What Limits Indirect Appropriability?
Michael Waldman
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
One argument concerning copyright protection is that the returns to copyright protection are limited because of indirect appropriability, where indirect appropriability is the idea that original producers receive returns from copying because the buyers of original units are willing to pay more when they can sell copies. This paper argues that indirect appropriability is limited in most real world markets and explores in a series of theoretical models why this is the case.
Keywords: copyright; indirect appropriability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 K0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-02-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ipr and nep-pr~
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44690/1/MPRA_paper_44690.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Related works:
Chapter: What limits indirect appropriability? (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:44690
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