

# Hard Fault Analysis of Trivium

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**Abstract**—Fault analysis is a powerful attack to stream ciphers. Up to now, the major idea of fault analysis is to simplify the cipher system by injecting some soft faults. We call it soft fault analysis. As a hardware-oriented stream cipher, Trivium is weak under soft fault analysis.

In this paper we consider another type of fault analysis of stream cipher, which is to simplify the cipher system by injecting some hard faults. We call it hard fault analysis. We present the following results about such attack to Trivium. In Case 1 with the probability not smaller than 0.2396, the attacker can obtain 69 bits of 80-bits-key. In Case 2 with the probability not smaller than 0.2291, the attacker can obtain all of 80-bits-key. In Case 3 with the probability not smaller than 0.2291, the attacker can partially solve the key. In Case 4 with non-neglectable probability, the attacker can obtain a simplified cipher, with smaller number of state bits and slower non-linearization procedure. In Case 5 with non-neglectable probability, the attacker can obtain another simplified cipher. Besides, these 5 cases can be checked out by observing the key-stream.

**Index Terms**—Side-channel analysis, fault analysis, stream cipher, Trivium

## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. Background and Results of Our Work

Side-channel analysis of stream ciphers [1] is a class of novel attacks by combining physical and mathematical methods, including fault analysis [2], power analysis [3], timing analysis, etc. In the class of side-channel analysis, fault analysis is a powerful attack. Up to now, the major idea of fault analysis is to simplify the cipher system by injecting some soft faults (that is, by changing the values of some positions at some moment), thus revealing the key hidden in the encryption machine. We call such attack soft fault analysis. Soft fault analysis is a known differential attack [4], by which the attacker can obtain additional low-degree-equations of the state. Trivium [5], [6] is a hardware-oriented stream cipher, and one of the finally chosen ciphers by eSTREAM project, but it is weak under soft fault analysis [7], [8].

In this paper we consider another type of fault analysis of stream cipher, which is to simplify the cipher system by injecting some hard faults (that is, by setting the values of some positions permanently 0). We call it hard fault analysis. Such attack was presented by Eli Biham and Adi Shamir [9], used for breaking block ciphers. We present the following results about hard fault analysis of Trivium. In Case 1 with the probability not smaller than 0.2396, the attacker can obtain 69

bits of 80-bits-key. In Case 2 with the probability not smaller than 0.2291, the attacker can obtain all of 80-bits-key. In Case 3 with the probability not smaller than 0.2291, the attacker can partially solve the key. In Case 4 with non-neglectable probability, the attacker can obtain a simplified cipher, with smaller number of state bits and slower non-linearization procedure. In Case 5 with non-neglectable probability, the attacker can obtain another simplified cipher. Besides, these 5 cases can be checked out by observing the key-stream.

The contents are organized as follows. Next subsection is an explanation to soft fault analysis and hard fault analysis. In section II we prepare for hard fault analysis of Trivium, including description of Trivium, our assumptions, notations, and some facts. In section III we present different features of fault injected machine, in 7 different cases. In this section we show that, in each of former 5 cases, either the key can be revealed, or the cipher can be practically simplified. In section IV we present an algorithm to identify the cases, by observing the key-stream. In this section we identify the former 4 cases with the probability closed to 1, and identify Case 5 with the probability no smaller than  $4/5$ . Section V is the conclusion and future work expectation.

### B. Soft Fault Analysis and Hard Fault Analysis

Soft fault analysis is based on soft fault injection. At a random moment of the encryption machine's driving procedure, the attacker changes the values of some random positions of the state. By the differential of the key-stream, the attacker can obtain several additional low-degree-equations of the state.

Hard fault analysis is based on hard fault injection. The attacker makes the values of some random positions of the state permanently 0. That is, after hard fault injection, those injected bits can be read out as 0, but can no longer be written in. According to technical restriction, hard fault injection must be made before the encryption machine's driving procedure.

Three comparisons between hard fault analysis and soft fault analysis are as follows.

Comparison 1: Hard fault analysis is more practical than soft fault analysis. The main criticism against soft fault analysis was the transient fault model that was claimed to be unrealistic [9]. Hard fault injection is a current technique for micro-probing, and has already become real danger to cipher chip [10]. For example, DS5003 is a new product of Maxim. It is a secure microprocessor chip by using coating technique, for resisting hard fault injection.

Comparison 2: Hard fault analysis is more expensive than soft fault analysis. Soft fault injection is assumed to be made by simple fault induction (special kind of light, magnetic disturbance, or other brute methods). Hard fault injection needs expensive FIB and related equipment.

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TABLE I  
THE KEY-STREAM GENERATION ALGORITHM

Input: the initial state $(s_1, \dots, s_{288})$ , the number of output bits $N \leq 2^{64}$
Output: key-stream $(z_0, z_1, z_2, \dots, z_N)$
<pre> 1 : for <math>i = 0</math> to <math>N - 1</math> do 2 : <math>z_i \leftarrow s_{66} + s_{93} + s_{162} + s_{177} + s_{243} + s_{288}</math> 3 : <math>t_1 \leftarrow s_{66} + s_{91}s_{92} + s_{93} + s_{171}</math> 4 : <math>t_2 \leftarrow s_{162} + s_{175}s_{176} + s_{177} + s_{264}</math> 5 : <math>t_3 \leftarrow s_{243} + s_{286}s_{287} + s_{288} + s_{69}</math> 6 : <math>(s_1, \dots, s_{93}) \leftarrow (t_3, s_1, \dots, s_{92})</math> 7 : <math>(s_{94}, \dots, s_{177}) \leftarrow (t_1, s_{94}, \dots, s_{176})</math> 8 : <math>(s_{178}, \dots, s_{288}) \leftarrow (t_2, s_{178}, \dots, s_{287})</math> 9 : end for </pre>

Comparison 3: After soft fault analysis, an encryption machine can be returned back to the owner and be used again. On the other hand, after hard fault analysis, an encryption machine is destroyed, so that it seems meaningless to reveal the hidden key for this machine. By this, it may be considered that hard fault analysis is not as valuable as soft fault analysis. This may also be the reason for that hard fault analysis has sparsely appeared in the literature of stream cipher analysis.

For Comparison 3, we argue that hard fault analysis is useful in some application scenes. One scene is that current key is used for decrypting the former plain-texts before they are outdated. Another scene is that the system has a weak key-renewal-algorithm, where current key can help to predict future keys. The third scene is that several machines share a common key, or have closely related keys.

## II. PREPARATION FOR HARD FAULT ANALYSIS OF TRIVIUM

### A. Trivium Key-Stream Generation and Trivium State Initialization

The state of Trivium is 288 bits long, denoted as  $(s_1, \dots, s_{288})$ . The state is renewed by 3 combined NFSRs (Non-linear Feedback Shift Registers). The first NFSR is 93 bits long, denoted as  $(s_1, \dots, s_{93})$ . The second NFSR is 84 bits long, denoted as  $(s_{94}, \dots, s_{177})$ . The third NFSR is 111 bits long, denoted as  $(s_{178}, \dots, s_{288})$ . Current key-stream bit is a linear function of current state. Table 1 is an equivalent algorithm for the key-stream generation.

The key is 80 bits long, denoted as  $(k_1, \dots, k_{80})$ , and is secret. IV (Initial Vector) is 80 bits long, denoted as  $(IV_1, \dots, IV_{80})$ , and is public. In other words, if anyone obtains an encryption machine, he can arbitrarily set the value of IV. Table 2 is an equivalent algorithm for the initial state generation.

Table 1 and Table 2 show that, for key-stream generation and initial state generation, the state renewal is the same. In detail, let  $s_{(t,j)}$  denote the state bit at time  $t$  and position  $j$ , then Table 3 presents a clearer description for the state renewal.

*Lemma 1:* [5], [6] Let  $(s_1, \dots, s_{288})$  denote the initial state (that is, the state at the time just before generating  $z_0$ ). Take  $\{z_0, z_1, z_2, \dots\}$  as functions of  $(s_1, \dots, s_{288})$ . Then

- 1)  $\{z_0, z_1, \dots, z_{65}\}$  are 66 linear functions.
- 2)  $\{z_{66}, z_{67}, \dots, z_{147}\}$  are 82 quadratic functions.

