Monetary policy goals and central bank independence

M.A. Akhtar
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M.A. Akhtar: Federal Reserve Bank of New York

BNL Quarterly Review, 1995, vol. 48, issue 195, 423-439

Abstract: During recent years a strong body of academic literature has argued that central bank independence (CBI) is necessary in order to achieve and maintain low inflation. This appears to support the view of central bankers that they should have the autonomy to pursue policy objectives without being pressured by short-term political objectives. The treatment of policy goals and the issue of policymakers' inflationary bias within CBI models are reviewed.

Keywords: Decision-making; Models; Decision making; Evaluation; Monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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