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Japanese cruiser Iwate

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A postcard of Iwate at anchor, 1905
History
Empire of Japan
NameIwate
NamesakeMount Iwate
Ordered19 July 1898
BuilderArmstrong Whitworth, United Kingdom
Laid down11 November 1898
Launched29 March 1900
Completed18 March 1901
Reclassified
Stricken30 November 1945
Fate
  • Sunk by air attack, 25 July 1945
  • Raised and scrapped, 1946–1947
General characteristics
Class and typeIzumo-class armored cruiser
Displacement9,423 t (9,274 long tons)
Length132.28 m (434 ft) (o/a)
Beam20.94 m (68 ft 8 in)
Draft7.21 m (23 ft 8 in)
Installed power
Propulsion2 Shafts; 2 triple-expansion steam engines
Speed20.75 knots (38.43 km/h; 23.88 mph)
Range7,000 nmi (13,000 km; 8,100 mi) at 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph)
Complement672
Armament
Armor

Iwate (磐手) was the second and last Izumo-class armored cruiser (Sōkō jun'yōkan) built for the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) in the late 1890s. As Japan lacked the industrial capacity to build such warships herself, the ship was built in Britain. She participated in most of the naval battles of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. The ship was moderately damaged during the Battle of Port Arthur, the Battle off Ulsan, and the Battle of Tsushima. Iwate played a minor role in World War I and began the first of her many training cruises for naval cadets in 1916, a task that would last until the end of 1939. The ship continued to conduct training in home waters throughout the Pacific War. Iwate was sunk by American carrier aircraft during the attack on Kure in July 1945. Her wreck was refloated and scrapped in 1946–1947.

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  • Fallout from Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant - Richard Broinowski

