Papers by Manuel García-Carpintero
Reason and Rationality, 2013
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Oxford Handbooks Online, 2015
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Mind
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Diánoia. Revista de Filosofía, 2016
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Grazer Philosophische Studien
In this paper I discuss Künne's Modest Theory of truth, and develop a variation on a worry th... more In this paper I discuss Künne's Modest Theory of truth, and develop a variation on a worry that Field expresses with respect to Horwich's related view. The worry is not that deflationary accounts are false, but rather that, because they take propositions as truth-bearers, they are not philosophically interesting. Compatibly with the intuitions of ordinary speakers, we can understand proposition so that the proposals do account for a property that such truth-bearers have. Nevertheless, we saliently apply the truth-concept also to entities such as utterances or assertions, and the deflationary accounts do not provide a similarly deflationary account for those applications. In fact, there are good reasons to suspect that no such account would be forthcoming; we need something more substantive or inflationary there.
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2014
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Philosophical Issues, 1997
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2014
ABSTRACT (pre-publication version) This paper confronts the disagreement argument for relativism ... more ABSTRACT (pre-publication version) This paper confronts the disagreement argument for relativism about matters of taste, defending a specific form of contextualism. It is first considered whether the disagreement data might manifest an invariantist attitude that speakers have pre-reflectively. Semantic and ontological enlightenment should then make the impressions of disagreement vanish, or at least leave them as lingering ineffectual Müller-Lyer-like illusions; but it is granted to relativists that this does not fully happen. López de Sa's appeal to presuppositions of commonality and Sundell's appeal to metalinguistic disagreement are discussed, and it is argued that, although they help to clarify the issues, they do not fully explain why such impressions remain under enlightenment. To explain it, the paper develops a suggestion that other writers have made, that the lingering impression of disagreement is a consequence of a practical conflict, appealing to dispositions to practical coordination that come together with presuppositions of commonality in axiological matters.
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Cuts and Clouds, 2010
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Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, 2013
ABSTRACT Castañeda, Perry, and Lewis argued in the 1960s and 1970s that thoughts about oneself “a... more ABSTRACT Castañeda, Perry, and Lewis argued in the 1960s and 1970s that thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts – require special treatment and advanced different accounts. In this chapter, I discuss Ernest Sosa’s approach to these matters. I first present his approach to singular or de re thought in general in the first section. In the second, I introduce the data that need to be explained, Perry’s and Lewis’s proposals and Sosa’s own account, in relation to Perry’s, Lewis’s, and his own views on de re thought. In the third section, I present the account I prefer – a “token-reflexive” version of Perry’s original account that Perry himself came to adopt in reaction to Stalnaker’s criticisms. In the final section, I take up Recanati’s recent arguments, from a viewpoint on de se thought very similar to Sosa’s, to the effect that such an account is in a good position to explain the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. I argue there that that is not the case, and I conclude by suggesting that the token-reflexive account fits better both with the data and with Sosa’s Fregean take on de re thought in general.
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The Philosophical Quarterly, 2013
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Philosophy Compass, 2012
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Philosophical Studies, 1996
... hand side says in the context of the utterance. A definition like that could still be materia... more ... hand side says in the context of the utterance. A definition like that could still be materially correct, but the link with the intuitive concept of truth would have been severed. Now, what is characteristic of a Tarskian truth-concept ...
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Mind & Language, 1994
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The Journal of Philosophy, 1994
Q uotation is an apparently very simple procedure, yet even here semantic theorizing has been abl... more Q uotation is an apparently very simple procedure, yet even here semantic theorizing has been able to find opportuni-ties for involved argument. The Fregean theory holds that the expression inside the quotation marks is the referring expression, while the role of the quotation ...
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Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 2007
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History and Philosophy of Logic, 1998
This paper argues for a conditional claim concerning a famous argument—developed by Church in elu... more This paper argues for a conditional claim concerning a famous argument—developed by Church in elucidation of some remarks by Frege to the effect that the bedeutung of a sentence is the sentence’s truth-value—the Frege–Gödel–Church argument, or FGC for short. The point we make is this :if, and just to the extent that, Arthur Smullyan’s argument against Quine's use of FGC is sound, then essentially the same rejoinder disposes also of Davidson's use of FGC against ‘correspondence’ theories of truth. We thus dispute a contention by Professor Davidson that it is coherent to accept that Smullyan’s rejoinder takes away the force of Quine’s version of FGC, while still consistently using FGC to establish that if true sentences (or utterances) correspond to anything, they all correspond to the same thing. We show that the differences between the cases discussed by Smullyan and Davidson’s version of FGC on which Davidson relies for his contention are irrelevant to the point under dispute
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Erkenntnis, 1996
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Dialectica, 2014
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Papers by Manuel García-Carpintero