Corruption and power in democracies

Francesco Giovannoni and Daniel Seidmann

Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, vol. 42, issue 3, 707-734

Abstract: We study the implications of Acton’s dictum that power corrupts when citizens vote (for three parties) and governments then form in a series of elections. In each election, parties have fixed tastes for graft, which affect negotiations to form a government if parliament hangs; but incumbency changes tastes across elections. Our model entails various plausible predictions about long-run patterns of government. Acton’s dictum results in possible government turnover, and in different predictions about possible government composition: for example, that the grand coalition may form. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Date: 2014
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Related works:
Working Paper: Corruption and Power in Democracies (2012)
Working Paper: Corruption and Power in Democracies (2008)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-013-0739-x

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