research-article

Optimal green certificate auction design embedding economic dispatch

Authors:

Chenye WuAuthors Info & Claims

e-Energy '22: Proceedings of the Thirteenth ACM International Conference on Future Energy Systems

Pages 157 - 171

https://doi.org/10.1145/3538637.3538847

Published: 28 June 2022 Publication History

Abstract

The rapid development of carbon capture technology speeds up its industrialization and wide application with the help of massive investment. In addition to the capital market, such investment may also come from a well-designed carbon market. This paper proposes a green certificate auction to maximize the auction revenue for enabling the carbon capture technology. Besides political and regulatory requirements, the goodwill from contributing to carbon neutrality may also incentivize the generating companies to participate. The auction design is challenging as it associates with the economic dispatch procedure in the electricity market. Using the notion of virtual demand, we decouple the auction from economic dispatch, and we prove that our designed auction enjoys optimality, truthfulness, and individual rationality. We also show that our auction can be extended to the multi-period scenario, highlighting the impact of leftover certificates. We further provide an upper bound for sample complexity when the willingness of participants cannot be well-identified. Numerical studies verify the effectiveness of the proposed auction and the tightness of the derived sample complexity bound.

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Cited By

Mou GHuang JWu C(2022)Are Consumers with Low Serving Costs Necessarily Carbon Friendly?2022 IEEE Sustainable Power and Energy Conference (iSPEC)10.1109/iSPEC54162.2022.10033008(1-5)Online publication date: 4-Dec-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/iSPEC54162.2022.10033008
Xu GShi JJiang WWu CWang DHan Z(2022)A Two-Stage Emission Mismatch Penalty Game to Facilitate Carbon and Electricity Market Interaction2022 IEEE 6th Conference on Energy Internet and Energy System Integration (EI2)10.1109/EI256261.2022.10116087(2838-2843)Online publication date: 11-Nov-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/EI256261.2022.10116087

Index Terms

Optimal green certificate auction design embedding economic dispatch
1. Applied computing
  1. Operations research
    1. Decision analysis
      1. Multi-criterion optimization and decision-making

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cover image ACM Conferences

e-Energy '22: Proceedings of the Thirteenth ACM International Conference on Future Energy Systems

June 2022

630 pages

ISBN:9781450393973

DOI:10.1145/3538637

General Chairs:
Sebastian Lehnhoff
University of Oldenburg, Germany
,
David Irwin
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
,
Dan Wang
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong

Copyright © 2022 ACM.

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Published: 28 June 2022

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e-Energy '22: The Thirteenth ACM International Conference on Future Energy Systems

June 28 - July 1, 2022

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Overall Acceptance Rate 160 of 446 submissions, 36%

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Cited By

Mou GHuang JWu C(2022)Are Consumers with Low Serving Costs Necessarily Carbon Friendly?2022 IEEE Sustainable Power and Energy Conference (iSPEC)10.1109/iSPEC54162.2022.10033008(1-5)Online publication date: 4-Dec-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/iSPEC54162.2022.10033008
Xu GShi JJiang WWu CWang DHan Z(2022)A Two-Stage Emission Mismatch Penalty Game to Facilitate Carbon and Electricity Market Interaction2022 IEEE 6th Conference on Energy Internet and Energy System Integration (EI2)10.1109/EI256261.2022.10116087(2838-2843)Online publication date: 11-Nov-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/EI256261.2022.10116087

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