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Research Article

Keywords: Android Security, Android Malware, Permissions Based Detection, Static Detection, Mobile Security, Literature Review.

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A Comprehensive Review on Permissions-Based Android Malware Detection

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Abstract

The first Android-ready "G1" phone debuted in late October 2008. Since then, the growth of Android malware has been explosive analogous to the rise in the popularity of Android. The major positive aspect of Android has been its open-source nature, which empowers app developers to expand their work. But at the same time, authors with malicious intentions pose grave threats to users. In the presence of such threats, Android malware detection is the need of an hour. Consequently, researchers have proposed various techniques involving static, dynamic, and hybrid analysis to address such threats using numerous features in the last decade. But the feature that most researchers have extensively used to perform malware analysis and detection in Android security is Android permission. Hence, to provide a clarified overview of the latest and past work done in Android malware analysis and detection, we perform a comprehensive literature review using permissions as a central feature or in combination with other components by collecting and analyzing 200 studies from January 2009 to February 2023. We extracted information such as the choice opted by researchers between analysis or detection, techniques used to select or rank the permissions feature set, features used along with permissions, detection models employed, the malware datasets used by researchers, and lastly, the limitations and challenges in the field of Android malware detection to propose some future research directions. Additionally, based on the information extracted, we answer the six research questions designed considering the above factors.

Keywords: Android Security, Android Malware, Permissions Based Detection, Static Detection, Mobile Security, Literature Review.

1 Introduction

In the last decade, we have witnessed the exponential growth of the Android operating system in the mobile market. According to a recent report, the Android system constitutes more than 80% of the whole market of smart phones¹. The main reason behind Android's success is its free, open-source code, which empowers smartphone manufacturers to transform their devices with pre-installed applications and customized user interfaces for a beautiful customer experience. But Android's

 $^{^{1}}$ www.tenda.com.cn

open-source nature is a boon and a bane. On the one hand, where it brings the benefits of technological broadband and update, it also allows criminals to use it for ill practices. These days mobile phones are not only used for communication purposes, but gradually they have become a crucial part of our lives containing the smallest to the most critical and private user data. In such a situation, robust and effective Android detection mechanisms are the need of the hour.

Android OS was released in 2008, and just then, the first Android malware was spotted in 2010, which targeted users by subscribing to premium SMS services. Since then, malware attacks have been on the rise, and at the same time, security attempts have been fighting to keep up with the ever-increasing and constantly changing malicious attacks. The total number of Android malware worldwide have already increased from 22,088 in 2012 to 33,237,653 in Jan 2023². Looking closer at the real-time threat analysis and statistics of Android malware worldwide, we will understand how desperately the Android Market needs Android security and malware detection systems.

Researchers and practitioners use various analysis and detection measures to address the abovementioned concerning numbers. Based on the standard research techniques in the literature, Android malware detection is usually carried out using three analysis techniques: static, dynamic, and hybrid. The static analysis aims to investigate malware without executing the actual code but by collecting basic information about the app's functionality. In contrast, dynamic analysis performs and monitors an application to track its nature to find traces of malicious behavior. The working of hybrid analysis works in a way such that it combines the advantages of both static and dynamic analysis. Although static analysis poses some limitations while dealing with advanced malicious deformation techniques such as dynamic code loading, static analysis still proves to be quite efficient, usable, and scalable in prohibiting malware before execution. Amongst all the static features, the most popular and commonly used static feature is permissions. Google introduced a permission system for the Android OS, making it

²https://portal.av-atlas.org/malware

mandatory for all developers to define the necessary permissions required for the functionality of their product. It is up to the user to grant or deny access to the requested permissions during the installation. Hence, monitoring the usage of permissions before installing any application can prevent the spread of malware. It may seem challenging to a standard user, but the researchers have used the meaning, frequency, and combination of permissions requested over the past 13 years to build robust Android malware detection models.

Table I shows that this review offers much more than most previous works in this area. This review is not based on a general topic like [5], but instead focuses systematically on applying for permissions as a feature in Android Malware analysis/detection. Some surveys and reviews exist in the literature, such as [13] and [12], to analyze the work done in Android malware detection using analysis techniques, features, and machine learning models. A systematic literature review focusing on the trend of static analysis and the usage of machine learning models, respectively, was covered in the two surveys mentioned above. However, there has been a gap in the Android malware detection investigation in recent years. More specifically, a survey highlighting the popularity of Android permissions as a feature in Android malware analysis/detection is missing. Therefore, it is indispensable to summarize the related work in the field of Android malware detection using permissions from the advent of the first proposed Android malware-related model.

To have a clear view of the usage and popularity of permissions as a feature in Android malware analysis and detection over almost 14 years (2009-2023), we conducted this Comprehensive Literature Review (CLR) after analyzing the related work thoroughly. The main contributions of this work are highlighted below :

- We perform this CLR using a vast dataset of 200 research papers that aim to use permissions for Android malware analysis/detection, almost covering the advent of Android OS [14] and the first malware in 2009 to the current research scenario in the second month of 2023 [15].
- Apart from obtaining information about the usage and permission-based techniques, we

Reference	nce Feature Technique Model Analysis/ Methodology Dataset Discussion						
Itelefence	Analy-	used	used	Detection		used	on Limita-
	-	useu		Detection	Comparison	useu	
	sis		(ML/DL)				tions and
							Future
							Directions
[1]	\checkmark	x	\checkmark	x	х	х	\checkmark
[2]	\checkmark	x	\checkmark	x	х	х	х
[3]	\checkmark	x	\checkmark	x	х	\checkmark	х
[4]	\checkmark	x	\checkmark	x	х	\checkmark	х
[5]	х	x	x	x	х	х	х
[6]	\checkmark	x	x	x	х	х	х
[7]	х	х	\checkmark	x	х	х	х
[8]	\checkmark	х	\checkmark	x	х	х	\checkmark
[9]	х	х	\checkmark	x	х	\checkmark	\checkmark
[10]	х	x	x	x	х	х	х
[11]	\checkmark	х	х	x	\checkmark	х	\checkmark
[12]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	x	х	\checkmark	\checkmark
This arti-	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
cle							

Table 1: Comparison of recent reviews having similar coverage with this article. (\checkmark = Having content, x = having no or little content)

comprehensively analyzed other features combined with permissions, detection models, and datasets used.

- According to the results of empirical evidence, permissions prove to be quite informative and efficient as a means of detecting malware in Android smartphones.
- Finally, we make the discussions about the results, limitations and possible future work directions using permissions as a feature.

1.1 Review Protocol

In this section, we discuss in detail the main steps involved in conducting this CLR :

- 1. Research questions: After reviewing the related work and locating the different queries that need to be analyzed in this review, we put forward six research questions and their answers that further perform the basis of the following sections. Table 2 presents six research questions about the usage of permissions in Android malware detection.
- 2. Search Strategy: Our first step while building a comprehensive literature survey is collecting related work by various authors in Android security, mainly based on permissions. Our

work revolves around the usage and impact of permissions in the area of Android malware detection; hence we chose the related work that has used permissions alone or combined with other static/dynamic features to analyze or detect malware in Android smartphones. We identified several search sources and search items to cover the related research between the period of 2009 to 2023 and, in the end, selected seven electronic databases, which include main journals and conferences, namely -

- IEEE Xplore Digital Library
- ScienceDirect
- ACM Digital Library
- Wiley Online Library
- Google Scholar
- SpringerLink
- Web of Science
- 3. Data extraction and synthesis: The last step of our survey, which is the data extraction and synthesis, is directly related to the first step, i.e., the research questions. According to the information extracted from various research papers, we can find the answers to the research

ID	Research Questions	Motivation
RQ1	What was the primary underlying purpose of using permissions	Assess the goals of
	defined by the researchers- behavioral analysis or malware detec-	researchers and prac-
	tion?	titioners.
RQ2	What feature ranking, selection, or other techniques are used to	Identify the com-
	build an Android malware analysis/detection system considering	monly used method
	permissions?	for selecting and
		extracting relevant
		features.
RQ3	Which features are primarily used in combination with permissions	Identify the com-
	for Android malware analysis/detection?	monly used features
		along with permis-
		sions.
RQ4	Which ML/DL/other models are used for Android malware anal-	Compare the popu-
	ysis/detection?	larity of ML and DL
		models.
RQ5	Which datasets are used for malware analysis/detection?	Identify the most
		famous experimental
		datasets.
RQ6	What are the limitations, challenges, and future directions for	Assess the limitations
	permissions-based Android malware analysis or detection?	or challenges and
		consequently, pro-
		pose future research
		directions.

 Table 2: Research Questions

questions and queries. We extracted the following information from all the research papers used for this review -

- Purpose of research Choice between creating an Android malware detection model or analyzing benign and malware apps.
- Technique used As described above, our focus relies upon permissions; hence we obtained information on how authors utilized permissions to build their malware analysis or detection model.
- Features used Most common features chosen and utilized by authors while carrying out their research work in combination with permissions.
- Type of model used Choice of model and classifiers preferred between Machine learning (ML) and Deep learning (DL) or any other kind if used for analysis or detection.
- Malware dataset used What malware datasets are used by the authors in their corresponding works?

- Limitations Limitations of detection/analysis models mainly associated with permissions as a feature in the field of Android security?
- Future Directions Assessing the limitations and challenges faced by the permissionsbased Android malware analysis/detection models, we propose some future research directions.

2 Purpose of Research

In response to RQ1, we present the data summarizing the choice preferred by authors in Table 3, between only analyzing the permissions in malware/benign apps or detecting malicious behavior in applications by proposing full-fledged malware detection using a dataset comprising of both benign and malware applications. The analysis process closely observes the behavioral pattern of features requested by applications. It could be performed using both applications classes [16] or even individual types too [17]. On the other hand, a research paper falls under the detection category if the corresponding authors have performed detection using a mixed or unlabelled dataset after completing the analysis or training phase.

Table 3 indicates that over the span of around 14 years, almost all the researchers and practitioners aimed to detect malware in Android smartphones using the datasets available in the market comprising both normal and malware applications. But some authors chose to carry out only the analysis of feature behavior; for instance, the authors in [18]analyzed descriptions of apps downloaded from the Google Play Store to predict the requested permissions but didn't use any malware applications. If we try to come to a conclusion using the data highlighted by Table 3 to understand the situation better, we can observe that a little over 93% of the work mentioned in the table revolved around malware detection using permissions and not only analyzing apps' permissions. Hence, based on the results presented above, we answer the first Research Question that the majority of researchers have chosen the path of building permissions-based Android malware detection models instead of merely analyzing the permissions of malware.

3 Techniques used

In response to RQ2, this section aims to present the various feature selection or ranking or other similar techniques used by researchers to exploit permissions while building an analysis/detection model. Be it feature selection or feature ranking, researchers aim to select features highly dependent on the response. Various feature reduction techniques have been used in primary studies to determine and choose significant features in Android malware detection. But some authors have approached the detection process in different ways too. Hence, we divided all the techniques into five categories: feature ranking, frequent patternsbased, graph-based approach, feature selection, and others. Some of the most commonly used methods are discussed in brief below.

(a) Frequency-based techniques - Frequencybased techniques generally fall under the

Table	3 : Purpose of Research	(Analysis or
	Detection)	

Detection)					
Related works	Ana	alysis	Malware Detec- tion		
	Normal	Malware	tion		
Zhang et al. [19]	\checkmark	√	\checkmark		
Li et al. [20]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Sahin et al. [21]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Talha et al. [22]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Varma et al. [23]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Mahindru et al. [24]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Dogru et al. [25]	 ✓ 	√	\checkmark		
Rathore et al. [26]	V	\checkmark	✓		
Shang et al. [27]	\checkmark	 ✓ 	<u>√</u>		
Tchakounte et al. [28]	v	\checkmark	v		
Ju et al. [16]	\checkmark	\checkmark			
Ilham et al. [29]	▼ ✓	v √	\checkmark		
Sahin et al. [30]	\checkmark	\checkmark	$\overline{\checkmark}$		
Angelo et al. [31]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Xiong et al. [32]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Lu et al. [33]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Kavitha et al. [34]	-	-	-		
E. Amer [35]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Chakravarty et al.	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
[36]			-		
Pondugula et al. [37]	√ _	 ✓ 	<u>√</u>		
Sahal et al. [38]	\checkmark	√ (✓		
Tuan Mat et al. [39]	\checkmark	\checkmark	$\overline{\checkmark}$		
Wang et al. [40] Park et al. [41]	\checkmark	\checkmark	$\overline{\checkmark}$		
Liang et al. [42]	v √	v	•		
Enck et al. [14]	▼ ✓	-	-		
Enck et al. [17]	\checkmark	-	-		
Wang et al. [43]	\checkmark	\checkmark	-		
Peng et al. [44]	\checkmark	\checkmark	-		
Pandita et al. [45]	\checkmark	-	-		
Samra et al. [46]	\checkmark	-	-		
Yerima et al. [47]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Aung et al. [48]	 ✓ 	√	<u>√</u>		
Yerima et al. [49]	\checkmark	√ (✓		
Sanz et al. [50]	\checkmark	\checkmark	<u> </u>		
Moonsamy et al. [51]	✓ ✓	V	v		
Backes et al. [52] Wu et al. [53]	v √	-	-		
Kato et al. [54]	v √	v √	▼ ✓		
Arora et al. [55]	✓ ✓	\checkmark	<u>√</u>		
Alsoghyer et al. [56]	\checkmark	\checkmark	· ✓		
Saleem et al. [57]	\checkmark	\checkmark	-		
Ghasempour et al.	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
[58]					
Shrivastava et al.	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
[59]					
Upadhayay et al. [60]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Lee et al. [61]			/		
Surendran et al. [62]	\checkmark	\checkmark	✓		
A. T. Kabakus [63] Wang et al. [64]	\checkmark	\checkmark	✓		
Wang et al. [64] Akbar et al. [65]	\checkmark	\checkmark	$\overline{\checkmark}$		
Zhu et al. [66]	v √	v √	$\overline{\checkmark}$		
Wang et al. [67]	v √	v √	$\overline{\checkmark}$		
N. McLauglin [68]	▼ ✓	✓ ✓	▼ ✓		
Wang et al. [69]	 ✓ 	∨	↓		
Grace et al. [70]	\checkmark	\checkmark	$\overline{\checkmark}$		
Liu et al. [71]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Bayazit et al. [72]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Lee et al. [73]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Zhu et al. [74]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		