Transcription

I want to talk to you tonight about Fukushima, what happened there. There's been so much distortion and disinformation that I'd like to set the record straight and I want to begin by talking about the Fukushima Daiichi reactor. Daiichi means "number one". It's a complex, it's not a reactor itself. In Fukushima Daiichi, which is on the eastern coast of Tohoku in the prefecture of Fukushima, there are 6 reactors all lined up in a line, we can see the square buildings there. Now that's only one of the assets of the Tokyo Electric Power Company which is the largest public company in Japan, and ladies and gentlemen, it's the largest electricity utility in the world. Not only do they have those six reactors, they have another, Fukushima Daini, which is number two Fukushima, which is further north from there and they have four reactors there and then over on the Japan Sea coast they have Kashiwasaki Kariwa, another 7 reactors there. So that's a total of seventeen reactors, seventeen out of the fleet of fifty-four reactors in Japan. One has to wonder why the Japanese are so enthusiastic about nuclear power, after all, they got atom-bombed twice. Well, I won't go into that much, except to say that President Dwight Eisenhower began a program after developing nuclear weapons in America to turn around and try and find some useful use for nuclear energy, this terribly, awesomely destructive force. And he began a thing called "Atoms for Peace" in the early 1950's. And through a tremendously powerful and persuasive public relations exercise, managed to persuade the Japanese that "you really need nuclear power" and he used quite a lot of characters there. Nakasone was a former prime minister. Nakasone when he was a young man was the principal proponent of nuclear power in Japan in the early 'fifties. The reason for it was that Japan has always felt that they lacked self-sufficiency in energy, and they wanted to get self-sufficiency. The way the so-called Nuclear Village in Japan persuaded the people that nuclear energy was the way to go was that "we don't have to import coal or gas or other energy sources, we can simply make nuclear energy with reactors and close the fuel cycle by developing fast breeder reactors and re-processing, and we don't have to bring in any more uranium". This hasn't worked, and in my own opinion it won't work. It hasn't worked in other countries, and it won't work in Japan. Indeed, there isn't one functioning fast-breeder reactor in the world today. There are a couple of prototype ones, there's one in India, there's one in Russia, France had two, Phenix and Superphenix, Japan had Monju and Joyo. Monju is a fast-breeder reactor in which, unfortunately, they've had a series of accidents, and the last one was where a gantry, about to put newly enriched uranium fuel, plutonium mixed oxide fuel into the reactor, fell into the reactor, weighing tonnes, they couldn't get it out, the thing was closed down and the man in charge of the reactor committed suicide. So that's kind of the end of that story. What happened at Fukushima Daiichi is that ... we all know about the 11th of March last year. It was a cold, grey overcast day in Japan, quite calm, but during the morning, that day, there were repeated earthquakes in Northern Honshu. They were being felt in Tokyo too, as far as Osaka and Kobe and Yokohama as well, but the main ones were occurring off the coast, the eastern coast of Fukushima. They built up in force, until around 2:30, one of the mothers of all earthquakes, force 9 on the Richter scale, exploded in the subterranean plates, about 300 kilometres off Fukushima, to an extent that a seismic atmospheric monitoring station in Taiwan picked it up as a vibration in the ionosphere, it was so intense. The reactors seemed to withstand that series of earthquakes. They were jolted, shaken, but they seemed to be alright. Until the tsunami, the tidal wave, at around 2:40-2:45. At this time, kids were coming out of their classrooms, little Japanese children at primary school, wearing their neat uniforms with their mushroom hats, all lining up in lines to get into buses or to get picked up by their parents to go home, right across the prefecture. Wives and mothers were coming home with their shopping, other people were beginning to round up their shifts at the manufacturing plants. Farmers were beginning to put their stock in the sheds, as it was still very cold as I said. And suddenly this enormous tidal wave, in fact it was two tidal waves in conjunction, travelling at the speed of a jet aircraft, about 500 kilometres an hour, 600 kilometres an hour, came in, and as it came towards the shore, it's a very steep coast there it goes down thousands of feet, into what is called the Oyashio current, which comes from Hokkaido, very cold, full of fish, but a huge current, and this, as it came towards the shore built up energy. I swim at Bondi every morning, and you can see the waves there, you can tell when they're dumpers, when they're really coming in and they're going to damage you and chuck you on the beach. And it came in and inundated the whole of the Sanriku coast, which is Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures, right up the coast of northern Honshu, and as you know devastated enormous amounts of buildings, it killed 20,000 people trying to flee. They had some warning, but not enough. Some of the kids had already been picked up from school and were taken inland. There were some warnings, by public telephone, and the Japanese have a very sophisticated mobile telephone system, and that was being used. So some escaped, but many, many, many did not. The ones who weren't smashed up against buildings were carried inland, and then many of them washed out to sea. There's a piece of footage I've seen which hasn't appeared on the repeated series of television you've seen in Australia, of the wave coming in, inundating all those plastic hothouses, and sweeping fishing boats under bridges and smashing them up, all that stuff. But this is a very poignant shot of, long distance shot of people labouring up the hill towards the camera and there's a bloke in a wheelchair who's struggling, and little kids, and they're all just washed away. Taken away in the reflux of the water going out to sea. Shortly after all this, and you know the events, the sequence of events, the generators that had the emergency power were inundated with water, and just before that happened, the whole of the grid, the power grid in the Tohoku region, the grid went out. So suddenly, they had no electricity to drive the pumps to keep the reactors cool, and the water inundated the emergency generators so they couldn't kick in. This is what the reactor looks like. It's been said, not very truthfully, by the nuclear industry that "this is a very old reactor. We don't build them like this anymore". Ladies and gentlemen, that's nonsense. A third of the American fleet of 104 reactors are this design, from General Electric. They're called boiling water reactors. They have one circuit of water that goes in through the reactor, out, flashes into steam through the steam generator, drives turbines, drives generators, develops electricity. This one, there are six of them at Fukushima Daiichi, number one was built in 1970 by General Electric. Two, three, four were built later on in the 'seventies by General Electric, Hitachi, Toshiba. Hitachi and Toshiba are two enormously powerful companies in Japan, and General Electric helped with that, so did French company Areva, they were involved with this too ... and five and six are the same thing. Now another myth is that "there isn't much radiation coming out of these reactors, and anyway, look at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, two bombs dropped, and the radiation dispersed". Well, it did disperse much more quickly there, because in Little Boy and Fat Man, the two uranium, enriched uranium and plutonium bombs dropped on those two cities, there were only about 15-20 kilograms of enriched uranium, nuclear material in those bombs. Now when they went off, that fissioned and most people were killed by kinetic force and by heat. And not for some time did the Americans admit that there was also a thing called "radiation sickness" that was happening there too. People, well after the blast, who didn't have marks on them, were getting sick and dying from losing their hair, the red platelets in their blood coagulating, diminishing, getting sick in the stomach, having all sorts of illnesses. Some survived, many did not. They died. Not for some time did the authorities admit that there was such a thing. It was Wilfred Bertrand, an Australian journalist who's been much maligned in my view by Bob Menzies as a Communist and a supporter of Stalin. He was none of those things. He was the first journalist to go to Hiroshima. He went in there against the orders of General MacArthur, because all the journo's had to go on Battleship Missouri to witness the surrender by the Japanese to the American forces, but instead he jumped on a train and made his way to Hiroshima, and recorded what was going on. The complete devastation from this atom bomb, and the way the people were, those who were still alive, were dying. The trouble is, to make the comparison though, Fukushima has in one reactor, I'll move on to the next slide. In one reactor, it's like a pear shape. This is the containment here, the reactor core which contains about 70 tonnes of enriched uranium. Enriched in the isotope 235, to 3%. And it's surrounded by the containment vessel which is made of steel, and underneath you've got the Wet Well, a condensation chamber, where the water, after going through the reactor, is taken down to that condensation chamber, which is a great big donut around the whole building. It turns back into water, and then is resurrected and brought back into the cycle again. Flashes into steam and keeps the generators turning. That is still basically what reactors are. The other kind of reactor is a pressurised water reactor which actually has two circuits, one circuit goes through the reactor core, and gets radioactive. The other one goes through a heat exchanger and takes the steam into turbines and generators, but it is not radioactive, so you can work on all that back end of the reactor without getting irradiated. You often see great cooling towers, usually an iconic view of nuclear power, said with some sonorous over-voice from the announcer, with great big cooling towers with steam coming off the tops. Well, all that is is the condensation chamber. It's got nothing to do with the reactor itself. In fact at Morwell in Victoria, the brown coal fields, you see those things all over the place. But that's what it looks like. Oh, I'll come to that later. So the reactors, what happened inside three of them, three out of six of them.. two of them were closed dowm, they were in cold shutdown, numbers five and six. Number four was offline because it was just having a whole lot of irradiated fuel, spent fuel, put back into its cooling pond, which is this