TABLE II  
THE INITIAL STATE GENERATION ALGORITHM

Input: the state $(s_1, \dots, s_{93}) \leftarrow (k_1, \dots, k_{80}, 0, \dots, 0)$ $(s_{94}, \dots, s_{177}) \leftarrow (IV_1, \dots, IV_{80}, 0, \dots, 0)$ $(s_{178}, \dots, s_{288}) \leftarrow (0, \dots, 0, 1, 1, 1)$
Output: the initial state $(s_1, \dots, s_{288})$
<pre> 1 : for <math>i=1</math> to 1152 do 2 : <math>t_1 \leftarrow s_{66} + s_{91}s_{92} + s_{93} + s_{171}</math> 3 : <math>t_2 \leftarrow s_{162} + s_{175}s_{176} + s_{177} + s_{264}</math> 4 : <math>t_3 \leftarrow s_{243} + s_{286}s_{287} + s_{288} + s_{69}</math> 5 : <math>(s_1, \dots, s_{93}) \leftarrow (t_3, s_1, \dots, s_{92})</math> 6 : <math>(s_{94}, \dots, s_{177}) \leftarrow (t_1, s_{94}, \dots, s_{176})</math> 7 : <math>(s_{178}, \dots, s_{288}) \leftarrow (t_2, s_{178}, \dots, s_{287})</math> 8 : end for </pre>

TABLE III  
THE STATE RENEWAL

$(s_{(t+1,1)}, s_{(t+1,2)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,93)})$ $= (s_{(t,243)} + s_{(t,286)}s_{(t,287)} + s_{(t,288)} + s_{(t,69)}, s_{(t,1)},$ $s_{(t,1)}, \dots, s_{(t,92)})$
$(s_{(t+1,94)}, s_{(t+1,95)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,177)})$ $= (s_{(t,66)} + s_{(t,91)}s_{(t,92)} + s_{(t,93)} + s_{(t,171)},$ $s_{(t,94)}, \dots, s_{(t,176)})$
$(s_{(t+1,178)}, s_{(t+1,179)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,288)})$ $= (s_{(t,162)} + s_{(t,175)}s_{(t,176)} + s_{(t,177)} + s_{(t,264)},$ $s_{(t,178)}, \dots, s_{(t,287)})$

- 3)  $\{z_{148}, z_{149}, \dots, z_{213}\}$  are 66 cubic functions.
- 4) Each of  $\{z_{214}, z_{215}, \dots, \}$  is at least a quartic function.

Lemma 1 shows such a weakness of Trivium that its non-linearization procedure is over slow. By knowing the key-stream, a large number of low-degree-equations will be obtained.

### B. Assumptions, Notations and Some Facts

Suppose that the attacker obtains an encryption machine (or an encryption card, etc), equipped with Trivium. He wants to obtain the hidden key  $(k_1, \dots, k_{80})$ . He makes hard fault injection. The hard fault bits are from random one of 3 NFSRs, and at random positions in this NFSR. At injecting moment, he can not control the positions of hard fault bits. After injection, he does not know the positions of hard fault bits. Then he set  $(IV_1, \dots, IV_{80}) = (0, \dots, 0)$ . That is, for initial state generation procedure, the input state is

$$\begin{aligned}
 (s_1, \dots, s_{93}) &\leftarrow (k_1, \dots, k_{80}, 0, \dots, 0), \\
 (s_{94}, \dots, s_{177}) &\leftarrow (0, \dots, 0), \\
 (s_{178}, \dots, s_{288}) &\leftarrow (0, \dots, 0, 1, 1, 1).
 \end{aligned}$$

Then he starts up the machine (initial state generation and key-stream generation), and checks the output key-stream from this fault-injected machine.

It is easy to see that our assumptions are quite trivial.

$P_L$  denotes the lowest position of injected faults.  $P_H$  denotes the highest position of injected faults. According to our assumptions,  $P_H$  and  $P_L$  fall into the same index set  $\{1, \dots, 93\}$ , or  $\{94, \dots, 177\}$ , or  $\{178, \dots, 288\}$ .  $P_L$  is of the following 7 cases.

Case 1:  $94 \leq P_L \leq 162$ .

Case 2:  $178 \leq P_L \leq 243$ .

Case 3:  $1 \leq P_L \leq 66$ .

Case 4:  $163 \leq P_L \leq 171$ .

Case 5:  $172 \leq P_L \leq 176$ .

Case 6:  $P_L = 177$ .

Case 7: other values of  $P_L$ , that is,

$$67 \leq P_L \leq 93 \text{ or } 244 \leq P_L \leq 288.$$

It is clear that the probability of Case 1 is never smaller than  $69/288=0.2396$ , that the probability of Case 2 is never smaller than  $66/288=0.2291$ , and that the probability of Case 3 is never smaller than  $66/288=0.2291$ . Probabilities of Case 4 and Case 5 are not clear, because we do not set detailed injection model. We can only say that these 2 probabilities are non-neglectable. The probability of Case 6 is never larger than  $1/288=0.0035$ , and generally is far smaller than 0.0035.

We call the input state the state at time 0, and sequentially rank the state at time 1, 2,  $\dots$ . By this ranking, the initial state (that is, the state at the time just before generating  $z_0$ ) is the state at time 1152.  $(s_{(t,1)}, s_{(t,2)}, \dots, s_{(t,288)})$  denotes the state at time  $t$ . So that, for each  $m \geq 0$ , the key-stream bit  $z_m$  has such a representation

$$z_m = s_{(m+1152,66)} + s_{(m+1152,93)} + s_{(m+1152,162)} \\ + s_{(m+1152,177)} + s_{(m+1152,243)} + s_{(m+1152,288)}.$$

\* denotes an arbitrary bit-value.

Some simple facts about hard fault injection are as follows.

Suppose  $j$  is a position of hard fault injected bit, where  $1 \leq j \leq 93$ . Then  $s_{(t,j+m)} = 0$  for each  $(t, m)$  such that  $t \geq 0$  and  $0 \leq m \leq \min\{93 - j, t\}$ .

Suppose  $j$  is a position of hard fault injected bit, where  $94 \leq j \leq 177$ . Then  $s_{(t,j+m)} = 0$  for each  $(t, m)$  such that  $t \geq 0$  and  $0 \leq m \leq \min\{177 - j, t\}$ .

Suppose  $j$  is a position of hard fault injected bit, where  $178 \leq j \leq 288$ . Then  $s_{(t,j+m)} = 0$  for each  $(t, m)$  such that  $t \geq 0$  and  $0 \leq m \leq \min\{288 - j, t\}$ .

### III. FEATURES OF FAULT INJECTED MACHINE IN 7 CASES

#### A. Features of Fault Injected Machine in Case 1: $94 \leq P_L \leq 162$

*Lemma 2:* The state at time 27 is the follow.

- 1)  $(s_{(27,1)}, \dots, s_{(27,93)}) = (k_{43}, \dots, k_{66}, k_{67} + 1, k_{68} + 1, k_{69}, k_1, \dots, k_{66})$ .
- 2)  $(s_{(27,94)}, \dots, s_{(27,161)}) = (*, \dots, *)$ , and  $(s_{(27,162)}, \dots, s_{(27,177)}) = (0, \dots, 0)$ .
- 3)  $(s_{(27,178)}, \dots, s_{(27,288)}) = (0, \dots, 0)$ .

*Lemma 3:*

- 1) For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 27$ ,  $(s_{(t+1,1)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,93)}) = (s_{(t,69)}, s_{(t,1)}, \dots, s_{(t,92)})$ . So that  $\{(s_{(t,1)}, \dots, s_{(t,93)}), t \geq 27\}$  has a period 69.
- 2) For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 27$ ,  $(s_{(t,70)}, \dots, s_{(t,93)}) = (s_{(t,1)}, \dots, s_{(t,24)})$ .
- 3) For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 27$ ,  $(s_{(t,162)}, \dots, s_{(t,288)}) = (0, \dots, 0)$ .

Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 are clear by gradually renewing the state (see Table 3), and by considering the state at time 0:

$$(s_{(0,1)}, \dots, s_{(0,93)}) = (k_1, \dots, k_{80}, 0, \dots, 0). \\ (s_{(0,94)}, \dots, s_{(0,177)}) = (0, \dots, 0). \\ (s_{(0,178)}, \dots, s_{(0,288)}) = (0, \dots, 0, 1, 1, 1).$$

*Proposition 1:* Suppose  $94 \leq P_L \leq 162$ . Then the key-stream  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  has a period 69, where

$$(z_0, z_1, z_2, \dots, z_{68}) \\ = (k_{18}, k_{17}, \dots, k_1, k_{69}, k_{68} + 1, k_{67} + 1, k_{66}, k_{65}, \dots, k_{19}).$$

*Proof:* By Lemma 2 and Lemma 3,  $z_0 = s_{(1152,66)}$ ,  $z_1 = s_{(1153,66)}$ ,  $z_2 = s_{(1154,66)} \dots$ . So that the key-stream  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  has a period 69. Again  $z_0 = s_{(1152,66)} = s_{(27,45)} = k_{18}$ . Proposition 1 is proved.  $\square$

#### B. Features of Fault Injected Machine in Case 2: $178 \leq P_L \leq 243$

*Lemma 4:* The state at time 27 is the follow.

- 1)  $(s_{(27,1)}, \dots, s_{(27,93)}) = (k_{43}, \dots, k_{66}, k_{67} + 1, k_{68} + 1, k_{69}, k_1, \dots, k_{66})$ .
- 2)  $(s_{(27,94)}, \dots, s_{(27,177)}) = (k_{40} + k_{65}k_{66} + k_{67}, k_{41} + k_{66}k_{67} + k_{68}, \dots, k_{53} + k_{78}k_{79} + k_{80}, k_{54} + k_{79}k_{80}, k_{55}, k_{56}, \dots, k_{66}, 0, \dots, 0)$ .
- 3)  $(s_{(27,178)}, \dots, s_{(27,242)}) = (*, \dots, *)$ .
- 4)  $(s_{(27,243)}, \dots, s_{(27,288)}) = (0, \dots, 0)$ .