Related works	Ana	alysis	Malware Detec- tion
	Normal	Malware	
Almahmoud et al. [75]	~	√	\checkmark
Feng et al. [76]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Kandukuru et al. [77]	√ √	\checkmark	\checkmark
Arora et al. [78]			\checkmark
Ding et al. [79]	v √	v √	$\overline{\checkmark}$
Sahin et al. [80]	v √	V V	$\overline{\checkmark}$
Idrees et al. [81]	v √	v √	▼
Khariwal et al. [81]	v √	v √	$\overline{\checkmark}$
Idrees et al. [83]	v √	v √	<u>√</u>
Zhu et al. [15]	v √	v √	$\overline{\checkmark}$
Bai et al. [84]	v √	V V	$\overline{\checkmark}$
Taheri et al. [85]	v √	v √	▼
Alazab et al. [86]	v √	v √	<u>↓</u>
Mathur et al. [87]	v √	v √	▼
Imtiaz et al. [88]	v √	v √	▼ ✓
Liu et al. [89]	v √	v √	$\overline{\checkmark}$
Chen et al. [90]		v √	$\overline{\checkmark}$
Guan et al. [90]	\checkmark	\checkmark	$\overline{\checkmark}$
Mohamed et al. [91]	\checkmark	\checkmark	$\overline{\checkmark}$
Varma et al. [92]	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Gyunka et al. [93]	\checkmark	\checkmark	$\frac{\checkmark}{\checkmark}$
Taha et al. [95]	v √	✓ ✓	$\overline{\checkmark}$
	\checkmark		$\overline{\checkmark}$
Peng et al. [96] Ashwini et al. [97]		 ✓ 	
	\checkmark	\checkmark	$\frac{\checkmark}{\checkmark}$
Jiang et al. [98]			
Wang et al. [99]	\checkmark	 ✓ 	<u> </u>
Rana et al. [100]	\checkmark	\checkmark	<u> </u>
Lu et al. [101]	 ✓ 	√	✓
Millar et al. [102]	\checkmark	✓	\checkmark
Barrera et al. [103]		-	-
Shabtai et al. [104]	✓	-	-
Felt et al. [105]	\checkmark	-	-
Erickson et al. [106]	\checkmark	-	
Sarma et al. [107]	\checkmark	√	\checkmark
Frank et al. [108]	\checkmark	-	-
Jhu et al. [109] Peiravian et al. [110]	v √		
	v √	\checkmark	$\frac{\checkmark}{\checkmark}$
Sanz et al. [111] Feldman et al. [112]	v √	✓ ✓	
Pehlivan et al. [112]	v √	\checkmark	$\frac{\checkmark}{\checkmark}$
Rahman et al. [113]	v √	v √	$\overline{\checkmark}$
Rovelli et al. [114]	✓ ✓	\checkmark	$\overline{\checkmark}$
Arp et al. [116]	\checkmark	\checkmark	$\overline{\checkmark}$
Yerima et al. [117] Kang et al. [118]	\checkmark	\checkmark	$\frac{\checkmark}{\checkmark}$
Kang et al. [118]			
Zhao et al. [119]	\checkmark	\checkmark	$\frac{\checkmark}{\checkmark}$
Qiao et al. [120]		\checkmark	
Chen et al. [121]	\checkmark	✓ 	$\frac{\checkmark}{\checkmark}$
Demertzis et al. [122]		\checkmark	
Verma et al. [123]	\checkmark	\checkmark	<u> </u>
Wang et al. [124]	\checkmark	\checkmark	<u> </u>
Tangil et al. [125]	\checkmark	\checkmark	<u> </u>
Wang et al. [126]	✓	\checkmark	<u> </u>
Li et al. [127]	\checkmark	\checkmark	$\frac{\checkmark}{\checkmark}$
Bhattacharya et al. [128]	-	V	
Xie et al. [129]	√ _	\checkmark	✓
Xie et al. [130]	 ✓ 	 ✓ 	✓
Ren et al. [131]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Tao et al. [132]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Namrud et al. [133]	 ✓ 	 ✓ 	✓
Alswaina et al. [134]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Qiu et al. [135]			
Qiu et al. [135] Zhu et al. [136] Feng et al. [137]	V V	✓ ✓ -	✓ ✓ -

Related works	An	alysis	Malware Detec- tion	
	Normal	Malware	51011	
Aonzo et al. [138]	√	√ Niaiwai e	\checkmark	
Urooj et al. [139]	∨	V V	$\overline{\checkmark}$	
Wang et al. [140]	∨	-	-	
Wang et al. [140]	∨	 ✓	-	
Zhang et al. [141]	v √	-	•	
Kesswani et al. [142]	v √	-	-	
	v √			
Ibrahim et al. [144]		√ ·	<u>√</u>	
Arshad et al. [145]	 ✓ 	√	<u>√</u>	
Yuan et al. [146]	 ✓ 	V	✓	
Zhou et al. [147]	\checkmark	V	\checkmark	
Cilleruelo et al. [148]	 ✓ 	√ _	<u>√</u>	
Firdaus et al. [149]	\checkmark	\checkmark	√	
Wang et al. [150]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Singh et al. $[151]$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Rafiq et al. $[152]$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Mahdavifar et al.	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
[153]				
Seraj et al. [154]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Mahindru et al. [155]	\checkmark	\checkmark	✓	
Sahin et al. [21]	\checkmark	\checkmark	$\overline{\checkmark}$	
Anupama et al. [156]	∨	v √	↓	
Chen et al. [157]	v √	v √	<u>∨</u> √	
	v √	v √	$\overline{\checkmark}$	
Mahindru et al. [158]		V	v	
Tchakounté et al.	\checkmark	✓	\checkmark	
[159]				
Nissim et al. [160]	 ✓ 	\checkmark	✓	
Peynirci et al. [161]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Nauman et al. $[162]$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Bhattacharya et al.	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
[163]				
Bao et al.[164]	\checkmark	-	-	
Medrano et al. [165]	\checkmark	-	-	
Mat et al. [165]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Shatnawi et al. [166]	\checkmark	\checkmark	$\overline{\checkmark}$	
Smmarwar et al.			•	
[167]	v	•	v	
Arif et al. [168]				
	V	v	v	
Manzanares et al.	v	· ·	-	
[169]			/	
Bhat et al. [170]	√	√	<u>√</u>	
Elayan et al.[171]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Syrris et al. [172]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Idrees et al. [173]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Rehman et al. [174]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Martin et al. [175]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Navarro et al. [176]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Milosevic et al. [177]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Alzaylaee et al. [178]	\checkmark	\checkmark	✓	
Cai et al. [179]	· ·	\checkmark	$\overline{\checkmark}$	
Badhani et al. [180]	∨	v √	↓	
Hijawi et al. [181]	v √	v √	<u>∨</u> √	
Sheen et al. $[181]$	\checkmark	\checkmark	$\overline{\checkmark}$	
Nisha et al. [183]	 ✓ 	V	✓	
Song et al. [184]	\checkmark	V	✓	
Zhang et al. [185]	√	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Yang et al. [186]	\checkmark		-	
Thiyagarajan et al.	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
[187]				
Qaisar et al. [188]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Appice et al. [189]	\checkmark	\checkmark	✓	
Zhu et al. [190]	\checkmark	\checkmark	· ✓	
A. Altaher [191]	∨	\checkmark	<u>√</u>	
Su et al. [192]	v √	v √	$\overline{\checkmark}$	
Mahindru et al. [193]				
	\checkmark	\checkmark	<u>√</u>	
Dehkordy et al. [194]	\checkmark	\checkmark	✓	
Nguyen et al. [195]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Taheri et al. [196]	\checkmark	\checkmark	✓	

Related works	Analysis		Malware Detec- tion
	Normal	Malware	
Mahesh et al. [197]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Firdaus et al. [198]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Shrivastava et al.	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
[199]			
Varsha et al. [200]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
M. Deypir [201]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Mahindru et al. [202]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Keyvanpour et al.	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
[203]			
Razak et al. [204]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Xie et al. [205]	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Mahindru et al. [206]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Alecakir et al. [18]	\checkmark	-	-
Ali et al. [207]	\checkmark	-	-
Sun et al. [208]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
AlJarrah et al. [209]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Gharib et al. [210]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Sun et al. [211]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

category of feature ranking techniques; however, they can sometimes be used as a feature selection technique too. The main underlying concepts that these techniques tend to exploit are -

- Some features are frequently requested by only one class of dataset, either benign or malware, and as the goal is generally to differentiate between normal and malicious applications, the features that are frequently requested only by the malware applications are considered dangerous, and the ones having a high frequency in the case of normal applications are considered to have low-risk factor [58].
- Some features are commonly used by both the classes, benign and malware, and hence they can be excluded to choose only the more informative features. For instance, permissions such as "INTERNET" are frequently requested by both malware and benign apps; hence the authors in [20] chose to eliminate such permissions as they might introduce ambiguity in the malware detection process. Moreover, they ranked the features based on their frequency of usage in malicious and benign apps.
- Apart from the two approaches mentioned above, the authors also focus on how often one permission or feature is repeated in the whole dataset or has a low support value. In such cases also, the frequency is

used as a parameter to rank and further select only the relevant features.

(b) Information Gain (Information Gain) -Information Gain can be defined as a measure of reduction in entropy. One can understand it as a measure of reduction in the amount of information upon splitting a dataset according to a certain value of a random variable. Information Gain is inversely proportional to entropy, i.e., the higher the information gain, the lower the entropy of that particular group, as the element of surprise would be less. Mathematically, Information Gain is calculated by comparing the entropy of the dataset before and after a transformation. Common usage of Information Gain includes forming decision trees from a training dataset. Information Gain is calculated for each variable in the first step, followed by selecting the variable with the maximum Information Gain value and thus minimizing the entropy and obtaining the best splits of the dataset for efficient classification.

As feature ranking is a subset of feature selection, Information Gain can be used as both techniques, i.e., to reduce the dataset and simultaneously choose only the most informative features. This is done by calculating the gain of each variable in the context of the target variable. Information Gain value for each independent attribute is calculated and further ranked from top to bottom, the top being the most relevant with the highest Information Gain score. After this, a threshold could be decided to filter out only the features with Information Gain values above the threshold, which can be further included in the machine or deep learning classifiers.

(c) Principal Component Analysis (PCA) -Another commonly used feature selection technique in Android malware detection is Principal Component Analysis, which works on reducing the number of variables while preserving as much information as possible. PCA identifies the correlations to calculate the eigenvectors and eigenvalues, which identifies the principal components in return. After that, one can choose which principal components to keep and which ones to discard by creating a feature vector.

(d) Chi-square - Chi-square is generally used in statistics to test the independence of two events, but quite often, it has also been used as a feature selection technique in Android malware detection to reduce the size of the feature set. Mathematically, Chi-square measures how expected count E and observed count O deviate from each other. The Chi-square formula [212] is defined in the below equation.

$$\chi_c^2 = \sum \frac{(O_i - E_i)^2}{E_i}$$

where: c=Degrees of freedom, O=Observed value(s), and E=Expected value(s)

While aiming for feature selection, the features having higher chi-square values are selected for model building as a higher chisquare value depicts higher dependence over the target variable or the response.

(e) Clustering - Clustering is another technique that has been extensively used in Android malware detection first to understand a dataset and further club the similar and less informative features. In terms of machine learning, unlabelled grouping examples are called clustering.

In response to RQ2, we conclude by the information depicted in Table 4 that the most commonly used techniques involving the use of permissions are Information Gain and frequency-based, e.g., [58] and [20]. Apart from these, most researchers based their approach around utilizing either ML or DL classifiers by tuning the hyperparameters, e.g., [196] and [171]. Figure 1 gives a better and closer understanding of Table 4. As we can see, close to 48% of the total research works used in this review based their approach on either ML or DL classifiers/techniques [110]-[115]. Either they fed the extracted features directly to the machine learning classifiers to be dealt with or used techniques like gain ratio, correlation coefficient [29], mutual information, relief [36]




Fig. 1: Statistics depicting the most commonly used techniques to build an Android malware analysis/detection system considering permissions

etc., to compute the feature score. The second most common approach used by researchers and practitioners to reduce or choose the best set of features is utilizing the statistical tests (13.04%) such as Chi-square [119], PCA [34], Mann–Whitney test [132], variance threshold [26], ANOVA [120] and many more. Around 11% of the total work account for approaches based upon features' frequency [19]-[20] and clustering-based frequent patterns [46] each. 5.98% papers utilised some sort of similarity score [22] or rule based techniques [17] to analyse or detect Android malware. Lastly, 6.52% and 3.26% of the comprehensive studies used graph-based [185], [186], and some other techniques, respectively. For instance, in [31], the authors mapped the permissions on the x-y plane using their corresponding protection level, whereas in [45], they utilized app descriptions to deduce the permissions required by an application. Hence, based on the results presented above, we answer the second Research Question that popular techniques to handle the extracted permissions and other features are the ML and DL classifiers as their hyper parameters can be easily tuned to reduce, rank, or select the unlabelled or unbalanced feature set.

	Table 4: Technique used						
Related works	Feature Ranking	Frequent Pat- terns	Feature Selection	Graph based	Others		
Zhang et al. [19]		Monitored the permission usage within the appli- cation and with the system					
Li et al. [20]	Ranking based on the frequency of permissions being requested.						
Sahin et al. [21]			Linear Regression				
Talha et al. [22]					Combined Risk score calcu- lated for each app		
Varma et al. [23]					Used permissions as fea- tures to study the perfor- mance of ML algorithms		
Mahindru et al. [24]			Discarded the ones not installed or starting at launching stage				
Dogru et al. [25]					Permission groups score calculated, to sum up an app's Risk Score		
Rathore et al. [26]			Variance threshold, autoencoders, and PCA				
Shang et al. [27]			Reduced the permission set with Pearson's Corre- lation Coefficient				
Tchakounte et al. [28]		Similarity score based on sequence alignment					
Ju et al. [16]		Manual pattern recognition to existing malware permissions pat- terns					
Ilham et al. [29]			Gain Ratio, Information Gain, Correlation Coeffi- cient, CFS subset Evalu- ator				
Sahin et al. [30]					Relevance Frequency		
Angelo et al. [31]					Mapped the permissions on the x-y plane using their corresponding protec- tion level		
Xiong et al. [32]		Used unique and common permis- sions patterns from both datasets as weak Classifier					
Lu et al. [33]			Improved RF algorithms along with introducing fuzzy sets of samples				
Kavitha et al. [34]			PCA and Sequential Forward selection, Lim- iting the permissions by accepting or deny- ing each permission separately according to Dangerous level				
E. Amer [35]			Dangerous ievei		Developed an ensemble comprising multiple classi- fiers		
Chakravarty et al. [36]			Information Gain, Relief, Gain Ratio				
Pondugula et al. [37]					Deep Neural Network model		

Table 4: Technique used

Sahal et al. [38]	Ranking based on permissions class fre- quency			
Tuan Mat et al. [39]			Used Bayes classifier after optimising features using Chi-Square Test	
Wang et al. $[40]$			Association rule Mining, PCA , Deep Cross Net- work	
Park et al. [41]			Reduced features by removing built-in, cus- tom, dangerous, and permissions that are used at least once	
Liang et al. [42]		Generated k maps for permission combinations based on their usage		
Enck et al. [14]				Presented analysis of the newly launched Android OS in 2009
Enck et al. [17]		Defined rules based upon dan- gerous level and possible negative impact		
Wang et al. [43]		Calculated the risk score of each app using Baye's rule based upon fre- quency of permis- sions and risk lev- els		
Peng et al. [44]				Calculated the risk scores of applications using prob- abilistic methods like Naïve Bayes and its modi- fications
Pandita et al. [45]				Introduced a framework based upon natural lan- guage processing called "WHYPER" which used application descriptions to describe which permissions are needed and why
Samra et al. [46]		Permissions are used as features to make clusters using K-means cluster algorithm		
Yerima et al. [47]	Permissions are used as features along with others to be fed into the Bayesian Classifier			
Aung et al. [48]			K best features selected using Information Gain	
Yerima et al. [49]	Permissions are used as features along with others to be fed into the Bayesian Classifier			
Sanz et al. $[50]$				Work based upon permis- sion frequency
Moonsamy et al. [51]			Biclustering method to visualize for rare, unique as well as frequent pat- terns, followed by reduc- ing permissions based on their support differ- ence between normal and malicious datasets	

Backes et al. [52] Wu et al. [53]		Used permissions,			Appguard, a powerful sys- tem capable of modifying user-defined security poli- cies on untrusted applica- tions and converting them into new trusted ones
wu et al. [55]		and other infor- mation to form a feature set, further applied K-means and EM algorithm to form clusters for malware detec- tion			
Kato et al. [54]					Calculated similarity score between malware and nor- mal permission pairs after dividing them into differ- ent categories
Arora et al. [55]				Used permission pairs to con- struct graphs for normal and malware apps	
Alsoghyer et al. [56]					Malware detection model based on the frequency of permissions occurrences followed by using machine learning algorithm to assess the model
Saleem et al. [57]					Calculated the first four moments for permission's binary data after using Kernel Density Estimation and used the varying values as a means to distinguish between applications
Ghasempour et al. [58]	Permissions ranked by using frequency- based weighting method		PCA followed by using a statistical method based upon eigenvalues and eigenvectors		
Shrivastava et al. [59]					Risk score was calculated based on permissions fre- quency for each permission which in turn was used to classify applications as high risk, medium risk, and low risk
Upadhayay et al. [60]	Ranked the permis- sions based on the frequency of their occurrence in the datasets and com- bined them with the best network traffic features				
Lee et al. [61]					Classified normal and mali- cious apps through ML- based detection techniques based on the frequency of permission of Android apps
Surendran et al. [62]					Fed into the Logistic Regression (LR) classifier first followed by applying the naïve bayes classifier to find interdependency between features
A. T. Kabakus [63]					Fed into the Convolutional Neural network (CNN) model as one-dimensional input to form a training model