thing up here. An extraordinarily vulnerable position. Why put a cooling pond which has so much irradiated fuel in it, right up above the reactor? It seems very close. Well the reason is because it's easy to use a gantry to take out the spent fuel rods from the outside of the core, take them up, across and put them in the pool. It's a matter of utility. The trouble is, it's very exposed. In reactor number four, it was full of spent fuel, only just been put there, and it shook and shook and actually created cracks in the vessel which are still being assessed today and it's very dangerous. Then in one, two and three, the water fell, turned into steam and the enormous heat at 1200 degrees centigrade, rising up to 2000 degrees centigrade, was reacting with the zirconium in the cladding in the rods, forming hydrogen and zirconium oxide. Now hydrogen as you know is a very flammable gas, and in three of the reactors, one, two and three, it exploded, and blew the tops off the reactors. It was pandemonium then at the reactors because TEPCO has a "safety culture", propaganda if you like, to suggest that these reactors were safe. To such an extent that they never talked about radiation to the Japanese people. They provided as did all the other nine utility companies in Japan with reactors, they provided money for jobs, tax relief, kindergartens, schools, roads, hospitals. It was a form of institutionalised bribery to get the people in the regions where reactors were going to be built used to having reactors "and they're safe". You know the Japanese love comic strips and comic books. Manga. There was a very tragic Manga that was created, it was drawn after the Fukushima explosions, for little kids of between two and about six (years). And it showed "Mr Reactor". He had a bad tummy ache, and that was alright, provided he only farted. That's put in basic language. But if he did a poo, then you were in trouble and you had to get under your desk. It's that kind of propaganda that the Japanese were using to try and convince kids that it was alright. Reactors blew, huge clouds of radiation. The first, fortunately, went out to sea. But when the wind swung around, the 12th, 13th of March, they came back to the north-west, and a huge cloud of radiation containing Iodine 131, Cesium 137, Strontium 90, Plutonium 239, and many other actinides, and radioactive toxins were blowing across north-eastern Honshu. There was a huge storm, a rain storm, around the 14th or 15th of March which pushed all that radiation down onto the tops of the mountains, and when my wife and I went there in October, to go up to the region, we were warned not now, not ever could you go bushwalking in those lovely mountains in Fukushima, because they were radioactive. But they were not the only things that were radioactive. Rice fields were just about to, let's see we're coming into Summer so the Spring plantings had been planted. Rice was there. A lot of livestock in the region too, in Fukushima and Iwate and Miyagi. One of the tragedies of what happened was that this was one of the richest agricultural areas of Japan. We talk about Kobe beef and how beautiful that is. It comes from Kobe in the south-west of Honshu, but the beef from Fukushima is much better. So the locals claim. It's beautifully bred, every beef cow has a certificate of authenticity. There are goats, there are sheep. There's a lot of cats and dogs of course, they're mostly pets. These all had to be left behind when the government reluctantly decided against the advice of TEPCO which was obfuscating the whole issue, that people within a 10 kilometre radius had to leave. Then they upped that to a 20 kilometre radius. Every day appeared in the daily press in Tokyo, this map, showing the concentric circles where the reactors are and what the so-called radiation levels are in these regions. You'll notice it goes down to Tokyo. Tokyo there. They're talking about milliSieverts. A milliSievert is a measurement of radiation, of what is permitted in the human body, according to the authorities. It's measured in terms of a standard man, of about 70 kilograms and about 5 feet 8 or nine inches tall. In Australia I think they'd be a bit bigger than that. But that is supposed to be, and 20 milliSieverts a year is the maximum dosage that man can have and not get some kind of radiation cancer. The trouble is, kids of 3-5 kilograms are having the same criteria applied to them. Now what the Dickens is this all about? Not only that, but the Japanese government was now in panic mode, and it was upping the level. These maps which appeared every day, they always had a footnote saying "this is well below the radiation level you need to worry about", ignoring what is now, I think, an established fact in radiation science that there is "no minimum dose of radiation". It's a bit like smoking. Some smokers never get lung cancer. Other smokers do, and some people who never smoked get lung cancer. Radiation. You might be hit by Cesium 137 and Iodine whatever. You might never get sick from cancer from that radiation, but the chances that you will, increase. It depends on your psychology. It depends on your genetic structure. It depends on your physical health, and your susceptibility to cancer. What we suspect, in the nuclear-skeptical industry as I'm a part of, what we suspect is that the nuclear industry has been able to disingenuously say that "there have been no fatalities from radiation at Fukushima, therefore, it's safe". Just as there were no fatalities at Three Mile Island in 1979. There were no fatalities at Calder Hall in Britain in 1956. They tend to avoid Kyshtym which is near Chelyabinsk in the Soviet Union probably the worst nuclear accident. Worse than Chernobyl, worse than Fukushima where the Russians, the Soviet union had a bomb factory, and were producing weapons from Plutonium 239, and they had the Plutonium in trenches, in this, it's really a slave labour town. All these indentured people brought in by Stalin to make nuclear weapons. It was the height of the Cold War, late in the 'fifties. And there was an explosion. Not a nuclear explosion, but a lot of the plutonium blew up and many, many, many thousands of people died. It didn't come out immediately because of the Soviet Union putting a clamp on the whole thing, but in fact it happened, only later that people realised what an enormous catastrophe that was. Not just in the number of people who had died, but in the long-term genetic effects of that as well. With Chernobyl there is still an enormous amount of controversy about how many people died. The estimates go from one optimistic figure of about 8,000 deaths, I think that was put together by the World Health Organisation and the International Atomic Energy Agency, up to a million. That was put together by Russian scientists, and it only came out about two years ago. But meanwhile we continue to have this argument about radiation and we have heterodox views. A colleague of mine at the Australian National University, a professor of nuclear physics, Aden Bern, a very polite New Zealander, knows a lot about nuclear physics, but is not a physician, but he claims that "radiation really doesn't do you much damage at all". I must quote, I don't know if he's in the audience, but Professor Barry Brook? No answer? Okay, not here. But what he said after the Fukushima accident was "the risk of meltdown is extremely small. The death toll from any such accident, even if it occurred will be zero. There will be no breach of containment, and no release of radioactivity, beyond at the very most, some venting of mildly radioactive steam to relieve pressure. Those spreading fear, uncertainty and doubt at the moment will be the ones left with egg on their faces. I'm happy to be quoted forever on the above if I am wrong, but I won't be. The only reactor that has a small probability of being finished is unit number one, and I doubt that, but it may be offline for a year or two." Not only did he say this straight after, but he repeated the same kind of message for some time afterwards. I'll come back to the Australian attitude, because it's very interesting. You people in South Australia, you've got Honeymoon and Olympic Dam and Beverley. Three mines and the word there's that South Australia has the biggest and richest uranium deposits in the world. It think that's a bit of a stretch, but never mind. But a lot of miners were very angry, very angry indeed when Fukushima occurred and I've been to a number of seminars at the Lowy Institute in Sydney which is very pro-nuclear, that were fulminating about the myths that were created about nuclear power and how bad it is. And you know, you have to think well, what is this all about? Well it's about money. It's about shares. It's about power. And if you continue until, and I think it's happening in Japan, people realise that this is one hell of a way to boil water, and it's very dangerous, and there are much better ways for generating electricity. Let me just continue to say that, and I'll not take too much longer, but why do I think things are changing in Japan? Well the Japanese, they're very good at bearing misfortune. They're very stoic people. They're very disciplined people. Now I generalise of course, but of course if you can generalise about anyone, you can generalise about the Japanese. I've got many friends there. I speak the language, I lived there, my wife speaks much better than I do, mine's very stilted Japanese but nevertheless. It's a wonderful country and they're wonderful people. Very inventive. But there's a Nuclear Village and the Nuclear Village consists of bureaucrats in government, nuclear bureaucrats in the ministry of economy, trade and industry, they're very pro-nuclear. The big companies like Toshiba and Hitachi, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Ishikawajima-Harima, and other who make the things, they make the containment vessels, they make the nuclear rods, they process things, they enrich things, they do the whole process. It's a huge industry. A multi-billion dollar industry, and a lot of government officials who think that this is the way to self reliance. "Japan is going to be great again". The analogy is with the second World War. The Kwantung Army decided in the thirties that they had to go south, invade China and invade South-east Asia and take all the rubber plantations from those wicked white colonialists, and the oil and the food products and the palm oil and everything so that "we will become a self-sustaining empire" the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. And then the only thing that stopped them in fact was when the Emperor said in a massive understatement the the war was "not necessarily going to our advantage" after Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been bombed, so they changed course. And then they changed course radically to a policy of economic expansion and growth, as you know. They became very successful in the 'fifties and the 'sixties and the nuclear industry was part of that. The vision developed in the minds of the