*Proof:* We induce the state at time 27 by gradually renewing the state.

The state at time 1:

$$(s_{(1,1)}, \dots, s_{(1,93)}) = (k_{69}, k_1, \dots, k_{80}, 0, \dots, 0), \\ (s_{(1,94)}, \dots, s_{(1,177)}) = (k_{66}, 0, \dots, 0), \\ (s_{(1,178)}, \dots, s_{(1,288)}) = (0, \dots, 0, 1, 1).$$

The state at time 2:

$$(s_{(2,1)}, \dots, s_{(2,93)}) = (k_{68} + 1, k_{69}, k_1, \dots, k_{80}, 0, \dots, 0), \\ (s_{(2,94)}, \dots, s_{(2,177)}) = (k_{65}, k_{66}, 0, \dots, 0), \\ (s_{(2,178)}, \dots, s_{(2,288)}) = (0, \dots, 0, 1).$$

The state at time 3:

$$(s_{(3,1)}, \dots, s_{(3,93)}) \\ = (k_{67} + 1, k_{68} + 1, k_{69}, k_1, \dots, k_{80}, 0, \dots, 0), \\ (s_{(3,94)}, \dots, s_{(3,177)}) = (k_{64}, k_{65}, k_{66}, 0, \dots, 0), \\ (s_{(3,178)}, \dots, s_{(3,288)}) = (0, \dots, 0).$$

The state at time 12:

$$(s_{(12,1)}, \dots, s_{(12,93)}) \\ = (k_{58}, \dots, k_{66}, k_{67} + 1, k_{68} + 1, k_{69}, k_1, \dots, k_{80}, 0), \\ (s_{(12,94)}, \dots, s_{(12,177)}) = (k_{55}, \dots, k_{66}, 0, \dots, 0), \\ (s_{(12,178)}, \dots, s_{(12,242)}) = (*, \dots, *), \\ (s_{(12,243)}, \dots, s_{(12,288)}) = (0, \dots, 0).$$

The state at time 13:

$$(s_{(13,1)}, \dots, s_{(13,93)}) \\ = (k_{57}, \dots, k_{66}, k_{67} + 1, k_{68} + 1, k_{69}, k_1, \dots, k_{80}), \\ (s_{(13,94)}, \dots, s_{(13,177)}) \\ = (k_{54} + k_{79}k_{80}, k_{55}, \dots, k_{66}, 0, \dots, 0), \\ (s_{(13,178)}, \dots, s_{(13,242)}) = (*, \dots, *), \\ (s_{(13,243)}, \dots, s_{(13,288)}) = (0, \dots, 0).$$

The state at time 14:

$$(s_{(14,1)}, \dots, s_{(14,93)}) \\ = (k_{56}, \dots, k_{66}, k_{67} + 1, k_{68} + 1, k_{69}, k_1, \dots, k_{79}), \\ (s_{(14,94)}, \dots, s_{(14,177)}) \\ = (k_{53} + k_{78}k_{79} + k_{80}, k_{54} + k_{79}k_{80}, k_{55}, \dots,$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& k_{66}, 0, \dots, 0), \\
& (s_{(14,178)}, \dots, s_{(14,242)}) = (*, \dots, *), \\
& (s_{(14,243)}, \dots, s_{(14,288)}) = (0, \dots, 0).
\end{aligned}$$

The state at time 27:

$$\begin{aligned}
& (s_{(27,1)}, \dots, s_{(27,93)}) \\
& = (k_{43}, \dots, k_{66}, k_{67} + 1, k_{68} + 1, k_{69}, k_1, \dots, k_{66}), \\
& (s_{(27,94)}, \dots, s_{(27,177)}) \\
& = (k_{40} + k_{65}k_{66} + k_{67}, \dots, k_{53} + k_{78}k_{79} + k_{80}, k_{54} + k_{79}k_{80}, \\
& \quad k_{55}, \dots, k_{66}, 0, \dots, 0), \\
& (s_{(27,178)}, \dots, s_{(27,242)}) = (*, \dots, *), \\
& (s_{(27,243)}, \dots, s_{(27,288)}) = (0, \dots, 0).
\end{aligned}$$

Lemma 4 is proved.  $\square$

Notice that 1) and 2) of Lemma 3 are still true for Case 2:  $178 \leq P_L \leq 243$ . Now we present a definition. For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 27$ , define  $a_{t+1} = s_{(t,66)} + s_{(t,91)}s_{(t,92)} + s_{(t,93)}$ . For each  $t$  such that  $0 \leq t < 27$ , define  $a_{t+1} = a_{t+70}$ .

*Lemma 5:*

1) For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 27$ ,

$$\begin{aligned}
& (s_{(t+1,94)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,177)}) \\
& = (s_{(t,177)} + a_{t+1}, s_{(t,94)}, \dots, s_{(t,176)}).
\end{aligned}$$

2)  $\{a_{t+1}, t \geq 27\}$  has a period 69, where

$$\begin{aligned}
& (a_{28}, \dots, a_{96}) = (k_{39} + k_{64}k_{65} + k_{66}, k_{38} + k_{63}k_{64} + \\
& k_{65}, \dots, k_1 + k_{26}k_{27} + k_{28}, k_{69} + k_{25}k_{26} + k_{27}, k_{68} + \\
& 1 + k_{24}k_{25} + k_{26}, k_{67} + 1 + k_{23}k_{24} + k_{25}, k_{66} + k_{22}k_{23} + \\
& k_{24}, k_{65} + k_{21}k_{22} + k_{23}, \dots, k_{45} + k_1k_2 + k_3, k_{44} + \\
& k_{69}k_1 + k_2, k_{43} + (k_{68} + 1)k_{69} + k_1, k_{42} + (k_{67} + 1)(k_{68} + \\
& 1) + k_{69}, k_{41} + k_{66}(k_{67} + 1) + k_{68} + 1, k_{40} + k_{65}k_{66} + \\
& k_{67} + 1).
\end{aligned}$$

3)  $\{a_{t+1}, t \geq 27\}$  has a period 69.

*Proof:* 1) is clear from Trivium state renewal. For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 27$ , each  $j$  such that  $1 \leq j \leq 69$ ,  $s_{(t,j)} = s_{(27,j-t+27 \pmod{69})}$ . So that

$$\begin{aligned}
a_{t+1} & = s_{(t,66)} + s_{(t,91)}s_{(t,92)} + s_{(t,93)} \\
& = s_{(t,66)} + s_{(t,22)}s_{(t,23)} + s_{(t,24)} \\
& = s_{(27,24-t \pmod{69})} + s_{(27,49-t \pmod{69})}s_{(27,50-t \pmod{69})} \\
& \quad + s_{(27,51-t \pmod{69})}.
\end{aligned}$$

So that 2) is true, and 3) is immediate from 2). Lemma 5 is proved.  $\square$

*Lemma 6:* Take the following changes for the state at time 27.  $(s_{(27,172)}, \dots, s_{(27,177)})$  are changed as

$$\begin{aligned}
& (s_{(27,172)}, \dots, s_{(27,177)}) \\
& = (s_{(27,94)} + a_{27}, s_{(27,95)} + a_{26}, \dots, s_{(27,99)} + a_{22}),
\end{aligned}$$

and other positions of the state at time 27 are kept unchanged. Then

1) For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 33$ ,  $(s_{(t,1)}, \dots, s_{(t,177)})$  and  $(s_{(t,243)}, \dots, s_{(t,288)})$  are kept unchanged.

2) The key-stream  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  are kept unchanged.

*Proof:* *Proof:* Notice that we are in Case 2:  $178 \leq P_L \leq 243$ , and that the state bits shift rightwards. So that Lemma 6 is clear.  $\square$

*Lemma 7:* Take the state at time 27 as the changed value as described in Lemma 6. Then For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 27$ , each  $j$  such that  $94 \leq j \leq 177$ ,  $s_{(t+78,j)} = s_{(t,j)} + a_{t+172-j}$ .

