Book by Klaas Kraay
Theism is the view that God exists; naturalism is the view that there are no supernatural beings,... more Theism is the view that God exists; naturalism is the view that there are no supernatural beings, processes, mechanisms, or forces. This Element explores whether things are better, worse, or neither on theism relative to naturalism. It introduces readers to the central philosophical issues that bear on this question, and it distinguishes a wide range of ways it can be answered. It critically examines four views, three of which hold (in various ways) that things are better on theism than on naturalism, and one of which holds just the opposite.
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Edited Books by Klaas Kraay
Does God Matter? features eleven original essays written by prominent philosophers of religion th... more Does God Matter? features eleven original essays written by prominent philosophers of religion that address this very important, yet surprisingly neglected, question. One natural way to approach this question is to seek to understand what difference God’s existence would - or does - make to the value of the world and the well-being of its inhabitants. The first essay sets the stage for the discussion of this topic. The three essays in Section I defend versions of pro-theism: the view that God’s existence would - or does - make things better than they would otherwise be. The four essays in Section II defend anti-theism: the view that God’s existence would, or does, make things worse than they would otherwise be. The three essays in Section III consider the interplay between the existential and axiological debates concerning the existence of God. This book presents important research on a growing topic in philosophy of religion that will also be of keen interest to scholars working in other areas of philosophy (such as metaphysics, epistemology, and value theory), and in other disciplines.
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In recent decades, scientific theories have postulated the existence of many universes beyond our... more In recent decades, scientific theories have postulated the existence of many universes beyond our own. The details and implications of these theories are hotly contested. Some philosophers argue that these scientific models count against the existence of God. Others, however, argue that if God exists, a multiverse is precisely what we should expect to find. Moreover, these philosophers claim that the idea of a divinely created multiverse can help believers in God respond to certain arguments for atheism. These proposals are, of course, also extremely controversial. This volume collects together twelve newly published essays – two by physicists, and ten by philosophers – that discuss various aspects of this issue. Some of the essays support the idea of a divinely created multiverse; others oppose it. Scientific, philosophical, and theological issues are considered.
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Papers by Klaas Kraay
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1991
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Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 9, 2019
In contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, it is widely held that if God exists, no gratuit... more In contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, it is widely held that if God exists, no gratuitous evil occurs. In an important series of papers, however, William Hasker has resisted this view. If Hasker’s argument were to succeed, this would have significant consequences for certain arguments from evil, and for the debate about the axiological effects of God’s existence. Chapter 3 sets out and evaluates Hasker’s argument—three objections to it are considered and rejected, but a fourth objection is developed in a way that places considerable pressure on his view.
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Three very prominent arguments for atheism are (1) the argument from sub-optimality, (2) the prob... more Three very prominent arguments for atheism are (1) the argument from sub-optimality, (2) the problem of no best world, and (3) the evidential argument from gratuitous evil. To date, it has not sufficiently been appreciated that several important criticisms of these arguments have all relied on a shared strategy. Although the details vary, the core of this strategy is to concede that God either cannot or need not achieve the best outcome in the relevant choice situation, but to insist that God must and can achieve an outcome that is good enough. In short, this strategy invokes divine satisficing in response to these arguments for atheism. (The widespread use of this strategy may have gone unnoticed because the appeal to divine satisficing is usually implicit.) In sections 1-3, the three arguments for atheism will be set out, and it will be shown that the relevant replies all employ this shared strategy. Section 4 will show that those who invoke divine satisficing have failed to estab...
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The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion, 2021
This article surveys the area of philosophy known as analytic philosophy of religion. This area e... more This article surveys the area of philosophy known as analytic philosophy of religion. This area emerged in the 1950s in the English-speaking philosophical world, and has grown considerably. Section 1 outlines its origins and characteristics. Section 2 lists venues in which this work appears, and recommends other survey-style resources. Section 3 discusses central topics in this area, including the divine attributes, arguments about the (non)existence of God, the epistemology of religious belief and experience, miracles, the meaning of life, life after death, and heaven and hell. Section 4 introduces two contemporary developments: a movement called ‘analytic theology’, and increasing philosophical reflection on nontraditional versions of theism and other religious worldviews. Section 5 discusses two important criticisms of this area: one holds that the range of topics it considers is too narrow, and the other holds that the standpoints its practitioners hold, and the methods they use, are limited and limiting.