Nuclear Village "we can develop this power and it will sustain us, and we will be world leaders". And there are 54 reactors in Japan to prove that case. They've had a few accidents in the past, but nothing compared with Fukushima. And now this has occurred, there are people who are beginning to say "it's not on". There are Nobel prize laureates like Kenzaburo Oe, and other writers, philosophers, creative people, and politicians who are saying "we don't want nuclear power anymore". You know that in 2009 the Democratic Party of Japan, the first time since the end of the war, apart from a very brief period, became the first liberal with a small 'l', semi-socialist government in Japan. They took over from the conservative liberal democratic party, the Jimento and they said Hatoyama, the first Prime minister under the new regime said "we're gonna stop the power of the bureaucrats, we're gonna take over, we the elected people are going to run this country and we're not going to let the conservatives run things" but then he fell on his sword and Naoto Kan took over. Kan was the Prime Minister when Fukushima blew, and he was not all that experienced. He was a bright man, but he was anti-nuclear. He was particularly panicked by a report that he got from his Prime Ministerial office technicians, who said "look, if this cooling pond in reactor number four actually falls over, or if the reactor vessels themselves breach, you're gonna have to evacuate Tokyo" 250 kilometres to the south. He knew he couldn't do that. You can't evacuate 15-20 million people from a city like that, couldn't be done. I think probably wisely in retrospect he held that to himself, he didn't let that out, but it deeply worried him. If he'd let it out, it would have panicked everyone. Didn't happen, and you know, proved to be not the case. Tokyo is still surviving, and it's okay so far. What he did do though was close the Hamaoka plant which is south-west of Tokyo, which is much closer to Tokyo and just as susceptible to earthquakes and tsunamis as Fukushima. He also insisted on taking away the nuclear regulatory body from METI, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. There's a system in Japan called "amakudari" which means descent from heaven, or descent from the Gods. The Gods are the bureaucrats, and they had a cosy arrangement with the private companies, Mitsubishi et al, that once they retired they would take over senior positions in these companies, you see. So that each was scratching the other's back. They weren't regulating at all independently. They were part of the industry. So what Naoto Kan did was say "I'm not going to have this anymore". He also started a push for renewables, but the pressure became too great and he also fell on his sword, only about 6 months ago, and passed over the command to Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. Now Noda is a different kettle of fish, he's the present Prime Minister. He's fairly quiet, he doesn't say much. He's an economist. Naoto Kan was an engineer. And Noda doesn't have the same fire in his belly about changing the political situation in Japan to get rid of nuclear power. Meanwhile the Nuclear Village is regathering their forces, they've got big, powerful men in METI who are now pushing nuclear power again, saying "you don't have to worry about this, that was an aberration, it won't happen again" but you've got a whole lot of local governments, provincial governments, the government of Fukushima was the first one to do it, to say "hey, we don't want reactors any more" and the law in Japan says that you must have local government approval before you can restart any of those reactors, and right now, only three out of 54 reactors in Japan are operating. Last summer, eleven were. The Japanese got through that hot summer without blackouts and without having to cut off their air-conditioners except for sometimes. By remarkable self-discipline among the people who were only too prepared to accommodate the Government's wish to conserve power, and they did lots of things to do that, so you're building up a head of steam here, and I say in my book if any of you care to read it when it comes out, and yes, I would like you to give me some suggestions on a title for it, I'm saying in that that the Japanese have turned a corner, and I think that there's going to be a change. Now, Alison and I went up to the region, we took the shinkansen fast train to Fukushima and we saw and we talked to farmers and we talked to local officials and many of them were very frank with us. And we also went to a hospital, a medical hospital, the Fukushima medical centre and met a very charming, young professor of radiation medicine in his clinic. His clinic was very modern and it had every bit of equipment. It had a stainless steel bath to wash radiation off victims. It had a gurney at the front with a dummy on it, showing you how you'd bandage it up so it'd be alright. You had charts on the wall, but what struck a note in me was the charts were all about 'naturally occurring radiation'. That is, radiation you get from the ground or from the sun. He said at the end, I said 'look you don't seem to be worried, you're staying here with your young children.' He said 'Yes, I'm here to disprove the lie, I'm here to say that radiation is alright, and is going to be okay. As my wife and I left, we thought 'I wonder if TEPCO financed this clinic? I wonder if they pay this man's salary? I wonder if they financed the whole hospital?' I'll be careful in my book not to make that assumption, the fact is I don't know. But I suspect that's the case. There are some captains of industry coming on board about this new thing of renewables. They haven't done much yet, and some conservatives we talked to in Tokyo said 'we can't do it, we don't have enough wind, we don't have enough solar, we don't have enough geothermal. But they do. There's a tremendous amount of geothermal in Japan. It's the worst possible archipelago on which to build nuclear reactors because it's so prone to earthquakes, but also they've got an enormous geothermal capacity. Masayoshi Son is the Chief Executive Officer and chairman of the Japanese computer giant Softbank. He's one of the richest men in Japan. He said 'for us to head towards a clean and more inexpensive option over the long term, all the Government needs to do is to take solar power purchasing policy it is already discussing one step further, and simply add the resolution to purchase all power at 40 yen for the next 20 years. It is sheer nonsense to cling to nuclear power, when it will recede in the future, instead of taking the path that will definitely lead to cost reduction. Solar, solar-thermal, wind, geothermal, biomass, oceanic energy and other blessings of nature can be used for thousands of years without contaminating the earth. These are forms of energy that co-exist with nature without destroying it. Ports of the past can gain new life as ports of solar and wind energy. Such recovery projects would create huge job opportunities for the regions' people, and Japanese manufacturers already have the number one solar technology in the world. Instead of exporting it, we should use it domestically to create the world's largest solar belt. There are a lot of other visionaries who are saying let's build photo-voltaics and other kinds of renewable energy along the Tohoku coast, and my bet, ladies and gentlemen, and I say this in my book, sticking my neck out, of course, is that the nuclear industry in Japan has a short life from now. I give it ten years before there's a diminution. A lot of reactors are not going to go back online, none are going to be built, no new ones are going to be built. The ones that will be allowed to come back online will be begrudgingly and simply as part of a mix in the interim as they go to renewables. Let me finish by saying what impression I think this will have on the rest of the world. Japan as you know is a world leader in all sorts of technologies. The Koreans are catching up fast. Korea is very gung-ho about nuclear and will continue. They're having a nuclear safety conference in March, in Seoul this year. The whole task is to prove that nuclear is safe. No-one 's going to ask the question 'should we have it at all,' but they're going to reinforce the message that it is safe, and they've got lots and lots of people there. It follows on from the Obama conference of 2009 in Washington where they were talking about nuclear safety. The emphasis there was on terrorism, this is on safety. Russia will continue to develop RosAtom and its nuclear external capacities. The British, they're still pro-nuclear and I always worry because their technology is not very good. The Americans are equivocal. You'll notice that Obama has just signed off on two new reactors being built somewhere in the United States, but there are 104 in their fleet and many of them are aging and will have to close down. They still, and this is one of the biggest problems with nuclear, no-one has yet developed a spent fuel repository that can take that stuff and isolate it from the biosphere for the required geological time. Yaku Mountain is a joke, it's a political football. It's not working. The Swedish have tried. The French think they've got somewhere. And the French too, the French as you know are very positive, the second or third biggest nuclear power. 58 reactors. Sarcozy is in favour of nuclear the but Ségolène Royal and the Socialist party that's standing for the next presidential election is against nuclear power. It will be very interesting to see what happens there. The Germans have stopped! Now two countries, Germany with its powerful economy and Japan with its powerful economy, if they can prove anything at all it will be that we can do without nuclear. So it doesn't leave the miners, BHP Billiton, the American owners of Beverley and the people who own honeymoon very far to go. And it'm very sorry for South Australia. You've got a premier who wants this and sees dollar signs flashing in his eyes, but the fact is that uranium exports from Australia are just under one billion dollars a year. Queensland alone export 400 billion dollars of coal a year. It's a drop in a bucket. I think it's less than the value of industrial salt that we export from this country, and yet we blow it up into a big thing. Final point to make is, if I can end on this note. Julie Bishop was fond of saying when she was shadow minister for the environment that 'we need nuclear because it's going to save us from global warming. Here's the fact. Electricity generation around the world counts for 18 percent of carbon emissions. 18 percent. So even if tomorrow through some miracle you could change all the coal and oil and gas generators into nuclear, you're still not making much of a dent on the other two major villains which are transport hydrocarbons and deforestation. They're the things that are doing the damage, not nuclear. So thank you very much for your indulgence, and I'd like to answer questions and have a discussion if you'd like. [applause]

