The political economy of targeted safety netsNo 31498, Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes from The World Bank Abstract: This paper is the written version of a lecture that draws principally on research on safety nets and operational experience with the implementation of safety nets, drawing heavily on the crisis of safety net programs in Indonesia from 1998 to 2000. As such it provides more views than reviews of the literature on the principal issues in the political economy of targeted safety net programs. The text is followed by a Q&A that clarifies views put perhaps too starkly in the text. Five major issues are reviewed. First, the implications of some simple models of electoral politics which make the budget allocated to programs endogenous to their targeting design highlight the dangers in ignoring political economy. Second, the political economy of safety net versus safety rope programs is reviewed. Third, some of the literature on the perception of fairness of the targeting criteria is reviewed. Fourth, the issue of local versus central targeting of programs is discussed. Fifth, the political economy of program implementation that considers the fit between program targeting and the organizational culture of the implementing organization is considered. Keywords: Safety Nets and Transfers; Services&Transfers to Poor; Rural Poverty Reduction; Poverty Impact Evaluation; Poverty Monitoring&Analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:hdnspu:31498 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes from The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433. Contact information at EDIRC. |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.