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God is traditionally taken to be a necessarily existing being who is unsurpassably powerful, know... more God is traditionally taken to be a necessarily existing being who is unsurpassably powerful, knowledgeable, and good. The familiar problem of actual evil claims that the presence of gratuitous suffering in the actual world constitutes evidence against the existence of such a being. In contrast, the problem of possible evil claims that the possibility of bad worlds constitutes evidence against theism. How? It seems plausible to suppose that there are very bad possible worlds. But if God exists in every world, then God exists in those, too. And if God exists in very bad worlds, some say, God is culpable for not ensuring that they are better. This paper considers this argument, surveys some responses, and offers a novel solution. Along the way, it argues that theists should maintain that the actual world is a multiverse featuring all and only universes worthy of being created and sustained by God, and – more controversially – it recommends that theists embrace modal collapse: the claim...
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Religious Studies, 2021
In a recent article (Kraay 2013), I argued that some prominent responses to two important argumen... more In a recent article (Kraay 2013), I argued that some prominent responses to two important arguments for atheism invoke divine satisficing – and that the coherence and propriety of this notion have not been established. Chris Tucker (2016) agrees with my evaluation of divine satisficing, but disagrees with my exegesis of these responses. He argues that they should be understood as invoking motivated submaximization instead. After reviewing the dialectical situation to date, I assess whether motivated submaximization can be deployed in such a way as to defeat these arguments for atheism. I argue that it's far from clear that it can.
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Synthese, 2021
In recent years, epistemologists have devoted enormous attention to this question: what should ha... more In recent years, epistemologists have devoted enormous attention to this question: what should happen when two epistemic peers disagree about the truth-value of some proposition? Some have argued that that in all such cases, both parties are rationally required to revise their position in some way. Others have maintained that, in at least some cases, neither party is rationally required to revise her position. In this paper, I examine a provocative and under-appreciated argument for the latter view due to Elgin (in: Feldman and Warfield (eds) Disagreement, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 53–68, 2010; The Philosopher’s Magazine, fourth quarter, pp 77–82, 2012; True enough, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2017; in: Johnson (ed) Voicing dissent: the ethics and epistemology of making disagreement public, Routledge, New York, pp 10–21, 2018). I defend it against a series of objections, and I then identify some fruitful ways in which her view could be developed further.
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Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, 2019
Consider this claim:
(1) If God exists, no gratuitous evil occurs.
This claim enjoys widespread... more Consider this claim:
(1) If God exists, no gratuitous evil occurs.
This claim enjoys widespread assent in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. It could be harnessed into an argument for pro-theism: it certainly looks like a reason for thinking that God’s existence would make the world better than it would otherwise be, at least if there is an appropriate causal connection between the antecedent and the consequent. But (1) is also the first premise of a widely discussed argument for atheism that continues as follows:
(2) Gratuitous evil occurs.
Therefore,
(3) God does not exist.
In recent decades, much of the debate about this argument (and probabilistic variants of it) has concerned the claim expressed in premise (2). Critics of this claim have defended accounts of our epistemic circumstances and capacities according to which this premise cannot reasonably be asserted. This controversial position has become known as skeptical theism, and it has generated a large and very technical literature.
A few authors, however, have attempted to resist (1). One such strategy is developed in a series of important publications by William Hasker (1992, 2004b, 2008). If Hasker’s argument were to succeed, this would be an important result for the overall debate about whether God exists, since it would count against a prominent kind of argument for atheism. While Hasker does not explicitly consider the question of the axiological consequences of God’s existence, his argument, if sound, would also be an important result for this debate, since it would count against one line of apparent support for pro-theism.
In section 2, I discuss certain restrictions on God’s permission of evil in order to illuminate claim (1), and in section 3, I set out Hasker’s case against it. In section 4, I clarify an important point about Hasker’s argument: I show that it does not require Hasker to maintain that God’s plan for creation requires the actual occurrence of gratuitous evil. In section 5, I set out and evaluate four criticisms of Hasker’s argument. Finally, in an Appendix, I consider the merits of a successor argument for atheism – one that is compatible with Hasker’s view.