Wang et al.			Decision Tree, Extra		
[64]			trees, Chi-square test,		
			Genetic algorithm, SVM		
			based on recursive fea-		
			ture elimination, MI		
Akbar et al.			Employed Random For-		
[65]			est to generate the		
			feature importance		
			and combined it with		
			Google's dangerous per-		
			missions and the features		
			used in $[66]$ to select the		
			best set of permissions		
Zhu et al. [66]			Used TF-IDF and Cosine		
			similarity to choose the		
			best features		
Wang et al.			Fed the permissions data		
[67]			combined with the API		
			sequence data into the		
			LR model		
N. McLauglin					Used permissions as fea-
[68]					tures in PerceiverIO blocks
					to be combined with the
					opcode PerceiverIO blocks
Wang et al.	Ranked using				
[69]	Mutual Information				
	(MI), correlation				
	coefficient and T-				
	test				
Grace et al.		Risk level on an			
[70]		unknown applica-			
		tion is decided by			
		checking for dan-			
		gerous permission			
		requests			
Liu et al. [71]		Sensitive permis-	Filtered out using		
		sion patterns are	improved FP growth,		
		extracted	removing clusters having		
			same support and low		
			JARO distance followed		
			by performing hierarchi-		
			cal clustering		
Bayazit et al.					Fed as input into the
[72]					Recurrent neural Networks
r. 1					(RNN)-based classifiers
Lee et al. [73]			Information Gain and		
			genetic algorithm		
Zhu et al. [74]					Fed into deep learning
					hybrid methods such as
					unsupervised method
					Merged Sparse Auto-
					Encoder (MSAE) and
					supervised method Stacked
					Denoising Auto-encoders
					(SDAE) and fed the
					extracted results to SVM
					and KNN
Almahmoud	Ranked on the basis				
et al. $[75]$	of cosine similarity				
Feng et al. [76]			Chi-square test and		
			extremely randomized		
			tree method		
Kandukuru et					Computed the permission's
al. [77]					score using Jaccard-bitwise
					similarity technique to
					compare an app's risk
	1		1	1	
					score with the threshold

Arora et al.		Combined the			
[78]		permissions and			
		network traffic			
		feature values and			
		generated the fre-			
		quent patterns			
		using FP- Growth			
		algorithm			
Ding et al. [79]			Chi-square test, analysis		
0[]			of variance (ANOVA) F-		
			value, and MI		
Sahin et al.					Fed into linear regression
[80]					based classifiers
Idrees et al.		Distinguishing fre-			babed elaboliters
[81]		quency pattern			
		ranges			
Khariwal et al.	Information Gain	Tanges			
[82]	Information Gam				
Idrees et al.		Constructed a			
[83]		detection matrix			
Zhu et al. [15]					Fed into Multi-Head
					Squeeze-and-Excitation
					Residual block (MSer),
					and stacked it to construct
					a deep network MSerNet
Bai et al. [84]			Fast Correlation-Based		
			Filter by [213]		
Taheri et al.			Random Forest Algo-		
[85]			rithm		
Alazab et al.			Information Gain		
[86]					
Mathur et al.			Frequency counting,		
[87]			backward elimination		
			and collinearity check		
Imtiaz et al.					Fed into a deep learn-
[88]					ing artificial neural net-
[]					work classifier
Liu et al. [89]			Fed into RBM com-		
			bined with subspace		
			methods to reduce the		
			feature dimensionality		
			after choosing the best		
			subspaces by clustering		
			techniques		
Chen et al.			PCA		
$\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 90 \end{bmatrix}$			1 0/1		
Guan et al.			k-means clustering algo-		Fed the results to Synthetic
			rithm		Minority Over-Sampling
[91]			11011111		Technique (SMOTE)
Mohamed et			Chose the most common		rechnique (SWOTE)
al. [92]			features		
Varma et al.			Bat Optimization,		
[93]			Cuckoo Search, and		
			Grey Wolf Optimization		
			wrapper feature selec-		
		L	tion techniques		
Gyunka et			PCA		
al.[94]					
Taha et al.		Clustering similar			
[95]		Permissions			
Peng et al. [96]			Adaptive shrinkage CNN		
Ashwini et al.					Fed the features to
[97]					machine learning classifiers
Jiang et al.	The dangerous fea-				
[98]	tures backtracked				
	from sensitive API				
	calls are ranked in				
	order of Information				
	Gain score				
	1		1		1

Wang et al. [99]				Fed to various classifiers to create an ensemble clas-
				sifier based upon selec- tive Ensemble method and genetic algorithm
Rana et al. [100]			Selected only the most useful feature word by	genetic algorithm
Lu et al. [101]			creating a dictionary	Fed the permissions to
Millar et al.				DBN classifier Fed the permissions to a
[102]				CNN classifier
Barrera et al. [103]		Found permissions usage pattern		Fed to the SOM to analyze permissions usage pattern
Shabtai et al. [104]	Information Gain, Fisher Score and Chi-Square			
Felt et al. [105]				Compared permissions required to invoke API methods and actually requested permissions to check for over privilege issues
Erickson et al. [106]				Mapped permissions required to invoke API methods to check for pri- vacy leaks
Sarma et al. [107]		Considered the permission pat- terns from their malware dataset and some critical most requested permissions to generate risk sig- nals for the users		
Frank et al. [108]		To extract statis- tically significant permission request patterns		
Jhu et al. [109]				To compare the permis- sions required by an appli- cation by analyzing the description given by the developer with its actual requested permissions
Peiravian et al. [110]				Fed to various machine learning classifiers
Sanz et al. [111]				Fed to various machine learning classifiers
Feldman et al. [112]				Fed to various machine learning classifiers
Pehlivan et al. [113]			GainRatioAttributeEvaluator,ReliefAttributeEvaluator,CfsSubsetEvaluator,ConsistencySubsetEvaluatorSubset	
Rahman et al. [114]				Fed to various machine learning classifiers
Rovelli et al. $[115]$				Fed to various machine learning classifiers on the server side component
Arp et al. [116]		Mapped to a joint vector space, where patterns were analyzed geo- metrically		
Yerima et al. [117]				Fed to various machine learning classifiers

Kang et al.		Calculated the			
[118]		likelihood ratio			
		under the given			
		distribution of			
		permissions and			
		further used			
		the Needleman-			
		Wunsch algorithm			
		to calculate simi-			
		larity score			
Zhao et al.			Chi-square and Informa-		
[119]			tion Gain		
Qiao et al.			ANOVA and		
[120]			SVM—Recursive Fea-		
			ture Elimination		
Chen et al.					Fed to various machine
[121]					learning classifiers
Demertzis et					Fed to ELM classifier and
al. [122]					eSNN along with various
					hardware components
Verma et al.					Extracted the functional
[123]					call graph of the applica-
()					tions, used a procedure
					inspired by the neighbor-
					hood hash graph kernel
					(NHGK) and create a
					graph classification prob-
					lem
Wang et al.	Absolute permission				Feature vector was created
[124]	rate difference				composed of permissions,
[124]	rate unierence				receiver actions, and hard-
					ware components
Tangil et al.	Extra Tree algo-				ware components
[125]	rithm and rank them				
[120]	by mean decrease				
	impurity				
Wang et al.	Impunty				FrequenSel [119] and Infor-
Wang et al. [126]					mation Gain
Li et al. [127]			PCA Method based on		mation Gam
Li et al. $\begin{bmatrix} 127 \end{bmatrix}$					
			singular value decompo-		
Dististic			sition (SVD)		
Bhattacharya	Information Gain				
et al. [128]					
Xie et al. [129]					Fed the results of syntax
					and semantic features to
					the machine learning clas-
371	ļ				sifiers
Xie et al. [130]					Feature vectors were
					reshaped to matrices by
					embedding to feed to CNN
Dent	ļ				classifier
Ren et al.					Fed the features to vari-
[131]					ous machine learning and
					ensemble classifiers
Tao et al. [132]			Mann–Whitney test		
			to analyze statistical		
			significance of permis-		
			sion usage in both the		
			datasets		
Namrud et al.		Analysed the per-			
[133]		missions usage			
		pattern w.r.t dif-			
		ferent categories			
		by using a com-			
		bination of SOM			
		and K-means			
Alswaina et al.			Extremely Randomized		
[134]			Trees		

Qiu et al. [135]			Created a Feature vec- tor table with the help of TF-IDF technique to form binary type vectors with security/privacy-related capabilities as annotations
Zhu et al. [136]			Fed the extracted features to an ensemble classifier of MLP and SVM as fusion classifier
Feng et al. [137]			App descriptions pre- processed by NLP methods are fed into the Neural network model to produce binary probability distri- bution for each permission
Aonzo et al. [138]			Fed the features to their own proposed linear and nonlinear classifiers
Urooj et al. [139]			Fed the features to vari- ous machine learning and ensemble-based classifiers
Wang et al. [140]			Processed the user reviews by using permissions docs, API docs, and app descrip- tions to infer the permis- sions required by an appli- cation
Wang et al. [141]			Fed the extracted features to various machine learning classifiers
Zhang et al. [142]			Utilised Whole call graphs (WCG) and parsed the mapping list to locate sensitive operations, form User-aware Call Graph, and perform static analysis
Kesswani et al. [143]	Divided the per- missions under generic and privacy-invasive categories to fur- ther calculate the percentage of generic and privacy-invasive permissions of an unknown applica- tion		
Ibrahim et al. [144]			Fed to the deep learning classifier, in particular to embedding layers, followed by clustering and flatten- ing layers to make their shape appropriate
Arshad et al. [145]			Fed the static and dynamic features to a machine learning classifier
Yuan et al. [146]			Fed the static and dynamic features to a deep learning classifier
Zhou et al. [147]			Fed the extracted features to deep learning based clas- sifier
Cilleruelo et al. [148]		Reduce the multiple per- missions that are the same but present differ- ences based on the appli- cation package	

Firdaus et al.			Generic Search	
[149] Wang et al. [150]		Support-based permission can- didate method to mine unique required or used permission pat- terns		
Singh et al. [151]			BI-Normal Separation (BNS), MI, Relevancy Score (RS), and the Kullback-Leibler (KL)	
Rafiq et al. [152]				Fed the extracted features to machine learning classi- fiers tuned by using NIAs
Mahdavifar et al. [153] Seraj et al.				Fed the extracted features to a deep learning classifier Fed the extracted permis-
[154] Mahindru et			Chi-Square, Gain Ratio,	sions to a MLP neural net- work classifier
al. [155]			Filtered Subset selection, Information Gain fea- ture, LR analysis, PCA	
Sahin et al. [21]			Relevance frequency fea- ture selection (RFFS), Document frequency thresholding (DF), Information Gain, Chi- square, Odds ratio (OR), IDF and other filter- based methods	
Anupama et al. [156]	Fischer Score			
Chen et al. [157]				Fed the extracted permis- sions after removing the useless ones to RF machine learning classifier
Mahindru et al. [158]	Chi-squared test, Information Gain feature evaluation, LR analysis, Infor- mation Gain, oneR feature evaluation, PCA		T-test, Pearson's corre- lation Coefficient, Rough set analysis (RSA), Con- sistency subset evalua- tion approach, Filtered subset evaluation	
Tchakounté et al. [159]				Permissions and other fea- tures are utilized to form fuzzy-hashed signatures of known malware to find similarity score between them and unknown appli- cations
Nissim et al. [160]				Fed the extracted features to SVM and a couple of proposed active learning methods for detection after processing
Peynirci et al. [161]			Delta IDF based upon differential inverse doc- ument frequency (IDF) values	
Nauman et al. [162]				Fed the extracted features to various Deep learning and machine learning clas- sifiers
Bhattacharya et al. [163]			Improvised Particle Swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm for a rough set with a new random key encoding method	

Bao et al.[164]		Traced the API - permission pat- terns to predict the permissions for an app by using			Fed into the naive Bayes multinomial classification model for text classifica- tion and predicting permis- sions for an application
Medrano et al. [165]		API Taint tracking to analyze and find mappings between Android Class Function (ACFs) and the Permis- sions			
Mat et al. [165]			Information Gain and chi-square		
Shatnawi et al. [166]	LR model		Recursive Feature Elimi- nation (RFE)		
Smmarwar et al. [167]			Binary Grey Wolf Opti- mization (BGWO)		
Arif et al. [168]			Information Gain		
Manzanares et al. [169]					Extracted permissions and other static and dynamic features to prepare a com- prehensive dataset
Bhat et al. [170]	Information Gain		Deleted the features that are too infrequent and the ones that are present in almost the same num- ber in both the datasets		
Elayan et al.[171]					Fed the extracted results to various machine classifiers
Syrris et al. [172]			Removed the features having low variance		
Idrees et al. [173]	Information Gain				Found the correlation between permissions and intents using Pearson cor- relation coefficient
Rehman et al. [174]					Fed the results to various machine learning classifiers to find the cosine similarity between features
Martin et al. [175]					Extracted to create a comprehensive and com- plete dataset, then fed the results to various machine learning classifiers for detection
Navarro et al. [176]	RF feature impor- tance		Eliminated the linearly dependent vectors while performing the Bag of Graphs (BoG) technique	Formed Ontology- based graphs to find the rela- tionship between permis- sions defined, used, interfaces protected by per- missions and the resources access through them	

Milosevic et al. [177]					Fed into various machine learning and ensemble classifiers for classification and clus-
					tering
Alzaylaee et	Information Gain				0
al. [178]					
Cai et al. [179]	Information Gain				
Badhani et al. [180]			Removed features having constant value or zero variance		Fed the features to various machine learn- ing and ensemble clas- sifiers. Further applied k-mode algorithm for clustering of features
Hijawi et al. [181]	Fed the features to various machine learning classifiers to rank them on the basis of their impor- tance				
Sheen et al. [182]	Chi-Square, Relief, Information Gain				
Nisha et al.	mormation Gain		PSO, Social Spider Algo-	Represented	
[183]			rithm (SSA), and Grav- itational Search Algo- rithm (GSA)	permissions in the form of ontology graphs to understand the relation- ship between permissions, packages and interface classes	
Song et al. [184]		Dangerous permis- sions are matched with the permis- sions requested by an unknown appli- cation to generate a detection report and submit it to users			
Zhang et al. [185]				Identified explicit and implicit per- mission use points to fur- ther create permission use graphs to analyze the permissions behavioral	
Yang et al. [186]				pattern Constructed State Transi- tion Graphs (STG) from permissions to implement breadth- first search (BFS) in the dynamic exploration phase to analyze the permission behavior	

Thiyagarajan et al. [187]	Pruning on the basis of frequency		Chi-square, Support based, association-based, PCA	
Qaisar et al. [188]			PCA, Co-relation attribute evaluation (CAE)	Constructed clusters using k-means algorithm to match up with the newly added features in the case base
Appice et al. [189]				Clustering based k- means ++ algorithm to form sep- arate clusters for each view which were combined later using stacking-based fusion method to learn the con- sensus malware detection pattern
Zhu et al. [190]				Fed the results to RF- based machine learning classifier
A. Altaher [191]	Information Gain ratio			Fed the extracted permis- sions to an evolving fuzzy neuro inference classifier involving clustering meth- ods
Su et al. [192]		Fed the results to a DBN learning model to obtain unique behavioral characteristics		
Mahindru et al. [193]	Chi-squared test, Information Gain feature evaluation, logistic regression analysis, Informa- tion Gain, oneR feature evaluation, PCA		T-test, Pearson's cor- relation Coefficient, RSA, Consistency subset evaluation approach, Fil- tered subset evaluation	
Dehkordy et al. [194]	Ranked features on the basis of frequency in both the datasets and removed the com- mon or rarely used or irrelevant features			Balanced the dataset using SMOTE, Random under- sampling, and Hybrid
Nguyen et al.	ANOVA		DNN, SVM	
[195] Taheri et al. [196]	Random Forest Regressor algorithm			Fed the results to a C4N and Robust-NN classifier
Mahesh et al. [197]			Minmax technique	Fed the preprocessed results to CNN-ARFO proposed classifier
Firdaus et al. [198]	Information Gain, frequency-based top range selected			Fed the results bio-inspired versions of ANN
Shrivastava et al. [199]			Defined frequency based rules defined over per- missions and intents to predict malicious risk level of an application	
Varsha et al. [200]	NB, weight calcula- tion		Entropy based Cate- gory Coverage Difference (ECCD) and Weighted Mutual Information (WI)	
M. Deypir [201]	Ranked the permis- sion based on the entropy and Infor- mation Gain score calculated by the proposed method			Entropy-based method to calculate information gain score for permission and correspondingly risk score for an application

Mahindru et al. [202]	Chi-squared test, Information Gain feature evaluation, logistic regression analysis, Informa- tion Gain, oneR feature evaluation, PCA	T-test, Pearson's cor- relation Coefficient, RSA, Consistency subset evaluation approach, Fil- tered subset evaluation	
Keyvanpour et al. [203]		Eliminated features having frequency count and RF weigh below the standard deviation, frequency counts over groups of features	
Razak et al. [204]		Particle Swarm opti- mization (PSO), evolutionary computa- tion, Information Gain	
Xie et al. [205]	Frequency based	Fisher score	Fingerprinted Android malware families based on top permission behavioral patterns
Mahindru et al. [206]		T-test, multivariate lin- ear regression stepwise forward selection and cross-correlation	Fed the extracted features to various machine learning and ensemble classifiers
Alecakir et al. [18]			App descriptions are fed into neural network classi- fiers to learn and analyze the sentences and predict the permissions requested
Ali et al. [207]			Fed the permissions and other information to the SVM classifier to learn and predict preferred applica- tion permissions to its user
Sun et al. [208]			Took keywords from permissions, API calls, intents, etc as parameters and found the Keywords Correlation Distance (KCD) between them to choose the most relevant features and fed the results to SVM classifier
AlJarrah et al. [209]	Information Gain		
Gharib et al. [210]			Fed the features to Deep Auto Encoder (DAE) neu- ral network classifier
Sun et al. [211]		Criteria based on the ratio between the num- ber of apps in both datasets, PCA	Fed the extracted features to a Positive and Unla- belled (PU) learning classi- fier

```
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_PHONE_NUMBERS"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.VIBRATE"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS"/>
```

Fig. 2: Snapshot of permissions requested by WhatsApp Messenger app

4 Features used

In response to RQ3, this section aims to present the results obtained after analyzing the types and number of features used for Android malware detection in combination with permissions. We divide the features used into two categories: Static and Dynamic.

