Imposing Monotonicity Nonparametrically in First-Price Auctions
Daniel Henderson (),
John List,
Daniel Millimet (),
Christopher Parmeter and
Michael Price
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
Monotonicity of the equilibrium bidding strategy is a key property of structural auction models. Traditional nonparametric estimators provide a flexible means of uncovering salient features of auction data, but do not formally impose the monotonicity assumption that is inherent in the models during estimation. Here, we develop a nonparametric estimator which imposes the monotonicity assumption. We accomplish this by employing the constraint weighted bootstrapping theory developed in the statistics literature. The finite sample performance of our estimator is examined using simulated data, experimental data, as well as a naturally occurring data set composed of thousands of bids from Canadian timber auctions.
Keywords: Constrained Weighted Bootstrap; Bandwidth; Equilibrium Bidding Strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C12 C14 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-04-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ecm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8769/1/MPRA_paper_8769.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19538/4/MPRA_paper_19538.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:8769
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