Awards as signals

Bruno Frey and Susanne Neckermann

No 513, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: Awards are widespread in all countries and are prevalent both in the public sphere and in the private sector. This paper argues, and empirically supports, that awards serve public functions and economists should take them seriously. Using a unique cross-country data set, we suggest that awards serve as signals. Awards are more prevalent the more difficult the position and status of an individual is to observe due to an anonymous and globalized setting.

Keywords: Awards; Signals; Status; Anonymity; Globalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 D63 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta and nep-ltv
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Awards as Signals (2010)
Working Paper: Awards As Signals (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:iewwpx:513

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