Nash Bargaining, Credible Bargaining and Efficiency wages in a matching model for the US

Sophocles Mavroeidis and James Malcomson

No 776, 2011 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: This paper incorporates Nash bargaining, credible bargaining and efficiency wages as special cases of an over-arching model of wage determination in a matching model that is used to assess econometrically how well each fits US data. With Nash bargaining, estimates for worker bargaining power and the value of non-work activity are almost identical to those calibrated by Hagedorn and Manovskii (AER 2008). However, the over-identifying restrictions are overwhelmingly rejected statistically, as they are for credible bargaining. Efficiency wages fit the data better, with the over-identifying restrictions not rejected statistically, and result in a lower, more plausible estimated value of non-work activity.

Date: 2011
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Working Paper: Nash Bargaining, Credible Bargaining and Efficiency Wages in a Matching Model for the US (2010)
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