Paper 2016/566
Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments (and More) in 3 Rounds
Michele Ciampi, Rafail Ostrovsky, Luisa Siniscalchi, and Ivan Visconti
Abstract
The round complexity of commitment schemes secure against man-in-the-middle attacks has been the focus of extensive research for about 25 years. The recent breakthrough of Goyal, Pandey and Richelson [STOC 2016] showed that 3 rounds are sufficient for (one-left, one-right) non-malleable commitments. This result matches a lower bound of [Pas13]. The state of affairs leaves still open the intriguing problem of constructing 3-round concurrent non-malleable commitment schemes. In this paper we solve the above open problem by showing how to transform any 3-round (one-left one-right) non-malleable commitment scheme (with some extractability property) in a 3-round concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme. Our transform makes use of complexity leveraging and when instantiated with the construction of [GPR16] gives a 3-round concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme from one-way permutations secure w.r.t. subexponential-time adversaries. We also show how our 3-round concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme can be used for 3-round arguments of knowledge and in turn for 3-round identification schemes secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in CRYPTO 2016
- Keywords
- non-malleabilitycommitmentsPoKsidentification schemes.
- Contact author(s)
- mciampi @ unisa it
- History
- 2016-06-03: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/566
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/566,
author = {Michele Ciampi and Rafail Ostrovsky and Luisa Siniscalchi and Ivan Visconti},
title = {Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments (and More) in 3 Rounds},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/566},
year = {2016},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/566}
}