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Religions, 2018
Michael Almeida once told me that he thought we were just a couple of hours of conversation away ... more Michael Almeida once told me that he thought we were just a couple of hours of conversation away from reaching deep agreement about some important topics in the philosophy of religion pertaining to God, multiverses, and modality. This paper represents my attempt to move this conversation forward and to seek this common ground. Specifically, I respond to Almeida’s 2017 paper entitled “The Multiverse and Divine Creation, external link”. In the first four sections, I record my disagreement with him concerning some smaller matters. In Section 5, I try to persuade him that what he considers a ‘bug’ in the theistic multiverse is actually a feature—and a desirable one at that. In Section 6, I close by identifying some points at which our views seem to converge.
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Philosophy Compass, 2016
In contemporary analytic philosophy, the problem of evil refers to a family of arguments that att... more In contemporary analytic philosophy, the problem of evil refers to a family of arguments that attempt to show, by appeal to evil, that God does not (or probably does not) exist. Some very important arguments in this family focus on gratuitous evil. Most participants in the relevant discussions, including theists and atheists, agree that God is able to prevent all gratuitous evil, and that God would do so. On this view, of course, the occurrence of even a single instance of gratuitous evil falsifies theism. The most common response to such arguments attempts to cast doubt on the claim that gratuitous evil really occurs. The focus of these two survey papers will be a different response – one that has received less attention in the literature. This response attempts to show that God and gratuitous evil are compatible. If it succeeds, then the occurrence of gratuitous evil does not, after all, count against theism. In the prequel to this paper, I surveyed the literature surrounding the attempts by Michael Peterson and John Hick to execute this strategy. Here, I survey the attempts due to William Hasker, Peter van Inwagen, and Michael Almeida, respectively.
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Philosophy Compass, 2016
In contemporary analytic philosophy, the problem of evil refers to a family of arguments that att... more In contemporary analytic philosophy, the problem of evil refers to a family of arguments that attempt to show, by appeal to evil, that God does not (or probably does not) exist. Some very important arguments in this family focus on gratuitous evil. Most participants in the relevant discussions, including theists and atheists, agree that God is able to prevent all gratuitous evil and that God would do so. On this view, of course, the occurrence of even a single instance of gratuitous evil falsifies theism. The most common response to such arguments attempts to cast doubt on the claim that gratuitous evil really occurs. The focus of these two survey papers will be a different response – one that has received less attention in the literature. This response attempts to show that God and gratuitous evil are compatible. If it succeeds, then the occurrence of gratuitous evil does not, after all, count against theism. After introducing some key terms, I survey the literature surrounding the attempts by Michael Peterson and John Hick to execute this strategy. In a follow-up paper, I discuss the attempts of William Hasker, Peter van Inwagen, and Michael Almeida, respectively.
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Religious Studies, 2014
Defenders and critics of the evidential argument from evil typically agree that if theism is true... more Defenders and critics of the evidential argument from evil typically agree that if theism is true, no gratuitous evil occurs. But Peter van Inwagen has challenged this orthodoxy by urging that for all we know, given God’s goals, it is impossible for God to prevent all gratuitous evil, in which case God is not required do so. If van Inwagen is right, the evidential argument from evil fails. After setting out this striking and innovative move, I examine three responses found in the literature, and show that none of them defeats van Inwagen’s argument. I then offer a novel criticism: I show that van Inwagen implicitly relies on the claim that God can sensibly be thought to satisfice, and I argue that this is seriously under-motivated. Accordingly, van Inwagen’s objection to the evidential argument from evil is, at best, incomplete.
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Toronto Journal of Theology, 2014
This essay discusses two issues. The first concerns whether the “insider’s” or “outsider’s” persp... more This essay discusses two issues. The first concerns whether the “insider’s” or “outsider’s” perspective is more truth-conducive in the study of religion. I do not attempt to settle this very thorny question: I merely attempt to identify some aspects of what it might mean to be an insider with respect to one kind of investigation – the investigation into whether God exists. The second issue concerns how best to characterize certain philosophical positions on the axiology of ultimate reality. Here I argue that it can be useful to group together certain axiological positions under one heading, while leaving their details open to interpretation. For example, two philosophers might agree that God’s existence would – or does – make the world far better than it would otherwise be, even though they have incompatible notions of what constitutes ‘far’ and ‘better’. In my view, it makes sense to call both thinkers pro-theists, despite their differences. In discussing these issues, I engage the work of Myron A. Penner and Paul Moser, both of whom published replies to a paper of mine, external link in the most recent issue of the Toronto Journal of Theology.
