External monitoring and returns to hedge fund activist campaigns

Ryan Flugum and Matthew E. Souther

Review of Financial Economics, 2020, vol. 38, issue 1, 97-140

Abstract: Firms targeted by hedge fund activists experience significantly higher returns when there are fewer external monitors in place at the target firm. Using analyst coverage and institutional ownership as measures of external monitoring presence, we find that low‐monitored activist targets experience abnormal returns 17.52% above that of high‐monitored targets in the 2‐year period following the initial campaign start date. The significant effect of external monitoring remains after controlling for target firm and activist characteristics. We also document improved operating performance and an increased monitoring presence at low‐monitored target firms across the same 2‐year period, consistent with the observed market performance.

Date: 2020
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https://doi.org/10.1002/rfe.1071

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:revfec:v:38:y:2020:i:1:p:97-140

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