Student Loans and the Allocation of Graduate Jobs

Alessandro Cigno and Annalisa Luporini ()

Working Paper series from Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis

Abstract: In an economy where graduate jobs are allocated by tournament, and some of the potential participants cannot borrow against their expected future earnings, the government can increase efficiency and ex ante equity by redistributing wealth or, if that is not possible, by borrowing wholesale and lending to potential participants. Both policies replace some of the less able rich with some of the more able poor and bring education investments closer to their first-best levels.

Keywords: higher education; matching tournaments; credit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D82 H42 I22 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07
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http://www.rcea.org/RePEc/pdf/wp38_13.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Student loans and the allocation of graduate jobs (2019)
Journal Article: Student loans and the allocation of graduate jobs (2019)
Working Paper: Student Loans and the Allocation of Graduate Jobs (2015)
Working Paper: Student loans and the allocation of graduate jobs (2013)
Working Paper: Student loans and the allocation of graduate jobs (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rim:rimwps:38_13

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