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SVP: Safe and Efficient Speculative Execution Mechanism through Value Prediction

Published: 05 June 2023 Publication History

Abstract

Speculative execution attacks such as Spectre and Meltdown exploit the wrong execution patch to leak private data. In current state-of-the-art defense strategies, executions of all memory accesses that use speculatively-loaded addresses are blocked, resulting in high overhead. Our key observation is that these blocked memory accesses can be executed without operand-dependent hardware resource usage through value prediction. Therefore, we propose a novel hardware defense framework, named Speculative Value Prediction (SVP), to safely and efficiently execute the potentially unsafe memory accesses earlier. We build SVP on the cycle-accurate Gem5 simulator and its performance improvement is positively correlated with the coverage of value predictors. Experiments show that when using the value predictor with 30%/60%/100% coverage, SVP outperforms the state-of-the-art defense mechanism STT in the Spectre model by 21.5%/50.3%/107.7% respectively, and in the Futuristic model by 28.7%/55.4%/105.7% respectively.

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Published In

cover image ACM Conferences
GLSVLSI '23: Proceedings of the Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2023
June 2023
731 pages
ISBN:9798400701252
DOI:10.1145/3583781
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 05 June 2023

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Author Tags

  1. hardware
  2. security
  3. side-channel
  4. speculative execution attacks
  5. value prediction

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  • Short-paper

Funding Sources

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China

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GLSVLSI '23
Sponsor:
GLSVLSI '23: Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2023
June 5 - 7, 2023
TN, Knoxville, USA

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Overall Acceptance Rate 312 of 1,156 submissions, 27%

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