Background and description

The 1896 Naval Expansion Plan was made after the First Sino-Japanese War and included four armored cruisers in addition to four more battleships, all of which had to be ordered from British shipyards as Japan lacked the capability to build them itself. Further consideration of the Russian building program caused the IJN to believe that the battleships ordered under the original plan would not be sufficient to counter the Imperial Russian Navy. Budgetary limitations prevented ordering more battleships and the IJN decided to expand the number of more affordable armored cruisers to be ordered from four to six ships. The revised plan is commonly known as the "Six-Six Fleet".[1] Unlike most of their contemporaries which were designed for commerce raiding or to defend colonies and trade routes, Iwate and her half-sisters were intended as fleet scouts and to be employed in the battleline.[2]

The ship was 132.28 meters (434 ft) long overall and 121.92 meters (400 ft) between perpendiculars. She had a beam of 20.94 meters (68 ft 8 in) and had an average draft of 7.21 meters (23 ft 8 in). Iwate displaced 9,423 metric tons (9,274 long tons) at normal load and 10,235 metric tons (10,073 long tons) at deep load. The ship had a metacentric height of 0.73 meters (2 ft 5 in).[3] Her crew consisted of 672 officers and enlisted men.[4]

Iwate had a pair of four-cylinder triple-expansion steam engines, each driving a single propeller shaft.[5] Steam for the engines was provided by 24 Belleville boilers and the engines were rated at a total of 14,500 indicated horsepower (10,800 kW). The ship had a designed speed of 20.75 knots (38.43 km/h; 23.88 mph) and reached 22.3 knots (41.3 km/h; 25.7 mph) during her sea trials from 15,739 ihp (11,737 kW). She carried up to 1,527 long tons (1,551 t) of coal[6] and could steam for 7,000 nautical miles (13,000 km; 8,100 mi) at a speed of 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph).[4]

The main armament for all of the "Six-Six Fleet" armored cruisers consisted of four 8-inch (203 mm) guns in twin-gun turrets fore and aft of the superstructure. The secondary armament consisted of 14 Elswick Ordnance Company "Pattern Z" quick-firing (QF), 6-inch (152 mm) guns. Only four of these guns were not mounted in armored casemates on the main and upper decks and their mounts on the upper deck were protected by gun shields. Iwate was also equipped with a dozen QF 12-pounder (3-inch (76 mm)) 12-cwt guns[Note 1] and eight QF 2.5-pounder (1.5-inch (38 mm)) Yamauchi guns as close-range defense against torpedo boats. The ship was equipped with four submerged 18-inch (457 mm) torpedo tubes, two on each broadside.[7]

All of the "Six-Six Fleet" armored cruisers used the same armor scheme with some minor differences. The waterline belt of Krupp cemented armor ran the full length of the ship and its thickness varied from 178 millimeters (7.0 in) amidships to 89 millimeters (3.5 in) at the bow and stern. It had a height of 2.13 meters (7 ft 0 in), of which 1.33 meters (4 ft 4 in) was normally underwater. The upper strake of belt armor was 127 millimeters (5.0 in) thick and extended from the upper edge of the waterline belt to the main deck. It extended 53.31 meters (174 ft 11 in) from the forward to the rear barbette. The Izumo class had oblique 127 mm armored bulkheads that closed off the ends of the central armored citadel.[8]

The barbettes, gun turrets and the front of the casemates were all 6 inches thick while the sides and rear of the casemates were protected by 51 millimeters (2.0 in) of armor. The deck was 63 millimeters (2.5 in) thick and the armor protecting the conning tower was 356 millimeters (14.0 in) in thickness.[9]

Construction and career

Iwate prior to launching, Newcastle upon Tyne
Iwate at anchor, Plymouth, c. 1901

The contract for Iwate, named after the eponymous prefecture,[10] was signed on 19 July 1898 with Armstrong Whitworth. The ship was laid down at their shipyard in Elswick on 11 November 1898 and launched on 29 March 1900, when she was named by Mme. Arakawa, wife of the Japanese Consul-General in London.[11] She was completed on 18 March 1901 and departed for Japan the following day[12] under the command of Captain Hikohachi Yamada, who had been appointed to supervise her construction and bring her back to Japan. Iwate arrived in Yokosuka on 17 May and Yamada was relieved by Captain Taketomi Kunikane on 6 July.[13]

Russo-Japanese War

At the start of the Russo-Japanese War, Iwate was the flagship of Rear Admiral Misu Sotarō, commander of the 2nd Division of the 2nd Fleet.[14] She participated in the Battle of Port Arthur on 9 February 1904, when Vice Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō led the Combined Fleet in an attack on the Russian ships of the Pacific Squadron anchored just outside Port Arthur. Tōgō had expected the surprise night attack by his destroyers to be much more successful than it was, anticipating that the Russians would be badly disorganized and weakened, but they had recovered from their surprise and were ready for his attack. The Japanese ships were spotted by the protected cruiser Boyarin, which was patrolling offshore and alerted the Russians. Tōgō chose to attack the Russian coastal defenses with his main armament and engage the ships with his secondary guns. Splitting his fire proved to be a poor decision as the Japanese eight- and six-inch guns inflicted little damage on the Russian ships, which concentrated all their fire on the Japanese ships with some effect.[15] Although many ships on both sides were hit, Russian casualties numbered some 150, while the Japanese suffered roughly 90 killed and wounded before Tōgō disengaged.[16] Iwate had, in fact, been considerably damaged in the engagement.[17]

