Equilibrium Market and Pricing Structures in Virtual Platform Duopoly

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We investigate the equilibrium market sturcture in virtual platform duopoly (auctions or other market forms) that are prevalent in internet settings. We take full account of the complexity of network effects in such markets and determine optimal pricing strategies. We invstigate the welfare implications of such strategies, look at the impact of non-exclusive services and at what happens in large markets.

Keywords: Two-sided Markets; Duopoly Pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-12-21, Revised 2007-04-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic, nep-mkt and nep-net
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:3239

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