Concesiones de plazo variable para la construcción y explotación de autopistas

Variable-term concessions for road construction and operation

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Private sector participation in infrastructure projects traditionally financed by governments (roads, airports, seaports) is increasing around the world. This paper describes how a toll road concession works. It discusses how the usual mechanism, based on a concession contract with a pre-determined fixed term, and a selection process of concessionaires through minimum-toll auctions, does not lead to optimal outcomes. In particular, it is shown how this type of mechanism in fact lies behind the frequent concession contract renegotiations observed in practice. A new mechanism is proposed, based on a flexible term concession, which is adjusted according to the actual traffic level using the road, and an auction with bids for total net revenue and maintenance costs. This new mechanism eliminates traffic risk from toll road concessions, and it guarantees an effective selection of the most efficient concessionaires.

Keywords: roads; highways; franchising; concessions; auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:12653

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