In early March, Kamimura was tasked to take the reinforced 2nd Division north and make a diversion off Vladivostok. While scouting for Russian ships in the area, the Japanese cruisers bombarded the harbor and defenses of Vladivostok on 6 March to little effect. Upon their return to Japan a few days later, the 2nd Division was ordered to escort the transports ferrying the Imperial Guards Division to Korea and then to join the ships blockading Port Arthur. Kamimura was ordered north in mid-April to cover the Sea of Japan and defend the Korea Strait against any attempt by the Vladivostok Independent Cruiser Squadron, under the command of Rear Admiral Karl Jessen, to break through and unite with the Pacific Squadron. The two units narrowly missed each other on the 24th in heavy fog and the Japanese proceeded to Vladivostok where they laid several minefields before arriving back at Wonsan on the 30th.[18]

The division failed to intercept the Russian squadron as it attacked several transports south of Okinoshima Island on 15 June due to heavy rain and fog. The Russians sortied again on 30 June and Kamimura finally was able to intercept them the next day near Okinoshima. The light was failing when they were spotted and the Russians were able to disengage in the darkness. Jessen's ships sortied again on 17 July headed for the eastern coast of Japan to act as a diversion and pull Japanese forces out of the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea. The Russian ships passed through Tsugaru Strait two days later and began capturing ships bound for Japan. The arrival of the Russians off Tokyo Bay on the 24th caused the Naval General Staff to order Kamimura to sail for Cape Toi Misaki, Kyūshū, fearing that Jessen would circumnavigate Japan to reach Port Arthur. Two days later he was ordered north to the Kii Channel and then to Tokyo Bay on the 28th. The General Staff finally ordered him back to Tsushima Island on the 30th; later that day he received word that Jessen's ships had passed through the Tsugaru Strait early that morning and reached Vladivostok on 1 August.[19]

Battle off Ulsan

Iwate at anchor, 1902

On 10 August, the ships at Port Arthur attempted a breakout to Vladivostok, but were turned back in the Battle of the Yellow Sea. Jessen was ordered to rendezvous with them, but the order was delayed. His three armored cruisers, Rossia, Gromoboi, and Rurik, had to raise steam, so he did not sortie until the evening of 13 August. By dawn he had reached Tsushima, but turned back when he failed to see any ships from the Port Arthur squadron. 36 miles (58 km) north of the island he encountered Kamimura's squadron, which consisted of four modern armored cruisers, Izumo, Tokiwa, Azuma, and Iwate. The two squadrons had passed during the night without spotting one another and each had reversed course around first light. This put the Japanese ships astride the Russian route to Vladivostok.[20]

Jessen ordered his ships to turn to the northeast when he spotted the Japanese at 05:00 and they followed suit, albeit on a slightly converging course. Both sides opened fire around 05:23 at a range of 8,500 meters (9,300 yd). The Japanese ships concentrated their fire on Rurik, the rear ship of the Russian formation. She was hit fairly quickly and began to fall astern of the other two ships. Jessen turned southeast in an attempt to open the range, but this blinded the Russian gunners with the rising sun and prevented any of their broadside guns from bearing on the Japanese. About 06:00, Jessen turned 180° to starboard in an attempt to reach the Korean coast and to allow Rurik to rejoin the squadron. Kamimura followed suit around 06:10, but turned to port, which opened the range between the squadrons. Azuma then developed engine problems and the Japanese squadron slowed to conform with her best speed. Firing recommenced at 06:24 and Rurik was hit three times in the stern, flooding her steering compartment; she had to be steered with her engines. Her speed continued to decrease, further exposing her to Japanese fire, and her steering jammed to port around 06:40.[21]

Jessen made another 180° turn in an attempt to interpose his two ships between the Japanese and Rurik, but the latter ship suddenly turn to starboard and increased speed and passed between Jessen's ships and the Japanese. Kamimura turned 180° as well so that both squadrons were heading southeast on parallel courses, but Jessen quickly made another 180° turn so that they headed on opposing courses. At this time an eight-inch shell struck the roof of Iwate's starboard forward upper six-inch casemate and ignited the ready-use ammunition. The fire killed 40 and wounded 24 more and knocked out the six-inch gun in that casemate, as well as those below and aft of it. In addition, the 12-pounder above it was rendered inoperable. The Russians reversed course for the third time around 07:45 in another attempt to support Rurik although Rossia was on fire herself; her fires were extinguished about twenty minutes later. Kamimura circled Rurik to the south at 08:00 and allowed the other two Russian ships to get to his north and gave them an uncontested route to Vladivostok. Despite this, Jessen turned back once more at 08:15 and ordered Rurik to make her own way back to Vladivostok before turning north at his maximum speed, about 18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph).[22]

About this time Kamimura's two elderly protected cruisers, Naniwa and Takachiho, were approaching from the south. Their arrival allowed Kamimura to pursue Jessen with all of his armored cruisers while the two new arrivals dealt with Rurik. They fought a running battle with the Russians for the next hour and a half; scoring enough hits on them to force their speed down to 15 knots (28 km/h; 17 mph). The Japanese closed to a minimum of about 5,000 meters (5,500 yd), but Kamimura then opened the range up to 6,500 meters (7,100 yd).[22]

About 10:00, Kamimura's gunnery officer erroneously informed him that Izumo had expended three-quarters of her ammunition and he turned back after a five-minute rapid-fire barrage. He did not wish to leave the Tsushima Strait unguarded and thought that he could use his remaining ammunition on Rurik. By this time she had been sunk by Naniwa and Takachiho. They had radioed Kamimura that she was sunk, but he did not receive the message. Shortly after the Japanese turned back, Gromoboi and Rossia were forced to heave-to to make repairs. Iwate was the most seriously damaged Japanese ship and suffered a total of 40 killed and 37 wounded.[23]

In mid-September, Tokiwa and Iwate were transferred to the 1st Division. In early December the cruiser was sent home to refit. In mid-February, she was guarding the Tsugaru Strait and remained there through mid-April.[24]

