Bluff to peace: How economic dependence promotes peace despite increasing deception and uncertainty

Yuleng Zeng

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2020, vol. 37, issue 6, 633-654

Abstract: Trade–conflict studies have shown that economic dependence can promote peace by costly signaling resolve. However, with higher economic integration, targets also become more vulnerable to coercion and potential challengers are incentivized to bluff. In return, target states may resist more, raising the question of whether trade still promotes peace. I theorize that bluffing does not stoke conflict in this context because the bargaining environment allows states to inform and coerce simultaneously: the factor that renders a threat less credible also restrains states from further escalation. I test this theory’s implications with a structural estimation method and find supporting results.

Keywords: Costly signaling; structural estimation; trade and conflict; trade network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:37:y:2020:i:6:p:633-654

DOI: 10.1177/0738894219843659

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