The implications of “zeroing” for enforcement of US antidumping laws

William Nye

Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 2009, vol. 12, issue 4, 263-271

Abstract: The United States enforces its antidumping laws differently from other countries. The United States, but not other countries, uses “zeroing” to determine whether imports are being sold in the US at less than “normal” value. Rather than simply comparing the “normal” value with the average sale price in the US, the US truncates the observations of US sales transactions, so that transactions at prices above “normal” value are counted as if they occurred at the “normal” value. This procedure, which has been challenged at least six times by the World Trade Organization, may cost the US $46–112 million/year.

Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1080/17487870903314641

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