Political Contestability and Public Contracting

Marian Moszoro and Pablo Spiller

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Do public agents undertake socially inefficient activities to protect themselves? In politically contestable markets, part of the lack of flexibility in the design and implementation of the public procurement process reflects public agents' risk adaptations to limit the political hazards from opportunistic third parties---political opponents, competitors, and interest groups. Reduced flexibility limits the likelihood of opportunistic challenges, while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. We study this matter and provide a comprehensive theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions.

Keywords: Transaction Costs; Bureaucracy; Procurement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D73 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory 5.21(2019): pp. 945-966

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Journal Article: Political contestability and public contracting (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:102692

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