The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting

Rebecca Morton, Marco Piovesan and Jean-Robert Tyran

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a dark side, that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters are biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not de-bias voters.

Keywords: Condorcet Jury Theorem; information aggregation; majority voting; social information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D02 D03 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2013209

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