December 1947, pp. 752-7. See, for example, Communist Review, January 1948, pp. 5-7; August 1948, pp. 234-7; September discussion of Stalin's ousting of Tito from the Cominform, 1948, pp.270-83. For a comprehensive see Heather Williams, 'Between East and West? Yugoslavia and the Tito-Stalin Split, 1948', inWillie et al, The Cold War: Socialist History 11, Pluto Press, London, 1997, pp. 30-57. For the Thompson between the Cominform and Yugoslav and Soviet Communist 79-page text of the correspondence parties, see Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, London, 1948. L.L. Sharkey to Central Committee plenum, September 1948, p. 7 inML MSS 5021 ADD-ON 1936 5(76), folder, 'ALP affiliation, 1946'. 7October 1947 [p. 1] L.L. Sharkey to Political Committee meeting, L.L. Sharkey to Political Committee meeting, 10 January 1948, pp. 1,2,4,9,11. Emphasis added. R. Dixon to Central Committee plenum, 20 February 1948; J.C.Henry to Central Committee plenum, 22 February 1948, p. 8. R. Dixon to 15thNational Congress, 8May 1948, p. 7. L.L. Sharkey, For Australia Prosperous and Independent, Current Book Distributors, Sydney, May 1948, p. 25; L.L. Sharkey, The Way Forward, Current Book Distributors, Sydney, May 1948, p. 14. L.L. Sharkey to Central Committee plenum, 14 February 1949, p. 4. In his opening remarks (p. 1) two-camp thesis. Sharkey confirmed the correctness of the Cominform's Ibid., pp. 6-7. L.L. Sharkey to Central Committee plenum, 15 February 1949, reprinted in Communist Review, - where it could be, and was, invoked April 1949, pp. 112-3. The fact that this speech was reprinted - was a further indication of the the enemies of the CPA Party's na?ve self-confidence. by As a communist union official and later an anti-communist apostate, Geoff McDonald, 'the Party was going through a period of extreme leftism based on the false premise commented, that the economy was doomed and that the dawn of Socialism was near ... I too had made exaggerated estimates of how far the workers were prepared to go'. Geoff McDonald, Australia at Stake, Geoff McDonald, Melbourne, 1997, p. 53. For a Trotskyist assessment of this leftism see O'Lincoln, Into theMainstream, pp. 64-66. IllawarraMercury, 14 July 1949, p. 1; South Coast Times, 14 July 1949, p. 7.Moran was treasurer of the Sydney branch of theWaterside Workers Federation. in late 1953, acknowledged That some CPA leaders subsequently, and sought scapegoats for the 'left-sectarian' mistakes made during this period does not lessen the extent towhich these views the Party. See Tribune, 10March 1954, pp. 10-11; ML MSS 5971/1/10: [J.D. Blake], 'Some permeated Facts of History' [1960], p. 4, ML MSS 5971/1/10, [Len Fox], 'Communist Party "Consolidation" 1953-54' [nd 1973?]; Australian Left Review, no. 76, June 1981, p. 17. IllawarraMercury, 14 July 1949, p. 1. R. Dixon to 15thNational Congress, p. 67. See Neil Redfern, Class orNation: Communists, Imperialism and Two World Wars (forthcoming, London, 2005) for a discussion of the CPGB's war-time policy. In the winter of 1946-47 a shortage of fuel coincided with severe weather, leading to power-cuts and short-time working. Executive Committee Circular 10 February 1947, 'The Party and the Fuel Crisis', Records of the Communist Party of Great Britain, Labour History and Archive Centre, Manchester [henceforth CPGB Archive], CP/CENT/CIRC/01/08. World News and Views, 15March 1947. Pollitt to Creech-Jones, 22 November 1946, CPGB Archive: CP/CENT/INT/47/04. Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, R. Hart-Davis, London, 1962, p. 105. See Giuliano Procacci (ed.), The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949, Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, Milan, 1994, pp. 217-251, for the verbatim speech. Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement from Comintern toCominform, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1975, p. 477. Douglas Hyde, ? Believed, Reprint Society, London, 1950, p. 244-6. Daily Worker, 7 October 1947. See CPGB Archive: CP/CENT/EC/01/04-06; CP/CENT/PC/02/01-03. Procacci, The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences, p. 291. World News and Views, 1 February 1947. Mark Jenkins, Bevanism: Labour's High Tide: the Cold War and theDemocratic Mass Movement, 1979, p. 29. Spokesman, Nottingham, in CPGB Archive: CP/ CENT /INT/ 34/ 02. See relevant correspondence For the published debate see World News and Views, 7 August 1948 and the Australian Communist see CPGB Archive: Review, no. 85, September 1948, pp. 270-83. For the unedited correspondence CP/IND/DUTT/17/10. The sin of the Yugoslavs was to assume that the formation of the Cominform signalled a in Soviet foreign policy. They fell turn in communist policy rather than amanoeuvre revolutionary out with the CPSU and hence the Cominform by supporting the Greek communists during their civil war at a time when Soviet policy was to assign Greece to the British sphere of influence. Party' [given to an aggregate 'Harry Pollitt's Speech on the Situation in the Yugoslav Communist meeting of London Communists], World News and Views, 17 July 1948. This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Deery & Redfern 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85 . 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. Labor,Communism and the Cominform, 1945-50 85 1947. World News and Views, 20 December For Britain Free and Independent, pp. 7,12. Daily Worker, 8 September 1947. LabourMonthly, Feb. 1948, p. 49. 