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Shirking and Motivations in Firms: Survey Evidence on Worker Attitudes

Lanse Minkler ()

No 2002-40, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: In an extensive national survey, 82.7% of the respondents report that they are very likely to keep an agreement to work hard if they agreed to, even if it was almost impossible for their employer to monitor them. Based on mean responses, the rank order of motivations in descending importance is: moral, intrinsic, peer-pressure, and positive incentives. Respondents also report that fairness considerations are important and that they are especially likely to keep agreements to do a good job with honest employers. Logit analysis indicates that increases in moral and intrinsic motivations increase the likelihood of keeping agreements to provide effort. The evidence suggests that we need to re-examine a foundational assumption underlying the theory of the firm.

Keywords: Theory of firm; shirking; incentives; moral motivations; intrinsic motivations; fairness; attitudes. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2002-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-lab
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Shirking and motivations in firms: survey evidence on worker attitudes (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Shirking and Motivation in Firms: Survey Evidence on Worker Attitudes (2002) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2002-40

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