4.1 Static features

The static analysis investigates malware without the real code or instructions being executed. It provides basic information about app functionality and collect technical indicators from the AndroidManifest.xml and other resource files. In other words, it can be defined as a source code review of an Android application file. Several reverse engineering tools like Apktool³ or AAPT2 ⁴ can be used to decompile an apk and extract the features required. The features that can perform static analysis of applications are called static features. Some of the commonly used examples of static features are explained in brief below with Android permission being the most popular one -

(a) Permissions - The presence of App permissions helps the user in two ways mainly-

- By protecting access to the **Restricted** data, such as user's personal information.
- By protecting access to the **Restricted**

actions, actions such as recording audio. Because of the above two reasons, it has been made mandatory by the Android OS and the Android permission check system for all application developers to declare the list of permissions their application needs for its functionality or invoke the Android API successfully. Hence, the manifest file contains the list of all Android permissions required to run the application efficiently. Permission is declared using the <uses-permission>tag within the manifest file. For example, as shown in Figure 2, which is the snapshot of the AndroidManifest.xml file of "The WhatsApp Messenger" app, requires permissions such as "READ_PHONE_STATE", "READ_PHONE_NUMBERS",

"RECEIVE_SMS", "VIBRATE" and "AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS" to execute on Android smartphones. Some permissions fall under the category of install-time permissions, i.e., they are automatically granted upon the installation of the app, whereas some permissions are known as runtime permissions, which are further requested at runtime. Installtime permissions permit the app limited access

³https://apktool.en.lo4d.com/windows

to restricted data or actions that can affect the user to a minimal amount. Install-time permissions can be further divided into the following types -

- Normal permissions These permissions present minimal risk to the user's privacy and the functionality of other apps.
- Signature permissions These permissions are granted by the permission check system only when the requesting app is signed by the same certificate as the one that declared the permission.

Runtime permissions, often addressed as dangerous permissions, are requested at runtime by the application to ask for access to view restricted data or perform any prohibited action by presenting a runtime permission request prompt.

- 4. API calls- Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) act as the medium for one program to interact with another, and an API call or request can be defined as a message sent to a server asking an API to provide a service or information. After traveling from a client to an API endpoint and being received by the server, it is processed, and the request is executed in return for a response.
- 5. Intent: An Intent is a messaging object a developer can use to request an action from another app component. Three main fundamental use cases of intents are starting an activity, starting a service, and delivering a broadcast.
- 6. Opcode sequence: Opcodes can reflect the behavior pattern of an application to a certain extent using the underlying machine code, so they are often used as static features. They are extracted by decompiling the APK file and are generally obtained to facilitate the input detection model.

4.2 Dynamic features

Dynamic analysis opts for a different approach than static analysis. Instead of examining the code, it relies upon monitoring an application's behavior while it is running over any virtual or real CPU. As the name suggests, dynamic analysis is performed by analyzing the runtime behavior of applications, and the features analyzed during this process are called dynamic features, such as -

 $^{{}^{4} \}rm https://developer.Android.com/studio/command-line/aapt2$

- 1. Network traffic In simple words, network traffic is the amount of data that moves across a network during any time interval.
- 2. System calls A system call provides an interface between a process and the OS. They enable the operating system's services via API for the user programs to use. Some important system calls commonly used in the OS are wait(), fork(), exec(), kill():, exit(): etc.

Other commonly used features include hardware components, description of applications, network addresses, code-related patterns, etc.




Fig. 3: Statistics depicting the usage of features in combination with permissions

Table 5 summarizes the information regarding the usage of permissions as a feature in combination with other features. Based on the information depicted by Table 5, we can conclude that in combination with permissions, API calls and intents are the most used features by researchers for Android malware analysis/detection. Figure 3 presents a statistical summary of Table 5. As already discussed above and highlighted by the figure too, API calls [125]-[136] and intents [96]-[100] account for 65.38% and 41.53% usage respectively, i.e., out of the total research papers used in this review, majority of them utilized API calls or intents in combination with permissions. The third most commonly used feature is another static feature called hardware components [194]-[195], and it accounts for 16.15% of the total. Some dynamic features such as network traffic [76]-[79] and systems calls [47]-[49] are also seldom used by researchers and practitioners

in combination with permissions and their shares are 11.53% and 8.46% respectively. Apart from the static features mentioned above, many other components present in the manifest file of an apk prove to be a popular partner of permissions while building an analysis/detection model, as they account for a surprising 36.92% of the total. We note that intent and hardware components are also a part of the manifest file only, but since the researchers have extensively used them in combination with permissions, we display their usage separately instead of combining them with other rarely used Manifest file components. These features include App descriptions [109], version numbers [112], app components [116], meta information [126] and many more. Other features commonly used in combination with permissions are small file size [65], dex file [96], URLs [90], code-related information [130] etc., and they form 20.76% of the share. Hence, based on the results presented above, we answer the third Research Question that the researchers have preferred using API calls and intents the most in combination with permissions for Android malware analysis and detection.

5 Model used

In response to RQ4, this section describes the various ML and DL models [214] used by researchers and practitioners to conduct their research over the chosen range of reviews.

5.1 Machine Learning

Machine learning is a subset of artificial intelligence and a popular technology enabling machines to learn from past data and perform a given task automatically. Machine learning can be broadly divided into two types -

- 1. Supervised Machine learning
- 2. Unsupervised Machine learning

5.1.1 Supervised Machine learning

Just like a student who learns a concept under the supervision of a teacher, the machines are used to predict an output correctly with the help of the training data working as a supervisor that teaches the machines. The type of machine learning in which the devices are trained using well

 Table 5: Features Used

Related works	Permissions	API calls	Hardware Components	Intents	Others
Zhang et al. [19]	\checkmark	\checkmark	-		
Enck et al. [14]	\checkmark			\checkmark	
Yerima et al. [47]	\checkmark	\checkmark			System calls
Yerima et al. 49	\checkmark	\checkmark			System calls
Wu et al. [53]	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark	
Shrivastava et al. [59]	\checkmark			\checkmark	
Upadhayay et al. 60	\checkmark				Network traffic
Surendran et al. [62]	\checkmark	\checkmark			System calls
A. T. Kabakus [63]	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark	
Wang et al. [64]	\checkmark	\checkmark			Opcode sequences
Akbar et al. [65]	\checkmark				Permission rate, smali file size
Zhu et al. [66]	\checkmark	\checkmark			Permission rate, system events.
Wang et al. [67]	\checkmark	<u>,</u>			
N. McLauglin [68]	\checkmark	•			Opcode sequences
Grace et al. [70]	✓ ✓				Log file for app activities.
Liu et al. [71]	V V	\checkmark			Log me for app activities.
Bayazit et al. [72]	V V	v		\checkmark	
Dayazit et al. [72]				v	
Lee et al. [73]	V	/			
Zhu et al. [74]	 ✓ 	<u>√</u>			Demoission actor to 11
Almahmoud et al. [75]	V	\checkmark			Permission rates, system calls
Feng et al. [76]	\checkmark			 ✓ 	Network traffic
Kandukuru et al. [77]	\checkmark				Network traffic
Arora et al. [78]	\checkmark				Network traffic
Ding et al. [79]	\checkmark			\checkmark	Network traffic
Idrees et al. [81]	\checkmark			\checkmark	
Khariwal et al. [82]	\checkmark			\checkmark	
Idrees et al. [83]	\checkmark			\checkmark	
Zhu et al. [15]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		
Bai et al. [84]	\checkmark				Opcode sequences
Taheri et al. [85]	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark	
Alazab et al. [86]	\checkmark	· ✓		•	
Imtiaz et al. [88]	V V	∨		\checkmark	Network traffic
Liu et al. [89]	V V	<u>▼</u>		V	System commands, opcodes, Pack-
Liu et al. [69]	v	v		v	age and FlowDroid's features [175], Network traffic
Chen et al. [90]	\checkmark			\checkmark	URL's, data flow features
Guan et al. 91	\checkmark	\checkmark			
Mohamed et al. [92]	\checkmark	\checkmark			
Peng et al. [96]	V			V	Dex file headers, power spectrum density information of dex file structure entropy
Ashwini et al. [97]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
Jiang et al. [98]	\checkmark			\checkmark	
Wang et al. [99]	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark	
Rana et al. [100]	\checkmark	•	\checkmark	· ·	
Lu et al. [101]	· ·	\checkmark	•	•	Resource, semantic and dynamic
		·			features
Millar et al. [102]	\checkmark	\checkmark			Opcode sequences
Shabtai et al. [102]	V V	•	+		Dex features, Xml features and apk
juantai et al. [104]	*				features
Felt et al. [105]	\checkmark	\checkmark			10404105
Erickson et al. [106]	V	\checkmark			Ann Descriptions
Jhu et al. [109]	V				App Descriptions
Peiravian et al. [110]	V	\checkmark			
Sanz et al. [111]	\checkmark		\checkmark		
				\checkmark	Low version numbers, network traf-
Feldman et al. [112]	✓				fic
Arp et al. [116]	✓	✓	✓	\checkmark	App components, Network addresses
Arp et al. [116] Yerima et al. [117]	\checkmark	√	✓ 		App components, Network addresses Linux/Android commands
Arp et al. [116]	✓		✓ 	✓ ✓	Appcomponents,NetworkaddressesLinux/Android commandsFile hash, serial number,System
Arp et al. [116] Yerima et al. [117] Kang et al. [118]	✓ ✓ ✓	$\overline{\checkmark}$	✓ ✓		Appcomponents,NetworkaddressesLinux/Android commandsFile hash, serial number, Systemcommands
Arp et al. [116] Yerima et al. [117] Kang et al. [118] Zhao et al. [119]	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	√ ✓ ✓			Appcomponents,NetworkaddressesLinux/Android commandsFile hash, serial number,System
Arp et al. [116] Yerima et al. [117] Kang et al. [118] Zhao et al. [119] Qiao et al. [120]	✓ ✓ ✓	$\overline{\checkmark}$			App components, Network addresses Linux/Android commands File hash, serial number, System commands Action features and IP, URL features
Arp et al. [116] Yerima et al. [117] Kang et al. [118] Zhao et al. [119]	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	√ ✓ ✓			App components, Network addresses Linux/Android commands File hash, serial number, System commands Action features and IP, URL features Network traffic, newly defined features
Arp et al. [116] Yerima et al. [117] Kang et al. [118] Zhao et al. [119] Qiao et al. [120]		✓ ✓ ✓ ✓			App components, Network addresses Linux/Android commands File hash, serial number, System commands Action features and IP, URL features

Verma et al. [123]	\checkmark	√	√	\checkmark	App components, network addresses
Wang et al. [124]	\checkmark		√		Receiver actions
Tangil et al. [125]	✓	✓		~	Meta information, new features from app's resource files
Wang et al. [126]	√	✓	✓	~	Components, protected strings, IP addresses, and URL, commands
Li et al. [127]	✓	√		√	App components
Xie et al. [129]	\checkmark	1			
Xie et al. [130]		√	\checkmark	\checkmark	Code related patterns
Ren et al. [131]	· ·	· ·	•		Opcode sequence, hardware compo-
					nents
Tao et al. [132]	\checkmark	\checkmark			
Qiu et al. [135]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	Network addresses
Zhu et al. [136]	\checkmark	\checkmark			Permission rate, monitoring system events, data flows
Feng et al. [137]					App description
Aonzo et al. [138]					hpp description
Urooj et al. $[139]$	- V - V			√	App components, Packages,
		Ň		v	Receivers, services
Wang et al. [140]	\checkmark				API docs, user reviews, app descriptions
Wang et al. [141]	✓	✓	✓	~	Code patterns, functional call
					graphs
Ibrahim et al. [144]	\checkmark	 ✓ 			Opcode sequences, application size, services, receivers, fuzzy hash
Arshad et al. [145]	√	~	~	~	Application components, system call logs, network addresses
Yuan et al. [146]					Dynamic App actions
Zhou et al. [147]	✓	✓			Network addresses
Cilleruelo et al. [148]	\checkmark		√		Information published on the Google Play Store
Firdaus et al. [149]	✓			~	Code based features, system com- mands, directory path features
Wang et al. [150]	✓				manus, uncetory path leatures
Singh et al. [151]	· ·	✓			
Rafig et al. [151]	∨	√		✓	
Mahdavifar et al. [153]	 ✓	✓ ✓ ✓		▼ ▼	Packages, receivers, system calls,
					basic binders, composite behavior
Mahindru et al. [155]	\checkmark	√			User rating, number of user down- load apps
Anupama et al. [156]	\checkmark				System calls
Chen et al. [157]	\checkmark	√			
Mahindru et al. [158]	 ✓	√			
Tchakounté et al. [159]	· ·				Resource names, .dex codes, source
L 3	-				codes, package name certificate
Nissim et al. [160]	\checkmark				Metadataa, number of activities,
					services, receivers, permissions,
					providers
Peynirci et al. [161]	✓	✓			Strings
Bao et al.[164]	\checkmark	✓			App description
Shatnawi et al. [166]	\checkmark	\checkmark			
Smmarwar et al. [167]	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark	
Manzanares et al. [169]	\checkmark			\checkmark	System calls, hardware-software features etc.
Bhat et al. [170]	√	✓	✓	✓	Network addresses
Elayan et al.[171]	 ✓	V 		•	
Syrris et al. [172]	✓ ✓	V √		~	Actions, services, Broadcast, cate-
					gories
Idrees et al. [173]				✓ ✓	Process name
Rehman et al. [174]Martin et al. [175]	 ✓	✓		✓ ✓	Process name Opcode sequences, system com-
Navarro et al. [176]					mands, Network data etc. App components
Milosevic et al. [176]	√				Source code
					Source code
Alzaylaee et al. [178]	✓	✓		✓	
Cai et al. [179] Badhani et al. [180]	√	✓		✓	App components, shell commands
	√	✓			
Hijawi et al. [181]	√		\checkmark		Software components, URL, broad-
					cast receivers features

