The Economics

Abstract: This paper presents a model of conflict which allows belligerents to recruit both adults and children as soldiers. Warlords fight over the country's productive (i.e. non-military) output, and are aware of the tradeoff involved in recruitment: anyone who becomes a soldier cannot produce output. In equilibrium, child recruitment is determined by children's productivity relative to adults in both war and civilian production. The model's findings have implications for arms traffic control and bans on child labor.

Keywords: Child soldiers; civil war; small arms trade; child labor; comparative advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 J13 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0920

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