LEARNING TO PLAY APPROXIMATE NASH EQUILIBRIA IN GAMES WITH MANY PLAYERS

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under which play evolves to an imitation equilibrium ; convergence is conditional on the network of social interaction. We then illustrate, through example, how imitation and innovation can complement each other; in particular, we demonstrate how imitation can help a population to learn to play a Nash equilibrium where more rational methods do not. This leads to our main result in which we provide a general class of large game for which the imitation with innovation dynamic almost surely converges to an approximate Nash, imitation equilibrium.

Keywords: imitation; best reply; convergence; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp671.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Learning to Play Approximate Nash Equilibria in Games with Many Players (2004)
Working Paper: Learning to play approximate Nash equilibria in games with many players (2003)
Working Paper: Learning to play approximate Nash equilibria in games with many players (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:671

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