Tax evasion as a determinant of corruption: a game-theoretical analysis

Olena Sokolovska and Dmytro Sokolovskyi ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider a static non-cooperative game theoretic model of tax evasion. Some concepts concerned with strategies of interaction between economic agents are formalized in order to determine further possible presence of corrupt practices.

Keywords: tax evasion; game theory; corruption; behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D73 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015, Revised 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-iue and nep-pub
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:66423

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