Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

skip to main content
research-article

Constrained Proximity Attacks on Mobile Targets

Published: 04 March 2022 Publication History

Abstract

Proximity attacks allow an adversary to uncover the location of a victim by repeatedly issuing queries with fake location data. These attacks have been mostly studied in scenarios where victims remain static and there are no constraints that limit the actions of the attacker. In such a setting, it is not difficult for the attacker to locate a particular victim and quantifying the effort for doing so is straightforward. However, it is far more realistic to consider scenarios where potential victims present a particular mobility pattern. In this article, we consider abstract (constrained and unconstrained) attacks on services that provide location information on other users in the proximity. We derive strategies for constrained and unconstrained attackers, and show that when unconstrained they can practically achieve success with theoretically optimal effort. We then propose a simple yet effective constraint that may be employed by a proximity service (for example, running in the cloud or using a suitable two-party protocol) as a countermeasure to increase the effort for the attacker several orders of magnitude both in simulated and real-world cases.

References

[1]
Steve Alpern. 2013. Ten Open Problems in Rendezvous Search. Springer, New York, NY, 223–230. DOI:
[2]
Fan Bai and Ahmed Helmy. 2004. A survey of mobility models. Wireless Adhoc Networks, University of Southern California, USA., 147 pages.
[3]
Tracy Camp, Jeff Boleng, and Vanessa Davies. 2002. A survey of mobility models for ad hoc network research. Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 2, 5 (2002), 483–502. DOI:
[4]
L. Chen and K. Bian. 2015. The telephone coordination game revisited: From random to deterministic algorithms. IEEE Transactions on Computers 64, 10 (Oct. 2015), 2968–2980. DOI:
[5]
Jorge Cuellar, Martín Ochoa, and Ruben Rios. 2012. Indistinguishable regions in geographic privacy. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Applied Computing. ACM, New York, NY, 1463–1469. DOI:
[6]
Natasha Culzac. 2014. Egypt’s police ‘using social media and apps like Grindr to trap gay people’. Article on The Independent 17, (2014).https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/egypt-s-police-using-social-media-and-apps-like-grindr-to-trap-gay-people-9738515.html.
[7]
A. Gaudillière. 2009. Collision probability for random trajectories in two dimensions. Stochastic Processes and their Applications 119, 3 (2009), 775–810. DOI:
[8]
Per A. Hallgren, Martín Ochoa, and Andrei Sabelfeld. 2015. InnerCircle: A parallelizable decentralized privacy-preserving location proximity protocol. In Proceedings of the Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust. 1–6. DOI:
[9]
Per A. Hallgren, Martín Ochoa, and Andrei Sabelfeld. 2016. MaxPace: Speed-constrained location queries. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security. 136–144. DOI:
[10]
J. Harri, F. Filali, and C. Bonnet. 2009. Mobility models for vehicular ad hoc networks: A survey and taxonomy. IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials 11, 4 (April 2009), 19–41. DOI:
[11]
Ming-Shih Huang and Ram M. Narayanan. 2014. Trilateration-based localization algorithm using the lemoine point formulation. IETE Journal of Research 60, 1 (2014), 60–73.
[12]
Arvind Narayanan, Narendran Thiagarajan, Mugdha Lakhani, Michael Hamburg, and Dan Boneh. 2011. Location privacy via private proximity testing. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium.
[13]
Iasonas Polakis, George Argyros, Theofilos Petsios, Suphannee Sivakorn, and Angelos D. Keromytis. 2015. Where’s Wally?: Precise user discovery attacks in location proximity services. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 817–828. DOI:
[14]
Zbigniew Puchala and Tomasz Rolski. 2005. The exact asymptotic of the time to collision. Electronic Journal of Probability 10 (2005), 1359–1380.
[15]
Jaroslav Sedenka and Paolo Gasti. 2014. Privacy-preserving distance computation and proximity testing on earth, done right. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security. 99–110. DOI:
[16]
Reza Shokri, George Theodorakopoulos, George Danezis, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, and Jean-Yves Le Boudec. 2011. Quantifying location privacy: The case of sporadic location exposure. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies . Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 57–76.
[17]
Reza Shokri, George Theodorakopoulos, Jean-Yves Le Boudec, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux. 2011. Quantifying location privacy. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE Computer Society, 247–262. DOI:
[18]
Reza Shokri, George Theodorakopoulos, Carmela Troncoso, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, and Jean-Yves Le Boudec. 2012. Protecting location privacy: Optimal strategy against localization attacks. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, New York, NY, 617–627. DOI:
[19]
Max Veytsman. 2014. How I was able to track the location of any Tinder user. Retrieved March 2018 from http://blog.includesecurity.com/2014/02/how-i-was-able-to-track-location-of-any.html.
[20]
Xueou Wang, Xiaolu Hou, Ruben Rios, Per Hallgren, Nils Ole Tippenhauer, and Martín Ochoa. 2018. Location proximity attacks against mobile targets: Analytical bounds and attacker strategies. In Proceedings of the Computer Security. Javier Lopez, Jianying Zhou, and Miguel Soriano (Eds.). Springer International Publishing, 373–392.
[21]
Richard Weber. 2012. Optimal symmetric rendezvous search on three locations. Mathematics of Operations Research 37, 1 (Feb. 2012), 111–122. DOI:
[22]
Jing Yuan, Yu Zheng, Xing Xie, and Guangzhong Sun. 2011. Driving with knowledge from the physical world. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. ACM, 316–324.
[23]
Jing Yuan, Yu Zheng, Chengyang Zhang, Wenlei Xie, Xing Xie, Guangzhong Sun, and Yan Huang. 2010. T-drive: Driving directions based on taxi trajectories. In Proceedings of the SIGSPATIAL International Conference on Advances in Geographic Information Systems. ACM, 99–108.

Cited By

View all
  • (2022)ECQV-Based Lightweight Revocable Authentication Protocol for Electric Vehicle ChargingBig Data and Cognitive Computing10.3390/bdcc60401026:4(102)Online publication date: 27-Sep-2022

Recommendations

Comments

Please enable JavaScript to view thecomments powered by Disqus.

Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security  Volume 25, Issue 2
May 2022
263 pages
ISSN:2471-2566
EISSN:2471-2574
DOI:10.1145/3505216
Issue’s Table of Contents

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 04 March 2022
Accepted: 01 November 2021
Revised: 01 September 2021
Received: 01 September 2020
Published in TOPS Volume 25, Issue 2

Permissions

Request permissions for this article.

Check for updates

Author Tags

  1. Location privacy
  2. proximity attacks
  3. mobility pattern
  4. quantification

Qualifiers

  • Research-article
  • Refereed

Funding Sources

  • Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation and the Regional Ministry of Economy, Knowledge, Business and University of the Junta de Andalucía
  • Captación de Talento para la Investigación

Contributors

Other Metrics

Bibliometrics & Citations

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

  • Downloads (Last 12 months)44
  • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)10
Reflects downloads up to 01 Oct 2024

Other Metrics

Citations

Cited By

View all
  • (2022)ECQV-Based Lightweight Revocable Authentication Protocol for Electric Vehicle ChargingBig Data and Cognitive Computing10.3390/bdcc60401026:4(102)Online publication date: 27-Sep-2022

View Options

Get Access

Login options

Full Access

View options

PDF

View or Download as a PDF file.

PDF

eReader

View online with eReader.

eReader

Full Text

View this article in Full Text.

Full Text

HTML Format

View this article in HTML Format.

HTML Format

Media

Figures

Other

Tables

Share

Share

Share this Publication link

Share on social media