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American Philosophical Quarterly, 2013
Three very prominent arguments for atheism are (1) the argument from sub-optimality, (2) the prob... more Three very prominent arguments for atheism are (1) the argument from sub-optimality, (2) the problem of no best world, and (3) the evidential argument from gratuitous evil. To date, it has not sufficiently been appreciated that several important criticisms of these arguments have all relied on a shared strategy. Although the details vary, the core of this strategy is to concede that God either cannot or need not achieve the best outcome in the relevant choice situation, but to insist that God must and can achieve an outcome that is good enough. In short, this strategy invokes divine satisficing in response to these arguments for atheism. (The widespread use of this strategy may have gone unnoticed because the appeal to divine satisficing is usually implicit.) In sections 1-3, the three arguments for atheism will be set out, and it will be shown that the relevant replies all employ this shared strategy. Section 4 will show that those who invoke divine satisficing have failed to establish that this is a coherent notion. Accordingly, these replies to three important arguments for atheism are, at present, incomplete.
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Toronto Journal of Theology, 2013
I’d like to thank the Canadian Theological Society for this invitation to speak. It is a double h... more I’d like to thank the Canadian Theological Society for this invitation to speak. It is a double honour to be this year’s Newman Lecturer. It is an honour to be associated with the name of Jay Newman, who made impressive and wide-ranging contributions to philosophy. Jay, as you perhaps know, was especially interested in the philosophy of culture, and I’m delighted that his legacy will ensure continued interaction between the cultures of academic philosophy and theology. It is also a great honour to follow in the footsteps of the eminent previous Newman lecturers: J.L. Schellenberg, Maurice Boutin, Robert Larmer, and William Sweet (who is here today). My talk today will be divided into three parts. First, I will say a little bit about contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, and its practitioners’ beliefs. Second, I will describe and briefly evaluate four recent meta-philosophical analyses of this subdiscipline. (That’s a fancy way of saying that I’m going to air a bit of dirty laundry.) These four analyses each identify problems with this subfield, and propose solutions. Finally, I will introduce a framework for a research program in the philosophy of religion that I think these authors should all welcome.
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2013
For many centuries, philosophers have debated this question: “Does God exist?” Surprisingly, they... more For many centuries, philosophers have debated this question: “Does God exist?” Surprisingly, they have paid rather less attention to this distinct – but also very important – question: “Would God’s existence be a good thing?” The latter is an axiological question about the difference in value that God’s existence would make (or does make) in the actual world. Perhaps the most natural position to take, whether or not one believes in God, is to hold that it would be a very good thing if such a being were to exist. After all, God is traditionally thought to be perfectly powerful and good, and it might seem obvious that such a being’s existence would make things better than they would otherwise be. But this judgment has been contested: some philosophers have held that God’s existence would make things worse, and that, on this basis, one can reasonably prefer God’s non-existence. We first distinguish a wide array of axiological positions concerning the value of God’s existence which might be held by theists, atheists, and agnostics alike. We next construe these positions as comparative judgments about the axiological status of various possible worlds. We then criticize an important recent attempt to show that God’s existence would make things worse, in various ways, than they would otherwise be.
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2013
In a recent paper in this journal, external link, Jason Megill (2011) offers an innovative meta-a... more In a recent paper in this journal, external link, Jason Megill (2011) offers an innovative meta-argument which deploys considerations about multiple universes in an effort to block all arguments from evil. In what follows, I contend that Megill has failed to establish a key premise in his metaargument. I also offer a rival account of the effect of multiverse models on the debate about evil.
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Book by Klaas Kraay
Edited Books by Klaas Kraay
Papers by Klaas Kraay
(1) If God exists, no gratuitous evil occurs.
This claim enjoys widespread assent in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. It could be harnessed into an argument for pro-theism: it certainly looks like a reason for thinking that God’s existence would make the world better than it would otherwise be, at least if there is an appropriate causal connection between the antecedent and the consequent. But (1) is also the first premise of a widely discussed argument for atheism that continues as follows:
(2) Gratuitous evil occurs.
Therefore,
(3) God does not exist.
In recent decades, much of the debate about this argument (and probabilistic variants of it) has concerned the claim expressed in premise (2). Critics of this claim have defended accounts of our epistemic circumstances and capacities according to which this premise cannot reasonably be asserted. This controversial position has become known as skeptical theism, and it has generated a large and very technical literature.
