Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation and Coalition Governments: A Simulation and Laboratory Experiment

Michael F. Meffert () and Thomas Gschwend ()
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Michael F. Meffert: Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Postal: L 13, 15, D-68131 Mannheim

No 07-55, Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications from Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim

Abstract: The theory of strategic voting has been tested in experiments for elections in single member districts with three candidates or parties. It is unclear whether it can explain strategic voting behavior in a fairly common type of political system, multi-party systems with proportional representation, minimum vote thresholds, and coalition governments. In this paper, we develop a (non-formal) strategic voting game and show in a simulation that the model produces election scenarios and outcomes with desirable characteristics. We then test the decision-theoretic model in a laboratory experiment. Participants with a purely instrumental (financial) motivation voted in a series of 25 independent elections. The availability of polls and coalition signals by parties was manipulated. The results show that voters are frequently able to make optimal or strategic vote decisions, but that voters also rely on simple decision heuristics and are highly susceptible to coalition signals by parties.

Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2007-07-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cmp, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pol
Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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Working Paper: Strategic voting under proportional representation and coalition governments: a simulation and laboratory experiment (2007)
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