*Proof:*

1) If  $94 \leq j \leq 171$  and  $t \geq 27$ , then  $t + 172 - j \geq 28$ , so that

$$\begin{aligned}
s_{(t+78,j)} & = s_{(t+172-j,94)} \\
& = s_{(t+171-j,171)} + a_{t+172-j} \\
& = s_{(t,j)} + a_{t+172-j}.
\end{aligned}$$

2) If  $172 \leq j \leq 177$  and  $t \geq 33$ , then  $156 \leq j - 6 \leq 171$  and  $t - 6 \geq 27$ . By 1),

$$\begin{aligned}
s_{(t+78,j)} & = s_{(t-6+78,j-6)} \\
& = s_{(t-6,j-6)} + a_{t-6+172-(j-6)} \\
& = s_{(t,j)} + a_{t+172-j}.
\end{aligned}$$

3) If  $172 \leq j \leq 177$  and  $t = 27$ , then  $94 \leq j - 78 \leq 99$ , so that  $s_{(27+78,j)} = s_{(27,j-78)}$ . By the assumptions of Lemma 6,

$$\begin{aligned}
s_{(27+78,j)} & = s_{(27,j-78)} \\
& = s_{(27,j)} + a_{27+172-j}.
\end{aligned}$$

4) If  $172 \leq j \leq 177$ ,  $28 \leq t \leq 32$ , and  $j - (t - 27) \leq 171$ , then  $167 \leq j - (t - 27) \leq 171$ . By 1),

$$\begin{aligned}
s_{(t+78,j)} & = s_{(27+78,j-(t-27))} \\
& = s_{(27,j-(t-27))} + a_{27+172-(j-(t-27))} \\
& = s_{(t,j)} + a_{t+172-j}.
\end{aligned}$$

5) If  $172 \leq j \leq 177$ ,  $28 \leq t \leq 32$ , and  $j - (t - 27) \geq 172$ , then  $172 \leq j - (t - 27) \leq 176$ . By 3),

$$\begin{aligned}
s_{(t+78,j)} & = s_{(27+78,j-(t-27))} \\
& = s_{(27,j-(t-27))} + a_{27+172-(j-(t-27))} \\
& = s_{(t,j)} + a_{t+172-j}.
\end{aligned}$$

Lemma 7 is proved.  $\square$

*Lemma 8:* Take the state at time 27 as the changed value as described in Lemma 6. Then

1) For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 27$ , each  $j$  such that  $94 \leq j \leq 177$ ,

$$s_{(t+1794,j)} = s_{(t,j)} + \sum_{m=0}^{22} a_{t+34-j+3m}.$$

2)  $\{(s_{(t,1)}, \dots, s_{(t,177)}), t \geq 27\}$  has a period 3358.

*Proof:* According to Lemma 5, Lemma 6, Lemma 7 and the fact that  $1794 = 78 \times 23 = 69 \times 26$ ,

$$\begin{aligned}
s_{(t+1794,j)} & = s_{(t+78 \times 23,j)} \\
& = s_{(t,j)} + \sum_{n=0}^{22} a_{t+172-j+78 \times n \pmod{69}} \\
& = s_{(t,j)} + \sum_{m=0}^{22} a_{t+34-j+3m},
\end{aligned}$$

so that 1) is true. According to 1), for each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 27$ , each  $j$  such that  $94 \leq j \leq 177$ ,

$$\begin{aligned}
s_{(t+3588,j)} & = s_{(t+1794+1794,j)} \\
& = s_{(t,j)} + \sum_{m=0}^{22} a_{t+34-j+3m} \\
& \quad + \sum_{m=0}^{22} a_{t+1794+34-j+3m} \\
& = s_{(t,j)}.
\end{aligned}$$

This implies that  $\{(s_{(t,94)}, \dots, s_{(t,177)}), t \geq 27\}$  has a period 3358. Again by the fact that  $\{(s_{(t,1)}, \dots, s_{(t,93)}), t \geq 27\}$  has a period 69, 2) is true. Lemma 8 is proved.  $\square$

*Proposition 2:* Suppose  $178 \leq P_L \leq 243$ . Then

- 1) The key-stream  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  has a period 3358.
- 2)  $\{z_0, z_1, z_2, \dots, z_{3357}\}$  are linear functions of 216 variables  $(s_{(27,25)}, \dots, s_{(27,93)}, s_{(27,100)}, \dots, s_{(27,177)}, a_{28}, \dots, a_{96})$ , and these functions are known.
- 3) By knowing the values of  $\{z_0, z_1, z_2, \dots, z_{3357}\}$ , the attacker obtains 3358 linear equations of 216 variables  $(s_{(27,25)}, \dots, s_{(27,93)}, s_{(27,100)}, \dots, s_{(27,177)}, a_{28}, \dots, a_{96})$ . The rank of these linear equations is 210, so that there are  $2^6 = 64$  possible solutions.

*Proof:* 1) is clear from Lemma 8. Notice that for each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 27$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} (s_{(t+1,1)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,93)}) &= (s_{(t,69)}, s_{(t,1)}, \dots, s_{(t,92)}), \\ (s_{(t+1,94)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,177)}) &= (s_{(t,171)} + a_{t+1}, s_{(t,94)}, \dots, s_{(t,176)}). \end{aligned}$$

So that, for each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 27$ ,  $(s_{(t,1)}, \dots, s_{(t,177)})$  can be induced from

$(s_{(27,25)}, \dots, s_{(27,93)}, s_{(27,100)}, \dots, s_{(27,177)}, a_{28}, \dots, a_{96})$  by linear recursion which is already known. So that 2) is true. 3) is our checking result. Proposition 2 is proved.  $\square$

Notice that the true value of

$(s_{(27,25)}, \dots, s_{(27,93)}, s_{(27,100)}, \dots, s_{(27,177)}, a_{28}, \dots, a_{96})$  satisfies

$$(s_{(27,25)}, \dots, s_{(27,93)}) = (k_{67} + 1, k_{68} + 1, k_{69}, k_1, \dots, k_{66}),$$

and

$$(s_{(27,100)}, \dots, s_{(27,177)}) = (k_{46} + k_{71}k_{72} + k_{73}, \dots, k_{53} + k_{78}k_{79} + k_{80}, k_{54} + k_{79}k_{80}, k_{55}, \dots, k_{66}, 0, \dots, 0, k_{40} + k_{65}k_{66} + k_{67} + a_{27}, \dots, k_{45} + k_{70}k_{71} + k_{72} + a_{22}).$$

These relations present another group of equations of 216 variables

$(s_{(27,25)}, \dots, s_{(27,93)}, s_{(27,100)}, \dots, s_{(27,177)}, a_{28}, \dots, a_{96})$ , described as the follow.

$$\begin{aligned} &(s_{(27,109)}, \dots, s_{(27,171)}) \\ &= (s_{(27,82)}, \dots, s_{(27,93)}, 0, \dots, 0), \\ a_{28} &= s_{(27,66)} + s_{(27,91)}s_{(27,92)} + s_{(27,93)}, \\ a_{29} &= s_{(27,65)} + s_{(27,90)}s_{(27,91)} + s_{(27,92)}, \\ &\dots \\ a_{69} &= s_{(27,25)} + s_{(27,50)}s_{(27,51)} + s_{(27,52)}, \\ a_{70} &= s_{(27,93)} + s_{(27,49)}s_{(27,50)} + s_{(27,51)}, \\ a_{71} &= s_{(27,92)} + s_{(27,48)}s_{(27,49)} + s_{(27,50)}, \\ &\dots \\ a_{94} &= s_{(27,69)} + s_{(27,25)}s_{(27,26)} + s_{(27,27)}, \\ a_{95} &= s_{(27,68)} + s_{(27,93)}s_{(27,25)} + s_{(27,26)}, \\ a_{96} &= s_{(27,67)} + s_{(27,92)}s_{(27,93)} + s_{(27,25)}. \end{aligned}$$

All these equations are enough to determine the true value of  $(s_{(27,25)}, \dots, s_{(27,93)}, s_{(27,100)}, \dots, s_{(27,177)}, a_{28}, \dots, a_{96})$ , so that enough to determine the value of  $(k_1, \dots, k_{69})$ .

Besides, all these equations can determine the value of

$$(k_{68}k_{69} + k_{70}, k_{69}k_{70} + k_{71}, \dots, k_{78}k_{79} + k_{80}),$$

so that determine the value of  $(k_{70}, \dots, k_{80})$ .

*C. Features of Fault Injected Machine in Case 3:  $1 \leq P_L \leq 66$*

*Lemma 9:*

- 1) For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 92$ ,  $(s_{(t,66)}, \dots, s_{(t,93)}) = (0, \dots, 0)$ .
- 2) For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 98$ ,  $(s_{(t,172)}, \dots, s_{(t,177)}) = (s_{(t,94)}, \dots, s_{(t,99)})$ .
- 3)  $\{(s_{(t,94)}, \dots, s_{(t,177)}), t \geq 98\}$  has a period 78.

*Proof:* 1) is clear in Case 3. 2) and 3) are immediate from 1).  $\square$

Now we present a definition. For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 98$ , define

$$b_{t+1} = s_{(t,162)} + s_{(t,175)}s_{(t,176)} + s_{(t,177)}.$$

For each  $t$  such that  $0 \leq t < 98$ , define  $b_{t+1} = b_{t+79}$ .

*Lemma 10:*

- 1) For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 98$ ,  $(s_{(t+1,178)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,288)}) = (s_{(t,264)} + b_{t+1}, s_{(t,178)}, \dots, s_{(t,287)})$ .
- 2)  $\{b_{t+1}, t \geq 0\}$  has a period 78.

*Proof:* Lemma 10 is just similar to Lemma 5.  $\square$

*Lemma 11:* Take the following changes for the state at time 98.  $(s_{(98,265)}, \dots, s_{(98,288)})$  are changed as  $(s_{(98,265)}, \dots, s_{(98,288)}) = (s_{(98,178)} + b_{98}, s_{(98,179)} + b_{97}, \dots, s_{(98,201)} + b_{75})$ , and other positions of the state at time 98 are kept unchanged. Then

- 1) For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 122$ ,  $(s_{(t,66)}, \dots, s_{(t,288)})$  are kept unchanged.
- 2) The key-stream  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  are kept unchanged.