Sheen et al. [182]	\checkmark	\checkmark			
Nisha et al. [183]	 ✓ 				Components and interfaces
Song et al. [184]	 ✓ 				MD5 blacklist database, permission
					intention
Zhang et al. [185]	 ✓ 	√		✓	
Yang et al. [186]	 ✓ 	√			
Qaisar et al. [188]	✓			~	Services provider, new APK attributes
Appice et al. [189]	 ✓ 	√		✓	Network addresses
Zhu et al. [190]	 ✓ 	 ✓ 			Permission rate, system events
Su et al. [192]	✓	√	√	✓	Strings, certificate-payload info, code pattern
Mahindru et al. [193]	\checkmark	√			Number of user download an app, rating of an app
Dehkordy et al. [194]	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	~	URLs, activity, service receiver, provider
Nguyen et al. [195]	 ✓ 	√	√	✓	Provider, activity, service, URLs
Taheri et al. [196]	 ✓ 	√			
Mahesh et al. [197]	 ✓ 			\checkmark	
Firdaus et al. [198]	 ✓ 				Directory path, telephony
Shrivastava et al. [199]	\checkmark			\checkmark	
Varsha et al. [200]	\checkmark		\checkmark	✓	Opcodes, strings, app components
Mahindru et al. [202]	\checkmark	√			Number of user download an app, rating of an app
Keyvanpour et al. [203]	 ✓ 	√	\checkmark	√	
Razak et al. [204]	 ✓ 				
Xie et al. [205]	 ✓ 	 ✓ 	\checkmark		
Mahindru et al. [206]	V	√			Number of user download an app, rating of an app
Alecakir et al. [18]	 ✓ 				App description
Ali et al. [207]	~				Rating, comments and number of downloads related to an app
Sun et al. [208]	 ✓ 	 ✓ 		✓	Package Name
AlJarrah et al. [209]	 ✓ 	~			Contextual information
Gharib et al. [210]	~	\checkmark			Logos, strings of notification mes- sages, system call sequences
Sun et al. [211]	 ✓ 	✓			IP address, requested URLs

"labeled" training data, i.e., some input data is already tagged with the correct output, to find a mapping function between the input variable with the output variable is called supervised machine learning. Practical usage of supervised machine learning includes Risk Assessment, Image classification, Fraud Detection, and spam filtering. Supervised learning can be divided into two types

- 1. Classification
- 2. Regression

Classification - This type of learning is used when the output variable is categorical, i.e., Yes-No, Male-Female, etc. type. Some commonly used classification algorithms are discussed in detail below -

1. Decision Tree (DT) Algorithm - Generally considered a classification problem; however, a Decision tree (DT) is a supervised learning technique that can be used both for classification and regression problems. As the name suggests, it is a tree-structured classifier utilizing the Classification and Regression Tree (CART) algorithm, where internal nodes represent the features of a dataset, branches represent the decision rules, and each leaf node represents the outcome. The main step while implementing a decision tree is to select the best attribute for the root and sub-nodes, and for that, the DT algorithm tries to maximize the information gain value, and iteratively the node having the highest information gain is chosen first. DT algorithm is further divided into three types -

- ID3 DT (Iterative Dichotomiser 3)
- C4.5 DT
- J48 DT
- 2. Random Forest (RF) Algorithm This type of supervised learning algorithm works on the ensemble learning concept, which includes combining multiple classifiers or *decision trees* to solve a complex problem and avoid the problem of overfitting. RF works in two parts; the first part revolves around creating the random forest by combining n number of DTs, whereas, in the second, the prediction for each tree is made.

RF and Bagging classifier (BC) come under the category of Bagging algorithms that work on the criteria of combining the results of multiple models.

- 3. Logistic Regression (LR) algorithm LR predicts the output of a categorical dependent variable, but instead of giving the exact value as 0 and 1, it produces the probabilistic values between 0 and 1. In the case of LR, instead of fitting a regression line, a logistic function, also known as the sigmoid function, maps the predicted values to probabilities.
- 4. K-Nearest Neighbor(KNN) Algorithm KNN works on the hypothesis that a similarity exists between the new and available cases. After analyzing the data, it puts the new case into the category that is most similar to the available ones, and this whole process takes place by calculating the Euclidean distance of K number of neighbors.
- 5. Support Vector Machine (SVM) The major aim of the SVM algorithm is to build the best line or decision boundary or hyperplane capable of segregating the n-dimensional space into classes so that the new data point can be easily fitted in the correct category for future cases. SVM uses extreme points, also known as support vectors, to help create a hyperplane; hence the algorithm is called Support Vector Machine. Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) is an algorithm for solving the quadratic programming (QP) problem that arises during the training of support vector machines (SVM). SVMs use the Kernel Trick and various kernel methods to transform linearly inseparable data into linearly separable data, thus finding an optimal boundary for possible outputs. Some of them are given below -
 - Linear kernel
 - Polynomial kernel (Poly)
 - Radial Basis Function (RBF)
 - Kernel change detection algorithm (KCD)
- 6. Naïve Bayes (NB) Algorithm It is one of the fastest machine learning models based upon the Bayes theorem or Bayes' Rule, often used to determine the probability of a hypothesis with prior knowledge depending upon the conditional probability. The NB algorithm is mainly used in text classification problems with a highdimensional training dataset. Three types of

Naive Bayes model are commonly used in the literature -

- Gaussian
- Multinomial
- Bernoulli
- 7. Bayesian networks (Bayesnet) These are probabilistic graphical models that utilize Bayesian inference for probability computations. It is a directed acyclic graph in which each edge corresponds to a conditional dependency, and each node corresponds to a unique random variable.

Regression This type of learning is used when a relationship exists between the input and the output variable and the prediction is of continuous variables. Some commonly used regression algorithms are linear regression, regression trees, nonlinear regression, Bayesian linear regression, polynomial regression [214] etc.

1. Linear Regression - With the concept of performing predictive analysis and the assumption of variables having a linear relationship, linear regression finds how the value of the dependent variable changes according to the value of the independent variable. Mathematically, linear regression finds the best-fit line with the least error, which means that the Mean Squared Error (MSE) between the predicted and actual values should be minimized.

5.1.2 Unsupervised Machine Learning

In the absence of labeled data, the models are trained using the unlabelled data set and are allowed to act without supervision, and the correct corresponding technique is called unsupervised machine learning. Unlike supervised learning, unsupervised learning cannot be used directly for a regression or classification problem because the related output data doesn't exist. The main aim of unsupervised learning is to analyze and locate the underlying structure of data, categorize that data according to similarities, and present that data in a compact format. Unsupervised learning is more suited for real-world problems as we often do not have input data with the corresponding output data. Unsupervised learning can be further divided into two types -

- 1. Clustering
- 2. Association

Clustering In this type of unsupervised learning, the data points are grouped into clusters of similar data points, and this is done by finding the presence or absence of similar patterns in the unlabelled data set. Commonly used for statistical data analysis, this technique provides each cluster with a cluster ID which is further utilized by machine learning algorithms to simplify the processing of huge and complex problems. One of the most commonly used clustering algorithms is the K- Means algorithm, capable of efficiently dividing the samples into different clusters of equal variances with the linear complexity of O(n). Other clustering methods used by researchers over the years include Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering (AHC) [51] Farthest First (FF) clustering, Filtered clustering (FC), Density-Based clustering (DB) [202], Hidden Markov Model (HMM), Google Distance (GD) Clustering [208] etc.

Association Rule Learning Association rule learning aims to find relations or associations among data variables using the concept of *If and Else* statements. Association learning relies upon support, confidence, and lift to compute the associations between thousands of items. Some of the commonly used association rule learning algorithms are discussed in brief below -

- 1. Apriori algorithm The algorithm relies upon breadth-first search and Hash Tree to efficiently compute and find the itemset associations after performing iterations on the large dataset.
- 2. F-P Growth algorithm Frequent Pattern Growth (F-P) Algorithm revolves around finding frequent patterns without candidate generation. Unlike Apriori's functioning, which includes the generate and test strategy, it constructs an FP Tree to fragment the items' paths and generate frequent patterns.

5.1.3 Boosting in Machine learning

Combining various weak classifiers to build strong classifiers is known as the boosting technique in machine learning, and it is one of the most popular learning ensemble modeling techniques. Iterations to combine old ones and build new models are performed until training data capable of producing optimum predictions is prepared. Adaptive boosting (AdaBoost) was the first algorithm to combine various weak classifiers into a single strong classifier in the history of machine learning. Some of the other major boosting algorithms used in the literature are as follows -

- Gradient Boosting Machine (GBM)
- Extreme Gradient Boosting Machine (XGBM)
- Light GBM
- CatBoost

5.2 Deep Learning

Deep learning can be defined as a subset of machine learning as it has similar working but different capabilities and approaches. Deep learning, also known as Deep Neural Networks (DNN), is inspired by the functioning of the human brain cells/ neurons and leads to the concept of artificial neural networks capable of learning and discovering insights from data. Some popular deep learning models used by researchers over the years are discussed in brief below -

- 1. Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) These networks take images as input, then assign importance, i.e., learnable weights and biases, to parts of the input to differentiate from one another. Through the help of relevant filters, a CNN successfully captures the Spatial and Temporal dependencies in an image.
- 2. Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) Often used in NLP or language translation, these networks use sequential or time series data as inputs. Unlike other neural networks, the output of RNN depends on the prior elements within the sequence as it takes information from prior inputs too. Some popular variants of RNN often used in the literature are given below -
 - Long short-term memory (LSTM) LSTM was proposed to solve the vanishing gradient and short-term memory problems. LSTM has "cells" type structures in the hidden layers of the neural network, which have three gates—an input gate, an output gate, and a forget gate capable of controlling the flow of information.
 - Gated recurrent units (GRUs) Similar to LSTM, even GRUs are capable of dealing with the short-term memory problem of RNN models, but unlike LSTM, GRUs use hidden states and have two gates: a reset and an update gate.

- 3. Artificial Neural Network (ANN) The working of ANN is similar to the working of nerve cells in the human brain. An artificial neural network has three or more layers that are interconnected. The first layer consists of input neurons. Those neurons send data to the deeper layers and then transfer the final output data to the last output layer. A fully connected multilayer neural network is called a Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP).
- 4. Deep Belief Neural (DBN) Networks These are the classifiers that use layers of stochastic latent variables, which make up the network. The top couple of layers in the DBN have no direction, but the layers above them have direct links to lower layers. DBNs have an edge over traditional neural networks as they can be generative and discriminative models.
- 5. Deep Autoencoders (DAE) The working of autoencoders is a bit different as they function as a special type of feedforward neural network in which the input is the same as the output. They tend to convert the information into a lower dimensional code, also known as latent-space representation, which is further used to reconstruct the result. The structure of an autoencoder comprises three parts: an encoding method, a decoding method, and a loss function.
- 6. Self-Organising Map (SOM) As depicted by the name, the map organizes itself without any supervision from anyone or anything. The training of SOM is done through a fierce neural network, a single-layer feedforward network that resembles the brain's functioning. Apart from being used as a classifier, it can also be used as a non-linear dimensionality reduction technique.

Table 6 summarizes researchers' choice between ML, DL, or any other algorithm. In response to RQ4, we conclude by the information in Table 6 that most researchers and practitioners opted for traditional supervised machine learning algorithms like DT, SVM, RF, and NB due to their convenient and simple working. But nowadays, researchers have realized that machine learning has some limitations too. It relies too much on human intervention, so it might not work well with complex feature engineering problems like Natural Language Processing (NLP),




Fig. 4: Statistics depicting the usage of various detection models

Image recognition, etc. Hence, as seen in Table 6, researchers have explored a new area of Deep Neural networks and models like CNN, ANN, DAE, etc., for the past few years.

Figure 4 gives us a closer understanding of Table 6. We classify the majorly used detection models from Table 6 into five categories: Decision Trees, Bayesian Learning, Ensemble Learning, Neural Networks, and Miscellaneous to analyze the usage of different classifiers. For instance, Figure 4 highlights that five, 25, and seven papers out of the 200 related work reviewed in our work involved the usage of CART, J48, and C4.5 Decision trees, respectively. However, note that 46.5%of the total work utilized the DT classifier without mentioning the particular type. With the help of the information highlighted by the figure, we can conclude that the five most used detection models include SVM [64]-[66], DT [110]-[115], RF [124]-[131] from Ensemble learning, NB [165]-[167] from Bayesian Learning and KNN [73]-[75] with 98 (49%), 93 (46.5%), 80 (40%), 77 (38.5%) and 53 (26.5%) corresponding number (percentage) of studies that involved the classifiers mentioned respectively. It is worth noting that due to the growing popularity of deep learning, researchers have extensively started using neural network classifiers in their work. Neural networks [72]-[76] have been involved in more than 35% of the studies mentioned in our review. Apart from the ML/DL

Table 6: Model used

Zhang et al. [19] (CMS) Permission behavioural pattern monitoring model Li et al. [20] SVM. Rotation Forest, PART, FT, Random Committee, RP. Permission behavioural pattern monitoring model Sahin et al. [21] NB, SMO, RF, C4.5 DT, LR, KNN MLP. Detection algorithm based upon per- mission score. Taiha et al. [22] NB, J48 DT, RF MLP, Multi-class classi- fler Detection algorithm based upon per- mission score. Mahindru et al. [24] NB, J48 DT, RF, Simple Logistic (SL), Istar Detection algorithm based upon per- mission score. Ju et al. [26] Improved NB classifica- tion algorithm. Algorithm based upon permission pat- tern Ju et al. [26] RF, SVM, J48 DT Shin et al. [27] Ju et al. [10] Manual pattern recognition to existing malware permission patterns Xiong et al. [31] J48 DT, NB MLP Xiong et al. [32] RF, DT, Apriori algo- rithm Developed a classifier name <i>ENCLAMALD</i> based upon permission patterns Variat et al. [33] RF, AdaBoost, SVM, DT MLP Shah et al. [34] J48 DT, RAdom Com- mither DNN Shah et al. [35] J48 DT, NB, SVM, KNN DNN Shah et al. [36] J48 DT, NB, SVM, KNN DNN Shah et al. [39]	Related works	Machine Learning (ML)	Deep Learning (DL)	Others
Li et al. [20] SVM, Rotation Forest, RF. PARM, FT, RT, Random, Committee, RF. Sahin et al. [21] NB, SMO, RF, C4.5 DT, LR, KNN MLP Talha et al. [22] NB, J48 DT, RF MLP, Multi-class classifier Malindru et al. [24] NB, J48 DT, RF, Simple Detection algorithm based upon permission acore. Malindru et al. [25] MB, J48 DT, RF, Simple Detection algorithm based upon permission acore. Tchakounte et al. [26] Improved NB classification algorithm based upon permission patterns Algorithm based upon permission patterns Ju et al. [16] Improved NB classification algorithm based upon permission patterns Manual pattern recognition to existing malware permissions patterns Sahin et al. [29] RF, SVM, J48 DT Manual pattern recognition to existing malware permission patterns Yaroge et al. [31] J48 DT, NB MLP Developed a classifier name ENCLAMALD based upon permission patterns Yaroge et al. [32] RF, DT, Apriori algorithm MLP Developed a classifier name ENCLAMALD based upon permission patterns Yaroge et al. [34] RF, AdaBoost, SVM, DT MLP Developed the classifier name ENCLAMALD based upon permission patterns Sahin et al. [36] RF, Tondom Commuter, SMO, Randomizable filtered classifier MLP Developed the classifier De	Zhang et al. [19]			
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DT, RF, CART Yerima et al. [49] Bayesian Classifier Sanz et al. [50] SL, NB, Bayesnet, SMO, IBK, J48 DT, Ran- domTree	Yerima et al. [47]	Bayesian Classifier		
Sanz et al. [50] SL, NB, Bayesnet, SMO, IBK, J48 DT, Ran- domTree				
IBK, J48 DT, Ran- domTree		Bayesian Classifier		
Moonsamy et al. [51] AHC	Sanz et al. $[50]$	IBK, J48 DT, Ran-		
	Moonsamy et al. [51]	AHC		

