El Dilema de Condorcet - el Problema de la Votación por Mayoría Simple de Duncan Black - la Paradoja De Kenneth Arrow - y el Manejo de Agenda

Horacio Piffano

Department of Economics, Working Papers from Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata

Abstract: This paper reviews the familiar “dilemma of Condorcet”, dealing with the voting by simple majority problem, studied by Duncan Black and Kenneth Arrow, to highlight the importance of a discretionary manipulation of the political agenda in a representative democracy. The dilemma is used to explain the presidential election outcome of Argentina in 2003 and to warning the relevance of the enforcement of permanent rules of procedure in social decisions making, namely, respect for the Constitution and democratic institutions designed under its principles.

Keywords: Condorcet; voting paradox; agenda manipulation; public choice. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2009-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: El Dilema de Condorcet - el Problema de la Votación por Mayoría Simple de Duncan Black - la Paradoja De Kenneth Arrow - y el Manejo de Agenda (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lap:wpaper:076

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