Battle of Tsushima

A Japanese postcard of Iwate at sea, c. 1905

As the Russian 2nd and 3rd Pacific Squadrons approached Japan on 27 May, having sailed from the Baltic Sea, they were spotted by patrolling Japanese ships early that morning, but visibility was limited and radio reception poor. The preliminary reports were enough to cause Tōgō to order his ships to put to sea and the 2nd Division spotted the Russian ships under the command of Vice Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky at around 11:30. Kamimura closed to about a range of 8,000 meters (8,700 yd) before sheering off under fire to join Tōgō's battleships.[25] Iwate, now the flagship of Rear Admiral Shimamura Hayao,[26] was last in the 2nd Division when Tōgō opened fire on the 2nd Pacific Squadron at 14:10 and, like most of the ships in the division, engaged the battleship Oslyabya which was forced to fall out of formation at 14:50 and sank 20 minutes later. The cruiser also fired upon the battleship Imperator Nikolai I before 14:50. The protected cruiser Zhemchug attempted to make a torpedo attack at about 15:06, but was driven off by fire from Iwate and the armored cruisers Kasuga and Nisshin. The battleship Knyaz Suvorov suddenly appeared out of the mist at 15:35 at a range of about 2,000 meters (6,600 ft). All of Kamimura's ships engaged her for five minutes or so with Azuma and the armored cruiser Yakumo also firing torpedoes at the Russian ship without effect.[27]

After 17:30 Kamimura led his division in a fruitless pursuit of some of the Russian cruisers, leaving Tōgō's battleships to their own devices. He abandoned his chase around 18:03 and turned northwards to rejoin Tōgō. His ships spotted the rear of the Russian battleline around 18:30 and opened fire when the range closed to 8000–9000 meters. Nothing is known of any effect on the Russians and they ceased fire by 19:30 and rejoined Tōgō at 20:08 as night was falling.[28] The surviving Russian ships were spotted the next morning and the Japanese ships opened fire around 10:30, staying beyond the range at which the Russian ships could effectively reply. Rear Admiral Nikolai Nebogatov therefore decided to surrender his ships as he could neither return fire nor close the range.[29]

In the meantime, the coast defense ship Admiral Ushakov had fallen well behind Nebogatov's ships and was spotted by the protected cruiser Chiyoda early in the morning, but the Japanese were more intent on locating the main body of the Russian fleet than attacking a single isolated ship. Admiral Ushakov was then spotted at 14:10, well after Nebogatov's surrender, by Shimamura who received permission to pursue her with Iwate and Yakumo. They caught up with the Russian ship at 17:00 and demanded her surrender. Admiral Ushakov attempted to close the range to bring the Japanese cruisers within range of her guns, but they were fast enough to keep the range open and the Russian ship never hit either one. After about half an hour, Admiral Ushakov was listing heavily enough that her guns could not elevate enough to bear and her commander ordered his crew to abandon ship and the scuttling charges detonated. The ship sank in three minutes and 12 officers and 327 crewmen were rescued by the Japanese. Between them, Yakumo and Iwate fired 89 eight- and 278 six-inch shells during the engagement.[30] Iwate was struck 17 times, over the course of the entire battle, including hits that burst in the water alongside. She was, however, only lightly damaged by two hits that caused two compartments on the lower deck to flood. These hits were made by two 12-inch, three 8-inch, two 6-inch, one 120 mm (4.7 in), five 75 mm (3 in), and four unidentified shells.[31]

As the IJN was preparing to invade Sakhalin Island in early July, Kamimura's 2nd Division, now reduced to Iwate, Izumo, and Tokiwa, was tasked to defend the Korea Strait before it escorted troops that made an amphibious landing in northeastern Korea. In mid-August, the division covered the landing at Chongjin, closer to the Russian border.[32] After the war, she was briefly commanded by Captain Yamashita Gentarō from 2 February to 22 November 1906 before he was relieved by Captain Arima Ryokitsu.[13]

Subsequent service

The ship participated in the early stages of the Battle of Tsingtao before returning to Sasebo on 2 October 1914.[33] The following month she was assigned to the First South Seas Squadron, based at Fiji and later at the Marquesas Islands.[34] On 1 September 1915, Iwate was assigned to the Training Squadron where she conducted long-distance oceanic navigation and officer training for cadets in the Imperial Japanese Navy Academy. She began the first of her 16 training cruises on 20 April 1916, together with Azuma, and visited Australia and Southeast Asia before returning home on 22 August. The ship was relieved of her assignment the next month, but rejoined the Training Squadron a year later in preparation for her next training cruise. Iwate departed on 2 March 1918, bound for Central America, Hawaii and the South Sea Islands, and returned on 6 July.[35]

Iwate at Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, 1933

Two years later, the ship began her next training cruise on 21 August 1920, visiting South America and the South Sea Islands, before returning on 4 April 1921.[36] On 1 September, she was re-designated as a 1st-class coast-defense ship.[13] On 26 June 1922, Iwate, accompanied by Izumo and Yakumo, began a circumnavigation of the world that took them to Hawaii, Los Angeles, California, through the Panama Canal to Rio de Janeiro, where the cadets viewed the Independence Centenary International Exposition commemorating Brazilian independence. The ships then visited Buenos Aires, Argentina and Durban, South Africa before heading home via the Indian Ocean, where they arrived on 8 February 1923.[13]

In 1924, four of Iwate's 12-pounder guns were removed, as were all of her QF 2.5-pounder guns, and a single 8 cm/40 3rd Year Type anti-aircraft (AA) gun was added. Refitted again in 1931, her torpedo tubes were removed as were all of her main deck 6-inch guns and their casemates plated over; she now carried only two 12-pounders, although she now had three 8 cm/40 3rd Year Type AA guns.[37] In addition her boilers were replaced by six Yarrow boilers with an output of only 7,000 ihp (5,200 kW) which reduced her top speed to 16 knots (30 km/h; 18 mph). She now carried 1,435 metric tons (1,412 long tons) of coal and 329 metric tons (324 long tons) of fuel oil. Her crew now numbered 726 officers and enlisted men.[4]

The ship continued to make training cruises, usually at two-year intervals, for the rest of the decade that took her to the East Coast of North America and the Mediterranean Sea among other places.[36] One of her cadets on the 1925–26 cruise was Prince Hironobu Fushimi.[38] In December 1928, the ship escorted Emperor Hirohito during an Imperial fleet review in Yokohama harbor.[39] From 1932 the training voyages became annual events, with the exception of 1935, until they ceased at the end of 1939.[36]

Iwate was assigned to the 12th Squadron of the 3rd Support Fleet from 1 February 1940. Despite her antiquated age, she was briefly re-classified as a 1st-class cruiser on 1 July 1942 before she was reclassified as a training ship in 1943.[40] On 19 March 1945, Iwate was attacked by American carrier aircraft, killing one crewman, although they failed to inflict any significant damage. Shortly afterwards, her 8-inch guns were replaced by four 12.7 cm (5.0 in) Type 89 dual-purpose guns in two twin mounts and four of her remaining 6-inch guns were removed. Her light anti-aircraft armament was significantly reinforced by the addition of nine license-built Hotchkiss 25-millimeter Type 96 light AA guns in one triple, two twin, and two single-gun mounts and two 13.2-millimeter Hotchkiss machine guns in single mounts.[13][40]

Iwate sunk off Kure, October 1945

The ship was bombed during the American aerial attack on Kure on 24 July 1945. While not hit by any bombs, the three near misses sprang the ship's seams and the resulting flooding caused her to sink in shallow water at coordinates 34°14′N 132°30′E / 34.233°N 132.500°E / 34.233; 132.500 the following day. She was removed from the navy list on 30 November and her hulk was raised and scrapped in 1946–47 by the Harima Dock Company.[13]

Notes

  1. ^ "Cwt" is the abbreviation for hundredweight, 12 cwt referring to the weight of the gun.