*Proof:* Notice that we are in Case 3:  $1 \leq P_L \leq 66$ , and that the state bits shift rightwards. So that Lemma 11 is clear.  $\square$

*Lemma 12:* Take the state at time 98 as the changed value as described in Lemma 11. Then for each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 98$ , each  $j$  such that  $178 \leq j \leq 288$ ,  $s_{(t+87,j)} = s_{(t,j)} + b_{t+265-j}$ .

*Proof:* The proof of Lemma 12 is somewhat similar to that of Lemma 7. The proving details are the follow.

- 1) If  $178 \leq j \leq 264$  and  $t \geq 98$ , then  $t + 265 - j \geq 99$ , so that

$$\begin{aligned} s_{(t+87,j)} &= s_{(t+265-j,178)} \\ &= s_{(t+264-j,264)} + a_{t+265-j} \\ &= s_{(t,j)} + a_{t+265-j}. \end{aligned}$$

- 2) If  $265 \leq j \leq 288$  and  $t \geq 122$ , then  $241 \leq j - 24 \leq 264$  and  $t - 24 \geq 98$ . By 1),

$$\begin{aligned} s_{(t+87,j)} &= s_{(t-24+87,j-24)} \\ &= s_{(t-24,j-24)} + a_{t-24+265-(j-24)} \\ &= s_{(t,j)} + a_{t+265-j}. \end{aligned}$$

- 3) If  $265 \leq j \leq 288$  and  $t = 98$ , then  $178 \leq j - 87 \leq 201$ , so  $s_{(98+87,j)} = s_{(98,j-87)}$ . By the assumptions of Lemma 11,

$$\begin{aligned} s_{(98+87,j)} &= s_{(98,j-87)} \\ &= s_{(98,j)} + a_{98+265-j}. \end{aligned}$$

- 4) If  $265 \leq j \leq 288$ ,  $99 \leq t \leq 121$ , and  $j - (t - 98) \leq 264$ , then  $242 \leq j - (t - 98) \leq 264$ . By 1),

$$\begin{aligned} s_{(t+87,j)} &= s_{(98+87,j-(t-98))} \\ &= s_{(98,j-(t-98))} + a_{98+265-(j-(t-98))} \\ &= s_{(t,j)} + a_{t+265-j}. \end{aligned}$$

- 5) If  $265 \leq j \leq 288$ ,  $99 \leq t \leq 121$ , and  $j - (t - 98) \geq 265$ , then  $265 \leq j - (t - 98) \leq 287$ . By 3),

$$\begin{aligned} s_{(t+87,j)} &= s_{(98+87,j-(t-98))} \\ &= s_{(98,j-(t-98))} + a_{98+265-(j-(t-98))} \\ &= s_{(t,j)} + a_{t+265-j}. \end{aligned}$$

Lemma 12 is proved.  $\square$

*Lemma 13:* Take the state at time 98 as the changed value as described in Lemma 11. Then

- 1) For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 98$ , each  $j$  such that  $178 \leq j \leq 288$ ,

$$s_{(t+2262,j)} = s_{(t,j)} + \sum_{m=0}^{25} b_{t+31-j+3m}.$$

- 2)  $\{(s_{(t,94)}, \dots, s_{(t,288)}, t \geq 98)\}$  has a period 4524.

*Proof:* According to Lemma 10, Lemma 11, Lemma 12 and the fact that  $2262 = 87 \times 26 = 78 \times 29$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} s_{(t+2262,j)} &= s_{(t+87 \times 26,j)} \\ &= s_{(t,j)} + \sum_{n=0}^{25} b_{t+265-j+87 \times n \pmod{78}} \\ &= s_{(t,j)} + \sum_{m=0}^{25} b_{t+31-j+3m}, \end{aligned}$$

so that 1) is true. According to 1), for each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 98$ , each  $j$  such that  $178 \leq j \leq 288$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} s_{(t+4524,j)} &= s_{(t+2262+2262,j)} \\ &= s_{(t,j)} + \sum_{m=0}^{25} b_{t+31-j+3m} \\ &\quad + \sum_{m=0}^{25} b_{t+2262+31-j+3m} \\ &= s_{(t,j)}, \end{aligned}$$

This implies that  $\{(s_{(t,178)}, \dots, s_{(t,288)}, t \geq 98)\}$  has a period 4524. Again by the fact that  $\{(s_{(t,94)}, \dots, s_{(t,177)}, t \geq 98)\}$  has a period 78, Lemma 13 is proved.  $\square$

*Proposition 3:* Suppose  $1 \leq P_L \leq 66$ . Then

- 1) The key-stream  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  has a period 4524.
- 2)  $(z_0, z_1, z_2, \dots, z_{4523})$  are linear functions of 243 variables  $(s_{(98,100)}, \dots, s_{(98,177)}, s_{(98,202)}, \dots, s_{(98,288)}, b_{99}, \dots, b_{176})$ , and these functions are known.
- 3) By knowing the values of  $(z_0, z_1, z_2, \dots, z_{4523})$ , the attacker obtains 4524 linear equations of 243 variables  $(s_{(98,100)}, \dots, s_{(98,177)}, s_{(98,202)}, \dots, s_{(98,288)}, b_{99}, \dots, b_{176})$ . The rank of these linear equations is 237, so that there are  $2^6 = 64$  possible solutions.

*Proof:* 1) is clear from Lemma 13. Notice that for each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 98$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} (s_{(t+1,94)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,177)}) &= (s_{(t,171)}, s_{(t,94)}, \dots, s_{(t,176)}), \\ (s_{(t+1,178)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,288)}) & \\ &= (s_{(t,264)} + b_{t+1}, s_{(t,178)}, \dots, s_{(t,287)}). \end{aligned}$$

So that, for each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 98$ ,  $(s_{(t,94)}, \dots, s_{(t,288)})$  can be induced from  $(s_{(98,100)}, \dots, s_{(98,177)}, s_{(98,202)}, \dots, s_{(98,288)}, b_{99}, \dots, b_{176})$  by linear recursion which is already known. So that 2) is true.

- 3) is our checking result. Proposition 3 is proved.  $\square$

Notice that the true value of  $(s_{(98,100)}, \dots, s_{(98,177)}, s_{(98,202)}, \dots, s_{(98,288)}, b_{99}, \dots, b_{176})$  satisfies 78 non-linear equations, described as the follow.

$$\begin{aligned} b_{99} &= s_{(98,162)} + s_{(98,175)} s_{(98,176)} + s_{(98,177)}, \\ b_{100} &= s_{(98,161)} + s_{(98,174)} s_{(98,175)} + s_{(98,176)}, \\ &\dots \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} b_{161} &= s_{(98,100)} + s_{(98,113)} s_{(98,114)} + s_{(98,115)}, \\ b_{162} &= s_{(98,177)} + s_{(98,112)} s_{(98,113)} + s_{(98,114)}, \\ b_{163} &= s_{(98,176)} + s_{(98,111)} s_{(98,112)} + s_{(98,113)}, \\ &\dots \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} b_{174} &= s_{(98,165)} + s_{(98,100)} s_{(98,101)} + s_{(98,102)}, \\ b_{175} &= s_{(98,164)} + s_{(98,177)} s_{(98,100)} + s_{(98,101)}, \\ b_{176} &= s_{(98,163)} + s_{(98,176)} s_{(98,177)} + s_{(98,100)}. \end{aligned}$$

78 non-linear equations and 4524 linear equations are enough to determine the true value of  $(s_{(98,100)}, \dots, s_{(98,177)}, b_{99}, \dots, b_{176})$ . They are not enough to determine the true value of  $(s_{(98,202)}, \dots, s_{(98,288)})$  because, in each linear equation, just 2 variables of  $(s_{(98,202)}, \dots, s_{(98,288)})$  appear. After that determination, 4524 linear equations become the linear equations of 87 variables  $(s_{(98,202)}, \dots, s_{(98,288)})$ , and we have verified that the rank of these linear equations is 86. This fact restricts  $(s_{(98,202)}, \dots, s_{(98,288)})$  into 2 possible values.

Then we redefine  $\{a_{t+1}, t \geq 0\}$ . For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 0$ ,  $a_{t+1} = s_{(t,66)} + s_{(t,91)} s_{(t,92)} + s_{(t,93)}$ . By considering Lemma 9,  $a_{t+1} = 0$  for each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 92$ .

*Lemma 14:*

- 1)  $(s_{(98,94)}, \dots, s_{(98,177)}) = (a_{20}, a_{19}, \dots, a_{15}, a_{14} + a_{92}, a_{13} + a_{91}, \dots, a_1 + a_{79}, a_{78}, a_{77}, \dots, a_{15})$ .
- 2)  $(s_{(98,178)}, \dots, s_{(98,288)}) = (a_{29}, a_{28}, \dots, a_1, 0, \dots, 0, b_{98} + a_{29}, b_{97} + a_{28}, \dots, b_{75} + a_6)$ .

(this is the changed value according to Lemma 11)

*Proof:* We induce the state at time 98 by gradually renewing the state.

