False Advertising

Andrew Rhodes () and Chris M Wilson

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: There is widespread evidence that some firms use false advertising to overstate the value of their products. Using a model in which a policymaker is able to punish such false claims, we characterize a natural equilibrium in which false advertising actively influences rational buyers. We analyze the effects of policy under different welfare objectives and establish a set of demand and parameter conditions where policy optimally permits a positive level of false advertising. Further analysis considers some wider issues including the implications for product investment and industry self-regulation.

Keywords: Misleading Advertising; Product Quality; Pass-through; Self-Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 L15 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68869/1/MPRA_paper_68869.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: False advertising (2018)
Working Paper: False advertising (2018)
Working Paper: False Advertising (2017)
Working Paper: False Advertising (2017)
Working Paper: False Advertising (2017)
Working Paper: False Advertising (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:68869

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