Dynamic Incentives for Buy-Side Analysts

Rahul Deb, Mallesh M. Pai and Maher Said

Working Papers from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics

Abstract: We develop a dynamic adverse selection model where a career-concerned buy-side analyst advises a fund manager about investment decisions. The analyst's ability is privately known, as is any information she learns over time. The manager wants to elicit information to maximize fund performance while also identifying and retaining high-skill analysts. We characterize the optimal dynamic contract, show that it has several features supported by empirical evidence, and derive novel testable implications. The fund manager's optimal contract both maximizes the value of information and screens out low-skill analysts by incentivizing the analyst to always provide honest advice.

Keywords: buy-side analysts; career concerns; analyst recommendations; forecasting; dynamic mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 D86 G11 G14 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des, nep-hrm and nep-mic
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Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamic Incentives for Buy-Side Analysts (2022)
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