Backes et al. [52]			Algorithm to assess and rewrite appli- cation policies
Wu et al. [53]	NB, KNN		*
Kato et al. [54]	Stacking Ensemble Learning (SEL), RF		
Arora et al. [55]			Algorithm to form graphs based upon permission patterns and frequency
Alsoghyer et al. [56] Saleem et al. [57]	RF, J48 DT, SMO, NB		
Ghasempour et al. [58]	DT, SVM		
Shrivastava et al. [59]			Algorithm to calculate the risk score of an application using the feature's fre- quency
Upadhayay et al. [60]	RF, SVM, NB		
Lee et al. [61]	KNN, SVM, AdaBoost, Extra Tree, RF		
Surendran et al. [62]	Tree augmented NB		
A. T. Kabakus [63]		CNN	
Wang et al. [64]	SVM, GBDT, XGBM, LightGBM, CatBoost, LR		
Akbar et al. $[65]$	SVM, Rotation Forest, RF, NB		
Zhu et al. [66]	SVM, An ensemble tak- ing DT as a base and involving PCA to form Rotation Forest		
Wang et al. [67]		Graph convolutional net- work	
N. McLauglin [68]		CNN	
Wang et al. [69]	SVM, RF, DT		
Grace et al. [70]			Risk level based detection of own algorithm
Liu et al. [71]	Multi-layered gradient boosting DT algorithm, SVM, DT, RF, XGBM		
Bayazit et al. [72]		RNN-based LSTM, BiL- STM, GRU	
Lee et al. [73]	J48 DT, RF, Deci- sion Table, NB, SMO, SVM, LR, IBK, KNN, AdaBoost	MLP	
Zhu et al. [74]	SVM, KNN	Merged Sparse Auto- Encoder (MSAE), Stacked Denoising Auto- encoders (SDAE).	
Almahmoud et al. [75]	SVM, KNN, NB, RF, DT	RNN	
Feng et al. [76]		CNN	
Kandukuru et al. [77] Arora et al. [78]	DT Apriori and FP-Growth algorithms		
Ding et al. [79]	KNN, multinomial NB,	Combination of a resid-	
	DT, RF, SVC, NuSVC, LinearSVC, LR, GBDT, XGBM	ual network (ResNet) and LSTM	
Sahin et al. [80]	KNN, NB, SVM, DT, Bagging-DT algorithms		Linear regression-based and bagging method ensemble algorithms
Idrees et al. [81]			Algorithm based on the identification of distinct usage patterns of permissions and intents
Khariwal et al. [82]	RF, SVM, NB		
Idrees et al. [83]	NB, Kstar, Prism		
Zhu et al. [15]		CNN based Multi-Head Squeeze-and-Excitation Residual block	
Bai et al. [84] Taheri et al. [85]	CatBoost Modified versions of KNN		
Alazab et al. [86]	RF, J48, RT, KNN and NB		

Mathur et al. $[87]$	KNN, SVM, LR, RF,		
	ET, XGBM, AdaBoost,		
	BG		
Imtiaz et al. [88]	DT, SMO, NB	MLP, ANN	
Liu et al. [89]	AdaBoost, Bagging,		Subspace based Restricted Boltzmann
	ExtraTrees, GBM, RF,		Machines (SBRBM)
Chen et al. [90]	Voting LightGBM SVM, GBM,	Normal Net and a	
Chen et al. [90]	AdaBoost, Extra-	Neural Networks	
	TreesClassifier, RF,		
	KNN, LR		
Guan et al. [91]	RF, KNN, NB, SVM		Class Imbalanced Learning (CIL),
			Synthetic Minority Over-Sampling
			Technique (SMOTE), Random under-
			sampling (RUS), Balance Cascade
Mohamed et al. [92]	KNN, NB, SVM, DT		
Varma et al. [93]	RF, SVM, KNN, DT,		Bat Optimization Algorithm for
	Nearest Centroid (NC)		Wrapper-based Feature Selection
			(BOAWFS)
Gyunka et al. [94]	NB, SL, RF, Partial DT,		
	KNN, SVM		
Taha et al. [95]	LightGBM, SVM, KNN,		
	LR, NB, DT.		
Peng et al. [96]		MLP, CNN	
Ashwini et al. [97]	Ridge Classifier, XGBM,		
	RF, SVC		
Jiang et al. [98]	J48, KNN, NB, SVM		
Wang et al. [99]	LR, DT, SVM	DBN	
Rana et al. $[100]$	DT, RF, Extremely ran-		
	domized trees (ERT),		
	GB Tree, SVM, LR	DDN CDU	
Lu et al. [101] Millar et al. [102]		DBN, GRU CNN	
Barrera et al. [102]		SOM	
Shabtai et al. [103]	DT, NB, BN, BBN,	5014	
Shabtai et al. [104]	BDT, PART, RF		
Felt et al. [105]			Own approach Stowaway to compare
			permissions required to invoke API
			methods and actually requested permis-
			sions
Erickson et al. [106]			
Sarma et al. [107]	SVM		
Frank et al. [108]			
Jhu et al. [109]	Naive Bayes with Multi-		
	nomial Event Model		
Peiravian et al. $[110]$	SVM, DT, Bagging pre-		
	dictor		
Sanz et al. $[111]$	KNN, DT, Bayesnet,		
	SVM		
Feldman et al. $[112]$	NB, SVM, KNN, C4.5		
	DT		
Pehlivan et al. [113]	Bayesian Classification,		
Rahman et al. [114]	CART, DT, RF, SMO NB, KNN, DT, RF, Deci-		
1,annan et al. [114]	sion Forest		
Rovelli et al. [115]	C4.5 DT, kstar Lazy		
	Learning, Repeated		
	Incremental Pruning to		
	Produce Error Reduc-		
	tion (RIPPER), NB,		
	AdaBoost		
Arp et al. [116]	SVM		
Yerima et al. [117]	RF, NB, DT, random		
	trees, SL		
Kang et al. $[118]$	NB		
Zhao et al. [119]	SVM, KNN, J48, NB		
Qiao et al. [120]	SVM, RF	ANN	
Chen et al. [121]	SVM, C4.5 DT, NB,	MLP	
	KNN, Bagging predictor		
Demertzis et al. [122]		Evolving Spiking Neural	Extreme learning machine (ELM)
		Network (eSNN), MLP,	
		Network (eSNN), MLP, Radial Basis functions, GMDH PNN, eSNN	

Verma et al. [123]	SVM, Minimal complex-		
	ity machine		
Wang et al. $[124]$	NB, LR, DT, Bayesnet,		
	RF, SVM		
Tangil et al. [125]	Extra Trees, SVM, RF,		
	XGBoost		
Wang et al. [126]	KNN, J48 DT, RF		
Li et al. [127]	NB, DT, LR, SVM, RF		
Bhattacharya et al.	Bayesnet, DT, IBK, J48	MLP	
[128]	DT, JRip, Kstar, LR,		
	RF, SMO, NB, etc.		
Xie et al. [129]	DT, RF, SVM, KNN, NB		
Xie et al. [130]	SVM, LR, RF	CNN	
Ren et al. [131]	SVM, KNN, AdaBoost,		
	RF, GBM		
Tao et al. [132]	RF, SVM, DT		
Namrud et al. [133]	SVM, K means, SOM		
Alswaina et al. [134]	Extremely Randomized	NN	
	Trees (ET), SVM, ID3		
	DT, RF, BC, KNN		
Qiu et al. [135]	SVM, DT	DNN	
Zhu et al. [136]	SVM, KNN, DT, LR,	MLP	
	RF, ET, Adaboost,		
	GBDT		
Feng et al. [137]	LR, NB-SVM	GRU, CNN	
Aonzo et al. [138]			Proposed their own linear and non lin-
L J			ear classifiers
Urooj et al. [139]	AdaBoost, SVM, RF,		
	KNN, NB, RBF, DT,		
	SVM		
Wang et al. [140]			Evaluated their own text semantic-
			based approach
Wang et al. [141]	SVM, KNN, RF		
Zhang et al. [142]			Own algorithm to detect bugs and
			Implicitly Malicious Behavior
Kesswani et al. [143]	NB		
Ibrahim et al. [144]	Stochastic Gradient	GRU	
Ibrainin et al. [144]	Descent (SGD), DT, RF,	Gite	
	SVC, KNN, XGBoost,		
	GaussianNB		
Arshad et al. [145]	SVM, RF, NB, DT		
Yuan et al. [146]	NB, C4.5 DT, LR, SVM	DBN, CNN, MLP	
Zhou et al. [140]	RF, KNN, SVM	GRU	
Cilleruelo et al. [147]	SVM, Stochastic gradi-	Gitte	
Cilleruelo et al. [146]			
	ent descent(SGD), RF,		
Findous et al [140]	XGBM	MLP	
Firdaus et al. [149]	NB, FT, J48 DT, RF	MLLF	
Wang et al. [150]	KNN, SVM, NB, J48 DT		
Singh et al. [151]	SVM(Linear)		
Rafiq et al. $[152]$	SVM, LR, DT, XGBM,		
	RF, KNN		
Mahdavifar et al. [153]	RF, SVM, KNN	Pseudo-Label Stacked	
		Auto-Encoder (PLSAE),	
		Pseudo-Label Deep Neu-	
		ral Network (PLDNN),	
		Label Programming	
		(LP)	
Seraj et al. $[154]$	RF, Gaussian NB, SVC,	MLP	
	KNN	2016 NV	
Mahindru et al. [155]	DT, LR, NB, SVM with	SOM, NN	
	linear kernel, polynomial		
	kernel, and RBF kernel		
Sahin et al. [21]	KNN, NB, RF, C4.5 DT,	SMO, MLP	
	LR		
Anupama et al. [156]	LR, CART, RF, SVM	DNN, CNN	
Chen et al. [157]	RF	CNN	
Mahindru et al. [158]	LSSVM with distinct	NN	
	kernel functions (polyno-		
	mial, RBF and linear),		
	LR, NB, DT		
Tchakounté et al. [159]			Algorithm based on fuzzy hash pro-
			cessed static features and computed
			similarity score

	CUL		
Nissim et al. [160]	SVM	MID	Active Learning methods
Peynirci et al. [161]	ID3, CART, J48 DT, RF, NB, RBF, SLo- gReg, Prism, MODLEM,	MLP	
	OneR, NNGE, SVM		
Nauman et al. [162]	Bayesian Statistical Inference	Neural networks, DAE , DBN, CNN , LSTM	
Bhattacharya et al.	Bayesnet, NB, Decision	SMO, MLP	Quick Reduct algorithm
[163]	Table, Random Tree, RF, J48 DT		
Bao et al.[164]	NB, Multinomial classifi- cation		Algorithms based upon predicting per- missions from API and text classifica-
			tion
Medrano et al. [165]	-	-	
Mat et al. [165] Shatnawi et al. [166]	NB LR, SVM, KNN, NB,		
Shathawi et al. [100]	GaussianNB		
Smmarwar et al. [167]	OEL, fine tree, NB, cubic		
	SVM, Weighted KNN,		
	Bagging, Adaboost, Gen- tleBoost		
Arif et al. [168]			Information Gain
Manzanares et al. [169]			Extracted applications to form a com-
			prehensive dataset
Bhat et al. [170]	DT, LR, SVM, NB, RF		
Elayan et al.[171]	SVM, KNN, NB, DT, RF	GRU	
Syrris et al. [172]	NB, RF, SVM	ANN	
Idrees et al. [173]	NB, DT, Decision Table, RF	SMO, MLP	
Rehman et al. [174]	SVM, KNN, DT, Linear Discriminant Analysis		
Martin et al. [175]	AdaBoost, Bagging		
	(with RF estimators),		
	ExtraTrees, GBM, RF,		
	Voting classifier combin- ing an RF, KNN, DT		
Navarro et al. [176]	RF, CART, Bagging		
Milosevic et al. [177]	C4.5 DT, NB, SVM		
	with SMO, RF, JRIP,		
	LR, AdaBoost, Far-		
	thest First, Simple		
	K-means and Expecta-		
	tion maximization (EM) algorithms		
Alzaylaee et al. [178]	SVM Linear and RBF,	MLP	
	NB, SL, DT, PART, J48		
	DT		
Cai et al. [179]	SVM, LR, RF, KNN,	MLP	
	Gaussian NB, multino-		
Badhani et al. [180]	mial NB, LDA, QDA, RF DT, ELM, LR, RIPPER,		
	SVM-linear		
Hijawi et al. [181]	RF, J48 DT, NB, SVM, KNN	MLP	
Sheen et al. [182]	Adaboost, IBK and J48		
	DT, Decision Stump,		
Niche et al [109]	Random tree, NB, SVM	CNN	
Nisha et al. [183] Song et al. [184]	KNN, SVM, RF, GBT	CNN	Dangerous permissions matching model
			to compute a threat degree threshold
Zhang et al. [185]			Algorithm to identify explicit and
			implicit permission use points to further
			create permission use graphs to analyze
			the permissions behavioral pattern
Yang et al. [186]			Algorithm to construct State Transition Graphs (STG) from permissions to ana-
			lyze permission-related behavior only
			under the combinations of the relevant
			permissions
Thiyagarajan et al. [187]	DT		

Qaisar et al. $[188]$	SVM, DT		Case-based learning approach to store and learn permissions like features
Appice et al. [189]	RF, SVM, stacking, ensemble	Deep-Net	Algorithm involving clustering-based sampling with the specific multi-view learning approach
Zhu et al. [190]	RF, SVM		
A. Altaher [191]		Neuro-fuzzy inference	
[]		system	
Su et al. [192]		DBN, SVM	
Mahindru et al. [193]	SVM, NB, RF, LR, K-	MLP, DNN, SOM, Y-	
	Means, FF, FC, DB,	J48, Y-SMO, Y-MLP,	
	Bayesnet, Adaboost,	best training ensem-	
	DT, KNN, J48 DT	ble approach (BTE),	
		majority voting ensem-	
		ble approach (MVE) and	
		nonlinear ensemble deci-	
		sion tree forest approach	
Dehkordy et al. [194]	SVM, KNN, ID3 DT	(NDTF)	
Nguyen et al. [194]	SVM, KNN, IDS D1	DNN	
Taheri et al. [195]	SVM	Robust NN, C4N CNN	
Mahesh et al. [197]	5 V IVI	CNN, ANN , DBN,	CNN-Adaptive Red Fox Optimization
		Method level behav-	(CNN-ARFO)
		ioral semantic approach	
		(MLBS) DE-CNN	
Firdaus et al. [198]	RF, Bayesnet, SVM	MLP, Voted perceptron	
		(VP), Radial basis func-	
		tion network (RBFN)	
		ANN	
Shrivastava et al. [199]			Frequency-based rules defined over per-
			missions and intents to predict mali- cious risk level of an application
Varsha et al. [200]	RF, Rotation forest,		
varsna ev an [200]	SVM		
M. Deypir [201]			Entropy-based method to calculate
			information gain score for a permission
			and correspondingly risk score for an
			application
Mahindru et al. [202]	K-mean, SVM(linear,	NN, SOM, FF, FC and	
	poly, RBF), DT, LR, NB	DB	
Keyvanpour et al. [203]	KNN, SL, NB, J48 DT, RT, RF		
Razak et al. [204]	RF, J48 DT, KNN,	MLP	
10224K Ct al. [204]	AdaBoost	11111	
Xie et al. [205]	SVM		
Mahindru et al. [206]	LOGR, SVM, NB, DT	Radial Basis Function	
		Neural Network RBFM-	
		KCM, RBFN-FCM,	
		RBFN-RAN, ANN, with	
		three different ensem-	
		ble methods (i.e., BTE,	
Alecakir et al. [18]		MVE, and NDTF RNN GRU, MLP	
Alecakir et al. $[18]$ Ali et al. $[207]$	SVM (Linear, RBF,	TOTAL GILO, MILE	
111 Ct al. [207]	Poly), LR		
Sun et al. [208]	HMM, GD, SVM (Lin-		
	ear, RBF, Poly, KCD)		
AlJarrah et al. [209]	RF, SVM, LR, NB,		
	KNN, DT		
Gharib et al. [210]	SVM, RF, NB, AdaBoost	DNN, DAE	
Sun et al. [211]	RF, DT, SVM		Positive and Unlabeled learning

classifiers mentioned in Figure 4, researchers have developed their algorithm, too, instead of using the traditional classifiers. For instance, in [55], Arora et al. proposed their algorithm to form graphs based on permission patterns and frequency as weights. Hence, based on the results of the empirical evidence, we answer the fourth Research Question that the most commonly used ML models are Support Vector Machines, Decision Trees, and Random Forest due to their convenient and simple working but at the same time, due to the limitations of traditional supervised learning methods, one can assume that the popularity of neural network models will surely rise.

