Paper 2015/142
Multi-Client Verifiable Computation with Stronger Security Guarantees
S. Dov Gordon, Jonathan Katz, Feng-Hao Liu, Elaine Shi, and Hong-Sheng Zhou
Abstract
Choi et al. (TCC 2013) introduced the notion of multi-client verifiable computation (MVC) in which a set of clients outsource to an untrusted server the computation of a function f over their collective inputs in a sequence of time periods. In that work, the authors defined and realized multi-client verifiable computation satisfying soundness against a malicious server and privacy against the semi-honest corruption of a single client. Very recently, Goldwasser et al. (Eurocrypt 2014) provided an alternative solution relying on multi-input functional encryption. Here we conduct a systematic study of MVC, with the goal of satisfying stronger security requirements. We begin by introducing a simulation-based notion of security that provides a unified way of defining soundness and privacy, and automatically captures several attacks not addressed in previous work. We then explore the feasibility of achieving this notion of security. Assuming no collusion between the server and the clients, we demonstrate a protocol for multi-client verifiable computation that achieves strong security in several respects. When server-client collusion is possible, we show (somewhat surprisingly) that simulation-based security cannot be achieved in general, even assuming semi-honest behavior.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in TCC 2015
- Keywords
- Verifiable ComputationAttribute-based EncrpytionFunctional Encryption
- Contact author(s)
- fenghao @ cs umd edu
- History
- 2015-02-27: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/142
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/142,
author = {S. Dov Gordon and Jonathan Katz and Feng-Hao Liu and Elaine Shi and Hong-Sheng Zhou},
title = {Multi-Client Verifiable Computation with Stronger Security Guarantees},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/142},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/142}
}