Corruption and staff expenditures in the U.S. Congress

Richard Boylan ()

Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Staff expenditures in the U.S. Congress increased exponentially from 1940 to 1980, but have remained roughly constant since. A theoretical model of Congressional expenditures, bureaucratic oversight, and congressional ethics is developed to understand historical data. Such a model allows one to define and test a measure of the fraction of Congress that maximizes material rewards (vs. intrinsic rewards of being in office).

Keywords: lobbying; corruption; political-economy; bureaucracy; oversight (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1998-04-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
Note: Type of Document - Tex; prepared on Sparc ; to print on PostScript; pages: 24 ; figures: included
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9804002

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