United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), was a United States Supreme Court decision which held that recording conversations using concealed radio transmitters worn by informants does not violate the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and thus does not require a warrant.
Facts and Procedural History
Criminal defendant White was convicted of narcotics charges in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The conviction was based on evidence obtained from recorded conversations in 1965 and 1966 between the defendant White and a government informant wearing a concealed radio transmitter. White appealed the conviction, claiming the conversations were recorded without his permission, that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy (see Katz), and the conversations were recorded without a warrant, violating his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus, White argued that the recorded conversations should not have been admitted as evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 405 F.2d 838, reversed the district court and remanded, and certiorari was granted.
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), is a United States Supreme Court decision which upheld the constitutionality of requiring the payment of a poll tax in order to vote in state elections.
Background
At the relevant time, Georgia imposed a poll tax of $1.00 per year, levied generally on all inhabitants. The statute exempted from the tax all persons under 21 or over 60 years of age, and all females who do not register for voting. Under the state constitution, the tax must be paid by the person liable, together with arrears, before he can be registered for voting.
Nolan Breedlove, a white male, 28 years of age, declined to pay the tax, and was not allowed to register to vote. He filed a lawsuit challenging the Georgia law under the Fourteenth (both the Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause) and the Nineteenth Amendments. T. Earl Suttles was named defendant in the case in his official capacity as tax collector of Fulton County, Georgia.
Taylor v. Standard Gas and Electric Company, 306 U.S. 307 (1939), was an important United States Supreme Court case that laid down the "Deep Rock doctrine" as a rule of bankruptcy and corporate law. This holds that claims, as creditors, upon an insolvent subsidiary company by controlling shareholders or other insiders, like managers or directors, will be subordinated to the claims of all other creditors.
Facts
The Deep Rock Oil Corporation was an undercapitalized subsidiary of the defendant Standard Gas Company.
Judgment
The Supreme Court held that, where a subsidiary corporation declares bankruptcy and an insider or controlling shareholder of that subsidiary corporation asserts claims as a creditor against the subsidiary, loans made by the insider to the subsidiary corporation may be deemed to receive the same treatment as shares of stock owned by the insider. Therefore, the insider's claims will be subordinated to the claims of all other creditors, i.e. other creditors will be paid first, and if there is nothing left after other creditors are paid then the insider gets nothing. This also applies (and indeed the doctrine was first established) where a parent company asserts such claims against its own subsidiary.
Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. 185 (1837) is a 7-to-0 ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States which held that the states of Kentucky and Tennessee had properly entered into an agreement establishing a mutual border between the two states. The plaintiffs in the case were granted title to property improperly conveyed by the state of Tennessee north of this border. In the ruling, the Supreme Court asserted the fundamental right of states and nations to establish their borders regardless of private contract, and made a fundamental statement about the rights of parties to object to a trial court ruling under the rules of civil procedure.
Background
In 1606, during European colonization of the Americas, James I of England granted the Charter of 1606 to the newly established Virginia Company, asserting royal title to Native American-occupied land between the 34th and 45th latitudes and 100 miles (160 km) inland, and permitting the Virginia Company to establish colonies there. In 1609, James I redefined the Colony of Virginia's boundaries to extend the colony's northern and southern boundaries as well as asserting title to all land west to the Pacific Ocean. In 1632, Charles I of England took the Colony of Virginia's grant north of the Potomac River away from Virginia and gave it to the new colony known as the Province of Maryland. Subsequent negotiations between the Province of Pennsylvania colony and Colony of Virginia further established the Virginia colony's northwestern border.
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872), is a United States Supreme Court case. The case was based upon a dispute regarding the Third or Walnut Street Presbyterian Church in Louisville, Kentucky. The Court held that in adjudications of church property disputes, 1) courts cannot rule on the truth or falsity of a religious teaching, 2) where a previous authority structure existed before the dispute, courts should defer to the decision of that structure, and 3) in the absence of such an internal authority structure, courts should defer to the wishes of a majority of the congregation. Because the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church had a clear internal authority structure, the court granted control of the property to that group, even though it was only supported by a minority of the congregation.
Smiley v. Citibank, (517 U.S. 735), is a 1996 U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding a regulation of the Comptroller of Currency which included credit card late fees and other penalties within the definition of interest and thus prevented individual states from limiting them when charged by nationally-chartered banks. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for a unanimous court that the regulation was reasonable enough under the Court's own Chevron standard for the justices to defer to the Comptroller.
The decision, which had begun as a class action in California, was seen as a victory for banks and credit-card issuers, who could mostly charge late fees as they pleased. For that same reason consumer advocates were displeased, warning that late fees could rise to previously unseen levels. They did, and one of the Citibank attorneys has expressed regret for his involvement.
The case
Background
In its 1978 Marquette Bank decision, the court had unanimously held that the National Banking Act of 1863, which created nationally-chartered banks in addition to the state ones that had previously existed, barred states from enforcing their anti-usury laws, which set caps on interest rates, against any national bank based in another state. In 1980, Citibank took advantage of that decision and moved its money-losing credit-card operations to South Dakota, after persuading that state's legislature and governor to repeal its anti-usury law. Other states and banks followed the example, and by 1990 the number of credit cards in circulation had doubled, while the average household's revolving balance increased more than fivefold. At the time late fees were bringing in $2 billion annually to the industry.