Footnotes

  1. ^ Evans & Peattie, pp. 57–62
  2. ^ Milanovich, p. 72
  3. ^ Milanovich, pp. 74, 80
  4. ^ a b c Jentschura, Jung & Mickel, p. 74
  5. ^ Milanovich, p. 81
  6. ^ Brook 1999, p. 112
  7. ^ Milanovich, p. 78
  8. ^ Milanovich, pp. 80–81
  9. ^ Chesneau & Kolesnik, p. 225
  10. ^ Silverstone, p. 331
  11. ^ "Naval & Military intelligence - The Japanese cruiser Iwate". The Times. No. 36103. London. 30 March 1900. p. 7.
  12. ^ Milanovich, p. 73
  13. ^ a b c d e f Hackett & Kingsepp
  14. ^ Kowner, p. 241
  15. ^ Forczyk, pp. 42–43
  16. ^ Corbett 1994, I, p. 105
  17. ^ Warner & Warner, p. 201
  18. ^ Corbett 1994, I, pp. 138–39, 142–45, 160, 177, 188–89, 191–96
  19. ^ Corbett 1994, I, pp. 283–89, 319–25, 337–51
  20. ^ Brook 2000, pp. 34, 37
  21. ^ Brook 2000, pp. 39, 43
  22. ^ a b Brook 2000, p. 43
  23. ^ Brook 2000, pp. 43, 45
  24. ^ Corbett 1994, II, pp. 52, 104, 162, 176
  25. ^ Corbett 1994, II, pp. 232, 235
  26. ^ Kowner, p. 352
  27. ^ Campbell, Part 2, pp. 128–32
  28. ^ Campbell, Part 3, pp. 186–87
  29. ^ Corbett 1994, II, pp. 319–20
  30. ^ McLaughlin, pp. 64–65
  31. ^ Campbell, Part 4, pp. 263, 265
  32. ^ Corbett 1994, II, pp. 356, 363–65, 377–80
  33. ^ Burdick, pp. 228, 241
  34. ^ Corbett 1938, I, pp. 366, 409
  35. ^ Lacroix & Wells, pp. 657–58
  36. ^ a b c Lacroix & Wells, p. 657
  37. ^ Chesneau, p. 174
  38. ^ "Japanese Training Cruiser on World Tour". Gloucester Citizen. 22 January 1926. p. 6. Retrieved 10 May 2015 – via British Newspaper Archive.
  39. ^ "Great Naval Review: British Warships Take Part in Yokohama Pageant". Western Morning News. 5 December 1928. Retrieved 10 May 2015 – via British Newspaper Archive.
  40. ^ a b Fukui, p. 4

References

  • Brook, Peter (2000). "Armoured Cruiser vs. Armoured Cruiser: Ulsan 14 August 1904". In Preston, Antony (ed.). Warship 2000–2001. London: Conway Maritime Press. ISBN 0-85177-791-0.
  • Brook, Peter (1999). Warships for Export: Armstrong Warships 1867-1927. Gravesend: World Ship Society. ISBN 0-905617-89-4.
  • Burdick, Charles B. (1976). The Japanese Siege of Tsingtau: World War I in Asia. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books. ISBN 0-2080-1594-9.
  • Campbell, N.J.M. (1978). "The Battle of Tsu-Shima, Parts 2, 3 and 4". In Preston, Antony (ed.). Warship. Vol. II. London: Conway Maritime Press. pp. 127–35, 186–192, 258–65. ISBN 0-87021-976-6.
  • Chesneau, Roger, ed. (1980). Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1922–1946. Greenwich, UK: Conway Maritime Press. ISBN 0-85177-146-7.
  • Chesneau, Roger & Kolesnik, Eugene M., eds. (1979). Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1860–1905. Greenwich: Conway Maritime Press. ISBN 0-8317-0302-4.
  • Corbett, Julian Stafford (1994). Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-129-7.
  • Corbett, Julian (March 1997). Naval Operations to the Battle of the Falklands. History of the Great War: Based on Official Documents. Vol. I (2nd, reprint of the 1938 ed.). London and Nashville, Tennessee: Imperial War Museum and Battery Press. ISBN 0-89839-256-X.
  • Evans, David & Peattie, Mark R. (1997). Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-192-7.
  • Forczyk, Robert (2009). Russian Battleship vs Japanese Battleship, Yellow Sea 1904–05. Botley, UK: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-84603-330-8.
  • Gardiner, Robert & Gray, Randal, eds. (1985). Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1906–1921. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-85177-245-5.
  • Hackett, Bob & Kingsepp, Sander (2012). "IJN Iwate: Tabular Record of Movement". SOKO-JUNYOKAN - Ex-Armored Cruisers. Combinedfleet.com. Retrieved 23 April 2015.
  • Jentschura, Hansgeorg; Jung, Dieter & Mickel, Peter (1977). Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1869–1945. Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute. ISBN 0-87021-893-X.
  • Kowner, Rotem (2006). Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War. Historical Dictionaries of War, Revolution, and Civil Unrest. Vol. 29. Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press. ISBN 978-0-81084-927-3.
  • Lacroix, Eric & Wells, Linton (1997). Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-311-3.
  • Milanovich, Kathrin (2014). "Armored Cruisers of the Imperial Japanese Navy". In Jordan, John (ed.). Warship 2014. London: Conway. ISBN 978-1-84486-236-8.
  • McLaughlin, Stephen (2011). "The Admiral Seniavin Class Coast Defense Ships". Warship International. XLVIII (1). Toledo, Ohio: International Naval Research Organization: 43–66. ISSN 0043-0374.
  • Silverstone, Paul H. (1984). Directory of the World's Capital Ships. New York: Hippocrene Books. ISBN 0-88254-979-0.
  • Warner, Denis & Warner, Peggy (2002). The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905 (2nd ed.). London: Frank Cass. ISBN 0-7146-5256-3.

External links

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