- 1)  $(s_{(78,94)}, \dots, s_{(78,177)}) = (a_{78}, a_{77}, \dots, a_1, 0, \dots, 0)$ ,  
 $(s_{(84,94)}, \dots, s_{(84,177)}) = (a_6 + a_{84}, a_5 + a_{83}, \dots, a_1 + a_{79}, a_{78}, a_{77}, \dots, a_1)$ ,  
 $(s_{(92,94)}, \dots, s_{(92,177)}) = (a_{14} + a_{92}, a_{13} + a_{91}, \dots, a_1 + a_{79}, a_{78}, a_{77}, \dots, a_9)$ ,  
 $(s_{(98,94)}, \dots, s_{(98,177)}) = (a_{20}, a_{19}, \dots, a_{15}, a_{14} + a_{92}, a_{13} + a_{91}, \dots, a_1 + a_{79}, a_{78}, a_{77}, \dots, a_{15})$ .
- 2)  $(s_{(69,178)}, \dots, s_{(69,288)}) = (0, \dots, 0)$ ,  
 $(s_{(78,178)}, \dots, s_{(78,288)}) = (a_9, a_8, \dots, a_1, 0, \dots, 0)$ ,  
 $(s_{(98,178)}, \dots, s_{(98,288)}) = (a_{29}, a_{28}, \dots, a_1, 0, \dots, 0)$ .  
 But the value of  $((s_{(98,265)}, \dots, s_{(98,288)}))$  is changed according to Lemma 11, so that  
 $(s_{(98,178)}, \dots, s_{(98,288)}) = (a_{29}, a_{28}, \dots, a_1, 0, \dots, 0, b_{98} + a_{29}, b_{97} + a_{28}, \dots, b_{75} + a_6)$ .

Lemma 14 is proved.  $\square$

Lemma 14 shows  $(s_{(98,207)}, s_{(98,208)}, \dots, s_{(98,264)}) = (0, \dots, 0)$ . This fact and all former equations are enough to determine the true value of  $(s_{(98,202)}, \dots, s_{(98,288)})$ .

Up to now, 243 variables  $\{s_{(98,100)}, \dots, s_{(98,177)}, s_{(98,202)}, \dots, s_{(98,288)}, b_{99}, \dots, b_{176}\}$  have already been uniquely determined. According to Lemma 14, the attacker can solve the value of  $(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{92})$ , which is the closest to the key  $(k_1, \dots, k_{80})$ .  $(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{92})$  is an unknown function of  $(k_1, \dots, k_{80})$ , because hard fault positions are unknown. But  $(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{92})$  can partially reveal the key, as described in Proposition 4 and Proposition 5.

*Lemma 15:* Suppose the indices of hard-fault-injected-bits are not from the set  $\{j, j+1, \dots, j+m\}$ , where  $1 \leq j \leq j+m \leq 93$ . Then  $s_{(m,j+m)} = s_{(0,j)}$ .

*Proposition 4:* Suppose  $1 \leq P_L \leq 66$ . Suppose  $a_{t+1} = 1$  for some  $t$  such that  $0 \leq t \leq 11$ . Then

$$(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{t+1}) = (k_{66}, k_{65}, \dots, k_{66-t}).$$

*Proof:* Notice that

$$(s_{(0,81)}, s_{(0,82)}, \dots, s_{(0,93)}) = (0, \dots, 0),$$

so that

$$(s_{(0,91)}s_{(0,92)} + s_{(0,93)}, s_{(1,91)}s_{(1,92)} + s_{(1,93)}, \dots, s_{(12,91)}s_{(12,92)} + s_{(12,93)}) = (0, \dots, 0),$$

and that

$$(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{12}) = (s_{(0,66)}, s_{(1,66)}, \dots, s_{(12,66)}).$$

Suppose  $a_{t+1} = 1$  for some  $t$  such that  $0 \leq t \leq 11$ , then the indices of hard-fault-injected-bits are never from the set  $\{66-t, 67-t, \dots, 66\}$ , or else there would be a contradiction. According to Lemma 15,

$$(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{t+1}) = (s_{(0,66)}, s_{(1,66)}, \dots, s_{(t,66)}) \\ = (s_{(0,66)}, s_{(0,65)}, \dots, s_{(0,66-t)}) \\ = (k_{66}, k_{65}, \dots, k_{66-t}).$$

Proposition 4 is proved.  $\square$

*Proposition 5:* Suppose  $1 \leq P_L \leq 66$ . Suppose  $a_{t+1} = 1$  for some  $t$  such that  $67 \leq t \leq 91$ . Then

- 1)  $(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{12}) = (k_{66}, k_{65}, \dots, k_{55})$ .
- 2)  $a_{13} = k_{54} + k_{79}k_{80}$ .
- 3) Either a) or b) is true, where

- a)  $a_{u+1} = k_{66-u} + k_{91-u}k_{92-u} + k_{93-u}$  for  $13 \leq u \leq t-27$ , and  $a_{v+1} = k_{91-v}k_{92-v} + k_{93-v}$  for  $65 \leq v \leq t-2$ .
- b)  $a_{u+1} = k_{66-u} + k_{91-u}k_{92-u}$  for  $13 \leq u \leq t-27$ , and  $a_{v+1} = k_{91-v}k_{92-v}$  for  $65 \leq v \leq t-2$ .

*Proof:* By the assumption " $1 \leq P_L \leq 66$ " we know that

$$(s_{(65,66)}, s_{(66,66)}, \dots, s_{(91,66)}) = (0, \dots, 0), \text{ so that} \\ (a_{66}, a_{67}, \dots, a_{92}) = (s_{(65,91)}s_{(65,92)} + s_{(65,93)}, \\ s_{(66,91)}s_{(66,92)} + s_{(66,93)}, \dots, s_{(91,91)}s_{(91,92)} + s_{(91,93)}).$$

Suppose  $a_{t+1} = s_{(t,91)}s_{(t,92)} + s_{(t,93)} = 1$  for some  $t$  such that  $67 \leq t \leq 91$ , then the indices of hard-fault-injected-bit are never from the set  $\{93-t, 94-t, \dots, 92\}$ , or else there would be a contradiction. Notice that  $(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{12}) = (s_{(0,66)}, s_{(1,66)}, \dots, s_{(11,66)})$ . So that

$$(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{12}) = (s_{(0,66)}, s_{(1,66)}, \dots, s_{(11,66)}) \\ = (s_{(0,66)}, s_{(0,65)}, \dots, s_{(0,55)}) \\ = (k_{66}, k_{65}, \dots, k_{55}).$$

$$a_{13} = s_{(12,66)} + s_{(12,91)}s_{(12,92)} + s_{(12,93)} \\ = s_{(0,54)} + s_{(0,79)}s_{(0,80)} + s_{(0,81)} \\ = k_{54} + k_{79}k_{80}.$$

1) and 2) are true.

Now suppose that 93 is not an index of hard-fault-injected-bit.

For each  $u$  such that  $13 \leq u \leq t-27$ , we have  $93-t \leq 66-u < 91-u < 92-u < 93-u \leq 80$ , so that

$$a_{u+1} = s_{(u,66)} + s_{(u,91)}s_{(u,92)} + s_{(u,93)} \\ = s_{(0,66-u)} + s_{(0,91-u)}s_{(0,92-u)} + s_{(0,93-u)} \\ = k_{66-u} + k_{91-u}k_{92-u} + k_{93-u}.$$

For each  $v$  such that  $65 \leq v \leq t-2$ , we have  $93-t \leq 91-v < 92-v < 93-v \leq 28$ , so that

$$a_{v+1} = s_{(v,66)} + s_{(v,91)}s_{(v,92)} + s_{(v,93)} \\ = s_{(v,91)}s_{(v,92)} + s_{(v,93)} \\ = s_{(0,91-v)}s_{(0,92-v)} + s_{(0,93-v)} \\ = k_{91-v}k_{92-v} + k_{93-v}.$$

a) is true.

Now suppose that 93 is an index of hard-fault-injected-bit. Then  $s_{(0,93)} = s_{(1,93)} = \dots = s_{(91,93)} = 0$ .