A few authors, however, have attempted to resist (1). One such strategy is developed in a series of important publications by William Hasker (1992, 2004b, 2008). If Hasker’s argument were to succeed, this would be an important result for the overall debate about whether God exists, since it would count against a prominent kind of argument for atheism. While Hasker does not explicitly consider the question of the axiological consequences of God’s existence, his argument, if sound, would also be an important result for this debate, since it would count against one line of apparent support for pro-theism.
In section 2, I discuss certain restrictions on God’s permission of evil in order to illuminate claim (1), and in section 3, I set out Hasker’s case against it. In section 4, I clarify an important point about Hasker’s argument: I show that it does not require Hasker to maintain that God’s plan for creation requires the actual occurrence of gratuitous evil. In section 5, I set out and evaluate four criticisms of Hasker’s argument. Finally, in an Appendix, I consider the merits of a successor argument for atheism – one that is compatible with Hasker’s view.
(1) If God exists, no gratuitous evil occurs.
This claim enjoys widespread assent in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. It could be harnessed into an argument for pro-theism: it certainly looks like a reason for thinking that God’s existence would make the world better than it would otherwise be, at least if there is an appropriate causal connection between the antecedent and the consequent. But (1) is also the first premise of a widely discussed argument for atheism that continues as follows:
(2) Gratuitous evil occurs.
Therefore,
(3) God does not exist.
In recent decades, much of the debate about this argument (and probabilistic variants of it) has concerned the claim expressed in premise (2). Critics of this claim have defended accounts of our epistemic circumstances and capacities according to which this premise cannot reasonably be asserted. This controversial position has become known as skeptical theism, and it has generated a large and very technical literature.
A few authors, however, have attempted to resist (1). One such strategy is developed in a series of important publications by William Hasker (1992, 2004b, 2008). If Hasker’s argument were to succeed, this would be an important result for the overall debate about whether God exists, since it would count against a prominent kind of argument for atheism. While Hasker does not explicitly consider the question of the axiological consequences of God’s existence, his argument, if sound, would also be an important result for this debate, since it would count against one line of apparent support for pro-theism.
In section 2, I discuss certain restrictions on God’s permission of evil in order to illuminate claim (1), and in section 3, I set out Hasker’s case against it. In section 4, I clarify an important point about Hasker’s argument: I show that it does not require Hasker to maintain that God’s plan for creation requires the actual occurrence of gratuitous evil. In section 5, I set out and evaluate four criticisms of Hasker’s argument. Finally, in an Appendix, I consider the merits of a successor argument for atheism – one that is compatible with Hasker’s view.
The phrase “axiology of theism” can be misleading in two respects, and so some preliminary clarifications are needed. First, since “theism” is sometimes taken to mean “belief in God”, the phrase “axiology of theism” can prompt the thought that the chief task here is to evaluate the (dis)value or (dis)utility of belief in God, or perhaps of some individual or society engaging in religious practices oriented towards God. While these are important projects in their own right, this literature does not concern them. Instead, the central goal is to attempt to understand the axiological import of God’s existence, or non-existence, for the world and its inhabitants. Second, while most of the discussion has indeed been about this issue, an important subsidiary thread has considered what sorts of preferences can be rational with respect to God’s existence or nonexistence. As we will see, one point of dispute has been whether preferences must track axiological judgments in order to be rational.
In section 1, I attempt to clarify the central axiological question. In section 2, I distinguish a range of positions that might be held on this issue. In section 3, I set out some considerations favouring each of the main positions. In section 4, I consider some connections between the debate about the axiological consequences of God’s existence and the debate about whether God exists. In section 5, I turn to the debate about rational preferences concerning God’s existence or non-existence. Finally, in section 6, I summarize the contributions to this volume and draw key connections between them.
In one area within the philosophy of religion (the debate concerning the “fine-tuning” argument), scientific multiverse theories are widely held to be hostile to theism. This is because such theories appear to account for the relevant data – the biophilic parameters of the universe we inhabit – without appeal to an intelligent designer. Yet, in recent years, several philosophers2 and one physicist3 have offered reasons for thinking that if theism is true, the actual world comprises (or probably comprises) many universes. I first set out some requirements – both scientific and otherwise – for such a theory. I then survey some problems such theories are held to face, and some prospects they are thought to have. Finally, I examine arguments both for and against the claim that multiverse theories can help theists respond to the problem of evil. I conclude that such theories advantage neither the theist or the atheist in the debate about evil: they merely require reframing arguments from evil.