6 Datasets used

Researchers and practitioners have adopted numerous malicious datasets in the past decade to carry out their research on Android malware. The datasets can be broadly divided into two types based on their data source: in-the-lab datasets and *in-the-wild* datasets. Traditional datasets such as Drebin^5 and Genome^6 are considered as baselines in the field of Android malware detection and fall under the category of *in-the-lab* datasets. On the other hand, datasets such as Virustotal⁷, Virusshare⁸, Contagio⁹, AMD [215], McAfee¹⁰ and Androzoo¹¹ are called *in-the-wild* datasets due to their continuously updating nature, and that is the reason why it's obvious that the performance of *in-the-wild* datasets is found to be more credible than that of *in-the-lab* datasets and in addition to the datasets mentioned above some researchers also utilized kaggle¹² and Anzhi¹³ type datastores too. Apart from the datasets mentioned above, the datasets provided by the Canadian Institute of Cybersecurity¹⁴ such as the CICInvesAndMal2019, CICAndMal2017, and CIC2020 have also been utilized by the researchers.




Fig. 5: Statistics depicting the most commonly used malware datasets

In response to RQ5, we present Table 7 as it summarizes the malware datasets used by researchers and practitioners to form their analysis/detection model. As seen from the table, most researchers have used traditional malware

 9 http://contagiominidump.blogspot.hk/

 Table 7: Dataset used

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Related works	Malware datasets used				
Zhang et al. [19]	Genome				
Li et al. [20]	Anzhi Store				
Sahin et al. 21	[216]				
Talha et al. [22]	Contagio, Drebin, Genome				
Varma et al. [23]	[917]				
Mahindru et al. [24]	[217] [218], [219], Genome, and AndroMal-Share ¹⁵				
	Share ¹⁵				
Dogru et al. [25]	Drebin				
Rathore et al. [26]	Drebin				
Shang et al. [27]					
Tchakounte et al.	CIC-AndMal2017				
[28]					
Ju et al. [16]	-				
Ilham et al. [29]	AMD				
Sahin et al. [30]	Kaggle				
Angelo et al. [31]	Unisa malware dataset (UMD) ¹⁶				
Vieng et al. [31]					
Xiong et al. [32]	[217]				
Lu at el. [33]	Baidu application market ¹⁷ , Genome,				
Kawitha at al [24]	Virusshare				
Kavitha et al. [34]	- Drohin Conomo				
E. Amer [35] Chakravarty et al.	Drebin, Genome				
Chakravarty et al.	AMD				
[36] Pondugula et al. [37]	For training data from IFFF Data Dart				
1 onduguia et al. [37]	For training data from IEEE DataPort,				
Cabal et al [20]	and sites like droidbench				
Sahal et al. [38]	Contagio, Genome				
Tuan Mat et al. [39]	Androzoo and Drebin				
Wang et al. [40]	Virusshare, Genome AndroZoo				
Park et al. [41]	Genome				
Liang et al. [42] Enck et al. [14]	Genome				
Enck et al. [14] Enck et al. [17]	- Android Market				
Wang et al. [43]	Genome				
	Genome				
Peng et al. [44] Pandita et al. [45]	Genome				
Samra et al. [46]	-				
Yerima et al. [47]	Genome				
Aung et al. [48]	-				
Yerima et al. [49]	Genome				
Sanz et al. [50]	VirusTotal				
Moonsamy et al. [51]	Genome				
Backes et al. [52]	-				
Wu et al. [53]	Contagio				
Kato et al. [54]	Drebin, Androzoo, VirusShare				
Arora et al. [55]	Genome, Drebin, Koodous				
Alsoghyer et al. [56]	HelDroid [220], RansomProber				
	project[212], VirusTotal, Koodous				
Saleem et al. [57]	Drebin				
Ghasempour et al.	Androzoo				
[58]					
Shrivastava et al.	Drebin				
[59]					
Upadhayay et al. [60]	Genome, Drebin, Koodous				
Lee et al. [61]	CICAndMal 2017				
Surendran et al. [62]	Drebin, AMD, AndroZoo, external repos-				
	itories				
A. T. Kabakus [63]	Drebin ,KuafuDet ¹⁸ ,AndroZoo, VirusShare				
Wang et al. [64]	Huawei application market ¹⁹ , Xiaomi application market ²⁰ , 360 application market ²¹ , Wandoujia application mar-				
	ket ²²				
Akbar et al. [65]	VirusShare				
Zhu et al. [66]	VirusShare				
Wang et al. $[67]$	Andro_dumpsys				

⁵http://www.sec.cs.tu-bs.de/ danarp/Drebin/

⁶http://www.malgenomeproject.org/

⁷https://www.virustotal.com

⁸https://virusshare.com/

¹⁰https://home.mcafee.com/Default.aspx?rfhs=1

¹¹https://androzoo.uni.lu/

 $^{^{12} \}rm https://www.kaggle.com$

¹³http://www.anzhi.com/

 $^{^{14} \}rm https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/index.html$

Related works	Malware datasets used
N. McLauglin	McAfee, vendor's internal dataset
[68]	
Wang et al. [69]	Mal_com1, Mal_com2 and Mal_Zhou [220]
Grace et al. [70]	Github
Liu et al. [71]	VirusShare
Bayazit et al.	CICInvesAndMal2019
[72]	
Lee et al. [73]	Andro-AutoPsy Dataset [221]
Zhu et al. [74]	MUDFLOW [222], VirusShare
Almahmoud et	CIC-AndMal2017, CIC-
al. [75]	InvesAndMal2019, CIC-MalDroid2020
Feng et al. [76]	CICAndMal2017
Kandu et al.[77]	Genome
Arora et al. [78]	Genome
Ding et al. [79]	CICInvesAndMal2019
Sahin et al. [80]	M0Droid[223], AMD, Kaggle, [224]
Idrees et al. [81]	Contagio, Drebin, Genome, Virus Total,
	theZoo, MalShare, VirusShare
Khariwal et	Genome, Drebin, Koodous
	Genome, Diebill, Koodous
al.[82]	Contogio VinueTotol annearly Andreid
Idrees et al. [83]	Contagio, VirusTotal, appsapk, Android-
	mob
Zhu et al. [15]	VirusShare
Bai et al. [84]	Drebin
Taheri et al. [85]	Drebin, Contagio, Genome
Alazab et al. [86]	AndroZoo, Contagio, MalShare,
	VirusShare, VirusTotal
Mathur et al.	Androzoo, AMD
[87]	
Imtiaz et al. [88]	CICInves AndMal2019
Liu et al. [89]	OmniDroid, CIC2019, CIC2020
Chen et al. [90]	VirusShare
Guan et al. [91]	VirusShare
Mohamed et al.	Genome, Maldroid
[92]	
Varma et al. [93]	CICInvesAnd Mal2019
Varma et al. [93] Gyunka et	CICInvesAnd Mal2019 Genome Contagio
Gyunka et	CICInvesAnd Mal2019 Genome, Contagio
Gyunka et al.[94]	Genome, Contagio
Gyunka et al.[94] Taha et al. [95]	Genome, Contagio Drebin
Gyunka et al.[94]	Genome, Contagio Drebin CICMalDroid 2020, CIC-InvesAndMal
Gyunkaetal. [94]Taha et al. [95]Peng et al. [96]	Genome, Contagio Drebin CICMalDroid 2020, CIC-InvesAndMal 2019, Drebin
Gyunkaetal. [94]Taha et al. [95]Peng et al. [96]Ashwiniet al.	Genome, Contagio Drebin CICMalDroid 2020, CIC-InvesAndMal
Gyunka et al.[94] Taha et al. [95] Peng et al. [96] Ashwini et al. [97]	Genome, Contagio Drebin CICMalDroid 2020, CIC-InvesAndMal 2019, Drebin Drebin
Gyunkaetal.[94]Taha et al. [95]Peng et al. [96]Ashwiniet al. [96]Jiang et al. [98]	Genome, Contagio Drebin CICMalDroid 2020, CIC-InvesAndMal 2019, Drebin Drebin Genome, Andro MalShare
Gyunka et al.[94] Taha et al. [95] Peng et al. [96] Ashwini et al. [97]	Genome, Contagio Drebin CICMalDroid 2020, CIC-InvesAndMal 2019, Drebin Drebin Genome, Andro MalShare Information Security Lab of Peking Uni-
Gyunka et al. [94] Taha et al. [95] Peng et al. [96] Ashwini et al. [97] Jiang et al. [98] Wang et al. [99]	Genome, Contagio Drebin CICMalDroid 2020, CIC-InvesAndMal 2019, Drebin Drebin Genome, Andro MalShare Information Security Lab of Peking Uni- versity
Gyunka et al. [94] Taha et al. [95] Peng et al. [96] Ashwini et al. [97] Jiang et al. [98] Wang et al. [99] Rana et al. [100]	Genome, Contagio Drebin CICMalDroid 2020, CIC-InvesAndMal 2019, Drebin Drebin Genome, Andro MalShare Information Security Lab of Peking Uni- versity Drebin
Gyunka et al. [94] Taha et al. [95] Peng et al. [96] Ashwini et al. [97] Jiang et al. [98] Wang et al. [99] Rana et al. [100] Lu et al. [101] Eu et al. [101]	Genome, Contagio Drebin CICMalDroid 2020, CIC-InvesAndMal 2019, Drebin Drebin Genome, Andro MalShare Information Security Lab of Peking Uni- versity Drebin VirusShare, Genome, Contagio
Gyunka et al. [94] Taha et al. [95] Peng et al. [96] Ashwini et al. [97] Jiang et al. [98] Wang et al. [99] Rana et al. [100]	Genome, Contagio Drebin CICMalDroid 2020, CIC-InvesAndMal 2019, Drebin Drebin Genome, Andro MalShare Information Security Lab of Peking Uni- versity Drebin VirusShare, Genome, Contagio Genome, Drebin, vendor's internal repos-
Gyunka et al. [94] Taha et al. [95] Peng et al. [96] Ashwini et al. [97] Jiang et al. [98] Wang et al. [99] Rana et al. [100] Lu et al. [101] Eu et al. [101]	Genome, Contagio Drebin CICMalDroid 2020, CIC-InvesAndMal 2019, Drebin Drebin Genome, Andro MalShare Information Security Lab of Peking Uni- versity Drebin VirusShare, Genome, Contagio
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$\begin{array}{c} {\rm Gyunka} & {\rm et} \\ {\rm al.} [94] \\ {\rm Taha \ et \ al.} [95] \\ {\rm Peng \ et \ al.} [96] \\ {\rm Ashwini \ et \ al.} \\ [97] \\ {\rm Jiang \ et \ al.} [98] \\ {\rm Wang \ et \ al.} [99] \\ {\rm Wang \ et \ al.} [99] \\ {\rm Rana \ et \ al.} [100] \\ {\rm Lu \ et \ al.} [100] \\ {\rm Harror \ at \ al.} \\ [102] \\ {\rm Barrera \ et \ al.} \\ [103] \\ {\rm Shabtai \ et \ al.} \\ [104] \\ {\rm Felt \ et \ al.} [105] \\ {\rm Erickson \ et \ al.} \\ [106] \\ {\rm Sarma \ et \ al.} \\ [106] \\ {\rm Sarma \ et \ al.} \\ [106] \\ {\rm Frank \ et \ al.} \\ [107] \\ {\rm Frank \ et \ al.} \\ [108] \\ {\rm Jhu \ et \ al.} \\ [109] \\ {\rm Peiravian \ et \ al.} \\ [110] \\ {\rm Sanz \ et \ al.} \\ [111] \\ {\rm Feldman \ et \ al.} \\ [112] \\ {\rm Pehlivan \ et \ al.} \\ \end{array}$	Genome, Contagio Drebin CICMalDroid 2020, CIC-InvesAndMal 2019, Drebin Drebin Genome, Andro MalShare Information Security Lab of Peking University Drebin VirusShare, Genome, Contagio Genome, Drebin, vendor's internal repository, AMD No malware No malware No malware Contagio No malware Steamy Window ²³ [217] VirusTotal Contagio COMODO Security Solutions, Inc., a private security company ²⁴ Kharon Malware Dataset ²⁵ , CICIn-
$\begin{array}{c} {\rm Gyunka} & {\rm et} \\ {\rm al.} [94] \\ {\rm Taha \ et \ al.} \ [95] \\ {\rm Peng \ et \ al.} \ [96] \\ {\rm Ashwini \ et \ al.} \ [96] \\ {\rm Ashwini \ et \ al.} \ [97] \\ {\rm Jiang \ et \ al.} \ [98] \\ {\rm Wang \ et \ al.} \ [99] \\ {\rm Wang \ et \ al.} \ [99] \\ {\rm Wang \ et \ al.} \ [100] \\ {\rm Lu \ et \ al.} \ [100] \\ {\rm Lu \ et \ al.} \ [101] \\ {\rm Millar \ et \ al.} \ [102] \\ {\rm Barrera \ et \ al.} \ [103] \\ {\rm Shabtai \ et \ al.} \ [105] \\ {\rm Erickson \ et \ al.} \ [105] \\ {\rm Erickson \ et \ al.} \ [106] \\ {\rm Sarma \ et \ al.} \ [106] \\ {\rm Sarma \ et \ al.} \ [106] \\ {\rm Jhu \ et \ al.} \ [109] \\ {\rm Peiravian \ et \ al.} \ [111] \\ {\rm Feldman \ et \ al.} \ [111] \\ {\rm Feldman \ et \ al.} \ [111] \\ {\rm Feldman \ et \ al.} \ [111] \\ {\rm Feldman \ et \ al.} \ [113] \\ \end{array}$	Genome, Contagio Drebin CICMalDroid 2020, CIC-InvesAndMal 2019, Drebin Drebin Genome, Andro MalShare Information Security Lab of Peking University Drebin VirusShare, Genome, Contagio Genome, Drebin, vendor's internal repository, AMD No malware No malware No malware Contagio No malware Steamy Window ²³ [217] VirusTotal Contagio COMODO Security Solutions, Inc., a private security company ²⁴ Kharon Malware Dataset ²⁵ , CICIn-
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Related works	Malware datasets used				
Rovelli et al. [115]	Genome, Contagio				
Arp et al. [116]	Genome,FakeInstaller, GoldDream ²⁷ , GingerMaster ²⁸ , DroidKungFu ²⁹				
Verine et al [117]	GingerMaster ^{-*} , DroidKungFu ^{-*}				
Yerima et al. [117]	McAfee VirusShare Contagio Malware lu				
Kang et al. [118]	VirusShare, Contagio, Malware.lu Drebin				
Zhao et al. [119] Qiao et al. [120]					
Chen et al. [120]	Genome 360 APKs ³⁰ , MobiSec Lab Website ³¹ ,				
	[217]				
Demertzis et al. [122]	Magnum- Research ³²				
Verma et al. [123]	Contagio, malware forums , security blogs, Genome				
Wang et al. [124]	VirusTotal				
Tang et al. [125]	Genome, Drebin				
Wang et al. [126]	Drebin, Genome				
Li et al. [127]	Drebin				
Bhattacharya et al. [128]	Contagio				
Xie et al. [129]	Genome, VirusShare, Drebin				
Xie et al. [130]	Genome, VirusShare, Drebin, antivirus				
Don at al [101]	companies				
Ren et al. [131]	Anzhi, AndroTotal, Drebin				
Tao et al. [132]	VirusShare, Contagio AndroZoo				
Namrud et al. [133]	Allul0200				
Alswaina et al. [134] Qiu et al. [135]	-				
Zhu et al. [135]	- ViruShare				
Feng et al. [137]	No Malware				
Aonzo et al. [138]	AndroZoo				
Urooj et al. [139]	MalDroid [225], DefenseDroid ³³ and a				
	small own generated dataset				
Wang et al. [140]	No malware				
Wang et al. [141]	FakeInst, Opfake, FakeInstaller, Droid-				
	KungFu, GinMaster, Plankton				
Zhang et al. [142]	No malware				
Kesswani et al. [143]	No malware				
Ibrahim et al. [144]	CICMalDroid 2020				
Arshad et al. [145]	Drebin				
Yuan et al. [146]	Genome, Contagio				
Zhou et al. [147]	Genome				
Cilleruelo et al. [148]	Malware selected on the basis of lifespan				
	criteria from Google Play Store				
Firdaus et al. [149]	Drebin				
Wang et al. [150]					
Singh et al. [151]	Drebin, polymorphic and metamorphic malware dataset				
Rafiq et al. [152]	Drebin, AMD, Androzoo				
Mahdavifar et al. [153]	VirusTotal, Contagio, AMD, CICMal- Droid202				
Seraj et al. [154]	Applications classified as harmful via				
	VirusTotal and downloaded from Google				
	Play Store				
Mahindru et al. [155]	Didn't mention properly				
Sahin et al. [21]	VirusShare				
Anupama et al. [156] Chen et al. [157]	Drebin AndroZoo				
Mahindru et al. [157]	AndroZoo Genome, [218]				
Tchakounté et al.	AMD				
[159]	1111L				
Nissim et al. [160]	Contagio, Genome, third party applica-				
	tion stores based in Russia, China, and Europe				
Peynirci et al. [161]	Genome, Drebin, AndroZoo				
Nauman et al. [162] Bhattacharya et al.	Drebin, VirusShare Wang's repository dataset ³⁴ , Contagio,				
[163] Bhattacharya et al.	KEEL/UCI repository				
Bao et al.[164]	No malware				
Medrano et al. [165]	No malware				
Mat et al. [165]	AndroZoo, Drebin				
Shatnawi et al. [166]	CIC InvesAndMal2019				