For each  $u$  such that  $13 \leq u \leq t-27$ , we have  $93-t \leq 66-u < 91-u < 92-u \leq 79$ , so that

$$a_{u+1} = s_{(u,66)} + s_{(u,91)}s_{(u,92)} + s_{(u,93)} \\ = s_{(u,66)} + s_{(u,91)}s_{(u,92)} \\ = s_{(0,66-u)} + s_{(0,91-u)}s_{(0,92-u)} \\ = k_{66-u} + k_{91-u}k_{92-u}.$$

For each  $v$  such that  $65 \leq v \leq t-2$ , we have  $93-t \leq 91-v < 92-v \leq 27$ , so that

$$a_{v+1} = s_{(v,66)} + s_{(v,91)}s_{(v,92)} + s_{(v,93)} \\ = s_{(v,91)}s_{(v,92)} \\ = s_{(0,91-v)}s_{(0,92-v)} \\ = k_{91-v}k_{92-v}.$$

Proposition 5 is proved.  $\square$

*D. Features of Fault Injected Machine in Case 4:  $163 \leq P_L \leq 171$*

*Proposition 6:* Suppose we are in Case 4:  $163 \leq P_L \leq 171$ . Then

- 1) For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 0$ ,

$$(s_{(t,171)}, \dots, s_{(t,177)}) = (0, \dots, 0),$$

so that generation of the key-stream  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  is degraded as

$$z_t = s_{(t+1152,66)} + s_{(t+1152,93)} \\ + s_{(t+1152,162)} + s_{(t+1152,243)} + s_{(t+1152,288)}, t \geq 0.$$

and the state is degraded into 273 bits

$$(s_{(t,1)}, s_{(t,2)}, \dots, s_{(t,162)}, s_{(t,178)}, s_{(t,179)}, \dots, s_{(t,288)}).$$

- 2) The state renewal is the follow.

$$(s_{(t+1,1)}, s_{(t+1,2)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,93)}) \\ = (s_{(t,243)} + s_{(t,286)}s_{(t,287)} + s_{(t,288)} + s_{(t,69)}, \\ s_{(t,1)}, \dots, s_{(t,92)}), \\ (s_{(t+1,94)}, s_{(t+1,95)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,162)}) \\ = (s_{(t,66)} + s_{(t,91)}s_{(t,92)} + s_{(t,93)}, s_{(t,94)}, \dots, s_{(t,161)}), \\ (s_{(t+1,178)}, s_{(t+1,179)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,288)}) \\ = (s_{(t,162)} + s_{(t,264)}, s_{(t,178)}, \dots, s_{(t,287)}).$$

- 3) The state renewal is reversible, and the inverse is the follow.

$$(s_{(t,1)}, s_{(t,2)}, \dots, s_{(t,93)}) \\ = (s_{(t+1,2)}, s_{(t+1,3)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,93)}, \\ s_{(t+1,67)} + s_{(t+1,92)}s_{(t+1,93)} + s_{(t+1,94)}), \\ (s_{(t,94)}, s_{(t,95)}, \dots, s_{(t,162)}) \\ = (s_{(t+1,95)}, s_{(t+1,96)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,162)}, \\ s_{(t+1,178)} + s_{(t+1,265)}), \\ (s_{(t,178)}, s_{(t,179)}, \dots, s_{(t,288)}) \\ = (s_{(t+1,179)}, s_{(t+1,180)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,288)}, \\ s_{(t+1,244)} + s_{(t+1,287)}s_{(t+1,288)} + s_{(t+1,1)} + s_{(t+1,70)}).$$

- 4) Change the IV (Initial Vector) from  $(IV_1, \dots, IV_{80}) = (0, \dots, 0)$  to the follow:  $IV_j = 0$  for each  $j$  such that  $1 \leq j \leq 80$ , except  $IV_{70} = 1$ . Then the key-stream  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  are kept unchanged.

Proposition 6 is clear by considering Trivium key-stream generation and Trivium state renewal. The following Proposition 7 is our checking result.

*Proposition 7:* Suppose we are in Case 4:  $163 \leq P_L \leq 171$ . Let  $(s_1, \dots, s_{162}, s_{178}, \dots, s_{288})$  denote the initial state (that is, the state at the time just before generating  $z_0$ ). Take  $\{z_0, z_1, z_2, \dots\}$  as functions of  $(s_1, \dots, s_{162}, s_{178}, \dots, s_{288})$ . Then

- 1)  $\{z_0, z_1, \dots, z_{65}\}$  are 66 linear functions.
- 2)  $\{z_{66}, z_{67}, \dots, z_{159}\}$  are 94 quadratic functions.
- 3)  $\{z_{160}, z_{161}, \dots, z_{228}\}$  are 69 cubic functions.
- 4) Each of  $\{z_{229}, z_{230}, \dots\}$  is at least a quartic function.

Proposition 6 and Proposition 7 present a simpler cipher than Trivium. It has a smaller number of state bits and a slower non-linearization procedure. So that it is easier to solve the state at a fixed time. If the state at a fixed time is known, the key will be known by reversing the state.

*E. Features of Fault Injected Machine in Case 5:  $172 \leq P_L \leq 176$*

*Lemma 16:* Suppose we are in Case 5:  $172 \leq P_L \leq 176$ . Then

- 1) For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq 5$ ,  

$$(s_{(t,176)}, s_{(t,177)}) = (0, 0).$$
- 2) Suppose  $m$  is the earliest time such that, for each  $t \geq m$ ,  $(s_{(t,176)}, s_{(t,177)}) = (0, 0)$ . Then for each  $t \geq m$ , we have

- a) The state is degraded into 282 bits  
 $(s_{(t,1)}, s_{(t,2)}, \dots, s_{(t,171)}, s_{(t,178)}, s_{(t,179)}, \dots, s_{(t,288)}).$
- b) State renewal is the follow.  

$$(s_{(t+1,1)}, s_{(t+1,2)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,93)})$$

$$= (s_{(t,243)} + s_{(t,286)}s_{(t,287)} + s_{(t,288)} + s_{(t,69)},$$

$$s_{(t,1)}, \dots, s_{(t,92)}),$$

$$(s_{(t+1,94)}, s_{(t+1,95)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,171)})$$

$$= (s_{(t,66)} + s_{(t,91)}s_{(t,92)} + s_{(t,93)} + s_{(t,171)},$$

$$s_{(t,94)}, \dots, s_{(t,170)}),$$

$$(s_{(t+1,178)}, s_{(t+1,179)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,288)})$$

$$= (s_{(t,162)} + s_{(t,264)}, s_{(t,178)}, \dots, s_{(t,287)}).$$

Lemma 16 is clear by considering Trivium key-stream generation and Trivium state renewal. Notice that state renewal procedure in Lemma 16-2)-b) is irreversible.

*Lemma 17:* Suppose  $m$  is the earliest time such that, for each  $t \geq m$ ,  $(s_{(t,176)}, s_{(t,177)}) = (0, 0)$ . Then

- 1) For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq m + 1$ ,  

$$s_{(t,163)} + s_{(t,178)} + s_{(t,265)} = 0.$$
- 2) For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq m + 2$ ,  

$$s_{(t,164)} + s_{(t,179)} + s_{(t,266)} = 0.$$
- ...
- 9) For each  $t$  such that  $t \geq m + 9$ ,

$$s_{(t,171)} + s_{(t,186)} + s_{(t,273)} = 0.$$

*Proof:* By Lemma 16 we know that, for each  $t$  such that  $t \geq m + 1$ ,

$$s_{(t,163)} = s_{(t-1,162)},$$

$$s_{(t,178)} = s_{(t-1,162)} + s_{(t-1,264)},$$

$$s_{(t,265)} = s_{(t-1,264)}.$$

So that 1) is true. Again for each  $t$  such that  $t \geq m + 1$ ,

$$s_{(t,163)} + s_{(t,178)} + s_{(t,265)}$$

$$= s_{(t+1,164)} + s_{(t+1,179)} + s_{(t+1,266)}$$

$$\dots$$

$$= s_{(t+8,171)} + s_{(t+8,186)} + s_{(t+8,273)}.$$

So that 2), 3),  $\dots$ , 9) are true, by considering 1). Lemma 17 is proved.  $\square$

*Proposition 8:* Suppose we are in Case 5:  $172 \leq P_L \leq 176$ . Then

- 1) Generation of the key-stream  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  is degraded as

$$z_t = s_{(t+1152,66)} + s_{(t+1152,93)}$$

$$+ s_{(t+1152,162)} + s_{(t+1152,243)} + s_{(t+1152,288)}, t \geq 0.$$

- 2) Suppose  $m$  is the earliest time such that, for each  $t \geq m$ ,  $(s_{(t,176)}, s_{(t,177)}) = (0, 0)$ . Then for each  $t \geq m + 9$ , we have

- a) the state is degraded into 273 bits  
 $(s_{(t,1)}, s_{(t,2)}, \dots, s_{(t,162)}, s_{(t,178)}, s_{(t,179)}, \dots, s_{(t,288)}).$
- b) The state renewal is the follow.  

$$(s_{(t+1,1)}, s_{(t+1,2)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,93)})$$

$$= (s_{(t,243)} + s_{(t,286)}s_{(t,287)} + s_{(t,288)} + s_{(t,69)},$$

$$s_{(t,1)}, \dots, s_{(t,92)}),$$

$$(s_{(t+1,94)}, s_{(t+1,95)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,162)})$$

$$= (s_{(t,66)} + s_{(t,91)}s_{(t,92)} + s_{(t,93)} + s_{(t,186)} + s_{(t,273)},$$

$$s_{(t,94)}, \dots, s_{(t,161)}),$$

$$(s_{(t+1,178)}, s_{(t+1,179)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,288)})$$

$$= (s_{(t,162)} + s_{(t,264)}, s_{(t,178)}, \dots, s_{(t,287)}).$$
- c) The state renewal is reversible, and the inverse is the follow.  

$$(s_{(t,1)}, s_{(t,2)}, \dots, s_{(t,93)})$$

$$= (s_{(t+1,2)}, s_{(t+1,3)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,93)},$$

$$s_{(t+1,67)} + s_{(t+1,92)}s_{(t+1,93)} + s_{(t+1,94)} +$$

$$s_{(t+1,187)} + s_{(t+1,274)}),$$

$$(s_{(t,94)}, s_{(t,95)}, \dots, s_{(t,162)})$$

$$= (s_{(t+1,95)}, s_{(t+1,96)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,162)},$$

$$s_{(t+1,178)} + s_{(t+1,265)}),$$

$$(s_{(t,178)}, s_{(t,179)}, \dots, s_{(t,288)})$$

$$= (s_{(t+1,179)}, s_{(t+1,180)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,288)}, s_{(t+1,1)} +$$

$$s_{(t+1,70)} + s_{(t+1,244)} + s_{(t+1,287)}s_{(t+1,288)}).$$

- 3) Change the IV (Initial Vector) from  $(IV_1, \dots, IV_{80}) = (0, \dots, 0)$  to the follow:  $IV_j = 0$  for each  $j$  such that  $1 \leq j \leq 80$ , except  $IV_{79} = 1$ . Then the key-stream  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  are kept unchanged.