'The number of working days lost by strikes did not exceed two and a half million in any of the 1987, years 1946-51.' Henry Pelting, A History of British Trade Unionism, Penguin, Harmondsworth, p. 221. See Phillip Deery, '"The Secret Battalion": Communism in Britain during the Cold War', Journal of Contemporary British History, vol. 13, no. 4,1999, pp. 1-28 for a discussion of the 1949 dock strike. 'The Third Labour Government', CPGB Archive: CP/CENT/EC/01 /07. Don't Let Them Send Our Sons toMalaya, leaflet in CPGB Archive: CP/CENT/INT/36/04. The Guardian, 9 June 1950, p. 6. See also L.L. Sharkey's foreword in the CPA booklet, Walter Blaschke, Freedom for Malaya, Current Book Distributors, Sydney, [nd]. For a discussion of the role and influence of Sharkey on theMalayan Communist Party, see Chin Peng, My Side ofHistory, Media Masters, Singapore, 2003, pp. 201-5; Phillip Deery, 'Malaya 1948: Britain's Asian Cold War', Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 6, no. 1,2005 (in press). Daily Herald, 28 June 1947. Daily Herald, 7 October 1947. "The Communists: We Have Been Warned', Labour Party Archive, Labour History and Archive 'CPGB' file, box 4. Centre, Manchester, Daily Herald, 3May 1948. Daily Herald, 27 February 1948. See Jonathon Schneer, Labour's Conscience: the Labour Left, 1945-51, Unwin Hyman, Boston, 1988, for a full account of these expulsions. See Darren Lilleker, Against theCold War: theNature and Traditions of Pro-Soviet Sentiment in the British Labour Party 1945-89, University of Sheffield Press, Sheffield, 2001, for an evaluation of the evidence. In 1940 Pritt was identified by the Soviet defector Walter Krivitsky as 'one of the chief recruiting in the UK'. PRO: KV 2/1064. Pritt claimed he was agents for Soviet underground organisations book in 1939. expelled for a breach of party discipline by writing a pro-Soviet anti-appeasement D.N. Pritt, The Autobiography ofD.N. Pritt, Part One: From Right to Left, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1965, pp. 221-239. likeMax Aitkin also voted against. See Hansard (Commons), 5th Series Various arch-imperialists 453, 6 July 1948, cols. 341-2. H.G. Nicholls, 77??British General Election of 1950, Macmillan, London, 1951, p. 251. Peter Hennessey and Gail Brownfield, 'Britain's Cold War Security Purge: the Origins of Positive Vetting', Historical Journal, vol. 25, no. 4,1982, pp. 965-973; Peter Weiler, Labour and the Cold War, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1988, pp. 219-221. See Branson, History of theCommunist Party of Great Britain, pp. 160-168. Daily Worker, 16March 1948. Most civil servants affected were transferred to non-sensitive work, not dismissed. See Thorpe, The British Communist Party andMoscow, pp. 269-70 for a brief discussion of this issue. F.H. Hinsley and C.A.G. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 4: Security and Counter-intelligence, HMSO, London, 1990, p. 287. Dave and Janet Springhall and others toWillie Gallacher, CPGB Archive: CP/IND/GALL/01 /06. TUC Annual Report 1949, p. 278. Isaacs toAttlee, 28 February 1949, PRO: PREM 8/1082 Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism, p. 218. on Communism National Archives of Australia [Vic],MP 1185/8, Item 1944/2/181, Memorandum in the Australian Military Forces, 8 February 1949. See Phillip Deery, 'Science, Security and the Cold War: an Australian Dimension', War and Society, vol. 17, no. 1,1999, pp. 81-100. is examined closely by Laurence W. Cold War partisanship by members of the legal profession Maher, in 'Tales of the Overt and the Covert: Judges and Politics in Early Cold War Australia', Federal Law Review, vol. 21,1993, pp. 151-201. the Struggle Against Australian Communism Laurence W. Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: 1945-1960 Part One', Anglo-American Law Review, vol. 27,1998, p. 374. See also his 'The Use and Abuse of Sedition', Sydney Law Review, vol. 14,1992, pp. 287-316. See Phillip Deery (ed.), Labour in Conflict: the 1949 Coal Strike, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1978, pp. 45-6. Tribune, 3 August 1945. Tribune, 21 September 1945. Tribune, 10 October 1947. Tribune, 9 April 1948. Tribune, 5March 1948. Tribune, 19March 1948. Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour in Power 1945-1951, Clarendon, London, 1985, p. 389. This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 861 LabourHistory Number 88 May 2005 in their dispute with the Soviet In 1948, for instance, he supported the Yugoslav communists Union. See Archie Potts, Zilliacus: a Lifefor Peace and Socialism, Merlin Press, London, 2002. 120. Schneer, Labour's Conscience, pp. 179,185. 'CPGB' file, box 4. 121. British Labour Party Records, Labour History and Archive Centre, Manchester, 122. See Postal Advocate, 21 August 1949, p. 1. 123. Thus, the claim that the CDLPP 'blossomed into an organised Left grouping which became so strong that it eventually won official recognition', is incorrect. Edgar Ross, A History of theMiners' Federation of Australia, Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation, Sydney, 1970, pp. 430-1. 124. Memorandum by Bevin, 3March 1948, Public Record Office, Kew: CAB 129/25 (CPGB 48/72) For and a discussion of this crucial paper, see Nicholas Owen, 'Facing Facts? The Labour Government Defence Policy, 1945-50', inNick Tiratsoo (ed.), The Attlee Years, Pinter, London, 1991, pp. 198-9. There appears to be a direct line running from the coup in Prague in February 1948 to the signing inApril 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty (later NATO) which solidified East-West inWashington divisions and congealed the Cold War. 125. Denis Healey, 'NATO, Britain and Soviet Military Policy', Orbis, vol. 13, no. 1,1949, p. 48. 119. This content downloaded from 140.159.34.46 on Wed, 10 Jun 2015 13:49:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions