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An Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Systems with Network Effects

Published: 19 September 2019 Publication History

Abstract

In a crowdsourcing system, it is important for the crowdsourcer to engineer extrinsic rewards to incentivize the participants. With mobile social networking, a user enjoys an intrinsic benefit when she aligns her behavior with the behavior of others. Referred to as network effects, such an intrinsic benefit becomes more significant as more users join and contribute to the crowdsourcing system. But should a crowdsourcer design her extrinsic rewards differently when such network effects are taken into consideration? In this article, we incorporate network effects as a contributing factor to intrinsic rewards, and study its influence on the design of extrinsic rewards. We show that the number of participating users and their contributions to the crowdsourcing system evolve to a steady equilibrium, thanks to subtle interactions between intrinsic rewards due to network effects and extrinsic rewards offered by the crowdsourcer. Taken network effects into consideration, we design progressively more sophisticated extrinsic reward mechanisms, and propose new and optimal strategies for a crowdsourcer to obtain a higher utility. Through simulations and examples, we demonstrate that with our new strategies, a crowdsourcer is able to attract more participants with higher contributed efforts; and the participants gain higher utilities from both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards.

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  • (2023)Walrasian Equilibrium-Based Pricing Mechanism for Health-Data Crowdsensing Under Information AsymmetryIEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems10.1109/TCSS.2022.317156610:3(1277-1287)Online publication date: Jun-2023
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      Published In

      cover image ACM Transactions on Internet Technology
      ACM Transactions on Internet Technology  Volume 19, Issue 4
      Special Section on Trust and AI and Regular Papers
      November 2019
      201 pages
      ISSN:1533-5399
      EISSN:1557-6051
      DOI:10.1145/3362102
      • Editor:
      • Ling Liu
      Issue’s Table of Contents
      Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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      Association for Computing Machinery

      New York, NY, United States

      Publication History

      Published: 19 September 2019
      Accepted: 01 July 2019
      Revised: 01 May 2019
      Received: 01 January 2019
      Published in TOIT Volume 19, Issue 4

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      Author Tags

      1. Crowdsourcing
      2. incentive mechanism
      3. intrinsic rewards
      4. network effects

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      • Research-article
      • Research
      • Refereed

      Funding Sources

      • NSFC
      • RGC
      • Natural Science Foundation of Hubei Province
      • Equipment Pre-Research Joint Fund of Ministry of Education of China (Youth Talent)
      • NSERC Discovery Research Program
      • Guangdong Natural Science Foundation
      • Hubei Provincial Technological Innovation Special Funding Major Projects
      • National Natural Science Foundation of China

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      Cited By

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      • (2023)A Comprehensive Survey on Resource Allocation Strategies in Fog/Cloud EnvironmentsSensors10.3390/s2309441323:9(4413)Online publication date: 30-Apr-2023
      • (2023)Incentive Mechanism for Spatial Crowdsourcing With Unknown Social-Aware Workers: A Three-Stage Stackelberg Game ApproachIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing10.1109/TMC.2022.315768722:8(4698-4713)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2023
      • (2023)Walrasian Equilibrium-Based Pricing Mechanism for Health-Data Crowdsensing Under Information AsymmetryIEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems10.1109/TCSS.2022.317156610:3(1277-1287)Online publication date: Jun-2023
      • (2023)Realizing Digital Product Passports with Crowdsourcing Principles: The Case of Sustainable Smart Grids2023 19th International Conference on Distributed Computing in Smart Systems and the Internet of Things (DCOSS-IoT)10.1109/DCOSS-IoT58021.2023.00068(381-388)Online publication date: Jun-2023
      • (2023)An intelligent model for supporting edge migration for virtual function chains in next generation internet of thingsScientific Reports10.1038/s41598-023-27674-513:1Online publication date: 19-Jan-2023
      • (2022)Distributed Agent-Based Orchestrator Model for Fog ComputingSensors10.3390/s2215589422:15(5894)Online publication date: 7-Aug-2022
      • (2022)Optimized Energy Efficient Strategy for Data Reduction Between Edge Devices in Cloud-IoTComputers, Materials & Continua10.32604/cmc.2022.02361172:1(125-140)Online publication date: 2022
      • (2022)TJOSConf: Automatic and Safe System Environment Operations Platform2022 11th International Conference on Software and Computer Applications10.1145/3524304.3524308(21-28)Online publication date: 24-Feb-2022
      • (2022)An approach of flow compensation incentive based on Q-Learning strategy for IoT user privacy protectionAEU - International Journal of Electronics and Communications10.1016/j.aeue.2022.154172148(154172)Online publication date: May-2022
      • (2022)IoT-Based Crowdsensing for Smart EnvironmentsInternet of Things for Smart Environments10.1007/978-3-031-09729-4_3(33-58)Online publication date: 17-Sep-2022
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