*Proof:* 1) is clear. 2) is a natural corollary of Lemma 16 and Lemma 17. 3) is clear.  $\square$

The following Proposition 9 is our checking result.



*Proposition 9:* Suppose we are in Case 5:  $172 \leq P_L \leq 176$ . Let  $(s_1, \dots, s_{162}, s_{178}, \dots, s_{288})$  denote the initial state (that is, the state at the time just before generating  $z_0$ ). Take  $\{z_0, z_1, z_2, \dots\}$  as functions of  $(s_1, \dots, s_{162}, s_{178}, \dots, s_{288})$ . Then

- 1)  $\{z_0, z_1, \dots, z_{65}\}$  are 66 linear functions.
- 2)  $\{z_{66}, z_{67}, \dots, z_{159}\}$  are 94 quadratic functions.
- 3)  $\{z_{160}, z_{161}, \dots, z_{228}\}$  are 69 cubic functions.
- 4) Each of  $\{z_{229}, z_{230}, \dots\}$  is at least a quartic function.

Proposition 8 and Proposition 9 present a simpler cipher than Trivium. It has a smaller number of state bits and a slower non-linearization procedure. So that it is easier to solve the state at a fixed time. If the state at a fixed time is known, the state at time 14 will be known by reversing the state, described in Proposition 8 (we know that  $14 \geq m + 9$ , where  $m$  is the earliest time such that, for each  $t \geq m$ ,  $(s_{(t,176)}, s_{(t,177)}) = (0, 0)$ ).

Now suppose that the state at time 14 is known. We know that  $(k_1, \dots, k_{79}) = (s_{(14,15)}, s_{(14,16)}, \dots, s_{(14,93)})$ . Then, if  $m < 5$ ,  $k_{80} = s_{(13,93)} = s_{(14,67)} + s_{(14,92)}s_{(14,93)} + s_{(14,94)} + s_{(14,187)} + s_{(14,274)}$ , according to Proposition 8. If  $m = 5$ , the value of  $k_{80}$  can not be determined.

#### F. Features of Fault Injected Machine in Case 6: $P_L = 177$

*Proposition 10:* Suppose we are in Case 6:  $P_L = 177$ . Then

- 1) Generation of the key-stream  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  is degraded as

$$z_t = s_{(t+1152,66)} + s_{(t+1152,93)} + s_{(t+1152,162)} + s_{(t+1152,243)} + s_{(t+1152,288)}, t \geq 0.$$

- 2) the state is degraded into 287 bits  $(s_{(t,1)}, s_{(t,2)}, \dots, s_{(t,176)}, s_{(t,178)}, s_{(t,179)}, \dots, s_{(t,288)})$ .
- 3) The state renewal is the follow.

$$\begin{aligned} & (s_{(t+1,1)}, s_{(t+1,2)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,93)}) \\ &= (s_{(t,243)} + s_{(t,286)}s_{(t,287)} + s_{(t,288)} + s_{(t,69)}, \\ & \quad s_{(t,1)}, \dots, s_{(t,92)}), \\ & (s_{(t+1,94)}, s_{(t+1,95)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,176)}) \\ &= (s_{(t,66)} + s_{(t,91)}s_{(t,92)} + s_{(t,93)} + s_{(t,171)}, \\ & \quad s_{(t,94)}, \dots, s_{(t,175)}), \\ & (s_{(t+1,178)}, s_{(t+1,179)}, \dots, s_{(t+1,288)}) \\ &= (s_{(t,162)} + s_{(t,175)}s_{(t,176)} + s_{(t,264)}, \\ & \quad s_{(t,178)}, \dots, s_{(t,287)}). \end{aligned}$$

- 4) Change the IV (Initial Vector) as  $(IV_1, \dots, IV_{78}) = (0, \dots, 0)$ , and  $(IV_{79}, IV_{80}) \neq (0, 0)$ . Then the key-stream  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  are kept unchanged.

Proposition 10 is clear. Notice that state renewal is irreversible.

#### G. Features of Fault Injected Machine in Case 7: $67 \leq P_L \leq 93$ or $244 \leq P_L \leq 288$

Case 7 has many features similar with former cases. Here are some examples.

If  $244 \leq P_L \leq 264$ , the features are similar to those of Case 4.

If  $265 \leq P_L \leq 287$ , the features are similar to those of Case 5.

If  $P_L = 288$ , the features are similar to those of Case 6.

If  $67 \leq P_L \leq 69$ , the features are similar to those of Case 4.

If  $70 \leq P_L \leq 92$ , the features are similar to those of Case 5.

If  $P_L = 93$ , the features are similar to those of Case 6.

## IV. CASES CHECKING

In this section we present an algorithm, to check the case by observing the key-stream  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$ . We firstly define 6 features for  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$ .

Feature 1:  $(z_0 z_1 \dots, z_{68}) = (z_{69} z_{70} \dots z_{137})$ .

Feature 2:  $(z_0 z_1 \dots, z_{3357}) = (z_{3358} z_{3359} \dots z_{6715})$ .

Feature 3:  $(z_0 z_1 \dots, z_{4523}) = (z_{4524} z_{4525} \dots z_{9047})$ .

Feature 4: Change  $IV_{70}$  from 0 to 1, then  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots z_{287})$  are kept unchanged.

Feature 5: Change  $IV_{79}$  from 0 to 1, then  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots z_{287})$  are kept unchanged.

Feature 6: Change  $IV_{80}$  from 0 to 1, then  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots z_{287})$  are kept unchanged.

Then we point out some facts, as the follow.

- 1) In Case 1,  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  satisfies Feature 1.
- 2) In Case 2,  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  satisfies Feature 2.
- 3) In Case 3,  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  satisfies Feature 3.
- 4) In Case 4,  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  satisfies Feature 4.
- 5) In Case 5,  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  satisfies Feature 5.
- 6) In Case 5,  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  may or may not satisfy Feature 6.
- 7) In Case 6,  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  satisfies both Feature 5 and Feature 6.

Then we present some natural assumptions, described in the follow.

- 1) If the case is not Case 1,  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  satisfies Feature 1 with a neglectable probability.
- 2) If the case is neither Case 1 nor Case 2,  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  satisfies Feature 2 with a neglectable probability.
- 3) If the case is not from Case 1, Case 2, Case 3,  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  satisfies Feature 3 with a neglectable probability.
- 4) If the case is not from Case 1, Case 2, Case 3, Case 4,  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  satisfies Feature 4 with a neglectable probability.
- 5) In Case 7,  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  satisfies Feature 5 with a neglectable probability.
- 6) In Case 7,  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  satisfies Feature 6 with a neglectable probability.

*Algorithm* Suppose that the attacker has obtained the key-stream  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$ , from a hard-fault-injected machine.

- 1) If  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  satisfies Feature 1, take the case as Case 1.
- 2) If  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  does not satisfy Feature 1, but satisfies Feature 2, take the case as Case 2.
- 3) If  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  does not satisfy each from Feature 1, Feature 2, but satisfies Feature 3, take the case as Case 3.

- 4) If  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  does not satisfy each from Feature 1, Feature 2, Feature 3, but satisfies Feature 4, take the case as Case 4.
- 5) If  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  does not satisfy each from Feature 1, Feature 2, Feature 3, Feature 4, but satisfies both Feature 5 and Feature 6, take the case as from Case 5, Case 6.
- 6) If  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  does not satisfy each from Feature 1, Feature 2, Feature 3, Feature 4, Feature 6, but satisfies Feature 5, take the case as Case 5.
- 7) If  $(z_0 z_1 z_2 \dots)$  does not satisfy each from Feature 1, Feature 2, Feature 3, Feature 4, Feature 5, Feature 6, take the case as Case 7.

Under our natural assumptions, Algorithm selectes wrong cases with a neglectable probability. In step 5) of Algorithm, we can also take the case directly as Case 5. The probability of mistake is no more than  $1/5$ .

## V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

From all of the discussions above, it is clear that Trivium is weak under hard fault analysis, with our trivial assumptions.

Hard fault injection will lead us to continue our work. One future work is combined fault analysis of Grain. Grain is another hardware-oriented stream cipher, and one of the finally chosen ciphers by eSTREAM project. We find Grain much stronger under either soft or hard fault analysis. We will combine hard fault injection and soft fault injection, looking for weakness of Grain. The second future work is the study under weaker assumptions. One weaker assumption is that, after fault injection, the values of those injected bits are permanently 0 or 1.

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