Related works	Malware datasets used
Smmarwar et al.	CICInvesAndMal2019
[167] Arif et al. [168]	AndroZoo, Drebin
Manzanares et al.	Drebin, AMD, VirusTotal,
[169]	VirusShare
Bhat et al. [170]	Virustotal, VirusShare, Drebin
Elayan et al. [170]	CICAndMal2017
Syrris et al. [172]	Drebin
Idrees et al. [172]	Contagiodump, Genome, Virus
Iurees et al. [175]	Total, theZoo, MalShare,
	VirusShare
Rehman et al. [174]	MODROID
Martin et al. [175]	Koodous, AndroZoo
Navarro et al. [176]	AndroZoo, [217], VirusShare,
	AndroMalShare
Milosevic et al. [177]	M0Droid
Alzaylaee et al. [178]	McAfee
Cai et al. [179]	AMD, Drebin
Badhani et al. [180]	Andro- DumpSys, AndroZoo,
r - 1	Contagio , AndroMalShare ,
	AMD, VirusTotal
Hijawi et al. [181]	[218]
Sheen et al. [182]	Genome
Nisha et al. [183]	AndroZoo, VirusShare, Andro-
	MalShare, PRAGuard[226]
Song et al. [184]	Not mentioned
Zhang et al. [185]	Genome
Yang et al. [186]	No malware
Thiyagarajan et al.	AndroZoo
[187]	
Qaisar et al. [188]	Android PRAGuard, Drebin,
	Open-source apps, Kharon,
	Androzoo, CICAAGM
Appice et al. $[189]$	Alternative Chinese and Rus-
	sian Markets, Android websites,
	malware forums, security blogs, Genome
Zhu et al. [190]	VirusShare
A. Altaher [191]	Genome
Su et al. [192]	Drebin, Genome, Contagio
Mahindru et al. [193]	Genome, AndroMalShare, [218]
Dehkordy et al. [195]	Drebin, AMD
Nguyen et al. [194]	AMD, Drebin
Taheri et al. [196]	Drebin, Contagio, Genome
Mahesh et al. [197]	Private companies
Firdaus et al. [198]	Drebin, Genome
Shrivastava et al.	Third-party applications
[199]	T T O TT
Varsha et al. [200]	Drebin
M. Deypir [201]	[217], Security expert and World
	Wide Web
Mahindru et al. [202]	Genome, AndroMalShare, [218]
Keyvanpour et al.	Drebin
[203]	
Razak et al. [204]	Drebin
Xie et al. [205]	Anzhi
Mahindru et al. [206]	[218], [219], Sanddroid
Alecakir et al. [18]	No malware
Ali et al. [207]	No malware
Sun et al. [208]	Contagio
AlJarrah et al. [209]	CICMalDroid2020
Gharib et al. [210]	R-PackDroid ³⁵ , HellDroid[220],
	Contagio, Koodous
Sun et al. [211]	Drebin

datasets in their studies, such as Genome and Drebin, whereas some have shifted their focus to other alternatives from the *in-the-wild* dataset category, namely Contagio. Figure 5 gives us a better understanding of Table 7 by plotting the top seven malware datasets in terms of usage in %, i.e., the percentage of studies that have utilized the corresponding malware dataset from the total lot of research papers used in our review. The statistics depict the preference of researchers towards the traditional datasets as Drebin [95]-[97] stands at the top with 26% usage, followed by Genome [103]-[104] at 22.5%. In-the-wild datasets such as Virusshare [90]-[91], Contagio [94] and Androzoo [86]-[87] stand at third, fourth and sixth rank with 14%, 12.5% and 10.5% share respectively. As discussed above, the popularity of the datasets provided by the Canadian Institute of Cybersecurity [166]-[167] due to the concise pattern of information in datasets, and they take up almost 11.5% of the comprehensive studies taken up in this review. Hence, based on the results presented above, we answer the fifth Research Question that the In-thelab datasets such as Drebin and Genome occupy the largest proportion of the most preferred malware dataset by researchers.

7 Challenges and Limitations

We answer our sixth Research Question in this and the subsequent section, wherein we describe a few limitations of proposed models mainly associated with permissions as a feature in the field of Android security followed by proposing some future research directions.

7.1 Drawbacks of using permissions as a feature

Static techniques are generally inexpensive in terms of complexity compared to dynamic approaches, as static features can be more easily extracted than dynamic ones. However, static methods have a few disadvantages, and consequently, models built over Android permissions are generally found incapable of recognizing the stealthier behavior of code obfuscation and dynamic code loading. As a result, some malicious apps may incorporate stealthy behavior and evade permissions-based detection. Additionally, the inability of many detection models to track behaviors that do not cause permission checks is another limitation of using permissions as a feature [19], [185].

7.2 Faulty Research dataset

The training and validation dataset is the foundation for any Android malware analysis/detection model. Faulty research datasets, biased to one class, i.e., either benign or malware, outdated, or insufficient in size or distribution, can produce inaccurate results in terms of meaning and poor detection accuracy. It has been noticed that app developers often make careless spelling mistakes. Applications are found with no permission requests or faulty formatting of manifest files. These reasons surely cause hindrances to research. Results with insufficient data are less efficient and accurate because of the lack of training data. Even if the detector performs well in the experimental tests, it might still prove to be inefficient in real life. Hence, building a good and informative dataset of Android applications that request the actual and essentially needed permissions or features is an important pre-requisite step for any model. One of the main reasons for accumulating faulty applications in one's dataset is the opensource nature of the Android operating system itself. Users are given the freedom to download applications not only from the mainstream market but also from informal third-party markets and unknown malicious websites, which might result in the mixing of benign and malware application sets.

7.3 Feature Extraction and Processing

Gathering the right application samples is important; however, knowing how and which features to extract is itself a very extensive research topic. As described in the previous section, despite the numerous advantages of using static features, static analysis and consequently permission-based techniques are also found to have some disadvantages At the same time, there are also many challenges to feature extraction with dynamic analysis. For example, how to ensure that all malicious behaviors can be triggered during dynamic analysis and which emulator to use to produce real-time usage patterns of a user are issues that need to be solved.

The summary and statistics presented in section V indicate that most of the research is still based on traditional analysis features, such as permissions, because of their strong training effect, vast size, and prominent relationship with class labels and behavior.

7.4 Application of Machine Learning

Machine learning methods are used in the field of Android malware detection to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of detection. However, because of the phenomena such as concept drift, the performance of traditionally trained classifiers has started to decline. Concept drift, which is a problem that arises with the continuous development and evolution of Android malware, has caused researchers and practitioners to shift their focus toward neural network-based detection methods. For example, Bayazit et al. [72] chose static analysis to build their various RNN-based classifiers. The features that they used were permissions and intents. In the end, they compared the detection results of their various RNN-based algorithms to determine that the Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (BiLSTM) model outperforms all. Moreover, neural networks can be applied to bridge the gap between the semantic representation of APKs and Android malware detection. Hence, we conclude that neural networks have potential in the field of Android malware detection using static analysis. The preference of researchers and practitioners is starting to tilt more towards deep learning classifiers while building their analysis/detection models because of the added advantages compared with the traditional machine learning classifiers. However, deep learning algorithms can be computationally expensive and may require many resources to be successfully trained. This can be seen as a major barrier, especially for people who want access to high-performance computing services but lack the necessary resources.

7.5 Unreasonable reliability over users

The majority of the proposed models in the field of Android malware detection lie under the category of *Off-Device* models, i.e., they rely upon the user to provide the application data and then return the malware report of the corresponding applications after performing their proposed approach which is, in fact, a tedious and long method. Instead, *On-Device* models are the need of the hour, capable of performing malware analysis/detection using the user's smartphone to generate instant malware reports.

7.6 Application Collusion

Application collusion is an emerging threat to Android-based devices that seem almost immune to permissions-based detection systems. In app collusion, two or more Android apps somehow collude to perform a malicious action that they cannot accomplish independently [55]. In this way, they perform malicious tasks without showing malware behavior.

7.7 Zero day malware

Zero-day malware is the kind of threat for which no patch exists yet and therefore seems immune to traditional signature-based analysis that identifies the dangerous permissions usage patterns. In simple words, permission-based malware detection strategies are based on knowledge of the vulnerability, exploit in question, or analyzing behavioral patterns of application classes, which obviously is not available for zero-day threats. As a result, certain methods for mitigating these threats are ineffective.

8 Future Directions

In this section, we provide some directions for future work in the Android malware analysis/detection field using Android permissions based on our investigation and review.

1. The Android OS has more than 150 pre-defined permissions. Moreover, as applications become more complex with time, this number is bound to grow only. Permissions are one of the key components present within any Android application's manifest file and have been widely used in the literature for Android malware detection. However, the usage pattern of permissions between normal and malware applications is generally quite similar. For instance, we have collected 77,000 normal apps and an equal number of malware apps from Androzoo. Furthermore, we have extracted permissions from the manifest files of corresponding applications. Table 8 shows that 13 of the top 20 permissions are common in normal and malware datasets. If all these permissions are considered features while building an analysis or detection model, poor detection accuracy results are inevitable. Table 9 helps us to further prove our point by summarizing the detection results considering all features, i.e., the total lot of 129 permissions, for detection without performing any feature selection/ ranking/ other technique. As seen from the Table, the highest detection accuracy achieved by using the BC classifier is merely 78.64%, which is too low in Android security for any malware detection model. Hence, priority should be given to feature selection or ranking to filter out only the most relevant and influential set of features in the future.

- 2. Combining multiple static analysis techniques or features can always be beneficial when it comes to comparison with using just a single feature set. Permissions are known to be manually designed and generally are coarse-grained in nature. Intents possess similar characteristics like permissions, whereas opcode-based methods are found to be capable of capturing contextual semantics of applications but they both fail to produce structural semantics. Functional call graphs do the needful by extracting structural semantics. Hence, we can say that using two or more types of static features in combination might further improve the experimental results and thus a model's detection accuracy.
- 3. Since stealthier malware may evade permissions-based static detection, several works in the literature aim to use dynamic features such as network traffic and system calls to detect such stealthier malware. However, analyzing dynamic features is complex and time-consuming; therefore, hybrid detection models serve the purpose as they combine both

PERMISSIONS	Normal	Malware		
	Fre-		Frequency	
	quency			
INTERNET	55063	INTERNET	55684	
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE	52391	ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE	55252	
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE	38934	WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE	54759	
WAKE_LOCK	32527	ACCESS_WIFI_STATE	53886	
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE	28554	READ_PHONE_STATE	53586	
RECEIVE	23875	READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE	46646	
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE	22516	WAKE_LOCK	44003	
VIBRATE	20472	GET_TASKS	43399	
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION	16968	CHANGE_WIFI_STATE	43165	
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION	16650	ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION	42425	
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED	16519	VIBRATE	42325	
CAMERA	14993	MOUNT_UNMOUNT_	41324	
CAMERA		FILESYSTEMS		
READ_PHONE_STATE	14176	ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION	40720	
C2D_MESSAGE	12342	WRITE_SETTINGS	39497	
BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_	10593	SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW	38594	
SERVICE	10595	SISTEM_ALERI_WINDOW		
BILLING	9905	CAMERA	36115	
FOREGROUND_SERVICE	9587	CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE	30874	
GET_ACCOUNTS	7806	RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED	29441	
WRITE_SETTINGS	7258	READ_LOGS	29112	
BLUETOOTH	5820	RECORD_AUDIO	27010	

 Table 8: Top 20 most frequently requested permissions from both normal and malware datasets with their corresponding frequency.

Table 9: Detection results considering allfeatures for detection without performing any
feature selection/ ranking/ other technique

		'	0/			-
FEATURES	Dete	ction a	accurac	y usi	ng var	rious
used	machine learning and deep learning					
	classifiers (in %)					
	DT	\mathbf{RF}	ANN	\mathbf{BC}	NB	LR
All Permis-	74.64	74.64	69.55	78.64	69.60	69.60
sions (129)						

static and dynamic elements. Because of static features like permissions in hybrid models, some malware samples can be easily detected. And dynamic features can help detect stealthier samples. Hence, hybrid models may be better for effective Android malware detection.

4. Moreover, as discussed in [143], the malware authors tend to request more permissions than their application requires for its functioning to cover up or hide their malicious intent. Due to the absence of any robust permission check system that provides an in-depth comparison of the permissions requested and required, malware authors exploit it as much as possible. Hence, more research is required on this to fulfill the absence of such a permission check system by the OS shortly to reduce the malware attacks at the initial level only.

5. Currently, repositories like Androzoo and CIC provide standardized application dataset samples and libraries with comprehensive background information and essential filters that solve the faulty dataset issue up to some extent.

9 Conclusion

This paper summarizes the state-of-the-art studies and comprehensively reviews the research trend in Android malware analysis/detection using permissions as a key feature. Concretely, this Comprehensive Literature Review (CLR) is conducted with the close observation and study of 200 research papers ranging from the advent of Android in 2009 to the current research scenario in 2023, covering almost 14 years of research history. Based on the six research questions put forward by us to understand the relevance of permissions as a means to analyze/detect Android malware, this CLR investigates the purpose of research (analysis or analysis combined with detection), the technique used to select or utilize or rank the extracted features, most commonly used features alongside with permissions, the malware datasets utilized by the researchers/ practitioners and lastly, the limitations, challenges in the field of Android malware analysis/detection in order to propose some future research directions.

According to this CLR, we answered the six research questions mentioned above and conclude that 1) Majority of researchers and practitioners have chosen the path of building Android malware detection models instead of merely analysing the malware; 2) The most popular techniques to handle the extracted features are the ML/DL classifiers as their hyper parameters can be easily tuned to reduce, rank, select even the unlabelled or unbalanced feature set, followed by statistical test such as Chi-square, Mann-Whitney test and many more; 3) Researchers have preferred using API calls and intents the most in combination with permissions while forming their Android malware analysis/detection models; 4) Based on the results of empirical evidence, we conclude that the most commonly used ML models are SVM, DT and RF due to their convenient and simple working but at the same time, due to the limitations of traditional supervised learning methods, one can assume that the popularity of neural network models will surely rise; 5) In-the-lab datasets such as Drebin and Genome occupy the largest proportion of the most preferred malware dataset by researchers.

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of interest - The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Ethical approval - This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by any of the authors.

Research Data Policy and Data Availability - The authors declare that the data supporting the findings of this study are available within the paper.

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